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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, the Journal staff undertakes to report the Court of Ap-
peals decisions of the previous term. This is the fourth such Review,
and, like its predecessors, it is directed primarily to Kentucky practi-
tioners and judges and to scholars interested in the details of state
law. Its purpose is to categorize, describe, analyze, and evaluate the
cases from the 1965-66 term. This Review also discusses certain
important cases from the 1964-65 term of the Court which were re-
ported too late for inclusion in last year's publication.
A survey of this type tends to become either a mere collection of
headnotes or an interminable series of loosely drawn essays. This
year, in attempting to solve the problem, we have discussed in detail
those decisions which seem significant and treated briefly those which
do not. Generally speaking, the more important cases are described
at the beginning of a section or subsection; the others, at the end or
in a footnote. When a decision called for extensive analysis, either
because of what the Court held or because of what it failed to hold,
we attempted to respond. Occasionally, a Kentucky decision has been
used as a springboard to topics of broad significance not essential to
an understanding of the case. For the most part, however, we have
confined ourselves to analyzing state law and making recommendations
for its improvement. Hopefully, some of the discussions will also sug-
gest useful approaches to attorneys faced with the task of persuading
the Court.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Administrative Agencies
1. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.-In some instances, a large
discretion may be vested in administrators issuing licenses, so that
considerations of the "human element" and of social policy may be
taken into acount for each applicant. Such is the situation for the
Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which has a wide dis-
cretion to either grant or deny licenses to otherwise qualified per-
sons.' As stated in the relevant statute, "a license that might be issued
under KRS 248.020 to 248.670 may be refused by a state administrator
for any reason which he, in the exercise of his sound discretion, may
deem sufficient."2
Two cases decided last term involved discretion in situations where
the Board had already established a quota for the number of licenses
necessary to serve a neighborhood and was requested to issue a new
license.3 Taken together, the cases seem to result in a rule that the
ABC Board may, but is not required to, reconsider the adequacy of
existing outlets in reaching its determination of whether to issue a
new license, even though the quota for the vicinity is not yet filled.
The first half of the rule-that the board may reconsider the
adequacy of existing outlets-was applied in Moberly v. Berry.4 There
the Court held that, even though the personal qualifications of the ap-
plicant had been established and the quota for licenses in the county
had not been filled, the ABC Board did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant a license, since existing outlets for the rural com-
munity were already adequate.
The second part of the rule-that the Board is not required to
reconsider the adequacy of existing outlets if the quota is unfilled-is
found in Southside Liquor, Inc. v. Moberly.5 There a quota had been
established for the number of licenses to be issued in the vicinity.
The Court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion when it
approved, without reconsidering the adequacy of existing outlets, an
application for a retail package liquor license, even though the new
location would be only 700 feet from its nearest competitor.
Although the ABC Board in its discretion may refuse to grant a
I Moberly v. Berry, 405 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1966); Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Bd. v. Woosley, 367 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1963).2 KRS § 243.450(2) (1942).
2 Moberly v. Berry, 405 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Ky. 1966); Alcoholic Beverage
Control Bd. v. Woosley, 367 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Ky. 1963).
4 405 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1966).
5396 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1965).
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license which will adversely affect the public interest, the refusal
must be supported by substantial evidence.7 In Moberly v. Thompson,8
therefore, the Court ruled there was no substantial evidence to sup-
port the Board's denial of an application for a liquor and beer license
one block from the location where the applicant had held similar
licenses for fourteen years. The testimony of a few non-drinkers that
they would feel unsafe or uncomfortable if the store were moved to
the new location was insufficient where a party adverse to the ap-
plicant testified that the neighborhood would not be harmed by the
move, and a veteran police officer testified that the applicant ran a
"very orderly tavern...-. Additionally, the proposed area was com-
mercial, parking facilities were to be improved, and the distance be-
tween present and proposed locations was slight. In allowing the
change of location, the Court thus evinced its concern with the
quantity and quality of evidence needed to support an order of the
ABC Board refusing a license on the grounds of public interest.
In George v. Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.,10 an ap-
plicant for a liquor license was held to be so vitally interested in an
appeal from an order of the Board granting a license that he was
considered an indispensable party. An appeal to the circuit court by
the applicant's competitor which named only the Board and did not
join the applicant was, therefore, unavailing. The rule that a misjoinder
of parties is not ground for dismissal" did not apply, because the
post-Board proceedings here attacked were not an action, but an
appeal.
2. Department of Revenue.-In Commonwealth, Dep't of Revenue
v. Schmid,12 the Court laid down the rule that the Department of
Revenue is an indispensable party to an appeal from a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals if the Department of Revenue is not named as
a party. However, the rule was not applied in this case because of
the novelty of the statutes8 creating the Board.
Department of Revenue v. Derringer14 held that a county clerk
must register and license an automobile purchased at a non-judicial
lien sale upon presentation of an affidavit establishing the purchaser's
6 Moberly v. Bruner, 882 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1964).
7 Moberly v. Johnson, 876 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1964) (detrimental influence on
passing children too speculative).
8404 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1966).
9 Id. at 279.
10 403 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1966).
11 CR 21.
12 404 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1966).
13KRS §§ 181.810-.870 (1964).
14 399 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1966).
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status as lienholder, even though a bill of sale is required by statute.'5
The lienholder-purchaser had complied with the statutory procedure' 6
of notifying the owner of the automobile by registered mail and news-
paper advertisement of the impending sale. The Court ruled that as
long as the sale is commercially reasonable it will be allowed. The
terms of the sale do not appear in the opinion.
8. Department of Motor Transportation.-In Davis v. Lynn Moving
& Storage Co.,"7 the Court interpreted certain statutes' s as requiring
that an applicant for certification as a motor carrier must be found fit
for the proposed service. Overcoming evidence of unfitness will not
satisfy the statute. An unequivocal finding of the applicant's fitness for
the proposed service is a prerequisite to the approval or transfer of
certification as a motor carrier. Nor may the applicant be approved for
any probationary period before the approval becomes final; the ap-
proval must be absolute when given.
4. Board of Hairdressers and Cosmetologists.-Kentucky Bd. of
Hairdressers & Cosmetologists v. Stevens 9 held that a circuit court,
by ordering an administrative agency to conduct a hearing on an ap-
plication for a license, thereby made a judicial determination that the
agency had jurisdiction and that, after the agency had held a hearing,
its order could be attacked only by timely statutory administrative
appeal. Because the order of the circuit court (that the agency hold a
hearing) was final and not interlocutory, the applicant's appeal to the
circuit court failed because it was not made within the prescribed
thirty days for an appeal from an order of the Board.20
5. Interstate Commerce Commission.-In Pinsly v. Thompson2'
the transfer of the ownership of a railroad had previously been
authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the condition
that subsequent disputes would be subject to arbitration. When a dis-
pute arose the railroad refused to arbitrate on the ground that the
dispute in no way resulted from the transfer. Because there is no
statutory administrative appeal available to a petitioner seeking arbi-
tration, as opposed to damages, the Court held that the action could
be brought directly into our courts under the Declaratory Judgment
Act22 to protect the right acquired under the order of the ICC. The
15IKRS § 376.275 (1962).
13KRS § 376.280 (1962).
17 894 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1965).
18KRS §§ 281.630(4), 281.630(6) (1950).
19 393 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1965).
20 KRS § 317.520(3) (1960).
197 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1965).
22yKtS §§ 418.040-.090 (1942).
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provision of the Interstate Commerce Act2 3 which confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the federal courts was not applicable, since there was
no claim that the Interstate Commerce Act had been violated.
1. Delegation of Powers.-In order to preserve Ashland's junior
B. Schools
college program, the Court last term upheld a contract between a
local school board and the University of Kentucky.24 The board had
transferred presently-held property and had placed title to newly
acquired property in a non-profit, no-capital stock corporation from
which it leased the property. It had then contracted with the state
university for the operation of the school, which the board financed
with revenue from a special tax which had already been approved by
the voters in accordance with the constitution 25 Because the board
could withdraw from the contract if its responsibilities and obligations
were not met, it did not unlawfully delegate or surrender its power
to either the corporation or the university.
The Court seemed quite concerned with the result to be reached
in the case. But for the device upheld, the continuation of Ashlands
junior college would have been doubtful. And, said the Court, "It
seems plain that the purpose of the special tax was to assure a junior
college facility for the people of the Ashland community."
20
2. Illegal Sales-Conflict of Interest.-The prohibition of sales to
a school board by a member of the board is strictly enforced. A board
member who violated the statute2 7 prohibiting sales to the school
board by board members was held in Commonwealth ex rel. Matthews
v. Coatney28 to have vacated his office by the violation. Neither ill
will toward the defendant board member by the school superintendent
who initiated the suit, nor failure to show that the board member did
not act in good faith, mitigated the violation.
3. Term of Employment of School Superintendents.-In Board of
Educ. of Pendleton County v. Gulick29 the Court held that a term of
employment for a school superintendent, once fixed, must be served
out by the superintendent or his successors. No contract which is to
become effective before the expiration of a term fixed by some previous
2349 U.S.C.A. § 5(2)(f)(1887).
2 4 Montague v. Board of Educ. of Ashland Independent School Dist., 402
S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1966).2 5 Ky. CONST. § 184.
26 402 S.W.2d at 97.
2 7KRS § 160.180(1)(e) (1942).
28 396 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1965).
29 398 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1966).
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contract will be valid. The rule, however, does not state that the
school board cannot contract with the superintendent for a period
extending beyond the presently existing term, admittedly a subtle
distinction.
In Wesley v. Board of Ed. of Nicholas County0 the statutory
provision 3' that a school superintendent may be removed only by the
concurrence of four members of his school board was held to con-
template a normal five-man board and mean eighty per cent of a school
board, regardless of the number of members. After the decision, KRS
160.850 was amended to read "four-fifths of the membership of a
board" rather than "four members."
4. Use of Tax Levy.-The Court refused in Earle v. Harrison
County Bd. of Educ.32 to enforce campaign promises. It held that the
school board was not bound by the passage of a special tax levy to
carry out any proposal that was not specifically stated on the ballot,
campaign promises notwithstanding.
C. Counties
In Garner v. Harris 3 two questions were raised in relation to a
reapportionment which reduced the number of the county's magisterial
districts from eight to five. On the first question, that of the sufficiency
of notice to the public, the posting of the notice of application for
reapportionment on postal cards at eye level in places the public was
accustomed to pass was considered sufficient. As the Court noted,
"certainly the public got the news as evidenced by the prompt filing
of exceptions ...and persistent opposition in the courts."34 On the
second question, that of the propriety of the reapportionment, it held
that, despite numerous procedural errors, the county court did not
abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily in reapportioning the districts,
because there was a reduction in the difference in population between
the largest and smallest districts from 6,038 to 474.
D. Zoning3 5
In Hobbs v. Markey,36 a landowner sought to change his com-
mercial greenhouse to a filling station. A horse farm across the road
30403 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1966).
31 KRS § 160.350 (1950).
32404 S.W.2d 455 (Ky. 1966).
33 394 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1965).
34 Id. at 467.
35 The Journal appreciates the assistance of Mr. Chester Care in the prepara-
tion of this section. Mr. Care, a second year student at the College of Law. is
a research assistant for the Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky,
(Continued on next page)
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was sufficiently proximate to support a complaint without proof of
devaluation of the farm. After the board of adjustment had allowed the
change, the owner of the horse farm appealed to the circuit court.
While the action was pending in the circuit court, the relevant zoning
statute was amended. The circuit court decided the case under the
amended statute, and the proposed change from a commercial green-
house to a filling station was not allowed. The Court of Appeals
then affirmed. In the most significant part of the opinion, the Court
recognized the legal theory, already established in some jurisdictions,37
that a change in statutory law or, it may be assumed, a local ordinance,
may defeat an appeal and that the amended statute will be controlling
in such cases. It is sometimes assumed that the mere filing of an appeal
establishes or preserves some vested right. Obviously, this is not true.
The Court must consider an appeal on the basis of the ordinance or
statute existing at the time of the hearing. The Court held that the
expenditure of time and money in connection with the application or
appeal is not sufficient to create a vested right. This rule will control
future administrative appeals where the controlling ordinance or
statute has been amended after the filing of the appeal in such manner
as to remove the appeal from the Board's jurisdiction. An example
might be a request for a special use where the special use has been
removed from the ordinance after the filing of the request but prior to
the hearing.
Additionally, Hobbs held that a qualified complainant is not neces-
sarily estopped from filing a valid protest with respect to a noncon-
forming use merely because he has failed to protest earlier and has
permitted the use to continue for a substantial period. This would not
be true in the case of a zoning map amendment or variance, where
time limits for the taking of an appeal are established by statute.3 8
In Blancett v. Montgomery39 a zoning ordinance was held a valid
exercise of the police power. In this question of first impression, the
Court upheld a city ordinance prohibiting drilling for oil in an area
zoned residential.40 In a sense, such an ordinance is much more
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
a planning consultant, an Associate Member of the American Institute of
Planners, and a former Director of Planning Services, City-County Planning Com-
mission, Lexington, Kentucky.
36 898 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1966).
37 Attorney Gen. v. Inhabitants of Town of Dover, 827 Mass. 601, 100
N.E.2d 1 (1951); Lacey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Hamilton Township,
Mercer County, 4 N.J. Super. 422, 67 A.2d 466 (1949).3 8KRS § 100.261 (1966).
39 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1966).4 0 Blancett v. Montgomery also discussed, infra, See. XVII, Property, text
at note 34.
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restrictive than ordinary prohibitions of business use of property in a
residential area because the particular drilling operation could be car-
ried on nowhere else. Still, because the ordinance is a valid exercise of
the police power, the property was held not to have been taken with-
out due process of law, and the landowner was prevented from re-
moving natural resources from his land. The principle is not a new
one,41 and the Court applies it in order to allow cities to protect
themselves from industry which they do not want to tolerate. The rule
is not that oil and gas cannot be produced within a city, but only that
a city, if it chooses, may restrict such production by zoning ordinances,
just as it may restrict other types of activity. Although the Director of
Oil and Gas had issued a permit for exploration for oil and gas on the
plaintiff's property, the Director's statutory authority42 did not pre-
empt the municipal power to regulate oil and gas activities within
their city limits.
Property zoned by a city-county zoning board was held in Farley
v. DeMuth43 to have become unzoned when annexed by the city be-
cause the zoning plan of the city-county zoning board was effective
only in unincorporated areas. Once the property was annexed by the
city, it could be zoned only by the city. The Court also held that the
city, which zoned the annexed property as residential except for an
eight and one-half acre tract which it zoned as commercial to allow a
shopping center, did not "spot-zone" the eight and one-half acre tract.
The shopping center was beneficial to the community as a whole. The
Court has previously held, regarding a question of spot zoning, that
the zoning ordinance will be upheld if reasonable minds could differ
as to whether the ordinance has a substantial relation to public
health, morals, safety, or general welfare.44 Spot zoning creates for a
small area "a particular zoning classification differing from that of the
surrounding property. '[S]pot zoning' is invalid where the ordinance
does not form a part of a comprehensive plan of zoning or is for mere
private gain as distinguished from the good of the common welfare."45
Thus, it seems that access to shopping facilities is a matter of public
welfare and an appropriate object of the police power. The reason
for this is that a shopping center, which usually consists of from five
to twenty-five acres, is a more or less "self-contained" land use or land
use unit. Therefore, it may exist in almost any reasonable location,
41 Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.
1931).
42 KRS § 353.500 (1960).
43 399 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1965).44 Luetenmayer v. Mathis, 333 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Ky. 1960).45 Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687, 689 (1951).
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without constituting spot zoning. The fact that it lies at the inter-
section of two major thoroughfares, as in this case, is not controlling,
and a planned shopping center can be just as valid when located in
the center of a residential neighborhood, depending on the circum-
stances. 40 Such a shopping center can be "buffered" by more re-
strictive districts, such as an apartment district or open space, in-
cluded within the same tract of land; it is also possible to include with-
in this type of area certain design elements, such as walls, fences,
and screen plantings, which will make such a use more acceptable or
less detrimental to adjacent properties. In Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak,47
there is a relatively brief discussion of the spot zoning question as it
relates to shopping centers. Suffice it to say, however, that now it
would be difficult at best to invalidate a rezoning for a shopping
center at such an intersection as involved here on the basis that it
constituted spot zoning.
In Franklin Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Simpson County Lumber
Co.,4 it was held that bricks, stored on property zoned as residential,
were a permitted non-conforming use which was not enlarged by the
storage of sawlogs on the property so long as the logs did not impede
the natural flow of air or obstruct the view. The basis issue was
whether the storage of logs was either an extension or a change in the
non-conforming use. Because both bricks and sawlogs are building
materials, there was neither.
In Franklin Co. v. Webster,49 the Court held that the authority of
the board of zoning adjustments and appeals is absolute; a city
ordinance cannot confer power upon the Capital Planning and
Zoning Commission to entertain an appeal or grant special zoning
permits.
Special or conditional uses are frequently contained within an
ordinance and are generally considered to be a "use by right," rather
than a variance from the requirements of the ordinancer0 Not only
are these uses frequently and properly controlled in many com-
munities by the planning commission rather than by the board of ad-
justment, but there has actually been a recent movement to remove
such uses from the jurisdiction of boards, on the theory that a planning
commission is in a better position to consider the merit of the pro-
posed use. A prerequisite to the inclusion of such uses in the ordinance,
46YoyLEY, ZONING LAw AND PRACrICE § 8-2, at 361 (3d ed. 1965).
47340 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1960); See also YoKLEY, op. cit. supra note 46,
§§ 8-1 through 8-6, at 359-93.
48394 SAV.2d 593 (Ky. 1965).
49400 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1966).50 Yomy, op. cit. supra note 46, § 4-24, at 182.
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however, is the establishment of standards to guide the administrative
body involved in determining the appropriateness of the proposed
use.51 If anything, the Court should have found that the special use
here was invalid because there were no standards contained within
the ordinance which would guide the planning commission in making
a decision.
The Court held in Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. City of
Anchorage 52 that a law relating to the administration of sixth class
cities was amended by implication to the extent necessary for con-
sistency with later enactments. The Court said the Legislature was not
misapprised of the character of the bill and reaffirmed the policy that
disfavors repeals and amendments by implication, except when, as
here, legislative intent is clear. The point is now moot, for the zoning
authority of fifth and sixth class cities in Jefferson County has been
transferred to the fiscal court. 3
In Thomas v. Barnett 4 it was held that, because the county plan-
ning and zoning commission's approval of preliminary plats for
proposed industrial development was only a recommendation, a
property owner had no course for relief from the commission's ap-
proval of the plats. Nothing of significance had yet occurred.
51 Id. at 172-77.
52.393 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1965).
53 KRS § 100.137(2) (1966).
54397 S.V.2d 781 (Ky. 1966).
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I. AGENCY
The Court of Appeals made only one significant agency law deci-
sion during the 1965-66 term, Decker v. Glasscock Trucking Ser.,
Inc.' Glasscock (the contractor), under pressure to meet a contract
deadline, orally contracted with Traylor (the trucker) for the latter
to furnish him with trucks and drivers, payment to be made at a
stipulated tonnage-mileage rate. Under the terms of this agreement,
the trucker paid for the fuel and parts necessary for the maintenance
of his trucks and paid the drivers. The contractor told the trucker
what to haul, where to haul it, and what routes to follow, and the
contractor could terminate the arrangement at will. The plaintiff was
injured as a result of the negligent operation of a truck owned by the
trucker and driven by his employee. The plaintiff sought to hold the
contractor vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The issue was whether the truck driver was the servant of the defend-
ant (the contractor for the hauling of materials to a highway con-
struction site) or was the servant of the independent contractor, who
had leased trucks to the defendant. The Court of Appeals ordered a
judgment against the contractor on the basis of Tindall v. Perry,2 which
held, on facts slightly less favorable to the plaintiff, that the defendant
had such right of control over the conduct of the negligent person
that the two must be considered master and servant.
In the Glasscock and Tindall cases, the Court relied solely on the
traditional right of control test.3 However, in other cases involving this
issue,4 the Court has chosen to utilize the American Law Institute
tests which embodies ten factors6 to be weighed in light of the facts
to determine the relationship existing between the parties. Both the
1 397 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965).
2283 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1955).
3 SnAVEY, AGENCY § 84(c) (1964): "The right to control the physical move-
ment of the employee is the most important single element in most of the situa-
tions. This does not mean de facto control, which is usually absent, but the
right to control" See also, MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 413-15, 429 (4th ed. 1952).
4Locust Coal Co. v. Bennett, 325 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1959); Sam Home
Motor & Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955).
5 IESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 220 (1957).
6 Id. at § 220(2) provides:
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an inde-
pendent contractor, the following matters of fact, among other, are con-
sidered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
(Continued on next page)
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traditional test and the American Law Institute test are based on
determining the right of control manifested between the parties.
However, it is suggested that the multi-factor test is a better choice in
all cases, in that it serves to define the relationship with greater pre-
cision, thereby allowing the parties to determine their relationship
without the need for court action.
In the only other agency decision7 made in the 1965-66 term, the
Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision involving the loaned
servant doctrine because of an error in the manner of instructing the
jury.
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer
or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation-
ship of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
7R. E. Gaddie, Inc. v. Evans, 894 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1965).
IV. COMMERCIAL LAW
The Court decided six cases dealing with commercial law. Of
these, the operative facts of four arose after the effective date of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' Each Code case will be discussed in
some detail because of the relative scarcity of Kentucky case law on
the subject. Those cases not decided under the Code will be con-
sidered in light of their probable disposition under Code law.
In Martin v. Ben P. Eubank Lumber Co.,2 the Court was given an
opportunity to hold that U.C.C. 1-205, which provides that the course
of dealing between the parties to a contract and the usage of the trade
in which they are engaged may be used to supplement or qualify the
terms of their contract, does not entitle a contracting party to take a
"fishing expedition" through the other's business records. The fact in
issue was the existence or non-existence of a ten per cent discount in
the oral sales contract. The plaintiff filed interrogatories which sought
disclosure of the names of other persons to whom the defendant had
sold materials and the nature of the contracts of sale. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's refusal to require divulgence of this
information. The Court was convinced that "ten per cent" is a plain
term, one whose existence or non-existence in the oral agreement
could be determined without resort to the information sought in the
interrogatories.
No authority was cited to substantiate the Court's position, but the
decision seems entirely proper in light of the purpose3 of section 1-205
as it appears from the highly persuasive official comments. Although
no cases have been found which decide whether such information is
made the proper subject of interrogatories by this section, it would
seem that whether any particular allegation of fact comes within the
"usage of trade" or "course of dealing" scope of U.C.C. 1-205 must by
its very nature be determined largely by the facts of the particular
instance.
Another Code case, Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle,4 involved an auto-
mobile dealer's express warranty of a vehicle sold to the plaintiff. The
defendant, when he sold a truck to the plaintiff in 1960, expressly
warranted the truck "to be free from defects in material and workman-
ship under normal use and service," but the defendant's liability was
limited to replacing any part which should be returned to the dealer
I KRS §§ 355.1-101 through 355.10-102 (1958, effective July 1, 1960).
2 395 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1965).
3 See official comments to Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.] § 1-205, especially comments 4 and 5.
4402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966).
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within certain time and mileage limitations and which defendant's
examination should disclose to be defective. All other warranties
were expressly disclaimed. Within a month the seller brought the
truck back, complaining of a vibration. Defendant's employee ex-
amined the truck, then told plaintiff that nothing could be done, since
"it was just the nature of the truck." Twice more within the stated
duration of the warranty the plaintiff complained to the defendant,
and received the same response. Finally the plaintiff sued for breach
of the express warranty.
The Court of Appeals held the defendant liable under the war-
ranty despite the expiration of the time contained in the warranty
itself. The Court conceded that the defendant was within its right
in disclaiming5 all implied warranties and in limiting" its duties to
replacement of defective parts, but it saw the obvious injustice to the
purchaser in such situations.7 Looking at the case from the plaintiff's
standpoint, the Court perceived that the purchaser, having noticed a
vibration in the truck, returned it to the dealer, only to be brushed off
by the dealer's reply that nothing could be done about it. Under the
express warranty the purchaser had done all he could do except per-
haps to disassemble the vehicle himself, select the defective part(s),
and demand replacement by the seller. The Court was unwilling to
impose such a duty on the purchaser, at least under this particular
warranty.
Again, the decision seems just and sensible, although the Court
was without the guidance of precedent. Moreover, it is in accordance
with the general attitude of the Code" toward limitation of warranties
and with the position taken by other courts and writers.9 Perhaps the
Court strained the interpretation of the particular warranty in Cox,
r See U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-718, 2-719 and official comments. Read col-
lectively, these unquestionably establish that disclaimers and limitations, though
disfavorably viewed, are permissible provided the party benefited thereby has
dealt with the other in complete candor and good faith.6 Ibid.
7 Said the Court (at 431):
We do not accept the appellant's contention that the duty was on the
buyer to point out what parts were defective and to ask replacement of
those specifically. It would not be reasonable to put that duty on the
buyer. Furthermore, the contract clearly contemplated an "examin-
ation" by the seller. It is our opinion that the duty was on the seller,
Upon complaint being made of unsatisfactory operation of the truck, to
make an examination designed to disclose the cause. And we think that
when, as here, the seller gives the buyer the "brushoff", there has been
a breach of warranty. (Emphasis added.)
s See U.C.C. § 2-316 and comments.
9 See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964);
Armco Steel Corp. v. Ford Const. Co., 237 Ark. 272, 372 S.W.2d 630 (1963);
First Nat'l Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965); Jaeger,
Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 Norms DAmE LAW. 501 (1964).
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and perhaps the purchaser was less than vigilant in protecting himself,
but the inevitable inequality of opportunity to inspect motor vehicles
surely warrants imposition of a strict burden of disclaimer on the
seller. Undoubtedly, the seller can still restrict his liability to any ex-
tent, provided the language of the warranty is sufficiently clear.10
In another case, the Court overlooked 1 an opportunity to clarify
its attitude toward waiver of defenses under the Code. Morgan v. John
Deere Co. of Indianapolisl2 held that the purchaser under a conditional
sales contract who agreed to "settle all claims of any kind against sel-
ler directly with seller and if seller assigns" the note, not to use any
such claim as a defense against the assignee, was precluded from as-
serting against the assignee a claim that the machine sold to him was
defective. The Court believed its decision was controlled by Walter
I. Hieb Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp.13
Since the Court ruled summarily on the basis of Hieb, some discussion
of Hieb is warranted.
The Court there was faced with a waiver of defenses clause almost
identical to the one in Morgan. The clause was attacked as contrary
to public policy. The Court rejected this argument in a well-reasoned
opinion. Most importantly for our purposes, the Court discussed the
validity of the clause under the then enacted but as yet ineffective
Uniform Commercial Code. It was pointed out that U.C.C. 9-206
(1),14 with certain exceptions, authorizes such waiver of defense
clauses. Since the Court in Morgan solidly endorsed Hieb, the con-
clusion is inescapable that U.C.C. 9-206(1) will eventually be given
full effect by our Court.' 5
The remaining case directly involving the Code arose from a
10 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) clearly allows a seller to disclaim and/or limit implied
warranties of fitness and of merchantability if he complies with the disclaimer
provisions enunciated therein.
11 It is assumed that the transaction in the Morgan case occurred after the
Code became effective, although the opinion does not set out the date. If the
case did arise prior to the Code, a statement to that effect should have been
inserted in the opinion.12394 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
'3332 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1959).
14 Section 9-206(1) provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer that he will not
assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller is enforcible by an assignee.
15The official comments to U.C.C. § 9-206 make it clear that the drafters
of the Code, after considering the confusion in the case law on waiver of
defenses, intended to resolve the issue in favor of such waivers. It thus appears
that the Hieb decision through Morgan correctly anticipated the impact of the
Code. Kentucky law of waiver of defenses therefore seems to be settled. For a
similar construction of U.C.C. § 9-206 see First Natl Bank v. Husted, 57 I1. App.
2d 227, 205 N.E.2d 780 (1965).
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criminal prosecution for forgery.16 In Davis v. Commonwealth1 the
defendant was indebted to a bank through several separate loans. The
bank indicated a willingness to consolidate them into one loan, and
for this purpose it furnished defendant with a blank promissory note
form upon which the signatures of the defendant, his wife, and his
sureties were to be placed. Defendant returned the note completely
blank except for his signature, his wife's, and the allegedly forged
signature of the sureties. At a later date the remaining blanks were
filled in by a bank officer.
One of the points raised by the defendant was that since the note
as returned to the bank was incomplete as to date and amount, it had
no legal efficacy and, therefore, was not the proper subject of a forgery.
In rejecting this defense, the Court relied upon the provision in U.C.C.
3-115 (1)18 to the effect that an incomplete instrument has legal
efficacy after it is completed in accordance with authority given to
the one who actually completes it.
The propriety of the Davis decision as a criminal law case is not a
matter of concern here, but this construction of U.C.C. 3-115(1) is
questionable.19 The chief weakness of the decision is that it assumes
that the defendant authorized the bank official to complete the in-
strument.20 The comments to the section 2' indicate that some showing
of actual authority may be required. At any rate, the future applica-
bility of the decision in contexts other than a forgery situation is
speculative.22
16 KRS § 434.130 (1942).
17 399 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1966).
IS U.C.C. § 3-115(1) provides:
When a paper whose contents at the time of signing show that it is
intended to become an instrument is signed while still incomplete in
any necessary respect it cannot be enforced until completed, but when
it is completed in accordance with authority given it is effective as com-
pleted.
19 Consider this case: A forges the signature of B, a surety, and presents
the note to the bank, intending to procure a loan of $1,000. C, a bank officer,
mistakenly fills in the blank amount for $10,000. Has A "forged" a note for$1,000 or for $10,000? Under Davis, the implication would seem to be that he
has forged it for $10,000.
20 There can be a question of fact whether an instrument was completed as
authorized or if authority existed. In Golden Dawn Foods, Inc. v. Calsuta, 1
Ohio App. 2d 464, 205 N.E.2d 121 (1964), the eistence of such a fact ques-
tion precluded the maker from a directed verdict.
21 Comment 3 shows that the prior section of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, which had provided that the signer's delivery of an incomplete instrument
in order that the instrument might be completed operated as a prima facie
authority to complete it in any amount, was specifically rejected by the drafters
of the Code. Authorization in fact, however, is apparently still possible.2 2 There appeqrs to be a dearth of authority on this issue. For general
discussion of the Code provisions relating to liability of parties to instruments
see Leary, Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 48 Ky. L. J. 198 (1960).
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In a pre-U.C.C. case, Gateway Auto Auction, Inc. v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.,23 the Court was presented with the question of
whether an automobile auction company had the title to certain auto-
mobiles necessary to maintain a conversion action against a finance
company which repossessed them. It held in the negative. In Gate-
way, the registered owner of the cars was one Downs. An employee of
Downs delivered four cars to Gateway. Gateway drew a check payable
to Downs, which check was subsequently endorsed and honored.
Downs' employee executed separate bills of sale for each car, signing
the name of his employer and, below that, his own name. On the same
day one Calvin "bought" the cars from Gateway. Calvin gave Gate-
way his check, and Gateway gave Calvin two documents for each car.
One was a bill of sale in which Calvin's name had been inserted as
the direct vendee of Downs; the other was a title warranty warranting
that title was in Gateway and that it would pass to Calvin when his
check was honored at the drawee bank. Calvin took possession of the
cars and executed a floor plan mortgage to General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (hereinafter called G.M.A.C.). The next day Calvin in-
formed G.M.A.C. that he was "in difficulty," whereupon G.M.A.C. in-
tercepted the check it had made payable to him and took possession of
the cars. G.M.A.C. sold the cars to persons having no knowledge of
the transaction between Calvin and Gateway. A few days later
Calvin's check made payable to Gateway was dishonored. Gateway
sued G.M.A.C. for conversion of the automobiles. The trial court
granted summary judgment for G.M.A.C. on the ground that Gateway
never had title to the cars. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same
ground.
The apparent harshness of Gateway is superficial. The loss which
the auction company suffered is in reality no more than a consequence
of its failure to protect itself. The Court alluded to the fact that Gate-
way attempted to retain a lien on the automobiles but failed in its at-
tempt. In the last analysis, the Court believed the company can re-
move the risk of such loss only by effectively taking title to the vehicles.
No Code provision demands a result different from Gateway's.
Since title is essential to a conversion suit,24 the only protection for an
auction company is to comply with the necessary steps to take title to
its vehicles before it resells them.
The Court does not set forth clearly the arrangement between
G.M.A.C. and Calvin. Apparently the floor plan mortgage entailed
23 398 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1966).24 18 Am. Jtm. 2d Conversion § 53 (1965).
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some sort of floating lien 25 on Calvin's inventory. Whether G.M.A.C.
had perfected 26 a security interest in the automobiles is not stated.
Under the Code, G.M.A.C. would be required to file a financing
statement27 to protect its security interest against Gateway,28 assuming
Gateway had been vested with title before its conveyance to Calvin.
The other pre-U.C.C. case, Louisville Credit Men's Ass'n v. Motors
Investment Co.29 should also be considered in light of its probable
disposition under the Code. Motors Investment involved application
of the old Negotiable Instruments Law ° to two distinct legal issues.
The suit was principally directed against the ultimate payee of two
checks drawn by a decedent, but it was also against the executor of
his estate. The plaintiff was the assignee for the benefit of creditors of
two defunct companies upon whose accounts he had drawn in order to
repay funds which he had embezzled from two other close corpora-
tions. One of the checks under attack was a treasurer's check payable
to a fictitious payee and the other was a check payable to decedents
attorney. Both were eventually paid to one of the victimized corpora-
tions. The plaintiff attacked the effectiveness of both these instruments,
its theory being that they were ineffective to insulate from creditor's
claims the funds transferred. The Court, in upholding both the in-
struments, discussed each check separately. In the interest of clarity,
this discussion will follow that procedure.
The deceased purchased the treasurer's check with a check drawn
on his account in the same bank. It was drawn by a bank officer who
had no knowledge that the named payee was fictitious. Plaintiff dis-
puted the effectiveness of this instrument on two grounds. One of
these, that the corporation to which it was paid was not a holder in
due course, will be discussed below. The second ground was that the
5 See U.C.C. § 9-205. The official comment states that:
This article expressly validates the floating charge or lien on a shifting
stock. . . . It repeals ... cases which held such arrangements void ...
because the debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over the
collateral.
2 U.C.C. § 9-303.
27 U.C.C. § 9-402 prescribes the formal requirements of financing statements.
KRS § 355.9-402(1) deviates from the official version of the Code by imposing
slightly more stringent requirements of description.
28 U.C.C. § 9-802. Note that Kentucky chose alternative A for its sub-
section (3) (b). The practical effect of this selection is that there must be
compliance with both the filing requirements of the U.C.C. and the procedures
for notation of liens under the motor vehicle statutes requiring registration in the
counties. Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1961).
See Whiteside, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 KY. L. J. 3 (1962).
29 394 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1965).
30 KRS ch. 356 (1942), repealed by KRS ch. 355 (1958).
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check was not a negotiable instrument because of the bank officer's
ignorance of the fact that the named payee of the treasurer's check
was fictitious. Concerning the second ground, the Court of Appeals
held that it was the intention and, by implication, the knowledge, of
the person who caused the check to be drawn, rather than the intent
of the person who actually drew it, which governed applicability of
Section 9(3)31 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The treasurer's
check was ruled negotiable and hence effective to protect the funds
from creditors claiming through companies who had been drawn
upon to repay the original embezzlment.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not have a black-letter pro-
vision corresponding exactly to section 9(3). Section 3-405 omits the
term, "fictitious payee," but still recognizes the situation in its list of
circumstances under which an endorsement by a person in the name
of a named payee is effective.32
The official comments to section 3-405 show that the words "ficti-
tious or non-existing" were deleted from section 3-405 because the non-
existence of the payee was thought to be relevant only as it bears on
the intent of the drawer. Under the Code, a black-letter rule for dis-
position of the "first check" part of Motors Investment does not readily
present itself. Section 3-405 is aimed at the situation in which the
named payee, rather than the actual drawer, implements fraud on the
nominal drawer; 3-405(1)(c) is aimed at the typical "padded payroll"
case.33 3-405(1) (b ), 4 so the official comment indicates, must govern
in such a case. This subsection rejects the fictitious payee rule in
favor of a test of "whether the signer intends that he shall have no
interest in the instrument."35 Since the question of whose intent
governs in such a case will necessarily arise under 3-405(1) (b), the
decision will have continuing efficacy.
The plaintiff attacked the negotiability of the second check, as
31 Section 9(8) provides: "[The instrument is payable to bearer] when it is
payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable .. . However, this case involved an
added formal step not found in the customary fictitious payee situation, namely
the use of the embezzler's check to purchase the treasurer's check.
32 Note that under the Code an instrument so endorsed is negotiable by
reason of the endorsement, whereas under the Negotiable Instrument Law an
instrument knowingly made payable to a fictitious or nonexistent payee was a
bearer instrument. The reason for this deviation is set forth in the comments to
U.C.C. § 3-405.
33 See comment 4 to U.C.C. § 3-405.
34 U.C.C. § 3-405(1) (b) provides that an endorsement by any person in the
name of a named payee is effective "f . . . a person signing as or on behalf of a
maker or drawer intends the payee to have no interest in the instrument...35 See comment 8 to U.C.C., § 3-405,
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well as the first, on the basis of Sections 52(4)36 and 5637 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. That is, it asserted that the payee of
these checks was not a holder in due course, since it was a corpora-
tion whose sole owner had notice of such facts that its taking of the
check was an act of bad faith. The Court again rejected the plaintiffs
argument, this time by refusing to disturb the trial court's evidentiary
findings that the payee took the checks in good faith and without
notice of any defect.
Assuming arguendo that the Court had upheld the plaintiffs as-
sertion, the effect of the U.C.C. can be seen by examining section
3-302. Subsection (1) (c) of that section provides that a holder is not
a holder in due course if he holds with notice of any defense against,
or claim to, the instrument on the part of any person. Since "any
person" includes the named payee, it follows that the disposition of the
issue under the Code would be virtually the same as under the
Negotiable Instruments Law.3 8
30 Section 52(4) requires as one condition for a holder to be a holder in due
course "that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any in-
firmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."3 7 Section 56 provides:
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual kmowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted
to bad faith.38 Howard v. Biggs, 378 P.2d 306 (Okla. 1962); First Pa. Banking and
Trust Co. v. DeLise, 186 Pa. Super. 398, 142 A.2d 401 (1958).
19671
V. CONDEMNATION
During the last term, the Court of Appeals decided more than
80 cases in the area of eminent domain or, more precisely, condemna-
tion law. Basically attributable to highway extension programs,
suburban expansion, urban redevelopment, municipal growth and
public authority activities, this deluge of litigation has created many
problems in both procedural and substantive law for the Court. For
purposes of this review, the cases may be catalogued under four
distinct headings. First, the Court decided a large number of cases
that dealt solely with the problem of whether the verdict or award of
the lower court was excessive. Secondly, the Court was faced with a
number of cases that focused upon valuation problems, and thirdly,
the Court was called upon to decide a few cases that related to
purely procedural problems. The concluding part of this section en-
compasses the remaining miscellaneous cases.
A. The Excessive Verdict
Case law in condemnation proceedings has taken great strides in
relaxing the proof requirements for establishing market value, both
in terms of what constitutes market value and the method by which
it may be proved. The entire structure of eminent domain proceedings
is designed to provide the landowner-condemnee with just compensa-
tion, arrived at largely by the condemnee's evidence and not at all
subject to strict rules of admissibility.1 Such a structure partially
accounts for the widespread dissatisfaction (hardly confined to the
Commonwealth of Kentucky 2) with condemnation proceedings in
general and admissibility problems in particular. In Kentucky, as in
other jurisdictions, 3 the rules of evidence are liberal with respect to
proof of market value, and throughout all jurisdictions "the courts
have never adhered to the strict rules of evidence which ordinarily
obtain in other litigation."4
During the 1962-63 term, however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
decided the companion cases of Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
1 State v. Evans, 340 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1960); Rutland, Jr., Eminent Domain
Litigation in Texas, 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 168, 172 (1965).
2 See, e.g., General Assembly, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, H. R. CoN.
REs. 59 (Serial No. 64) 1959 Sess.
3 See Sackman, The Right to Condemn, 29 ALBxNY L. BEv. 177 (1965);
Winner, Rules of Evidence in Eminent Domain Cases, 13 Arm. L. REv. 10 (1958-
59). But see United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir.
1949).
4 United States v, 50.8 Acres of Land, 149 F. Supp. 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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v. Tyree, and Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sherrod,6 which
attempted to establish some procedural and evidentiary guidelines for
both trial judges and practicing attorneys. In expressing its dissatis-
faction with the excessive verdicts that ordinarily follow when sound
evidentiary practices are ignored, the Court enunciated principles
designed to obviate the repetition of excessive verdicts. In the Tyree
case, for example, the Court engaged in a lengthy but lucid discussion
of evidence with probative value vis-4-vis incompetent7 and irrelevant
evidence. 8 In strongly pointing out that objections to incompetent
and irrelevant evidence must be made at the trial to preserve the issues
for appeal, the Court, in effect, was chastising Commonwealth at-
torneys for their failure to make such objections. The Courts remarks
were well-grounded, for in the area of condemnation, where "evidence
makes the case, timely objections to inadmissible evidence are of the
essence."9 The initial significance of the Tyree case, then, was that,
where no objection is made to possible incompetent or irrelevant
testimony, the testimony is correctly admitted and must be deemed to
have probative value; the verdict can be set aside by the Court of
Appeals only if it is patently in excess of the evidence's strength to
sustain it.10 In the Sherrod case, the Court directed its attack against
a trial judge whose instructions to the jury became so confusing that
he himself was unable to understand them. In holding that the in-
structions were erroneous, the Court restated the law in Kentucky by
outlining the type of factual considerations the jury could or could
not evaluate. The apparent meaning of the Tyree and Sherrod cases
is that the Court was quite dissatisfied with the indifferent practices
of trial judges and Commonwealth attorneys, for the rules of evidence
were being ignored state-wide. Such practices were resulting in the
true measure of damages, viz., the fair market value before and
after the taking, being ignored and excessive verdicts being awarded."
r 365 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1963).
6 367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963).
7 365 S.W.2d at 478. As to incompetent evidence, the Court in effect held
that if no objection is made to incompetency, then the jury may hear the
testimony to the extent that it has probative value.
8365 S.W.2d at 477. As to irrelevant evidence, the Court, in effect, held
that if a witness on direct examination bases his valuation on irrelevant considera-
tions, the testimony may be subject to a motion to strike.
9 17 Rutland, supra note 1, at 169.10 865 S.W.2d at 476. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals
ruled against the Commonwealth in Tyree and thereby held that the evidence,
which had not been objected to at the trial, had sufficient probative value to
sustain the award. Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that the verdict was
ipso facto excessive.
11 There are basically three formulas for computing the true measure of
damages. The least attractive rule allows for consequential damages as part of
(Continued on next page)
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The 1965-66 term revealed that the Court is still dissatisfied. At-
torneys have continually failed to make timely objections to incompe-
tent and irrelevant testimony; trial judges have continually allowed
juries to consider matters violative of basic evidentiary rules; excessive
verdicts have continued to flood the docket of the Court of Appeals.
Awards that are below the highest estimate and thus not excessive,' 2
awards that are less than the jury could have rendered, 3 awards that
indicate an after taking value which is less than the estimate of any
witness, 14 and awards that are sound because they are not the result
of passion or disregard of the evidence 5 are relegated out of serious
consideration simply because they are far outnumbered by the awards
that are clearly excessive. In spite of Tyree and Sherrod, the trend in
the lower courts is toward the excessive verdict, a trend that the
Court of Appeals earlier noted with trepidation. The significant re-
sult of this practice is that the Court has taken control of the excessive
verdict by seizing upon the "palpably excessive" standard promulgated
in the Tyree case.
In the Tyree case the Court stated the "palpably excessive" test,
which had been adopted in a number of other jurisdictions,16 as fol-
lows:
If, however, the jury gives the evidence more weight and value than
the maxiamum it is entitled to, the appellate court has the power to set
aside the verdict either on the ground of palpable excessiveness or on
the ground that it is not sufficiently supported by the evidence.' 7
Because shabby evidentiary practices have continued to produce exces-
sive verdicts, the Court has been compelled to use Tyree and Sher-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the value of the part taken. This formula is sometimes called the "Damages to
the Remainder Included in the Value of the Part Taken" rule. The second ap-
proach, that is, the standard adopted by the Kentucky Court in the Sherrod
case, is the difference between the fair market value of the whole before the taking
and the fair market value of the remainder after the taking. The formula which
is accepted by the majority of jurisdictions, but which is less heralded than the
Kentucky standard, is the "Value of the Part Taken Plus Damages to the Remainder"
rule. See I ORGEL, VALUATiON UNDE ElINErr DomAn §§ 49-51 (1953). See,
e.g., Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Howard, 405 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1966).
12 Commonvealth, Dep't of Highways v. Cooper, 397 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 195).
13 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Phillips, 391 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1965).
14Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Shearmn, 399 S.W.2d 736 (Ky.
1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Thompson, 398 S.W.2d 496 (Ky.
1966).
15 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Snoddy, 397 S.W.2d 356 (Ky.
1965).
16 Central I1. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Scully, 17 Ill. App. 2d 348, 161 N.E.2d 304
(1959); Mackie v. Schultz, 370 Mich. 78, 120 N.W.2d 733 (1963); Grand
River Dam Authority v. Gray, 138 P.2d 100 (Okla. 1943); Kamerer v. Com-
monwealth, 364 Pa. 120, 70 A.2d 305 (1950); Lofgren v. Superior Court of
Kitsap County, 230 Pac. 156 (Wash. 1924).
-7 365 S.W.2d at 477.
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rod as levers to dislodge excessive awards. It is perhaps ironical
that the two cases which were designed to deemphasize the role of
the appellate court in condemnation proceedings by resolving evi-
dentiary and procedural problems have resulted in the appellate court's
taking a more active role.
In making its present role undeniably clear, the Court struck down
one award simply because it was "palpably excessive."' 8 In Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sheffer,19 moreover, the Court held
that an award for residential property was excessive when the
residence was not affected by the taking and emphasized its holding
by declaring that the award "shocks the judicial conscience." 20 Fur-
thermore, in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Allie,21 the Court
had to restate one of the most fundamental rules of condemnation law:
an award that exceeds the highest estimate of either party is ipso facto
excessive. In Allie the Court also held that damages may not be
broken down into categories of damages to the land taken and dam-
ages to the remainder.
The present effect of the Tyree and Sherrod cases, then, is not
upon the indifferent practices of trial judges and Commonwealth at-
torneys; rather, it is upon the function of the Court of Appeals as it
relates to the excessive verdict. The Court is now taking active con-
trol of condemnation awards. By seizing upon the "palpably excessive
label and determining whether or not the evidence is of sufficient pro-
bative value to support the verdict, the Court, in effect, is becoming a
jury of last resort. While this role is undeniably unfortunate, it will
probably continue until trial judges and practicing attorneys accept
and apply the rules of evidence that the highest court in the state has
set out. Until that time, the Court will be maneuvered into parading
a caravan of excessive awards that must be overturned merely because
they violate the rudimentary tenets of Tyree and Sherrod.22
18 Kentucky Util. Co. v. Bruner, 400 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1966).
19 399 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1966).
20 Id. at 710.
21391 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1965).22 For excessive awards cases during the term, see: Commonwealth, Dep't of
Highways v. Lovell, 405 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1966), Commonwealth, Dep't of High-
ways v. Frazier. 404 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Allen, 403 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Tabor, 402 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.Quisenberry, 402 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Creason, 402 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of H'ghways v.
Gibson, 401 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Hunt,399 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Wynn, 396
S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hayes, 394
S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ray, 392 S.W.2d
665 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Rose, 392 S.W.2d 443
(Continued on next page)
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On a few occasions, the Court deemed it unnecessary to disturb an
award that was reasonably supported by the evidence. In Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Barton,23 for example, the Court found
no violation of Tyree and Sherrod and upheld the award. In the
Barton line of cases, 24 the Court merely looked to see if the evidence
reasonably supported the verdict. With its application of the reasona-
bleness test, the Court is thus steering away, slightly, from controlling
altogether the excessive award. The Barton line is significant only be-
cause in these cases the Court found no procedural or evidentiary
violations. These were cases in which procedures were properly
taken, evidence was properly admitted, the jury properly weighed
the probative value, and a reasonable award was made. Query: Is
this reasonableness test any different from the "palpably excessive"
test? Are they not essentially the same standard that the Court applies
in reviewing the reasonableness of an award? If the fundamental pro-
cedural and evidentiary pattern is followed, most awards theoretically
will be reasonable, and there will be less reason for the Court to
operate as a "super-jury." It is when this pattern is not adhered to
that the Court must step in.
There is a slight indication, however, that the Court is stepping in
too frequently. In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Merriman,25
for example, a rather significant dissent was registered. The Court held
the award to be excessive, but the dissent pointed out that the frontage
of a lot has a higher value than the remainder and that the award was
not therefore "obviously excessive."26 Is the significance of this dissent
that there is some unrest regarding the Court's automatic interference
with the possibly excessive award? To properly treat this dissent, the
Review turns to a case of primary importance, a case in which the
dissenting Justice gained two members of the Court for his position
in Merriman.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. King,27 the condemnees
were awarded $3,000 for a residential strip (7 feet by 70.75 feet)
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Dearen, 392 S.W.2d 49 (Ky.
1965); Kentucky Util. Co. v. Jett, 392 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. Holbrook, 390 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1965). But see Com-
monwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Aylor, 399 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. 1966).
23 398 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1966).24 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 2.3 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Srygler, 403 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1966); Com-
monwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Riley, 402 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1966); Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ballard, 402 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1966); Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Armstrong, 400 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1966).
25 392 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. 1965).
26 Id. at 662.
27400 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1966).
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across the front of the land, taken from a lot containing 21,225 square
feet. The before value of the entire lot was fixed by the jury at $22,500.
The amount taken then represented 2.3% of the entire lot, yet the
amount of the verdict represented 13.3% of the $22,500. The only
improvement affected by the taking was a hedge at the front of the
lot. In reversing the decision of the lower court, the Court of Ap-
peals held that "the amount of the verdict is palpably excessive"28 and
cited the Tyree case as the controlling authority. The strong dissenting
opinion first urged that, in computing the amount of depreciation of
residential property caused by moving a street closer to the house, the
Court should have the greatest reluctance in substituting its opinion
for that of a jury. It also challenged the logic of comparing the square
footage of the strip taken with the remaining area. The dissent stands
for the propositions that (1) in cases where the street is moved closer
to the house, the award is "a matter of pure guesswork"29 for which
the jury's estimate is about as valid as the Court's and (2) the front
part of a lot may have higher value than the back. The significance of
the King dissent is clearly that three members of the Court have
decided that the "palpably excessive" test of Tyree and Sherrod cannot
be rigidly applied in all appeals which at first blush indicate excessive
verdicts. Secondly, and more importantly, the dissent is trying to
provide the court with further guidelines in the valuation of property
taken. At least three members of the Court, then, believe that it is
error for the Court to superimpose its judgment above the jury's in
matters that, narrowly, involve land taken from the front of a lot or
in matters that, broadly, involve "guesswork." In spite of the per-
suasiveness of this dissent, however, the evidentiary rules of Tyree
and Sherrod are law in Kentucky, and the "palpably excessive" test
remains the guide for their application.
The rules of evidence in condemnation proceedings have remained
so undefined and so liberal that many jurisdictions have condoned the
fact that the trial judge has a wide latitude in the exercise of his
discretion;30 and excessive verdicts have thereby abounded in most
of these jurisdictions. In Michigan, for example, construction of a
constitutional provision3' has pointed to the jury as the sole arbiter of
both law and fact, and reversal for errors in the procedure is not
granted by the appellate court unless the jury proceeds on a wrong
theory or basis to determine the question of necessity or damages, or
28 Id. at 519.
29 Ibid.
30 See State v. Evans, 340 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1960).
3 1 Micn. CoNsT. art. 13, § 2.
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unless something out of the ordinary occurs in the proceeding which
has obviously influenced the jury to a wrong conclusion.32 In Tyree
and Sherrod, however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals sought to define
and somewhat restrict the rules of evidence to avert an avalanche of
excessive verdicts. When the Court's evidentiary guidelines were
ignored, the Court unfortunately had to interfere and usurp the
function of the jury. Such states as Texas, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
North Carolina, Wisconsin and Kansas,a 2A to mention only a few,
have done by statute what they were unable to do by case law pre-
cedent. Perhaps the Kentucky Court has developed the law to the
point where legislative statement of the rules might be justified in the
interest of clarity and litigation elimination. At least one legal scholar
has looked upon the legislative role as essential, in stating as follows:
There has been very little legislative activity with respect to the rules
of evidence pertaining to condemnation cases. An exception to the
general rule was the Pennsylvania revision bill introduced in 1963. It at-
tempted to set forth in some detail the rules of evidence which fre-
quently are in issue in condemnation proceedings. The bill contained
rules with regard to jury view, with regard to qualifications of expert
valuation witnesses, and with regard to the permissible testimony of such
itnesses. 33
Another legal scholar has gone even further in his plea that the
legislature step in and overhaul the present condemnation structure:
Patching up the old system where it has worn thin is unlikely to produce
a mechanism capable of fulfilling our present needs. There should be a
complete overhauling of the procedure comparable to the great pro-
cedural reforms recently accomplished in many jurisdictions with respect
to other civil actions. The promulgation of Federal Rule 71A should
show the way.3 4
Although it is perhaps essential for the legislature to assist
the Kentucky Court in its struggle to hand down evidentiary and
procedural guidelines and to reduce the frequency of the excessive
verdict, such assistance will hardly produce an immediate or complete
solution. (For further discussion of the possible effects of codification,
see section B, infra.) In spite of statutory guidance, "opinion in land
damage cases is often the most conjectural, unreliable and lowest kind
of evidence ever allowed in a Court of Justice.. .."35
32 Ontonagon R.R. Co. v. Norton, 236 Mich. 187, 188, 210 N.W. 480, 481
(1926).32AHelstad, Recent Trends in Highway Condemnation Law, 1964 VAsH.
U.L.Q. 58.
33 Helstad, supra note 32 A at 70.34 Wasserman, Procedure in Eminent Domain, MEacEa L. REv. 245, 287
(1960).35 Crumine v. Washington County Housing Authority, 376 Pa. 234, 241,
101 A. 2d 676, 679 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
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The above suggestions are not to be read as relieving the Ken-
tucky Court of its responsibility to review all cases in which possible
excessive verdicts were rendered. Because of the unreliable nature of
the evidence in condemnation proceedings, the "palpably excessive"
test of Tyree and Sherrod will continue to be an effective means by
which the Court and interfere and strike down those excessive
verdicts in which the proper procedural and evidentiary guidelines
have not been adhered to. In the final analysis then, the "palpably
excessive" standard is not merely a chastisement of the trial judges
and Commonwealth attorneys; it is also the only way in which the
Court can check the unreasonable awards of the jury although the
proceedings may be otherwise proper. For this reason, the reasonable
test in the Barton line of cases and the "palpably excessive" test in
the Tyree and Sherrod case are essentially the same approach that
the Court adopts in reviewing the reasonableness of an award in light
of all the evidence whether properly or improperly admitted. Be-
cause of this fact a necessary step for the solution devolves upon the
trial judges and Commonwealth attorneys themselves who must lend
more attention to the opinions handed down by the Court of Appeals
and any statutory guidance that may be forthcoming. In the final
analysis, then, the significance of the excessive verdict problem is not
simply that the Commonwealth is overrun with indifferent attitudes
toward evidentiary and procedural practices in the area of condemna-
tion law; but, rather, that the docket of the Court of Appeals is
running over with evidentiary and procedural cases that should have
been properly treated by the lower courts.36
B. Valuation and the Admissibility of Evidence
The problems of valuation and admissibility of evidence are so
interwoven that it is presumptuous and foolhardy to attempt to sep-
arate the two. The following cases present the types of practices
that often lead to the excessive verdicts which were analyzed in
section A above; however, these cases are segregated from the above
section not only because they deal with problems that are peculiar on
their particular facts but also because they did not lead to "palpably
excessive verdicts.
The basic problem in the valuation of the before and after val-
36 It is suggested that the Kentucky Court of Appeals might invoke remittitur,
especially where the awards approach "the unconscionable." See 9A VRNoN,
Tx'As STATUTEs 74, n.19 (Supp. 1966).
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ue3 7 in aiming at just compensation 38 stems from the fact that there is
no universally accepted definition of market value. Courts tend to
overgeneralize, and it is such overgeneralization that, according to
one legal scholar, leads to many errors and misunderstandings be-
tween the trial and appellate courts:
Overgeneralization, of course, is a vice which results in many errors.
The principal source of error of the "market value" concept lies in the
too-literal application of the traditional definition of market value as the
amount of money which a purchaser willing, but not obligated, to buy
the property would pay to an owner, willing but not obligated, to sell it,
taking into consideration all uses to which the land is adapted and may,
in reason, be applied. This implies that whatever a willing seller and a
willing buyer would consider in fixing the price is entitled to considera-
tion in determing the just compensation. But this is not true in the literal
sense. There are many factors which, though they undoubtedly have
a real and actual impact upon value and, therefore, are considered by
real or actual buyers and sellers, are not legally cognizable and must,
therefore, be excluded from consideration. Perhaps the error does not
lie in the definition, but in a common misconception of the definition.
It has been held in New Jersey that buyers referred to in the definition
are purely hypothetical, not actual and existing purehasers. 3 9
While the Kentucky Court of Appeals, along with most of the other
courts, is laboring under the hypothetical willing buyer-willing seller
concept in the valuation process, an analysis of the following cases
clearly indicates that the Court has, more importantly, resolutely
adhered to the spirit of Mr. justice Holmes' unchallenged precept in
the valuation process: "The question is, what has the owner lost, not
what has the taker gained?"40
During the last term, the Court was faced with one case that
required a differentiation in the valuation of mineral rights and
surface. In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Chapman,41 the
condemnees were comprised of two sets of heirs, one owning the min-
eral rights and the other owning the surface. In holding that a
separation of mineral and surface value was warranted to avoid a mul-
tiplicity of suits, the Court distinguished the well-established case
of Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Gearheart,42 which broadly
held that there should be no such separation of mineral and surface
values. As the Court in Gearheart pointed out, there had been no sev-
37 See note 11, supra.
38 "Just compensation, as the term implies, is compensation that is just to the
public as well as to the owner of the property taken.' See Sackman, supra note
3, at 190.
39 Id. at 191.40 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
41391 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1965).
42 383 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1964).
[Vol. 55,
CouRT OF APPEAis -REvIEW
erance of the mineral rights, for a single individual owned both the
mineral rights and the surface. The interesting aspect of the Gear-
heart case, however, is the procedure the Court used in the valuation
of the property and the apportionment of the interests. There the
Court cited Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. F. Reisch & Bros.,43 in which
the jury made a valuation of the fair market value of the entire pro-
perty and then made the apportionment. In the Chapman case, on
the other hand, there is no indication that a separate evaluation of
the entire property was made. It seems that the Court allowed a
separate evaluation of the two interests to be substituted for the
evaluation of the fair market value of the entire property, a necessary
step in the Reisch case which the court in Chapman never made. The
procedure of the Gearheart case is correct, for if the fair market value
of the entire property is never made, the separate valuation of the two
interests may well exceed the fair market value of the entire property.
The apportionments in such a case would be a fortiori excessive.
Two interesting cases came before the Court concerning land use,
land change, and the admissibility of evidence. In Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. Rogers,44 a pre-Sherrod decision, the Court was
confronted with the primary problem of whether to consider the
values of both parcels of a tract of land that was devoted to two dif-
ferent uses when the taking did injury to only one of the parcels.
On the front of condemnee's land was a residence and a sausage plant
was to the rear. The Commonwealth took ten acres adjacent to and to
the read of the sausage plant, and the taking necessitated the removal
of various improvements used in conjunction with the plant. Con-
demnee's witnesses were allowed to testify that the operation of the
sausage plant would be seriously impaired as a result of the taking.
There was also evidence that in a subsequent sale of the land the
presence of the sausage plant would diminish the value of the
residence. The problem is one of first impression in Kentucky.45 In
reversing, the Court in Rogers held that whenever a landowner devotes
a tract of land to two different uses, the tract is to be treated as two
separate parcels, and as the taking affects only one of the parcels, only
the difference in value of that parcel (viz., the sausage plant area)
should be valued. In reasoning its way toward a new rule in Ken-
tucky,40 the Court is certainly on firm ground in finding that one can-
43247 ]M. App. 350, 93 N.E. 383 (1910).
44399 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966).4 5 But see Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Slucher, 371 S.W.2d 851(Ky. 1963).
40The rule apparently had its origin in Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S.
355 (1903).
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not recover for indirect injury to separate parcels of land which he
may own in the same neighborhood.4 7 The real problem here is to
determine what constitutes a single or separate parcel. The Court
was assuredly correct in finding that a sausage plant is a use al-
together separate from a residence. By divorcing the sausage plant
parcel from the residence, the landowner, in effect, is holding out his
land as displaying two separate activities. Thus damage to one does
not injure the other. To allow the landowner to claim both damage to
the sausage plant parcel and damage to the entire tracts residential
use would be a duplication of damages in that he would be receiving
damages for the land in relation to that for which it was used (i.e., the
sausage plant) and also for the use to which the land would have been
devoted had not the higher valued plant been situated upon it. The
rule of Rogers, incidentally, has counterparts in a majority of jurisdi-
ctions.48
In Chitwood v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways,49 the Court
found an altogether different problem of land use. On appeal the
condemnees argued among other things that it was error for the trial
Court to permit appraisal witnesses to consider the prospect of rezoning
in determining the after value. The evidence indicated that after the
construction of the new interstate highway the land adjacent to the
old highway would probably be rezoned for commercial use. The
Court held that it was permissible for appraisal witnesses to consider
the effect that a probable zone change would have on the fair market
value of the land although they could not testify as to what the pro-
perty would be worth in the event of such rezoning, for at the time of
the sale, the rezoning had not occurred. The rule has a substantial
basis in the law of other jurisdictions.50 The significance of the Chit-
wood case is: (1) there must be reasonable evidence on the probability
of such a change, and (2) the witnesses can only consider the effect
of such a change on the price that a willing buyer would pay for the
land; they cannot testify as to what the property would be worth in
the event of the change.
In the case of Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Arnett,51 the
Court was called upon to determine whether the condemnee's witnesses
could evaluate the damages done to the farm as a single unit without
47 27 Am. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 315 (1966).
48 See, e.g., Cameron v. Chicago M. & St. P. By., 51 Minn. 153, 53 N.V.
199 (1892).
49 391 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1965).
50 See, 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 273(2) (1965); 53 ILL. Bus. J. 956
(1965).51 401 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1966).
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regard to separate parcel value when the Commonwealth did not
introduce evidence as to the separate parcels. In the absence of
Commonwealth testimony to the contrary, the Court correctly assumed
that the highest value of the farm was as a single unit and held that
the condemnee's witnesses may value the segregated farm as a single
unit without considering separate parcel value. This identical situation
arose in a later case, Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sea,52
which reaffirmed the Arnett rule. In the Sea case, the Court said that
if the opinion conflicted with Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Burns,53 the Burns case was modified. Burns had held that where a
farm has been severed into separate parcels, the after value should be
based solely on what exists after the taking without regard to what
existed before the taking, and the question is not how much did the
taking damage the original farm but what was the value of the farm
before the taking and what is the value of the parcels that remain. It
is submitted that the Arnett and Sea cases do not conflict with Burns.
The Court did not want Burns to be interpreted to mean that the ap-
praisal witnesses had to use the sum of the values of the separate
parcels or even mention such sum if the highest value was that of
the farm as a single unit. The highest value of the farm as a unit
or the value of the separate parcels could be used.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Redmon, 54 severance of a
farm gave rise to an issue somewhat different from that in Arnett and
Sea: is it permissible to add to the full value of the land taken the
damages done by the reduction in size of the farm? The Court held
that it was permissible, but the case is ultimately noteworthy because
it was distinguished from Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ray-
bourne, 5 in which such damages were not allowed but in which there
was insufficient evidence of damages done to the remainder.56
A large volume of cases dealt with minor evidentiary problems
that frequently crop up in the valuation of the before and after value.
The Court on one occasion outlined five bases for finding evidence
inadmissible 57 because it endangers the valuation process. It was not
error for the landowner to estimate the value of the property by using
a monthly rental basis in excess of the rent the property was cur-
52 402 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1966).
53 394 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 1965).
54403 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1966).
55 364 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1963).5 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Raybourne, supra, note 55, was
followed by Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Scott, 385 S.W.2d 330 (Ky.
1964), but the Scott case is also distinguishable from Commonwealth, Dep't of
Highways v. Redmon. 403 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1960).5 7 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Martin, 392 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1965).
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rently drawing when it was shown that the property had recently
drawn the estimated amount.58 Even though the lot has not been
developed for residential purposes, the condemnee may introduce
evidence as to the per lot value of the land.59 Testimony concerning
noise from the new highway is admissible, but negotiations between
the Highway Department and the landowners regarding an under-
pass desired by the landowners were inadmissible.60 Detailed itemiza-
tion of damages to a farm is not allowed. 61 It is error for the Court
to not strike testimony on cross-examination which shows that an ap-
praisal witness had figured the worth of coal and timber in determining
the value of the land, and in a closing argument the condemnee's
counsel may not portray the condemnee as a poor person unwilling to
sell.62 One case dealt with evidence of a lease,63 and one case dealt
with evidence of an option given to an owner for the purchase of
the farm.64 Two cases dealt primarily with possible evidentiary errors
that were not prejudicial.65 Finally, a well-established rule of evidence
was reaffirmed: the commissioner's report is incompetent on the trial
of the case to the jury.66 The latter case also held that where the
acquisition is necessary to an overall plan, it is incumbent on the
condemnee to prove that KRS 99.830-99.590 is arbitrary as to the
particular taking.
The final series of cases directly relating to the area of valuation
and evidence is quite important because it concerns appraisal by
expert witnesses. Eight cases generally related to the qualifications of
appraisal witnesses.67 The Court reaffirmed a very important rule: ap-
58 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Whipple, 392 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1965).
59 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ochsner, 392 S.W.2d 446 (Ky.
1965).
60 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Carson, 398 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966).
61Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hopson, 396 S.W.2d 805 (Ky.
1965).
62 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Taylor, 400 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Dairs, 400 S.W.2d 515 (1966). But see
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Atteberry, 402 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1966).63 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Thornbury, 399 S.W.2d 728 (Ky.
1966).
64 East Kentucky Rural Elec. Coop. v. Price, 398 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1965).65 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Swift, 404 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hendricks, 400 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1966).6 Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency of Louisville, 393
S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1965).
67See Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Musick, 400 S.W.2d 513 (Ky.
1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darnell, 400 S.V.2d 230 (Ky.
1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Givens Bros., Inc., 398 S.IV.2d
867 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Picklesimer, 397 S.W.2d
159 (Ky. 1965); Napier v. Commonwealth, Dept of Highways, 397 S.W.2d 45
(Kv. 1965); Commonwealth. Dep't of Highways v. Sanders, 396 S.W.2d 781 (Ky.
1965); Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Staton, 396 S.W.2d 766 (Ky.
(Continued on next page)
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praisal witnesses without experience in the science of real estate but
with knowledge of the land sought and the sale of land in the com-
munity are qualified to give testimony. 8 The rule that a landowner
who fails to qualify as an expert on land value should not be permit-
ted to testify was also reaffirmed. 9 On two occasions, the Court held
that the testimony of qualified expert witnesses which indicates no
grounds for their value estimates may nonetheless be admitted.70 As
these cases readily indicate, the Court leans toward allowing the expert
witness to give any testimony which may reasonably contribute to a
determination of the reasonable market value.71 The attitude of the
Kentucky Court assuredly cannot be subjected to the volley delivered
on the Arkansas appellate court in 1958 regarding its liberal attitude
toward expert testimony.72
Despite the fact that the Court's attitude toward expert witnesses
in particular and the entire area of valuation in general has been
clearly established, cases presenting nearly identical evidentiary prob-
lems continue to flood the appellate docket. Because of the lacka-
daisical attitudes in lower courts toward the Court's procedural and
evidentiary guidelines, it is perhaps time for the legislative assistance
alluded to in Part A of this section. The Court has gone about as far
as it can in developing the law of condemnation; the legislature should
codify the law into one comprehensive plan, perhaps modelled after
the law of one of the jurisdictions referred to in the above section or,
more effectively, after Federal Rule 71A. Without this assistance the
Court's docket will continue to overflow with the selfsame cases, and
the Court's attention will continue to be channelled away from mat-
ters of substantive importance.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
1965); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Harvey, 396 S.W.2d 311 (Ky.1965).
03 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Musick, 400 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1966).
09 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Sanders, 396 S.W.2d 781 (Ky.
1965).
70 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darnell, 400 S.W.2d 230 (Ky.
1966); Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Givens Bros., Inc., 398 S.W.2d
867 (Ky. 1966).71 Rutland, Jr., Eminent Domain Litigation in Texas, BAYLOR L. REV., 168,
170 (1965). See also Thompson v. Texas, 319 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1958).72 Winner, Rules of Evidence in Eminent Domain Cases, 13 Aim L. REv.
10, 25 (1958-59) states:
It is difficult to perceive why testimony which experience has taught is
generally found to be safely relied upon by men in their important
business affairs outside, should be rejected inside the court house....
We do not mean to say, of course, that an expert witness should be al-
lowed to roam at large in realms of fancy and testify at length about
hypothetical developments and mythical incomes to be realized there-
from. When this is attempted it should be firmly suppressed because of
its tendency to mislead and confuse and the waste of time involved.
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C. Procedure
Most of the procedural problems this year related to the construc-
tion of statutes or civil rules. Civil Rule 60.02, for example, was in-
terpreted in one case,73 and Rule 1.260(c) (3) was interpreted in
another.7 4 Finally, under the Civil Rules, one case dealt with an order's
omission to recite the reason for delay under Civil Rule 54.02.75 One
case held that whenever the condemnee participates in the jury
selection, the jury's impartiality is ipso facto suspect under KIRS
29.055(1).76 One case dealt with the allotted time for an appeal under
KRS 177.087(2) .7
Two major cases dealt with a problem in statutory interpretation
and lend themselves to a meaningful juxtaposition. In Common-
wealth, Dept of Highways v. Johnson,78 condemnor filed exceptions to
the award of the county court commissioners, but the condemnees did
not. At the trial on the exceptions by the circuit court, it was re-
vealed that the county court commissioners had mistaken the bound-
aries. The circuit court then directed the commissioners to make a new
report. The Court held that where one party fails to appeal, the
award is final as to that party and the only question to be decided at
the de novo trial is whether the judgment is excessive. This holding,
of course, does not imply that the condemnee may not introduce
evidence to show that the judgment was not excessive; it only says
that he may not introduce evidence to show that the judgment is
inadequate. In Maxwell v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways,79 on
the other hand, when the condemnees appealed to the circuit court
on the award of the county court commissioners, the condenor was
allowed to introduce evidence as to the value of the land at the new
trial even though the condemnor took no appeal. The Court held
that where the condemnor does not appeal the commissioners' report,
the failure to deny does not relieve the other party of proving his al-
legations concerning the amount of damage, and a party may not be
deprived of introducing proof on a triable issue of unliquidated
damages. The opinion means, then, that the condemnor may introduce
evidence to check the condemnee, but he may not introduce evidence
73 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Reynolds, 398 S.W.2d 703 (Ky.
1966).
74 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ketchersid, 396 S.W.2d 47 (Ky.
1965).75 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Garland, 394 S.W.2d 450 (Ky.
1965).76 Stillpass v. Kenton County Airport Bd., Inc., 403 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1966).
7 7 Burchett v. Commonwealth, Dept of Highways, 394 S.W.2d 741 (Ky.1965).78 403 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1966).
79 404 SW.2d 9 (Ky. 1966).
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to show that the original judgment was excessive. The Johnson and
Maxwell cases, then, although containing reverse factual situations,
are quite compatible.
D. Miscellaneous
The cases in this section represent either restatements or reaf-
firmations of existing law, which may be loosely catalogued under four
headings: damages, evidence, the right to condemn, and negligence.
1. Damages.-There were four cases which dealt specifically with
non-compensable items. Although in Commonwealth, Dep't of High-
ways v. Taylor County Bank"° the Court found that interference from
a reasonable construction operation with a temporary easement was a
non-compensable item, nominal damages were awarded.8' It seems
questionable to award nominal damages to vindicate a right which the
Court does not actually recognize. In Chain Belt Company v. Com-
monwealth, Dep't of Highways,82 costs of relocating business and
equipment were non-compensable because they are not only too
speculative but also because the incidental cost to the owner does not
relate to the difference in before and after values. In the event the
county clerk refuses to pay the condemnee, he is not allowed interest
when he fails to notify the Highway Department of his difficulty.83
It is proper to compensate as an owner of land one who under an
option to purchase has made downpayments and monthly payments
thereafter.84
2. Evidence.-While evidence of inconvenience is inadmissible be-
cause inconvenience is a non-compensable item, evidence of farming
back and forth across the highway was held admissible.85 In Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Shepherd,88 the Court held that when a
qualified witness gives testimony of sufficient probative value to sup-
port the verdict as well as testimony relating to non-compensable
items, the award should not be overturned. Reaffirmations of the
existing law in the area of change in access were made,87 and reaffrma-
tions were also declared in the area of comparable sales. 88
80 394 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1965).
81 Compare Note, 4 HousToN L. REv. 120 (1966).
82391 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1965).
83 Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Citizens Ice & Fuel Co., 394
S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1965).84 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Devillez, 400 S.W.2d 520 (Ky.
1966).
85 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Teater, 397 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1965).
86 392 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1965).
8 7 Commonvealth, Dep't of Highways v. Dotson, 405 S.w.2d 30 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hopson, 397 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1965);
(Continued on next page)
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An interesting case came before the Court relating to the evidence
that is contingent upon the jury's right to a view of the property.
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Hackworth 9 held that it was not
error to allow the jury to view a house from the outside after it has
been condemned by the Commonwealth and purchased and re-
located by the condemnee. To Nichols, "a view ... is almost if not
absolutely essential to an intelligent understanding of the case by
[the jury]." 90 The rule in Kentucky, however, is that observations of
the jury while on the view are not evidence,91 and the Court in Hack-
worth follows this precedent. But in light of other jurisdictions this
rule appears incorrect. 92 In the final analysis, the Hackworth case is
perhaps primarily significant because dictum in the case indicates
that the trial court may in the exercise of judicial discretion refuse a
view where the premises have been relocated. This dictum indicates
a deviation from the general rule.
S. Right to Condemn.-KRS 96.350(1) and KRS 106.010 were con-
strued, and under these statutes a sixth class city was found to have
the right to condemn land for a reservoir.93
4. Negligence.-There were two cases in which property was
negligently damaged by an employee of the state and an independent
contractor for the state, and the Court recognized the landowners
cause of action against the state.94 But in Commonwealth, Dept of
Highways v. Gisborne,95 the Court held that when property is damaged
for a public purpose through the negligence of a state employee, the
remedy of the injured party is not through the Board of Claims. 96 The
Court additionally held that in such a situation the Commonwealth is
not allowed a deed to the damaged property.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Adkins, 396 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Callihan, 391 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1965).8SMengel Properties v. City of Louisville, 400 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Cottrell, 400 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Burton, 398 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Calvert, 395 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, DeR't of Highways v. Brown, 392 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Bond, 391 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1965).
89 400 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1966).
905 NICHOLS, EmINENT DOMAiN § 18.3 (1962).
9 1 Pierson v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways. 350 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1961).
9227 Am. Jun. 2d Eminent Domain § 415 (1966).93 Embry v. City of Caneyville, 397 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1965).
94 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Cochrane, 397 S.W.2d 155 (Ky.
1965); Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Gisborne, 391 S.W.2d 714 (Ky.
1965).
95 391 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1965).96 KRS §§ 44.070-.110 (1946).
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
An important case decided last term was Hovious v. Riley,1 a civil
action to recover damages from an automobile accident. The trial
court permitted a state trooper to comment on defendant's refusal to
submit to a blood test designed to ascertain the degree of intoxication.
KRS § 189.520(6) provides that no one may be compelled to take a
blood test, but that comment on the refusal is permissible. In voiding
the comment section, the Court of Appeals held that it was repugnant
to both the fifth amendment and to Kentucky's self-incrimination
clause, section 11 of the state constitution.
The opinion fails to discuss directly whether refusal to take a blood
test is within the scope of the self-incrimination privileges. After
stating (1) that Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution provides only
that a defendant "cannot be compelled to give evidence against him-
self," (2) that the Legislature2 and the Court3 have strengthened this
right by not permitting comment on defendant's refusal to testify in
a criminal prosecution, and (3) that section 11 applies equally to
civil as well as criminal suits, 4 the Court concluded that section 11
prohibits comment on the refusal to take a blood test in a civil case.
With respect to the fifth amendment, the Court first asserted that the
fifth amendment applies to the states;5 it then relied heavily upon
Griffin v. California,6 where the Supreme Court invalidated the section
of the California Constitution which permitted comment on the de-
fendant's refusal to testify.7
The Court apparently assumed that the right to refuse to take a
blood test is protected by the fifth amendment; otherwise it would be
reaching the absurd conclusion that comment alone on an alleged
privilege not protected by the constitution is unconstitutional. It is
therefore reasonable to infer from the opinion that the Kentucky
Court believed that refusal to give a blood sample is within the self-
incrimination privileges. Moreover, Hovious is particularly significant
1403 S.W.2d 17 (1966).2 KRS § 421.225 (1962).
3 Adams v. Commonwealth, 264 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1954).4 Akers v. Fuller, 312 Ky. 502, 228 S.W.2d 29 (1950); Kindt v. Murphy,
Judge, 312 Ky. 395, 227 S.W.2d 895 (1950); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34
(1924).
5 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7 It is significant to note that there is no disagreement as to whether the
defendant's right to refuse to testify is within the scope of the fifth amendment
privilege.
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in that it not only extended the scope of the privilege but also ap-
plied this extension to a civil case.
Hovious places Kentucky among a distinct minority of states which
view refusal to submit to a blood test as within the state privilege
against self-incrimination. Only three other jurisdictions follow this
rule,8 although a small number of additional state courts have a
similar policy against admission of evidence obtained without the
defendant's consent for identification purposes." Evidence of a blood
test is admissible in twenty-eight states10 by statute and in six other
states by judicial decision."
At the time the Court of Appeals was deciding Hovious, the
Supreme Court had before it the question whether admission of the
result of the blood test taken over a defendant's objection violates the
federal constitution. Perhaps the Kentucky Court, in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions enlarging the scope of the fifth amendment,12
expected that the Supreme Court would support Hovous by overruling
Breithaupt v. Abram,' 3 a 1957 Supreme Court case, which found no
constitutional violation in the admission of evidence from a blood
test taken without the defendant's consent. However, subsequent to
Hovious, the Supreme Court did not overrule Breithaupt, but instead
reaffirmed its prior position. Four members of the Court dissented
from this 1966 decision, Schmerber v. California, and three of them
viewed the practice as a violation of the fifth amendment.14 Ap-
8 State v. McCarthy, 259 Minn. 24, 104 N.W.2d 673 (1960); People v.
Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362, aff'd 1 N.Y.2d 664, 150 N.Y.S.
2d 29, 133 N.E.2d 516 (1956). See also Engler v. State, 316 P.2d 625 (Okla.
Crim. 1957) (drunkometer); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956).
9 See 8 WiGMorE, EvmENcE § 2265 (McNaughten rev. 1961). These deci-
sions should be examined to determine if they turned on self-incrimination,
fourteenth amendment due process, or illegal search and seizure.
10 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432. 436-37 n.3 (1957), which lists 23
states which up to 1957 had statutes making blood tests admissible. Since 1957,
five states have added similar statutes. These are: Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. art.
35, § 100 (1959) ), Massachusetts (MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 24(1)(e)
(1961) ), Michigan (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325 (1960) ), Missouri (Ann. Mo.
Stat. § 564.442 (1965)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139 (1963) ).
"352 U.S. 437 n.3 lists cases in the following states: California, Colorado,
Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
12 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
1 8352 U.S. 432 (1957).
14 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Schmerber case illustrates the approaches of
the Justices. At 773, 778, and 779 Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortas, respec-
tively, expressed dissenting opinions on the basic premise that compelling the
defendant to submit to a blood test violates the fifth amendment's self-incrimina-
tion doctrine. Justice Douglas added that it is further a violation of the "zone of
privacy" surrounding the first eight amendments of the federal constitution. Justice
Fortas would add that such compulsion is violative of the fourteenth amendment
because it "shocks the conscience"; Chief Justice Warren joined Fortas in his ap-
(Continued on next page)
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parently no other state court has relied on the fifth amendment to
exclude evidence secured in this manner.
Hovious is particularly important because the Court extended the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination beyond its classical
limitation. Traditionally, this privilege has applied only to evidence
obtained through testimonial compulsion.15 The policy for such limita-
tion is twofold. First, the historical purpose of the privilege was to
protect individuals from the atrocities of the inquisition, wherein an
examinee was compelled to incriminate himself by words from his own
lips.16 Second, many authorities and government officials now believe
that unless the privilege is limited law enforcement officers cannot
adequately protect the public from crime. Proponents of a broader
privilege argue that the historical basis for limitation is anachronistic
and that extension would not seriously hinder law enforcement.17
Apparently implicitly endorsing the latter view, the Court of Appeals
seems to have equated lack of consent with compulsion and extended
the scope of self-incrimination to include at least this type of non-
testimonial evidence which has been taken without the defendant's
consent.
It is submitted that the Court has adopted a wise policy. The
historical justification for distinguishing between testimonial and non-
testimonial compulsion is outdated, since the effect of permitting one's
body or parts of one's body to be used as evidence over his objection
can be just as incriminating as if he incriminated himself through
speech. 18 The decision to apply the privilege to all or certain kinds
of non-testimonial evidence should depend solely upon thoroughly
documented analysis of whether its application excessively hinders the
ability of law enforcement officials to protect the public from crime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals is correct in impliedly placing the
burden of proof on the state to show why it is necessary to deprive an
individual of a personal right.
Although the Court of Appeals failed to discuss the policy con-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
proach with respect to the fourteenth amendment only (at 772). The majority
op*on viewed the "shock the conscience" question as relative to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and held that such compulsion did not violate
due process.15Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); 8 Wicmoam, op. cit.
supra note 9, at § 2263.
16 8 WGMfOE, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 2263.
17 Id. at § 2251.18 In Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 773, Black, J., dissenting, stated: "To reach the
conclusion that compelling a person to give his blood to help the State convict
him is not equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself strikes
me as quite an extraordinary feat."
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siderations concerning the specific question of whether the refusal to
take a blood test is within the privilege when the defendant has been
in a car accident, other courts have viewed the dispositive question as
turning upon a choice between two conflicting values: the public's
interest in highway safety, balanced against the private interest in
maintaining the sanctity of the person's body. In Breithaupt the
majority based its decision upholding admissibility in part on the
opinion that drivers under the influence of liquor cause many highway
accidents and that a driver's knowledge that he can be compelled to
take a blood test can be an effective deterrent to excessive drinking
before driving. 9 Most state jurisdictions also seem reluctant to
exclude such evidence because of their belief in the effectiveness of
the practice as a deterrent.20 Chief Justice Warren, on the other hand,
argued in a strong and persuasive dissent in Breithaupt that the right
of the individual to protect his body from invasion is more important
than the regulation of conduct on the highway through evidentiary
rules. 21 Although KRS § 189.520(6) granted only partial protection
from involuntary blood tests, the Court of Appeals in Hovious
brought Kentucky into full argreement with Chief Justice Warrens
position. In this respect Hovious is a wise decision and should be up-
held until proponents of highway safety show by actual data that
their deterrent argument has enough merit to outweigh the individual's
interest in maintaining the sanctity of his body.
The Court of Appeals took for granted the well-accepted rule
that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to civil as well as
criminal cases. 22 In light of the increased frequency and expense of
personal injury actions, the Court should re-evaluate the application
of the privilege in civil cases. It may strongly be argued that a plaintiff
in a personal injury action should not bear the cost of damages caused
by the defendant's negligence just because the defendant refused to
testify under the shield of the self-incrimination privilege.23 After all,
in many cases, the party being protected is the insurance company,
the party who can better spread the burden of loss.
Particularly in criminal law, Hovious raises many important, ques-
tions which should be answered soon. For example, does the Ken-
tucky Court now mean that all non-testimonial evidence obtained with-
out the defendant's consent from any criminal identification test, such
as fingerprinting, is inadmissible because of the expanded scope given
19 352 U.S. at 439.20 Id. See also footnote 10, supra.
21 352 U.S. at 440.
22 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 2252. See footnote 4, supra.
23 8 WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 2252.
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the privilege against self-incriminaton in Hovious? Is evidence taken
from an unconscious defendant, who cannot actually consent or
object, admissible? If the defendant is unaware of his right not to
submit to a blood test, must he be informed of this right and intel-
ligently waive it before any evidence secured from the test is ad-
missible? Finally, but probably most importantly, the Court of Ap-
peals at the first opportunity should make explicit its reasons for
concluding that evidence of a blood sample obtained against the de-
fendant's objection-which is non-testimonial evidence-is within the
privilege against self-incrimination.
B. Police Power
"Police Power" is defined as the state's proper exercise of its power
to prefer the public's interest in welfare, safety, convenience and good
morals over the rights of the individual.24 For the exercise of this power
to be proper it must satisfy both federal and state constitutional
limitations. It must not deny equal protection, or take property with-
out due process or just compensation in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.25 Although the Kentucky Constitution does not have a
due process clause as such, the state's exercise of power in the public
interest cannot be "arbitrary" under Section 2.26 The test for finding a
violation under either constitution is ultimately one of reasonableness, 27
and the Court has eliminated much of the potential verbal confusion
by stating that an allegation of a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment is another way of arguing that an exercise of power is arbitrary
under Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution.28 Two cases decided by
the Court of Appeals during the past term illustrate its approach.
In Puckett v. City of Muldraugh,29 the Court was faced with the
question of whether a city can, by appropriate ordinance, 30 impose
24 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964).
25 Ibid. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.26Ky. CoNsT. § 2 provides that "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives,
liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the
largest majority.2 7Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d at 887. In Pritchett v. Marshall, 375 S.W.2d
253 (Ky. 1964) it was unreasonable for an administrative agency to exceed the
bounds of its authorization. In Turner v. Peters, 327 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1959) an
ordinance which did not prescribe any standards was unreasonable. In Schneider
v. Wink, 350 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1961) the ordinance set up some standards, but
the standards were too vague, making the whole ordinance unreasonable.
28377 S.W.2d at 885; Pritchett v. Marshall, 375 S.W.2d at 258 (Ky. 1964).
29 403 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1966).30 The city of Muldraugh passed an ordinance that made the owner of
rental property liable for water consumed by his tenant except when the tenant
had paid a $100 deposit.
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liability for tenants' water bills upon the owner of rental property.
Appellant argued that such action is both a taking of property with-
out just compensation prohibited by the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution and an arbitrary exercise of power in derogation
of Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution.
In meeting the first argument, the majority relied on state cases
holding that state legislation making landlords liable for tenants'
water bills is not void as violative of the federal constitution.31 The
majority reasoned that, since a legislature can exercise this power, a
city which has received a proper delegation of the state's police
power32 can also make the landlord liable for his tenants' water bills.
It held that an ordinance such as the one passed by the city of
Muldraugh does not violate the fourteenth amendment.
The majority went on to hold that the ordinance was not arbi-
trary or unreasonable and thus not violative of Section 2 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution. It relied on a recent Kentucky case upholding
liability for garbage collection costs and classified the landlord as a
consumer of the water service.33 It felt that the landlord was not
being required to pay the debt of another since he, as well as his
tenants, was benefited by having water supplied to his property. The
majority also felt that "if [the landlord] requests this service or accepts
it, he impliedly agrees to pay the service charge . . .134 when an
ordinance so provides.
Judge Hill in his dissent discussed one of the most confusing as-
pects of the police power cases, the nature of the Court's role in re-
viewing the acts of the Legislature. The dissent, advocating the ap-
proach which was popular three decades earlier, suggested that it is
the Court's function to determine whether the city has based its action
on the most reasonable means available to control the problem. The
majority of the Court, however, adheres to the policy expressed in
Moore v. Ward,85 a 1964 decision. This policy, which is followed by
the majority of state courts 6 and by the Supreme Court,37 states that
it is not the function of the Court to judge the Legislature's wisdom
in determining what factors are important before enacting a statute,
3148 Am. Jur. Public Utilities and Services § 62 (1942); 94 C.J.S. Waters §
302(b) (1956).32 KRS § 106.210 (1954) grants local water districts and the municipality
the power to do all acts necessary and convenient for the operation and
maintenance of water plants and for the sale and distribution of water.
33 Cassidy v. City of Bowling Green, 368 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1963).
34 408 S.W.2d at 255
353 77 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964).
36 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 288 (1964).3 7 Berman v. Parker, 848 U.S. 26 (1954).
[Vol. 55,
COURT OF APPEALS REVIEV
and that the Court will interfere only if the statute does not have a
"reasonable relationship to a legitimate public purpose."38 (Emphasis
added.) Consistent with the latter approach to the judicial review
function, the Court upheld the Muldraugh ordinance on the basis of
its conclusion that the classification of the owner as a consumer was a
reasonable means of collecting delinquent water bills.
Muldraugh is significant precedent for Kentucky cities with similar
ordinances, and it may well encourage more communities to adopt
similar approaches to aid water companies and other public utilities.
The proper recourse for the many rental property owners in the state
is direct appeal to the state or city legislative body. In light of the
Court's refusal to sit as a super-legislature, landlords can expect little
comfort from the bench.
A case decided last term illustrates one type of limitation on the
considerable discretion allowed legislative bodies under the reason-
ableness standard of judicial review. In Bruner v. City of Danville,"9
the Court of Appeals voided an ordinance which authorized the city's
governing body to issue licenses to conduct public dances, but did not
prescribe any standards with which applicants could comply. The
trial court, in upholding the ordinance, had relied on a state statute40
which provides in part that the city can prohibit amusements within
the surrounding community. In rejecting this argument, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that any authority which the state granted a city
was subject to the same limitation of reasonableness applicable to the
exercise of police power. The grant by the city to the governing body
thus fell under the rule that a delegation of power without specification
of standards for its exercise is arbitrary and unreasonable.41 In fact,
even though an ordinance prescribes standards, the Court may still
find it unreasonable where the standards are too vague.42
Although both Muldraugh and Bruner raised collateral questions
of proper delegation of the state's police power, the Court was directly
confronted with the problem of the state's abdication of its police
power in Ward v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co.4 3 In this case the Court
reiterated the well-settled rule that a state agency may contract with
38 377 S.W.2d at 887.
39 394 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1965).40KRS § 85.150(5) (1942) grants the city power to pass an ordinance to
,icense, tax, regulate, prohibit, or suppress theatrical and other exhibitions, shows
and amusements, within the city and within one mile of the city limits.41 Turner v. Peters, 327 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1959).42 Schneider v. Wink, 850 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1961).
43402 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1966) (state highway department contracted with
the railroad company to pay the expenses for providing safety devices at eleven
intersections of highway and track).
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private persons to perform the state's police power functions.44 The
Court of Appeals also decided a routine case concerning procedural
due process in notice of service.4 5
C. Maximum Constitutional Limitation on Salaries
Section 24640 of the Kentucky Constitution prescribes the maximum
compensation for a public officer or employee, with certain excep-
tions,47 not pertinent here, as $7,200 per year. For seven decades the
Court of Appeals had heard arguments that the dollar limitation was
too prohibitive and should be changed by judicial interpretation.4
Finally, in Matthews v. Allen49 decided in 1962, the Court adopted the
"elastic dollar" theory in holding that the Legislature can consti-
tutionally compensate circuit judgesu0 above the $7,200 limit by
equating their current salaries with consumer price index, using 1949,
the date Section 246 was amended, as the base year. The decision was
justified on two theories. First, Section 246 does not fix the compensa-
tion; it merely puts a limit on the "dollars" that can be paid, without
stating whether they are "dollars" of 1949 purchasing power or
"dollars" of current value. Second, Section 18851 of the Kentucky
Constitution specifically provides that circuit judges should receive
adequate compensation for their services.
44 See Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Met. Sewer Dep't, 307 Ky.
689, 211 S.W.2d 867 (1948); City of Louisville v. Weible, 84 Ky. 290, 1 S.V.
605 (1886).45 McGaughey v. Keith, 392 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1965).46 Section 246 provides:
No public officer or employee, except the governor, shall receive as
compensation per annum for official services, exclusive of the compensa-
tion of legally authorized deputies and assistant which shall be fixed and
provided by law, but inclusive of allowance for living expenses, if any,
as may be fixed and provided for by law, any amount in excess of the
following sums . . . all other public officers, Seven Thousand Two
Hundred Dollars ($7,200).
47 The exceptions listed in Section 246 are Governor, Mayor of any first
class city, Judges and Commissioners of the Court of Appeals, and CircuitJudges.48 See Manning v. Sims, 308 Ky. 587, 213 S.W.2d 577 (1948) (a statute
providing for expenses of Court of Appeals Judges is not violative of Section
246). Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1154, 1157 (1948) lists all the salary cases brought
before the Court until 1948. These cases reveal that the Court has permitted
circumvention of the constitution with respect to employees under the pro-
scription, "excluding legitimate expenses." The limit was raised to $7,200 by
constitutional amendment in 1949. but subsequent attempts at amendment failed.
49 360 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1962).5 0 Through dictum the Court in this case indicated that all constitutional
officers should receive adequate compensation.
51 Section 133 provides:
The Judges of the Circuit Court shall, at stated times, receive for their
services an adequate compensation to be fixed by law, which shall be
equal and uniform throughout the State, so far as the same shall be paid
out of the State Treasury.
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The Allen case left open the question of whether all other con-
stitutional officers may be adequately compensated even though there
is no specific constitutional provision parallel to Section 133 supporting
such action by the Legislature. In Commonwealth v. Hesch,52 decided
last year, the Court answered in the affirmative.
The "elastic dollar" theory was further refined in Meade County v.
Neafus.53 Here, the issue was whether circuit courts are consti-
tutionally authorized to grant salary increases to constitutional of-
ficers. The Court of Appeals held that since Section 10654 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution prohibits courts from adjusting or fixing salaries,
such adjustments depend exclusively upon the authorization of the
Legislature. The real significance of this decision is that the Court
has developed a practical approach to compensating public officials
within the context of the rising cost of living, but has still provided
reasonable restraints by allowing only the Legislature to make such
changes within the range of increased living costs. This compromise at
least maintains the spirit of section 246.
Research indicates that no other state has judicially altered the
maximum compensation limitation in its constitution by the "elastic
dollar" method.5 Such loose construction of the constitution is illus-
trative of the Court's concern for the practical results of its decisions.
The value of this approach may be determined by weighing the neces-
sity of maintaining a high level of personnel in constitutional offices
through adequate compensation against the undesirability of allowing
the Court to circumvent the bold letter of the constitution, when he
people have refused to amend it. Strict construction might force the
constitutional revision sorely needed but often defeated.
D. Constitutional Revision in Kentucky-The 1966 Approach
Gatewood v. Matthews" confronted the Court of Appeals with
fundamental questions regarding the political theories underlying state
government. Petitioner Gatewood, individually and on behalf of the
52395 SAV.2d 362 (Ky. 1965). In this case the constitutionality of Senate
Bill 84 (KRS Chapter 109 (1964) ) which set a ma.dmum compensation limit of
$9,600 on the salaries of county clerks, sheriffs, circuit clerks, county judges, and
county jailers was upheld. The dissent advocated limiting the application of
Matthews v. Allen to circuit judges.
53 395 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1965).
54 Section 106 provides: "The fees of county officers shall be regulated by
law." The Court's only function is to construe the Legislature's acts.
55 The research on this concept consisted of the following: (1) American
Law Reports (2) American Jurisprudence (3) Corpus Juris Secundum (4) Index
to Legal Periodicals (5) Shepardizing of the Alen, Neafus, and Hesch cases
through September, 1966 (6) Cases cited in the text of each of these decisions
(7) Kentucky Law Journal (8) General Digest through 1966.
1403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966).
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citizens of Kentucky, sought an injunction to prevent a newly pro-
posed constitution from being presented directly to the people Ken-
tucky in the coming election of November 8, 1966. The Court, in July,
1966, rejected Gatewood's claim and upheld the constitutionality of
the proposed method of submission, but in the November election the
voters by a margin of almost four to one refused to adopt the proposed
constitution.2 The method of constitutional revision and the Court's
approval of it warrant special attention because, despite the present
mootness of the particular 1966 questions, the Gatewood case not only
has significant value as precedent but also focuses on a major con-
temporary problem facing Kentucky and other states: the creation of
effective, legitimate procedures to bring about total constitutional
revision.
Gatewood contended that the procedure for revision authorized
by the Kentucky General Assembly in Senate Bill 1613 violated
Section 258 of the Kentucky Constitution. This section of the consti-
tution provides for a four-step revision procedure: (1) the Legislature
by a two-thirds vote in two successive sessions must authorize the
taking of the sense of the people as to whether to call a constitutional
convention; (2) upon such legislative approval, the people must vote
on this question of calling a constitutional convention at the next
general election; (8) if the popular vote is affirmative, the people
elect delegates to the convention in the following general election;
and (4) the delegates then convene a constitutional convention and
promulgate a document which will be binding on the people and the
government. It should be noted that there is no provision in the
constitution which requires submission of the final draft to the people
for their approval or rejection; however, in 1947 the Court of Appeals
held in Gaines v. O'Connell that the people could restrict the conven-
tion delegates by requiring them to submit the finished document to
the people at an election.4 Senate Bill 161 significantly shortened the
procedure for revision. For the four steps outlined in section 258, it
substituted the promulgation of a constitution by government-ap-
pointed delegates and popular ratification of the finished document
produced by the convention.
Gatewood, relying on precedent,5 alleged that Senate Bill 161
2 Louisville Courier-Journal, Nov. 9, 1966, § A, p. 1, col. 6. This article reveals
that 510,099 votes were cast against adoption of the new constitution and
140,210 votes in favor of its adoption.
3 S.B. No. 161 (1966).
4 805 Ky. 397, 204 S.W.2d 425 (1947).
5 403 S.W.2d at 718. The following is a list of the cases which the Court
viewed from the standpoint of whether the procedure strictly complied with
(Continued on next page)
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should be invalidated because the procedure provided therein did
not strictly comply with section 258. However, the Court of Appeals
characterized the principal issue as "Whether by the terms of Sections
256 and 258 of the Constitution the people have imposed upon them-
selves exclusive modes of amending or revising their Constitution."6
(Emphasis added.) After stating that this was a question of first im-
pression in Kentucky, the Court held, with one judge dissenting,7 that
other modes of revision are constitutionally permissible. While the
Court of Appeals cited a Rhode Island s and a Georgia 9 case as pre-
cedent, the Georgia case is the only case to support the Court's ap-
proach to characterization of the issue. 10
The basic premise underlying the Court's decision is that Section
4 of the Bill of Rights of the Kentucky Constitution, guaranteeing
the inalienable rights of the people, gives to each generation the right
to change its form of government, notwithstanding restrictions on
constitutional revision imposed by drafters of the existing constitution.
Since Section 4 of the Bill of Rights provides that "at all times the
people have an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or
abolish their government in such manner as they may deem proper,""
(emphasis added) the Court viewed it as taking precedence over
section 258, which does not expressly prohibit other modes of re-
vision. Moreover, section 26 of the constitution provides "that every-
thing in this Bill of Rights is excepted out of the general powers of
government and shall forever remain inviolate ... "12
Secondly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the people are, in
fact, exercising their inalienable right to change their form of govern-
ment even when their only participation in revision is through ratifica-
tion of the finished document.'3 The Court of Appeals concluded its
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
revision and amendment sections of the Kentucky Constitution: Harrod v. Hatcher,
281 Ky. 712, 137 S.W.2d 405 (1940), Arnett v. Sullivan, 279 Ky. 720, 132
S.W.2d 76 (1939), McCreary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 162 S.W.2d 99 (1914).
6 403 S.W.2d at 718.
7Id. at 722 (Hill. J.. dissenting).8 In re Opinion to the Governor of Rfhode Island, 55 R.I. 56, 178 AtI. 433
(1935).
9 Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
10 "No case identical in its facts with the case now under consideration has
been called to our attention, and we have found none." Id. at 328.
" Ky. CONST. § 4.
12 Ky. CONST. § 26.
13 The Court buttressed this theory by relying again on the Georgia and
Rhode Island cases. While the Georgia court did rely solely on its constitution's
right of revolution" clause, the Rhode Island constitntion expressly enabled
the Legislature to adopt a mode of revision different from the one provided for
in the revision section. The Rhode Island court cited section 1 of article 4 which
provides: "The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry this
(Continued on next page)
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reasoning on this point by noting that both the 1850 and the 1891
Kentucky Constitutions were ratified by popular vote and then by
citing two comparatively recent Kentucky cases which discussed
ratification in favorable terms.14
A final basis for the Court's decision was its view that the direct-
vote provision substantially complied with the spirit of section 258.
The Court indicated that the purpose of the four step revision pro-
cedure in section 258 was to give the people fair notice that the
constitution was being revised and an opportunity to participate in
the process of revision. Apparently it concluded that the procedural
safeguards of section 258 may be satisfied by other modes of revision
so long as the people are provided with "due and proper notice and
[an] opportunity to acquaint themselves with any revision, and
[to] make their choice directly by a free and popular election. . ..15
In the opinion of the Court, the notice requirement is satisfied be-
cause "News and information is disseminated faster and more
efficiently than was anticipated when the Constitution was drafted," 6
and the popular participation requirement is met because the people
are able to vote directly for or against the final form of the proposed
document.
Despite the significance of the case, the Court's opinion represents
incomplete and superficial judicial analysis which fails to reach and
resolve the basic problems. The Court correctly held that the method
of revision specified in the constitution does not preclude alternate
modes of popular reformation of government. That each generation has
the right to determine its own form of government has been beyond
dispute in American political and legal theory since 1776. But this is
the easy question to answer. The difficult but crucial legal problems
which were not answered involve the conditions which must be met
before the section 4 right becomes operative and is properly exercised.
This issue is central to the case because surely the Court, by its
decision, did not mean that section 4 will automatically legitimate any
revision procedure for any party who invokes it. To determine whether
an alternate method of revision is constitutional, it is submitted that
a judicial body must thoroughly consider several matters, which were
either ignored or inadequately considered by the Court of Appeals in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
constitution into effect." See In re Opinion to the Governor of Rhode Island, 55
R.I. 56, 178 At. 433, 437 (1935).
14 408 S.W.2d at 719 cites the following cases: Chenault v. Carter, 332
S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1960) and Gaines v. O'Connell, 305 Ky. 397, 204 SAV.2d 425
(1947).
15 403 S.W.2d at 721.
16 Ibid.
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Gatewood: first, whether there is necessity or justification for the ap-
peal to inalienable rights to prevail over positive law; second, whether
the parties seeking to revise the government through this means consti-
tute the "people" exercising their inalienable right; and third, whether
the alternate method of revision advocated satisfies the requirements
of procedural due process, so as to give the people sufficient notice
and opportunity to participate in the process of revision.
Measured by these criteria, the Court in Gatewood, first of all, paid
inadequate respect to the existing legal system by readily approving
a means of revision quite at variance with the detailed constitutional
procedure, without specifically establishing that change could not
reasonably be achieved within the existing framework. The inalienable,
or natural, right of man to reform his government must be seen in its
relationship to our positivist legal order, which places great value upon
precedent, stability, and order. Our society is grounded on a belief
that changes in the form as well as the policy of government should
take place in a lawful manner and through our legal institutions.
Moreover, the inalienable right of the people embodied in section 4
has never been viewed as being contrary to this principle, but rather
as a safety value which is used when the people need to exercise it
to protect valued rights and procedures from a despotic government
or unjustified restrictions of the past. If any constitution or law is to
retain the respect of the people, the courts and other branches of
government must strictly adhere to it, except where circumstances are
shown to justify loose construction or circumvention.
Thus the point is not that section 258 provides exclusive modes of
revision, but rather that section 258 does set forth definite procedure
for revision and the Court of Appeals should require proof of the
necessity or justification for circumventing this procedure. Consti-
tutional revision through a constitutional assembly, under the pro-
cedure of section 2,58, could have been achieved by 1969.l Yet there
was no proof that great burden or expense would fall upon the
citizens of Kentucky if the constitution was not revised in 1966 but in
1969. Moreover, neither was there a showing that the procedure of
section 258 made revision of the constitution unreasonably difficult; in
fact, the increasing popular support for revision in each of the three
prior efforts at major overhaul of the document seem to refute the
17 The proposal for an unlimited convention could have been readopted by
the 1966 Legislature and the sense of the people taken in 1967. In 1968 the
people could have elected delegates to a convention. This convention, using the
Constitution Revision Assembly's document as a draft, could probably have
presented a revised constitution to the people by the 1969 general election, using
the procedure allowed by Gaines v. O'Connell, 805 Ky. 397, 204 S.W.2d 425
(19471.
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charge that the 1966 approach was necessary to break the control of
the "hand from the grave" over the present.18 It is incongruous for the
Court to reafirm daily its commitment to precedent and law, and
normally to depart from precedent only after explanations of why the
former law is no longer workable, and then to permit circumvention
of the most fundamental law of the state without requiring and dis-
cussing a justification for such departure.
The second criterion which the Court failed to satisfy was whether
the parties promoting a new mode of revision under section 4 could
properly utilize the benefits of this provision. In other words, it would
seem that such moving parties have the important burden of proving
that they in fact legitimately represent the people. State government
officials, and primarily the Governor, were mainly responsible for
initiation and direction of the revision movement. Under a statute
sponsored by the Governor and enacted by the 1964 General Assembly,
the members of the Constitution Revision Assembly were selected m
1964 by the Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Lieutenant Governor, and the Chief ustice of the Court of Appeals.
The Revision Assembly consisted of the seven former elected governors
of Kentucky, one delegate from each of the thirty-eight state senatorial
districts and five members selected from the state-at-large; an attempt
was made to appoint members from both political parties.
The method by which the delegates were selected presents a
serious problem because the Kentucky Constitution does not give
state government leaders the authority to name constitutional con-
vention delegates, but instead specifically reserves this power to the
people, who also retain the power to decide in a general elction
whether to call such an assembly. The Court of Appeals' believed
that the people were adequately participating in the revision, as re-
quired by section 4, because modern communications had given them
due notice of the proposed document as it was being formulated and
they were to have the opportunity to reject or accept the final draft.
This reasoning of the Court has been supported further by the argu-
ment that the mass of people cannot exercise revision themselves and,
therefore, assuming circumvention is justified, the Governor and the
Legislature can legitimately appoint a constitutional convention and
18 In 1931 and 1947 calls for an unlimited convention were rejected by
the voters, and in 1960 a call for a limited convention, restricted both as to the
number of subjects-twelve-and by the condition that the final draft would be
submitted to the people for approval, was also rejected; with each election the
percentage of voters voting in favor of revision increased. In 1960 the vote was
342,501 against and 324,577 for, which is equivalent to 48.65% of the voters
favoring the limited convention. See Oberst and Wells, Constitutional Reform in
Kentucky-The 1966 Proposal, 55 Ky. L.J. 50, 53-54 (1966).
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propose a revised constitution in disregard of revision procedures in
the existing constitution, so long as the people can approve or dis-
approve the final document in an election.' 9
There are obvious shortcomings in the 1966 procedure which are
not adequately dealt with by these justifications. To begin with, in
what sense was the Constitutional Revision Assembly truly repre-
sentative? Contrary to the American tradition of political representa-
tion and the procedure outlined in the Kentucky Constitution, the
people of each senatorial district did not elect a delegate to the con-
vention. Instead of the usual process whereby the elected representa-
tive makes the political decision after receiving advice from experts
on his staff or elsewhere, interested pressure groups, and constituents,
the 1966 approach to revision gave the power of decision to appointed
experts or leaders who were not agents of the people elected to
represent the interests of each community. Moreover, there were
important factual questions regarding the extent to which the ap-
pointed delegates actually had significant contact and communica-
tion with the communities they were supposed to represent.
Especially in the absence of proof of necessity or justification for
circumverting section 258, section 4 does not give government
officials, like any other minority, authority to set up procedures by
which the governmental officials appoint "representatives" of the
people, rather than to set up procedures by which these representatives
would be elected and more directly respronsive to the will of the
people. Because of the concentration of power in contemporary
government, the people need special protection against public officials
who, without popular authority, seek to bring about changes in the
form of government. The 1966 procedure for revision could too easily
allow those in power to impose their own values by appointing the
delegates to the convention and then using public money and public
employees to help convince the people that they should adopt the
document drafted under these circumstances.
Finally, regarding the third criterion, the Court did not realistically
consider whether the 1966 mode of revision adequately insured the
right of the people to have notice of, and participate in, revision.
KRS. 7.170,20 which originally created the Constitutional Revision As-
sembly in 1964, did not state that the Assembly's draft would be sub-
mitted directly to the people. In fact, there was no decision to use
direct submission until the Constitutional Revision Assembly had
completed its final draft; until then, it is apparent that the general
10 Oberst and Vells. supra note 18, at 64-65.20 KRS § 7.170 (1960).
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assumption was that this final draft would be submitted to a con-
vention of delegates elected by the people, consistent with Section 258
revision procedure. Moreover, one poll stated that, while the Assembly
was doing its work, forty percent of the people did not know the
constitution was being revised.21 Moreover, although statewide news-
papers reported Assembly meetings, the proposed document, and the
pre-election discussions, the debates of the constitutional convention
were never made available to the people. In addition, although many
public debates discussed the merits of the 1966 constitution after the
Court decision in July and before the November election, there was
much confusion as to the meaning and consequences of important
provisions. This uncertainty as to the scope of the document un-
doubtedly was an important factor contributing to its defeat. Thus,
subsequent events strongly challenge the significance of part of the
Court's rationale in upholding the 1966 approach-its notion that
"News and information is disseminated faster and more efficiently than
was anticipated when the Constitution was drafted." Progress in com-
munication does not mean that the news and information will be
disseminated in a fair and unbiased manner and in a manner which
people can understand.
In other cases22 where a court has upheld a mode of revision
different from the one specifically provided for in the constitution,
including the aforementioned Rhode Island and Georgia cases, 23 the
alternate mode of revision actually increased the participation of the
people. However, the Gatewood decision approves the acts of the
Governor and General Assembly initiating the process of revision and
appointing the revisers, thereby leaving the people only the op-
portunity to determine whether or not to accept the finished product.
This appointed assembly-direct submission procedure permits the
people to participate only in a negative sense, i.e., the people have the
power to veto the proposed constitution at the polls, but they do not
21 Oberst and Wells, supra note 18, at 76 which cites Louisville Courier-
Journal, April 23, 1966, § B, p. 1.22 
HAA, CONSTrTONAL CoNVENTrio Ns 39-40 (1917).
23 In re Opinion to the Governor of Bhode Island, 55 R.I. 56, 178 AUt. 433
(1935) the court held that the Legislature could call a constitutional convention
even though the constitution expressly provided that the Legislature should draft
the document. In Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 823. 37 S.E.2d 322
(1946), the court held constitutional a mode of revision which permitted the
people to ratify or reject the final document even though the Georgia Constitution
provided that after the Legislature voted twice to call a convention, the
Legislature must call one which is representive of the people. Note that the
rovision does not authorize the people to elect delegates to the convention. Thus,
y the Legislature allowing the people to vote on the final document, the people
participated to a greater degree than under the expressed mode of revision in
the constitution,
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have a voice through elected representatives in determining what
porvisions will be in the proposed document. Especially when the
Gaines4 decision is added to section 258, thus giving the people the
right to vote on the convention's final draft, the 1966 approach re-
duces the participation of the people in the actual process of revision.
Yet the Court of Appeals ignored these considerations in drawing its
conclusion that the 1966 approach safeguarded the right of the people
to participate in the reform of their government.
There remains only the need to put this discussion of the legality
of alternate modes of revision back into the larger context of judicial
decision-making in society. What then would be the significance of the
decision, even if the Court had considered carefully these three im-
portant matters which it failed to do in Gatewood? Such a decision
would only mean that the proposed method of revision is legal; it
would say nothing about the wisdom or desirability of such an ap-
proach. From the viewpoint of political or governmental theory, the
merits of any particular method of revision upheld by the Court are
part of the issue before the people as they decide whether to change
the constitution. Certainly, whenever constitutional revision is sought
through a method based on natural law, both the content and the
procedure of revision are important political decisions for the voter to
make in his attempt to evaluate the proposed change.
In short, there can be methods of constitutional revision which are
legal or constitutional, even though contrary to the procedure for
revision spelled out in a state's constitution. However, the Court,
through close and careful consideration must determine whether,
under the circumstances, a particular proposed method qualifiies. The
Gatewood decision lacks this kind of judicial analysis, which is called
for by litigation raising such significant legal and political questions.
Finally, it also fails to establish guidelines for similar attempts at
constitutional revision in the future, so as to assure that all modem
systems of communication and resources of the state are used in good
faith to truly effectuate the will of the people.
24 Gaines v. O'Connell, 305 Ky. 397, 204 S.W.2d 425 (1947). See also text
at note 4.
VII. CONTRACTS
The Court was relatively inactive in the area of contract law
during its 1965-66 term. Only two cases can be said to have been
significant; the remainder involve, to a greater or lesser degree, rather
routine application of established principles of contract law.
In the first significant case, Brown v. Noland Co.,1 the court upheld
an executory accord in favor of an injured plaintiff against an in-
surance company where the company offer was made before and ac-
cepted after the statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff was in-
jured by the allegedly negligent driving of the defendant's insured.
Suit was filed more than one year after the date of the injury. The
defendant pleaded the one year statute of limitations. In response, the
plaintiff pleaded estoppel to the defense of the statute and, in the
alternative, alleged that the defendant was liable in contract because
of an accord entered into by the parties. In support of its second as-
sertion, the plaintiff alleged that in June of 1963 an adjuster for the in-
surer made a firm offer to settle with the plaintiff. It was alleged that
no mention was made of the statute of limitations (which ran on
August 23, 1963), that no time limit was set for acceptance of the
firm offer, that plaintiff accepted the offer on November 23, 1963, and
that shortly thereafter the insurer repudiated the offer. The trial court
sustained both the insurer's and the insured's motions to dismiss on
the pleadings.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal as to the insured, re-
jecting the plea of estoppel on the ground that the claim was purely
one in tort and that sufficient facts to support an estoppel had not
been pleaded.2 Turning to the claim against the insurer, the Court
saw it as purely contractual.3 The issue thus became one of whether
1403 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1966). In another case, Gill v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 304(Ky. 1966), the Court held that mere receipt of a check from the defendent's
insurer, which check recited that it was in full settlement of the claim against the
insured, did not constitute acceptance of the offered settlement. The propriety of
the decision is beyond question. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 753 (1957).
2 Citing Cuppy v. General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629
(Ky. 1964); Burke v. Blair, 349 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1961); Pospisil v. Miller, 343
S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1961). The disposition of this issue seems to have been correctly
made under the authority of these cases. For a more complete discussion of the
issue, see 54 Ky. L. J 799 (1966).
3 The Court cited 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 52 (1964):
An accord is as much a contract as any other agreement, and an action
may be maintained against the party in default for the breach of nonper-
formance of an accord under the ordinary principles of the law of con-
tracts. In the absence of statute, if the debtor breaks a contract which is
an accord to be satisfied by a future stated performance, the creditor has
alternative remedies; he can enforce either the original duty or the accord.
403 S.W.2d at 35.
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a mere "accord,"4 without "satisfaction,"a imposed upon the parties to
the accord a contractual liability separate from any tort liability
springing from the original claim, and therefore was not barred by the
statute of limitations. By holding in the affirmative on this issue the
Court expressly overruled two Kentucky cases6 which had entrenched
the contrary rule in Kentucky law for almost a century and a half.
In their place it substituted the rule promulgated by the American
Law Institute.'
Simply stated, the Court reasoned that an "accord" was alone
sufficient to impose a contractual obligation on the insurer and that
this obligation, being totally unrelated to the insured's tort liability,
was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court's last step
was to hold that whether the plaintiff accepted the firm offer within
a reasonable time, and thereby bound the insurer to an accord agree-
ment, was a question of facts to be determined in further proceedings
below.
The decision in Brown is a good one. The old line of Kentucky
cases reflected a notion which formerly enjoyed the approval of many
courts," namely the belief that an accord was not a bar to the orig-
inal debt and therefore was not a binding contract. This was a result
of the courts' unwillingness to recognize as enforcible the "promise
for a promise" now generally recognized as an enforcible bilateral
contract.10 With the emergence of the bilateral contract concept, the
theoretical basis for refusing to give full force to an executory accord
disappeared." Moreover, in Brown the accord was not executory after
the tort claim against the insured was barred by the statute-at that
point the insurer's promise, to pay a certain amount of money, re-
mained executory but the plaintiff's promise, to refrain from pro-
4 1 Am. Jun. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 1 (1964) provides:
[A]n accord is an agreement by one party to give or perform and by the
other party to accept, in settlement or satisfaction of an existing or ma-
tured claim, something other than that which is claimed to be due, and
the satisfaction is the execution or performance of the agreement, or the
actual giving and taking of some agreed thing. The accord is the agree-
ment and the satisfaction is the execution or performance of such agree-
ment. When an accord is followed by a satisfaction it is a bar to the
assertion of the original claim, but until so followed, it has no effect.G1b;d.
' WVhayne Supply Co. v. Gregory, 291 S.W.2d 835 (1956); Elliott v. Dazey,
19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 268 (1826).7 1RESTATETMNT, CONTRACTS § 417 (1932). This rule was said to have been
recognized, though not adopted, in Barrett v. Clark, 226 Ky. 109, 9 S.W.2d 1091(1928).
8Cting RSATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 417 (1932).
9 6 ConniN, CONTRACTS § 1271 (1962).
10 6 CoRBN. CONTRACTS § 1271 (1962); 6 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1839-40(1938).
11 Ibid.
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secuting his tort claim, was usurped by the running of the statute.-
It is submitted that the accord thereby became unilateral and even
under the old rule would have been enforcible. But regardless of the
theoretical propriety of Brown, it clearly aligns Kentucky with the
position taken by the majority of courts13 and by the leading
scholars.14
Speaking in more practical terms, the rule of Brown will play a
welcome role in providing the public with some degree of protection
from unconscionable conduct on the part of insurance companies
which would induce an unknowing plaintiff to forestall prosecution of
his claim until the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Of
course, the rule should operate to the advantage of insurers who deal
with the public in an above-board manner by making this tactic
unavailable to their competitors and by establishing better public
relations for the industry.
The second significant case in the general area of contracts in-
volved the effect of an obligor's discharge in bankruptcy. In Local
Industrial Fin. Co. v. McDougale,'5 a case of first impression, the
defendant was the obligor on a debt owed to the plaintiff. Shortly
before he was awarded a discharge in bankruptcy, the defendant, by
means of a financial statement, procured a new loan as well as a
renewal of the existing loan. The plaintiff sought to recover both the
new money" and the "old money." The trial court allowed recovery
of the new, but denied recovery of the old. On appeal the parties con-
sented to limit the issue to the effect of the defendant's discharge in
bankruptcy.
The defendant admitted that the financial statement which he fur-
nished the plaintiff was false and was intended to deceive the plain-
tiff, and that the plaintiff had made the new loan and extended the
old loan in reliance thereon. The only issue before the Court was
whether the trial court properly limited the effect of the Celler
amendment of the Bankruptcy Act'6 to the "new" money. It held, in
12 It is interesting to note that the Court recognized seventy years ago that
a promise to forebear bringn suit, when made in return for a promise of contin-
ued employment, could becoe the basis of a suit for breach ofo cotract after the
suit was barred by the statute of limitations. See Hopperton v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
34 S.W. 895 (1896) (dictum).
13 See 1 AM. Jun. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 1 (1964).
14 See 6 CoRnmr, ComraACTS § 1271 (1962); BlEsTATE M Nr, CoNTRAc-rs §
417 (1932).
15 404 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1966).
16The pertinent provision of the Bankruptcy Act is Section 17(a)(2) as
amended in 1960 by 11 U.S.C.A. § 85:
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts . . . except such as . . . (2) all liabilities for obtaining
(Continued on next page)
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reversing, that the amendment applies to the old money as well as to
the new.
The Court noted that the same section of the Act priorl" to its
amendment in 1960 had been given a liberal construction by Ken-
tucky.' s It then cited two statutes 9 which demonstrate the disfavor
which Kentucky law expresses toward perpetrators of fraud. Next,
going from generalities to particulars, the Court cited a line of non-
Kentucky cases20 which held, under the old wording of the section,
that the creditor could collect both the old money and the new
money. Finally, the Court expressed its belief that the amendment
of the section in itself supported the decision in McDougale, since
the amended section deals expressly with false statements used to in-
duce loans of extensions of prior loans. On the basis of its liberal
position under the original section, and in light of what it considered
a liberalizing amendment by Congress, the Court felt compelled to
adopt what it deemed to be the majority2' view and hold the discharge
ineffective to release any part of the defendant's indebtedness.
The soundness of McDougale is apparent. While the Court was a
little over-defensive in justifying its decision on the basis of the liberal
construction of the original section, and while it belabored the obvious
in reciting Kentucky's disfavor toward fraudulent conduct, the de-
cision is in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Celler Amend-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
money or property by false pretenses or false representations . . . or ob-
taining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially
false statement in writing respecting his financial condition made or pub-
lished ... with intent to deceive.
17 The original wording of Section 17(a) (2) exempted from discharge such
debts as "are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false
representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another ... "
18 The Court was correct in citing the following cases to substantiate this
proposition: Time Fin. Co. v. Nelson, 312 Ky. 255, 227 S.W.2d 189 (1950); Loony
Creek Coal Co. v. Scott, 227 Ky. 328, 12 S.W.2d 852 (1928); Bingham v. Kendall,
228 Ky. 661, 4 S.W.2d 681 (1928).
19 KRS §§ 411.070, 411.090 (1942).20 Eriekson v. Bickmell, 28 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1928); In re Russell, 52 F.2d
749 (D.N.H. 1931); Gregory v. Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 189 Pac. 932 (1920);
Stewart v. Emerson, 52 N.H. 301 (1872); Personal Fin. Co. v. Bruns, 16 N.J.
Super. 133, 84 A.2d 32 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951); Personal Fin. Co. v. Snyder,
131 N.J.L. 597, 37 A.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Elisburg v. Simpson, 173 N.Y.
Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Public Loan Corp. v. Hood, 125 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio
C.P. 1955); National Fin. Co. v. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P.2d 9 (1961).
The weight to which some of these cases are entitled is lessened by close
scrutiny of their operative facts, but they do serve to show that liberal interpreta-
tion of the section was widespread.
21 Citing First Credit Corp. v. Wellnitz, 21 Wis. 2d 18, 128 N.W.2d 519
(1963); M-A-C Loan Plan, Inc. v. Cooper, 23 Conn. Supp. 184, 179 A.2d 313(1961); CHF Fin. Co. v. Jochum, 241 La. 155, 127 So. 2d 534 (1961). The
Jochum case is distinguishable on its facts, but the Wellnitz case, upon which the
Court relied heavily, is squarely in line with the McDougale facts.
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ment. One precautionary word: McDougale presents a factual situa-
tion where the amendment is undoubtedly applicable. Application
may well encounter more difficulties in a case where the equities are
not so clearly on the side of the creditor. For example, applicability
would be doubtful where the lender's insistence on extensive dis-
closure by the borrower "induces" the misrepresentation.
In the remaining contract cases decided last term, the Court ad-
hered to principles already well entrenched. Two such cases involved
the measure of damages arising from the breach of a contract. In
the first of these, Gray v. Mattingly,22 the Court held that the measure
of damages for breach of a building contract is the amount reasonably
necessary to make the building conform to the requirements of the
contract, but not to exceed the difference between market value as it
should have been built and its value as it actually was built. This
holding23 is sound on precedent 24 and is approved by the text
writers.25 The second case involving damages, King v. Holly Oil and
Gas Corp.,26 arose from the breach of a contract whereby the de-
fendant undertook to conduct an experimental water-flooding project.
The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only nominal
damages from the breach.27 It based its holding on two grounds.
First, the contract terms were so unclear as to when performance was
to be begun and completed that it was impossible to ascertain the
date of the breach. Second, the Court believed the subject matter
of the contract was so speculative that damages could not be ascer-
tained. The disposition of the case seems to be sound although at least
some of the cases cited by the Court are not squarely in line with the
King case.28 Either ground is sufficient to make ascertainment of
damages impossible. 29
22 399 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1966).2 3 In addition to the damage issue, the Court also held that an instruction
authorizing a finding of liability up to $4,000 was not prejudicial error where the
jury returned a verdict which did not exceed the highest amount authorized by
the evidence. This holding seems to be clearly in line with precedent. See River
Queen Coal Co. v. Mencer, 379 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1964).
24 State Property and Buildings Comm'n v. H. W. Miller Constr. Co., 385
S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1964); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 76 (1966).
255 CoRBIN, CONTACrS § 1089 (1964); McComancE, DAmAFs § 168
(1935).
26 402 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1966).
27 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1001 (1964) provides:
A plaintiff who has proved the breach of a contractual duty by the
defendant is always entitled to a judgment for damages therefore . . . it
is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the amount of harm that he
has suffered. . . . If he makes no such proof, however, the judgment
in his favor will be for nominal damages only.
28The Court cited North Star Co. v. Howard. 341 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1960);
Midland Gas Corp. v. Refltt, 286 Ky. 11, 149 S.W.2d 537 (1941); Carroll Gas
(Continued on next page)
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The Court disposed of one case which presented a reformation
issue, and one which turned on a question of mutuality of obligation.
The reformation case, Spratt v. Carroll,30 was disposed of under the
established rule3' that one who seeks to have a contract reformed
because of mutual mistake must show the mistake by clear and con-
vincing proof. The Court believed the plaintiff in Spratt failed to
meet this burden of proof, since her whole proof consisted of a
deposition by plaintiffs sister to the effect that she overheard the
plaintiff and defendant orally agree to terms at variance with the
written contract. Spratt is sound in principle as well as precedent. The
statute of frauds32 was not directly applicable in the case but, since
it lurks in the background of any case where reformation of a written
agreement is sought, the one who would so reform the writing should
bear a strict burden of proof.33 In the mutuality case, Coleman v.
Ponticos,34 the result was similarly dictated both by precedent35 and
contract theory.36 The Court simply applied the test by which it is
said that a contract is void for lack of mutuality and hence unenforce-
able only where the parties, or one of them, could abandon the contract
at any time.
37
Other cases decided by the Court involved restitution, termination
of purchase options, formation of a contract to purchase land, and
precipitation of a buyer's promissory note because of fraudulent mis-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
and Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 21 S.W.2d 445 (1929). Howard held on
the facts before it that the evidence of loss was too indefinite to support an as-
sessment of damages, but all three involved instances where the amount of loss
was the sole issue. The Court apparently believed King was governed by dif-
ferent principles, since the undetermined element was the date of the breach
rather than the actual losses incurred. Unfortunately, the speculative nature of
the contract further obscured the picture.
295 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1005, 1020 (1964). Whether the facts of King
actually presented an instance where assessment of damages was impossible is
questionable, since the Kentucky Court has a workable standard for measuringdamages in mineral lease cases. See Midland Gas Corp. v. Reffitt, 286 Ky. 11,
149 S.W.2d 587 (1941). It is submitted, however, th ththe Court was correct in
viewing King as a typical contract damage case, rather than applying the particular
rules for mineral lease cases since the indefinite aspects of King are not thosewhich are rest icted to mineral lease cases.
30 399 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1966).
3' Silver v. Overhead Door Co., 311 Ky. 650, 225 S.W.2d 115 (1949).eoRS §s855.201r(1960)equires written memorandum of a sales con-
tract fo gce 
m Connn, CONRAC'§ 836 (1950); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRTs § 1552
(19W8).
34 394 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1965).3 1 Folver's Bootery v. Selby Shoe Co., 273 Ky. 670, 117 S.W.2d 931 (1938);Rodgers v. Larriore & Perkins, 188 Ky. 468, 222 S.W. 512 (1920); 17 cM.
Jun. 2d Contracts § 104 (1964).3 31A CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963).
37 Springton Coal Co. v. Bowling, 228 Ky. 617, 14 S.W.2d 1082 (1929).
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representations by the seller. In the restitution case3s the Court held,
applying the generally accepted39 rule derived from equity,40 that
where two persons operate a business jointly for a matter of months
without negotiating a contract to govern their relationship, each party
is under a duty to restore to the other his goods to the extent of their
value or proceeds. In the purchase option case 4' the Court applied
the rule which has prevailed in Kentucky for fifty years42 and which
has the support of the writers43 and other courts.44 It held that where
a purchase option was conditioned to remain in effect until a land-
owner tendered a general deed, the option terminated when such a
deed was tendered and rejected. In the case45 involving formation of
a land conveyance contract, the Court held that, where the contract
was between the vendor and a real estate agent purchasing for him-
self, the fact that the contract was on a printed form naming the
purchaser as a real estate agent of the plaintiff, the realtor, would not
render the vendor liable for a brokerage commission. This decision
is laudable as an indication of the Court's willingness to look to the
realities of the situation before it. It was likewise soundly rooted in
precedent.46 The case47 in which precipitation of promissory notes
given for the purchase of stock was sought, though it presented a
complex factual maze,48 actually amounted to no more than a holding
that a contracting party must exercise reasonable care to protect him-
self and, more specifically, that a party should examine the seller's
records when they are available to him. The propriety of the decision
is unquestionable.
In one case49 the Court considered the issue of priority between an
38 Herman v. Jackson, 405 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1966).
39 See S TATEMENT, CoNTRACTS § 326 (1932); 5 WmLmroN, CoNTrAc-rs
§§ 1458-59 (1938).40 
"The equitable doctrine underlying the rule concerning restitution is that
a benefit conferred through a mistake of law or of fact must be restored." 77
C.J.S. Restitution at 322 (1952). See, e.g., Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Meyer,
301 Ky. 487, 192 S.W.2d 388 (1946).41 Phelps v. Cover, 394 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1965).
42 Stewart v. Gardner, 152 Ky. 120, 153 S.W. 3 (1913).
43 See RESTATEMENT, CoNTrArcrs § 35 (1932).
44 91 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 10 (1955).
45 Curtis v. Spadie, 399 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1966).4 6 Batts v. Snook, 268 Ky. 682, 105 S.W.2d 843 (1937).47 McClure v. Young, 396 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1965).48 In McClure the suit was brought by the seller for breach of contract. The
purchaser sought to have the amount of the debt precipitated for the reason
that the seller had fradulently misrepresented the cost of constructing the building
owned by the close corporation. The record reveals a series of transactions in-
volving inter- and intra-corporate manipulations which obscure the clarity of the
decision. It appears, however, that the purchaser had complete access to the
corporation's books during the negotiations which preceeded the sale.
49 Johnson Lumber Co. v. Stovall, 394 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1965).
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unrecorded materialman's lien and a recorded mortgage lien. Since
the materialman had not complied with the statutory 5 filing require-
ments and since the mortgagee was not chargeable with notice that
the builder was not paying his debts, although he did have notice that
work was being done on the property, the mortgage was given
priority. The holding is in accordance with precedent 51 and reflects
the position taken by most courts.52
Finally, the Court invoked in two cases53 the established rule of
construction 54 whereby contracts are construed in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of their terms and in such a manner as to implement
the parties' intention as it appears from the writing. In three other
cases55 it found the lower court's decision supported by substantive
evidence and on that ground refused to disturb the findings made
below.
5OKRS § 376.010 (1952).
51 Collier v. Dillon, 313 Ky. 244, 230 S.W.2d 617 (1950).
52 59 CJ.S. Mortgages § 254 (1949).
53 Mayes v. Coe, 402 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1966); Accurate Answering Serv. v.
Answering Serv., Inc., 394 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1965).
5 See, e.g., 17 AM. Jun. 2d Contracts § 241 (1964). Bradford v. Billington,
299 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1962); Whitlow v. Whitlow, 267 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1954);
Taylor v. Rosenthal, 308 Ky. 4, 213 S.W.2d 435 (1948).
55 Ori v. Steele, 399 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1966); BSY Co. v. Fuel Economy
Eng'r Co., 399 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1965); Ford v. Gilbert, 397 S.W.2d 41 (Ky.
1965).
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VIII. CRIMINAL LAW AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Search and Seizure
In the recent decision of Lane v. Commonwealth- the Court of Ap-
peals held that any search made incidental to an arrest for a minor
traffic violation is illegal, even though conducted against a nonowner
of the vehicle, and that no evidence obtained as a result of such a
search is admissible in a criminal prosecution. In a companion case
to that decision,2 the Court clarified its position by adding that the
Lane rule does not prevent the admission of evidence obtained where
no search is necessary for its discovery. During the past term, the
Court unequivocally affirmed these precedents. Appellant in Johns v.
Commonwealth3 had a reputation as a bootlegger. When he was
arrested for reckless driving, the arresting officer repeatedly requested
him to open the trunk of his car. Appellant reluctantly acquiesced
and the officer discovered a large quantity of beer. The Court
emphasized that there was no reasonable basis for the search of the
car in connection with a charge of reckless driving. Moreover, in
view of the fact that the beer was not plainly visible to the officer,
appellant was the victim of an illegal search and seizure, and his
conviction should therefore be reversed.
Commonwealth v. Mayfield4 presented a situation in which de-
fendant-victim of the illegal search and seizure was not the owner of
the vehicle searched but merely the one in control of the vehicle. The
Court held that non-ownership is of no consequence since the victim
of such a search is entitled to the same rights as the owner, namely,
to have the evidence obtained by the search suppressed.
It has been held in the federal courts that the fourth amendment
exclusion rule 5 is fundamentally a means of protecting privacy and
securing property, i.e., a personal protection. Therefore, to avail him-
self of that protection, one must establish the invasion of his own right
to property6 or privacy.7 He must be the one against whom the search
1386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1965).
2 Clark v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1965).
3 394 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1965).
4 394 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1965).
5 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
0 United States v. Lee Wan Nam, 274 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1960).
7 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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was directed or a victim of the seizure, and not merely a person
claiming prejudice through the use of evidence gathered as a conse-
quence of a search and seizure directed at another.8 Ownership of the
property searched is not necessary in order to give a right to object
to a search9 and not even consent on the part of the owner will sanction
a search against the non-owner while the latter is legally in possession
of the vehicle.10 Conversely, since an interest in the property is ordin-
arily a prerequisite for the giving of consent," the non-owner may not
waive the protection afforded the owner. Thus it appears that the
Lane and Mayfield decisions are well grounded in precedent.
Again, in Collins v. Commonwealth,12 the Court reaffirmed its ad-
dendum to the Lane and Mayfield doctrines by holding that, if an
officer stops a car for a traffic violation, he can search the car for
evidence of other offenses only if the incriminating evidence can be
readily seen and is in view of the officer. Of course, incriminating
evidence found on the person or in the immediate area following an
arrest based on probable cause is admissible despite the fact that no
warrant was obtained.13 Likewise where an officer stops a vehicle and
by shining his flashlight through the window recognizes certain
property alleged to have been stolen, the statements of the officer as
to having seen the property will be sufficient to constitute probable
cause for obtaining a warrant for arrest.14 But where there is no
evidence obtained incidental to the arrest and no search was made
that disclosed any incriminating evidence, the defendant is in no way
prejudiced by the search arrest.15
B. Double Jeopardy
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Bartkus v.
Illinois0 that an indictment and acquittal in a federal district court for
robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association did not
preclude a subsequent trial and conviction for the same offense in
the state courts of Illinois. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the 5-4
majority, traced a long line of precedents upholding the dual rights
8 Ibid.
9 United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
'o Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
" Taylor v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1966); See Annot., 78
A.L.R.2d 246 (1961).
12396 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1965).
'Wilson v. Commonvealth, 403 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1966).
14 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 394 S.V.2d 895 (Ky. 1965).
1r Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1965).
16359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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involved. The case has been much criticized,17 but it is still the law.
This year, the case of Hall v. Commonwealth'8 placed the "separate
sovereignties" question squarely before the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
In Hall the defendant was convicted in Ohio of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor and was subsequently convicted of the same
offense in Kentucky. The facts on the record are not copious, and the
comment here is only on the court's assertion that, though the
delinquency may have been a continuing course of conduct culmi-
nating in the Ohio conviction, "such portion of the conduct occurring
in Greenup County, Kentucky, and contributing to the delinquency of
the minor could be prosecuted in Greenup County."
Though the holding is in line with the prevailing national standard,
the Court unfortunately chose to adhere to the Bartkus rule. Various
arguments can be made against the standard. First, the right against
double jeopardy was designed to prevent the persecution of an
individual by repeated trials for essentially the same crime. An
accused should not be harrassed with the anxiety and expense of
continuous prosecution. Furthermore if the hypothesis be accepted
that the likelihood of a conviction increases in direct proportion to the
number of trials, the probability that an innocent man may be con-
victed must correspondingly increase. Thirdly, an individual should
be regarded as having the right to rely on the finality of a judicial
determination. Finally, the achievement of certainty and finality is
essential to the courts themselves. To try a man over and over again
for the same offense taints the system with a spirit of vindictiveness
and revenge which undermines respect for the whole judicial pro-
cess.
19
Ultimately, however, the problem of double jeopardy is not one
that may be dispensed with merely by exhortations to fairness,
decency, and the conscience of mankind.20 Dual allegiance is an
inescapable attribute of a federal system. From this axiom the corol-
lary necessarily follows that a single act may very well be injurious to
the interests of two or more states. But that similar conflicts in the
context of civil action arise daily and are resolved must surely im-
17 See Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and The Intruding Con-
stitution, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 591 (1961); Franck, An International Lawyer Looks
at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1096 (1959); Review, The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, 73 HAuv. L. REv. 157 (1959).
18 402 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1966). For right of a sovereign to try an accused
several times for multiple crimes growing out of a single occasion, see Ciucci v.
Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
19 See Fisher, supra note 17 at 592-94, quoted in LocmHAET, KAmsAn &
CHOPER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 842 (1964).20 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
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press on us that the success of the federal system depends finally on
cooperation between sovereigns. The spirit of full faith and credit
should extend to criminal prosecutions, but each affected state should
be allowed to contribute to the full presentation of all the evidence at
a single trial in the court mutually adjudged most appropriate. The
opportunity existed in Hall to articulate these considerations and to
establish the Kentucky rule against double jeopardy at a level of pro-
tection for the individual comparable to that recently established by
the Supreme Court for search and seizure,21 self-incrimination, 22 and
confession.23
In two other cases the Kentucky Court faced the question of
whether an indictment on two crimes somewhat similar to each other
constitutes double jeopardy. In both cases the Court held it did not.
The test used is that, if proof of one indictment would not sustain the
other, there are two distinct offenses, and the defendant is not pro-
tected by the privilege.24
The Court ruled in Runyon v. Commonwealth25 that a previous
acquittal on a charge of embezzlement did not preclude a conviction
of submitting a false claim to a political subdivision. In Schweinefuss
v. Commonwealth226 the same decision was reached on indictments for
pandering and for aiding and abetting prostitution. It is regretted
that more documentation and reasoning was not provided. No cases
were cited in Runyon; the Court merely stated summarily that proof
of the elements of one crime would not sustain the other. In
Schweinefuss the Court cited Adams v. Commonwealth2 as pre-
cedent. Adams supports the Court's ruling by dictum. A Kentucky
case, Lutes v. Commonwealth28 in discussing the offense of procuring,
apparently laid down a contrary rule to that of Schweinefuss and
Adams when it spoke of a panderer or procurer as one who "abets,
aids, finds, introduces... ."29 The Court of Appeals made no mention
of Lutes.
In Commonwealth v. Devine,3 0 the Commonwealth successfully
appealed from a directed verdict for acquittal on charges of hunting
rabbits out of season and hunting rabbits with headlights. KRS
21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).22 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).23 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).2 4 Easley v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Ky. 1958).
25 393 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1965).
26 395 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1965).
27313 Ky. 298, 231 S.W.2d 55 (1950).
28236 Ky. 549, 33 S.W.2d 620 (1930).
29 Id. at 553, 33 S.W.2d at 622.
30 396 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1965).
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21.140(3) permits appeal by the Commonwealth from adverse rulings
where such an appeal does not constitute double jeopardy. The Court
has construed this statute to permit appeals not only for certification
of the law, but also for appeal in misdemeanor cases punishable by
fine alone.
The proposition apparently had its beginning in Commonwealth
v. Keathly.3' Section 852 of the criminal code provided that "a judg-
ment on a verdict of acquittal, the punishment of which is imprison-
ment, shall not be reversed." From this negative rule, the court
construed positively that where imprisonment could not be a part of
the punishment, the Commonwealth could appeal. The authorities
indicate that Kentucky is the only jurisdiction holding that such an
appeal does not place one twice in jeopardy of 'life or limb."32
The reasoning of the Court should be reconsidered. A heavy fine
can be equally as oppressive to life or limb as a ten day jail sentence.
The distinction is artificially subtle. In this case, the maximum
penalties were, respectively, fines of $100 and $1,000. Should the
defendant be convicted in the subsequent trial and be financially
unable to pay the penalty, he might be incarcerated in the county
jail for as long as 1,100 days. An indigent is generally permitted to
pay off his fine with a jail term credited at $1.00 per day.33
It was, perhaps, the success in the Devine case which encouraged
the Commonwealth to challenge the very guts of the double jeopardy
privilege in Commonwealth v. Mullins.34 Defendants were convicted
of murder. The conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded
for a new trial. When both sides rested in the subsequent trial, the
defendants' motion for a directed verdict was granted. The Common-
wealth, claiming the grant of the directed verdict was erroneous, asked
the Court of Appeals to re-examine the rationale of the principle that
an accused might not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
The Commonwealth advanced the theory that the trial judge had
wielded the most awesome power of which he was capable-the
power to absolve an accused of guilt- and that absolute power may
no more be tolerated when invoked wrongly against society in favor
of a criminal defendant than when invoked wrongfully in favor of
society and against a criminal defendant. The argument was that
31 82 S.W. 1001 (Ky. 1904) (not otherwise reported).
32 See 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 215 (1965); 157 A.L.R. Criminal
Law § 77, at 1065 (1945); Mayers and Yarbrough. Bis Vexaris New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAJv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1960).
83 See KRS § 441.190 (1942). Other provisions for payment for labor by
prisoners at $2 or $8 per day are made in KRS § 431.150 (1942), and IRS
§ 441.180 (1942).
34 405 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1966).
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jeopardy should not attach until the accused has had a fair trial, and
that jeopardy is single and continues until such time as a fair trial has
been accomplished. 35
The Court affirmed the acquittal and adhered forthrightly to the
concept that a jury verdict, whether a directed one or not, is a final
judgment from which no appeal for error may be taken. The ruling of
the Court was unquestionably correct, but it may be noted that in
this challenge to a fundamental principle of jurisprudence is illustrated
the very tenuous nature of the Bill of Rights. 36 The forces chipping
away at these freedoms under the guise of public policy and ex-
pediency are ever at work.
C. Right to a Speedy Trial
In Dupin v. Commonwealth37 defendant moved under RCr 11.4238
to vacate judgment against him for failure of the Commonwealth to
grant a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The
propriety of the refusal to vacate judgment is not questioned. Rule
11.42 does not pretend to grant relief for every discrepancy in the
trial or inroad on due process. Only violations which may have had
some bearing on the legality or fundamental fairness of the trial may
be considered. Probably the movant could not satisfy such require-
ments here.
However, the rule expressed in this case and in a previous case
decided in this session of the Court,39 that failure to demand an early
trial constitutes waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, is
questionable. The case reaffirms the holding in Barker v. Common-
wealth,40 a case decided during the 1964-1965 session, in which the
Court laid down four factors relevant to consideration of whether
denial of a speedy trial assumes due process proportions: 1) the length
of the delay; 2) the prejudice to the defendant; 3) the reason for the
delay; 4) waiver by the defendant. The rule is the prevailing one in
most United States jurisdictions.41 Its practical effect is to place on
35 Id., at 29.30 In one other case, Jones v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1966),
the Court affirmed that the state's Habitual Criminal Statute is not unconstitutional
as placing an accused in double jeopardy. The Court reasoned that the mere in-
creasing of the penalty, where one has been previously convicted of the prime
offense, does not constitute double jeopardy.
37404 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966).38 Provisions of RCr 11.42 are set out above. See text of Section IX at note
170 for a more complete discussion.
30 La Vigne v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1966).
40.385 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964).
41 See Walton v. Bradley, 386 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1965); Note, 57 CoLuxr. L.
REv. 846, 853-55 (1957).
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the accused the burden of showing that the delay was not for proper
cause. It seems to establish a presumption that any delay was for a
lawful cause.
The better rule is that the burden of initiating and carrying
through the litigation is the responsibility of the state and in no
respect is the defendant responsible for bringing his case to trial.42
Since the guidelines establishing reasonable or unreasonable delay are
determined by the circumstances of each particular case,43 the
prosecutor should properly bear the responsibility for scheduling his
cases at the appropriate period. It seems both unfair and practically
impossible to require the defendant to expedite his own trial. This
latter consideration was present in Green v. Commonwealth.44 The
Court held that, where a defendant pleaded guilty in 1959 to illegal
possession of liquor for purpose of sale in local option territory and
in 1965 a judgment of conviction was entered for one year imprison-
ment, the delay in sentencing was unreasonable. The Court stipulated
that orderly procedure and due process require sentencing without un-
reasonable delay. If delay is not purposeful or oppressive, sentencing
two years after conviction has not been unreasonable.45 In Green, the
delay was regarded as a calculated one. The trial judge necessarily
had to know there had been no sentence imposed when the motion
for a new trial was overruled and the case stricken from the docket.
Apparently, the judge here was acting as his own self-styled probation
officer.40
D. Other Constitutional Questions
Four cases, which seemed to defy classification elsewhere, are
discussed in this section.
In Commonwealth v. Allen,47 the state appealed for certification of
the law from a dismissal on a charge of operating a lottery in violation
of KRS 486.860(2). The Court of Appeals reversed. Defendant was
indicted for operating a scheme of "referral selling" in which salesmen
solicited names of possible future customers from present customers.
The person submitting the name was assured some prize if a sale was
42 State v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
43See Ex Parte Trull, 133 Kan. 165, 298 Pac. 775 (1931); State v. Kuhn-
hausen, 201 Ore. 506, 272 P.2d 225 (1954).
44400 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1966).
45Pollard v. White, 352 U.S. 354 (1957).46 In another Kentucky case, Runyon v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.2d 877
(1965). the Court reasoned that appellant's right to a speedy trial had not been
violated if five months elapsed between indictment and trial.
47 404 S.W,2d 464 (Ky. 1966).
[Vol. 55,
COuRT oF APPEALs REviEw
effected to the referral. The decision preceded the 1966 amendment48
to the statute which clearly made such a scheme illegal.
The decision cannot be applauded. A lottery involves a payment of
a price for a chance to gain a prize.49 The Court conceded that the
price-change element is necessary but found this element "permeating
the whole scheme." The customer took a chance (a) that the referent
would not be interested, (b) that the salesmen would not adequately
make their presentations, (c) that the referent might already have
been referred to, (d) that the market might be saturated, and (e) that
the salesmen might not ever contact the referent. If satisfying these
criteria does, in fact, constitute the operation of a game of chance,
then every business in any state is an illegal one. Regardless of the
public policy involved in referral selling, such a plan was most
certainly not a lottery before the 1966 amendment to the applicable
statute. It is readily conceded that the Legislature had every right to
outlaw the plan if it chose to do so, but the violations charged here
preceded that amendment. In 1964, referral selling was nothing more
than a quite profitable method of passing on to the customer part of the
merchandising aspect of a business. It was no more a game of chance
than buying a share of stock. The reasoning here is artificial and
indicates that the Court was more interested in rendering a pre facto
effect to the policy of the 1966 amendment than in considering the
merits of the precise case before it.
In Commonwealth v. Hall,50 the Court held that the state statute
making the mere status of narcotics addiction a criminal offense was in
violation of the eighth amendment to the federal constitution and
invalid. The case, like Allen, was an appeal from a dismissal in the
trial court for a certification of the law.51 The holding in the case
cannot be criticized, though the grounds for the disposition are not
48 See KRS § 436.360 (1966).
49 The term "lottery" clearly requires the payment of a consideration in order
to be eligible for an award thereof by chance. See Wells v. J.C. Penny Co., 250
F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1957); Commonwealth v. Malco-Memphis Theaters, Inc., 293
Ky. 531, 169 S.W.2d 596 (1943); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 159 Ky. 80, 166
S.W.2d 794 (1914).
50 394 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1965).
51 The applicable statute was KRS § 218.250 (1946) which, omitting sub-
section (2) authorizing probation, reads as follows:(1) Any person who habitually uses narcotics as defined in KRS
218.010 shall be imprisoned in the workhouse or county jail for twelve
months.
(3) Any peace officer who apprehends a person under the influence of
a narcotic drug, or who hears a person state that he is addicted to the
use of narcotics, shall immediately arrest such person and take him be-
fore the proper court to be dealt with according to law.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
clear. It is only in the headnote for the case that any reference is made
to the eighth amendment. Presumably the reference is to the
privilege against cruel and unusual punishment, but no elucidation is
given in the text. Robinson v. California,52 a 1962 Supreme Court case
which held a similar California statute unconstitutional on eighth
amendment grounds, is apparently the controlling precedent. The
Court, in suggesting to the Legislature a number of valid enactments
which might replace the statute, cites cases from other jurisdictions53
for the proposition that similar legislation might have been held opera-
tive had it required proof of actual use of narcotics within the state.54
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,55 defendant appealed from a con-
viction of storehouse breaking on grounds that his joint prosecution
with a co-defendant violated the fifth amendment safeguard against
self-incrimination. Defendant voluntarily entered into the joint pro-
secution and declined to move for a separate trial. When the co-
defendant testified for himself the appellant made no objection or
motion to admonish the jury that the witness' testimony should be
disregarded as it pertained to appellant. At the close of the evidence
appellant requested such an instruction.
In holding that the request came too late, the Court pointed out
that by failing to ask for a separate trial the defendant must be said to
have assumed the hazards of the joint trial. The defendant should
52370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); State ex rel. Bloin v.
Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368 (1963); State v. Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191
A.2d 43 (1963).
54The Hall case is part of the newly emerging constitutional controversy
concerning the so-called 'status crimes." Many states have made unlawful the
quality or condition of: narcotic addiction (e.g., KRS § 218.250 [1946], ) the statute
interdicted in Hall), public drunkenness (e.g., KRS § 244.020 [1938] ), and
vagrancy (e.g., KRS § 436.520 [1940] ). Since the Supreme Court in Robinson
held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to make the status of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense, at least two circuit courts of appeal have ruled that
criminal prosecution of a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness is also a
violation of the eighth amendment of the federal constitution. Easter v. District
of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761
(4th Cir. 1966). See 55 Ky. L. J. 201 (1966). The Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari to a California appellant who was challenging the consti-
tutionality of a state statute which provided for punishment of chronic
alcoholics for public drunkenness. Budd v. California, 35 U.S.L. ,VxE 3139
(U.S. Oct. 18, 1966). Justices Fortas and Douglas dissented from the denial of
certiorari. The Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of state
statutes which make vagrancy a crime. But see Hicks v. District of Columbia. 197
A.2d 154. cert. granted, 379 U.S. 998 (1965), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 383 U.S. 252 (1966). Hicks involved the question of whether the Dis-
trict of Columbia vagrancy statute is void for vagueness. Justice Douglas, in a
dissent to the dismissal of certiorari, said: "I do not see how economic or social
status can be made a crime any more than being a drug addict can be."
55 403 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1966).
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reasonably have anticipated that his co-defendant would want to
testify on his own behalf, and that perhaps this evidence might in-
criminate him.
The case raises a latent due process issue which affects all trials
of multiple defendants. Where one lawyer must defend several
accused persons should the court ever permit a single trial? It is sub-
mitted that the possibilities of conflicting interests require a sum-
mary order for separation.
In Roe v. Commonwealth,"6 the Court of Appeals struck down the
Kentucky statute regulating nudist societies. The Court held that
state laws57 requiring a 20-foot brick, stone, or cement wall around
the society's premises and payment of an annual tax of $1,000 by
persons owning or operating the society were unconstitutional as an
unreasonable exercise of police power. The Court indicated by way
of dictum that the legislature could have obtained its objectives by
far less stringent and more "reasonable" methods.
A study of recent Kentucky cases shows that the Court of Appeals
has generally refused to strike down state regulatory legislation on
grounds of reasonableness.58 It is questionable whether it should have
done so on the grounds discussed here. A long line of Supreme Court
precedents under the federal constitution holds that a state legislature
has the right to pass any legislation it chooses, unless that legislation
conflicts with some specific prohibition covered by the Bill of Rights,
federal due process, the supremacy clause, or the like.59 The opinion
does not intimate that any such conflict existed for the instant
statutes,60 nor do the texts of the opinions cited by the Court as
56405 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1966).5 7 See KRS §§ 232.010-.050 (1942).58 See Puckett v. City of Muldraugh, 403 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1966); Moore v.
Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709
(Ky. 1964).
59 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel.
Western Reference and Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also HAND, TnE BmL OF RiGn-rs 70 (1958),
which states:judges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before
them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into
consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial
stomach. On the contrary, they wrap up their veto in a protective veil
of adjectives such as "arbitrary," "artificial," "normal," "reasonable,"
"inherent," "fundamental," or "essential," whose office usually, though
quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a
derivation far more impressive than their personal preferences, which are
all that in fact lie behind the decision.
60 The thrust of the Court's argument goes solely to the police power aspect,
but the case presented grave constitutional questions on the rights of freedom
of religion and freedom of assembly. Appellants offense consisted of conducting
a church service on property situate in a remote section of Greenun County and
(Continued on next page)
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precedent indicate any such conflict. If, then, the statutes are un-
constitutional under the state police powers, it must be because the
Court of Appeals has limited the scope of the powers by specifications
more restrictive than those of the Supreme Court.
Somewhere along the way the Court has apparently equated the
prohibition against exercise of arbitrary power in section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution 61 with a general requirement of "reasonable-
ness" in the exercise of the police powers. In the first place, such a
vague and indefinite criterion does not provide any sort of precise
formula or automatic mechanism for deciding cases. The restrictive
connotations of the term, however, (which in other contexts have been
used to expand the Court's power inordinately, see, e.g., Moore v.
Ward,62 and Jasper v. Commonwealth,63) are a plain recognition of the
fact that the state legislature is to have the broadest leeway in areas
where it has a general constitutional competence to act. Secondly, if
comparison with other jurisdictions can be a factor in determining
the "reasonableness" of discrimination in a state law, then, whatever
may be one's personal opinion, the statute is probably "reasonable."M
Even the Court concedes that had the Legislature chosen to abolish
the societies altogether it perhaps could have done so.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
belonging to the appellants. The property was visible from a surrounding ridge
on which sightseers carrying binoculars had assembled. Appellants had circulated
an application for membership in their church, but only the property owners
were participating in the service at the time of arrest. A sign warning people of
the nudist church had also been posted on the road to the area. The attorneys'
briefs indicate that appellants were sincere in their belief that certain Bible
texts called upon them to establish their church. Reference is made to the fact
that Adam and Eve were without raiment before the first sin, that King
Solomon prophesied in the nude, that Christ's clothing was taken from him when
he was crucified (Matthew 27: 31) and that in the third chapter of Isaiah it is
written that all clothing will be taken from the people on the day of judgment
and that ruin shall await those rulers who wear clothing (King James version).
The Kentucky Constitution, § 5 reads in part:
.. .and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall be
taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his
belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teaching. No human
authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights
of conscience.6 1 
Ky. CONST. § 2. "Absolute and arbitrary power denied. Absolute and
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen, exists nowhere in a
republic, not even in the largest majority.
62 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964).
63 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
64 The best examples of such permitted discriminations are United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding a special tax on the production or
distribution of narcotics); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (up-
holding a federal tax of $.10 per pound on colored oleomargarine while uncolored
oleo was taxed at $.005 per pound). See also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S.(8 Wall) 533 (1869) (upholding a prohibitive tax on state bank notes).
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Although the Court is to be commended for its dislike of the craw-
fish policy of driving an undesirable cult out of business by the taxing
and police powers, historically this has not been a justifiable reason
under federal due process for holding a statute unconstitutional. It
is submitted that section 2 of the state constitution is but shorthand for
the federal due process requirement and should be governed by the
same rules.6 5 Such reasoning as the Court relies on here must neces-
sarily end by being no more than a judicial attempt to write into
state laws and the state constitution the Court's notions of good public
policy. It is a power which no constitution confers upon any court
in the land.
65 See Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 885 where the Court said: "due
process . . . of the Federal Constitution, is simply another way of presenting the
argument that the Act is arbitrary under section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution."
See also Pritchett v. Marshall, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1963); 16 AM. Jim. 2d Con-
stitutional Law § 266 (1964).
IX. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Right To Counsel
The past year saw several cases which were squarely within the
problems created by recent Supreme Court rulings on self-incrimina-
tion and right to counsel. This section of the Court of Appeals Re-
view will consider the serious constitutional issues in these Ken-
tucky cases. In doing so, Escobedo v. Illinois' and its relation to these
cases will be discussed first, followed by examination of the latest
Supreme Court case, Miranda v. Arizona,2 its implications for future
state court cases, and a short discussion of the problems left unsolved.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that every accused shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel in
criminal proceedings. 3 Gideon v. Wainwright4 made this right to
counsel obligatory upon the States through the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, the 1963 Gideon decision was merely the opening
statement in what has become a series of attempts to settle problems
surrounding an accused's right to counsel.
One year later, the Supreme Court in the landmark decision of
Escobedo v. Illinois5 attempted to pinpoint the exact moment when
the right to counsel attached. This case has become the subject of
sometimes heated, sometimes scholarly, debate and interpretation.6
Both state and federal courts, in assessing Escobedo's implications,
severely split on their conclusions.1 One line of courts has given a
liberal interpretation to the broad language of Mr. Justice Goldberg
in Escobedo:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
1878 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-joy the right.., to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
4372 U.S. 385 (1963).
5 878 U.S. 478 (1964).6 See, e.g., KAzmsAE, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in CRMINAL JUsMTcE nr I Oa Tom (1965);
Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth Amendment Code of
Criminal Procedure, 56 J. Cm. L., C. & P. S. 156 (1965); Enker & Elsen,
Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49
MiNN. L. REv. 47 (1964); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on
Police Interrogations, 25 Omo ST. L. J. 449 (1964).
7 Compare United States v. Childress, 847 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1965) with
Collins v. Beto, 848 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1965). Compare People v. Dorado, 42
Cal. Rptr. 169, 62 Cal. 2d 850, 398 P.2d 361 (1965) with People v. Hartgraves,
81 Ill. 2d 875, 202 N.E.2d 38 (1964).
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incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an
opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the
accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ....
From such language, these courts determined that, when the
process has focused on the accused with the purpose of eliciting
incriminating statements, the right to counsel attaches without any
action by the accused. 9 Other courts attempted to limit the Escobedo
decision to its facts.10 These courts, relying on the Escobedo language
that the accused must have "requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his [retained] lawyer. . . ,"11 found that Escobedo did
not apply to situations where there is no retained counsel 12 nor in
either situation-retained or appointed- 13 unless a request has been
made. 14 These restrictive interpretations have been subjected to
stinging criticism by the commentators.1 5 However, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals followed the narrow view in deciding cases during
the 1965-66 term.'
One of these decisions, Scamahorne v. Commonwealth,7 involved
the admissibility of an oral confession obtained during in-custody
interrogation. The accused did not "request" counsel either before or
after the questioning which led to an oral confession. However, when
asked to transcribe his oral confession, he refused and requested
counsel. Defendant was convicted on the basis of his oral confession.
8 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
9 A more liberal interpretation is given in United States ex rel. Russo v. New
Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965); Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1964); DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964); Cruz v. Delgado, 233
F. Supp. 944 (Puerto Rico 1964); People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 62 Cal.
2d 338, 398 P.2d 361 (1965); State v. Adams, 400 P.2d 556 (Ore. 1965); State
v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557, modified, 398 P.2d 482 (Ore. 1965); State v. Dujour,
206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965).
10 A narrow reading is given in United States v. Robinson, 354 F.2d 109(2d Cir. 1965); Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965); Davis v.
North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Townsend v.
Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964); People v. Hartgraves, 31 MI1. 2d 375, 202
N.E.2d 33 (1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); Parker v. Warden,
203 A.2d 418 (Md. 1964); State v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964); Bean
v. State, 898 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); Hodgson v. New Jersey, 207 A.2d 542(N.J. 1965); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.S.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852 (1965); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Linde v. Maroney, 206 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1965); Browne v.
State, 131 N.W.2d 169 (Wis. 1964).
11378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
12 See cases cited note 10 supra.
13 Ibid.
'4 See 54 Ky. L.J. 602 (1966) and cases cited therein.
15 Note, 79 HIv. L. REV. 935, 1002 (1965).
16 Smith v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1966). For other narrow
interpretations see cases cited note 10 supra.
17394 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1965).
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The Court of Appeals, seizing upon the defendant's failure to request
counsel, distinguished Escobedo and affirmed. The Court then entered
into an extended analysis of the waiver of right to counsel, concluding
that, if any intelligent person who should know of his right to counsel
fails to request it, there will be a presumption of waiver.' This ap-
proach leaves unanswered the question of the degree of intelligence
required for the presumption of waiver to apply. In Scamahorne,
the Court "found" the requisite intelligence by commenting on the
defendants' behavior during the commission of the crime.
They had the intelligence to operate their automobile; leave it parked
a mile from the crime; to grovel across a back field where no one was
expected to see them; to sack up a 25-pound sledge hammer, a crow
bar, a screw driver and other tools; to get to the back of the building
wherein there was a possibility there was money; to run and hide behind
the evergreens when the lights from the police cruiser appeared; to put
up their hands when flashed on them, and ask the officers not to shoot.
We think the appellants were sufficiently intelligent to know that any-
thing they admitted could be used against them, and to know they
had a right to counsel and a right to waive counsel.' 9
The Court's application of the test leads one to conclude that it
believes the mechanics of pulling a heist are on an intellectual par
with constitutional interpretation. Clearly there are conceptual and
practical difficulties presented by use of the objective tort test of the
hypothetically reasonable man, i.e., "known or should have known.
This conclusion was borne out in a later case involving the ad-
missibility of a written confession. 20 In that case, no warning was
given the accused of his right to remain silent or to have counsel. The
interrogating officers testified that they did not warn the defendant
because they already "knew" he had earlier made an oral confession.
The Court, considering this along with the fact that the defendant had
not testified to the circumstances of his oral confession, presumed there-
fore that it must have been completely voluntary. By making this
presumption, the Court skirted the problem of right to counsel at
interrogation. Moreover, it lapsed into an obiter discussion, saying
that Escobedo applied only where the defendant requested counsel
and this request was denied.21
This decision put on the accused the burden of proving the in-
voluntary character of a confession, despite the Supreme Court's
words in Carnley v. Cochran:22 "[I]t is settled that where the as-
18 Id. at 116-17.
19 Ibid.2 0 Smith v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1966).
21 Id. at 688.
22369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
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sistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request." Although Carnley
involved counsel at the trial stage, it seems that after Escobedo the
proposition would apply with equal force during interrogation to help
the accused not only utilize his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination but also generally prepare his defense.
Further, Escobedo stated that the right to representation, to be
effective, must be provided early and that, so far as the defendant is
concerned, the time commencing immediately after arrest is one of
the most critical stages in the criminal process. At this stage the ar-
restee can be taken to a back room of a police station for interrogation.
The proceedings conducted in those rooms are not of record, and the
only transcript of them is the policemen's testimony. At this point,
the clear effect of the Kentucky Court's decision is to place on the
accused the burden of proving the confession involuntary. In reality,
the police have conducted an unrecorded trial in the stationhouse and
merely give their oral version of it when called to testify. It was with
respect to this "Kangaroo Court" that Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking
for the majority in Escobedo, wrote:
The rule sought by the state here, however, would make the trial no
more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the "right to use
counsel" at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all
practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial ex-
amination.23
The only way to avoid an unequal swearing contest between police-
men and a lone defendant as to what occurred in the stationhouse is
to place on the state the burden of proving the confession was
voluntary. Thus, it seems that the Court of Appeals' approach in this
second case again went contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of
Escobedo.
The question of waiver was involved in still a third case decided
last term by the Court. In Hamilton v. Commonwealth,24 the de-
fendant was in the custody of military authorities. Prior to questioning,
they warned the defendant of his right to remain silent. After they
read to the defendant a statement of a co-defendant which implicated
him, he requested counsel. At this point, the questioning officer,
following the mandate of Escobedo, stopped the interrogation and
attempted to obtain counsel for the accused. Unable to do so, the
officer informed the accused that after a request was made the law
did not permit further questioning and he would be forced to surrender
23 378 U.S. at 487.
24 401 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1966).
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the accused to the custody of the civilian authorities. Informed of
this propsect, the accused waived his right, and the subsequent
interrogation led to his "voluntary" confession. This confession was
admitted into evidence in the state criminal prosecution which re-
sulted in a conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, after con-
cluding that the procedures in Hamilton met all the requirements of
Escobedo. Undoubtedly, this is a close case, as the accused was
warned of his right to remain silent, and he also exhibited a know-
ledge of his constitutional rights when he requested counsel even
though the officers had not informed him of this right. The Court
found that the waiver was made with full knowledge of the con-
sequences and therefore lawful. Under a liberal interpretation of
Escobedo, the question would be whether the officers' whipsawing
the accused between continuing with interrogation and being turned
over to state police was implied coercion which caused the waiver of
right to counsel and rendered the confession inadmissible.
The previous discussion does not show the present state of the
law on the admissibility of statements obtained through in-custody
interrogation. A Supreme Court decision on June 18, 1966, has helped
clear the muddied waters in this area. This decision, Miranda v.
United States,25 made crystal clear the Supreme Court's intention to
enforce all of the essential principles of the Bill of Rights through the
fourteenth amendment at the exact point where individual freedom
comes into conflict with police powers. The judge-made rules of
Miranda do not apply to the three Kentucky cases decided last term
nor to any case in which the trial was held before June 13, 1966.26
However, even though Miranda is not retroactive, it is hoped that the
Kentucky Court, when deciding pre-Miranda cases, will apply Esco-
bedo liberally and give effect to the spirit of Miranda. Since Kentucky
practicioners now have, and the Court of Appeals will soon have, cases
in which Miranda is the applicable law, it is advisable to briefly dis-
cuss the case, its specific holding and a few of the unresolved problems.
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested and taken to a
Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining
witness. The police then took him to Interrogation Room No. 2 of the
detective bureau, where he was questioned by two police officers. The
officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised of his right to
have an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers had obtained
a written confession, signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement
25 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
26Johnson v. New Jersey, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966) (Miranda held to apply
only to cases coming to trial after June 13, 1966).
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was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made volun-
tarily, without threats or promises of immunity, and "with full know-
ledge of all my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may
be used against me."2 7 At the trial, the written confession was admitted
into evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers
testified as to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during the
interrogation. Miranda was found guilty. Holding that Miranda's
constitutional rights were not violated, the Supreme Court of Arizona
emphasized heavily Miranda's failure to specifically request counsel.2 8
Miranda appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held:
Reversed. Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult
with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation.
Nor was Miranda's right not to be compelled to incriminate himself
effectively protected in any other manner. The Court found that,
absent these warnings, a confession obtained was inadmissible. The
typed waiver clause was considered insufficient to constitute the
knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights.2 9
Miranda was only one of five post-Escobedo cases, which the Court
decided together in an attempt to clarify the confusion resulting from
the Escobedo language. To this end, some very specific rules were
set forth succinctly in Chief Justice Warren's opinion:
27 One of the officers testified that he read this paragraph to Miranda. Ap-
parently, however, he did not do so until after Miranda had confessed orally.
MEDALic, FnoOIr ESCOBEDO TO MInANDA: THE ANATOmY OF A SUPREME COURT
DEcisIoN 244 n.67 (1966).
28 State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965).
29 One case interpreting the intelligent waiver requirement is Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948). In that case a fifteen-year-old defendant read and signed
a confession in which the last line contained this "waiver" clause: "the law gives
you the right to make this statment or not as you see fit." The Supreme Court
held that the defendant could not have appreciated the true significance of the
statement and reversed. In other words, a more explicit waiver is required.
Prior to Miranda, the Oregon Supreme Court and the Second Circuit had
opportunities to rule on waiver cases and held the following sufficient:
1. "I knov that I am not required to make any statement and I know
that any statement I make may be used against me in criminal
proceedings in court." State of Oregon v. Neely, 398 P.2d 482 (Ore.
1965).
2. "You need not make a statement but if made, it might be used against
you in any trial of the charges in question." Lyles v. Beto, 329 F.2d
332 (2d Cir. 1964).
It is interesting to note that both of these valid waivers would now be suspect
since Miranda seems to require the presence of counsel in order to waive the
right to counsel and the right to remain silent. The position of the Supreme Court
as stated through the language in Haley and the Miranda decisions is that a de-
fendant cannot appreciate the legal consequences of his actions and the presence
of counsel under the sixth amendment is the only effective way to protect the
fifth amendment privilege.
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The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or in-
culpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any other significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be em-
ployed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following measures are required:
Prior to any questioning, the person (taken into custody) must be
warnec that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to
tWe presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that
he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and there-
after consents to be questioned.3 0
Thus, Miranda requires a four-fold warning to be given the accused
prior to any in-custody interrogation by police officers. The individual
must be warned that he has an absolute constitutional right to remain
silent,31 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him,32 that he has the right to have counsel present,33 and
that, if indigent, he has the right to appointed counsel.3 4 By presenting
its holding with great specificity, the Court made an earnest attempt to
avoid the problems created by the broad language of Escobedo.
In explaining the first requirement, that an individual has a con-
stitutional right to remain silent, the Court said: "If a person in
custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed
in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent."35
The Court made it clear that this protection must be extended to
everyone, including those who should have known of the right. This
holding seems to abolish the totality of the circumstances approach,30
30 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 1616 (1966).
31 Id. at 1624.
32 Id. at 1625.
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 1627.
35 Id. at 1624.36 The totality of the circumstances rule is a test used by the Court to
determine whether a defendant was aware of his rights. The age, intelligence,
education, prior contact with authorities, and the defendants behavior in the
instant case all serve to make up the totality of the circumstances. See Crooker v.
(Continued on next page)
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which was previously used in determining whether, on the face of a
silent record, an accused was aware of his rights. The Court said:
"We will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given."37
The rationale behind this rule was that such inquiries could "never be
more than speculation,"38 while "a warning is a clear cut fact."30 The
Court pointed out a secondary purpose of the warning: to "overcome
its [in-custody interrogations] pressures and to insure that the in-
dividual knows he is free to exercise the privilege ....40
The purpose of warning the accused that "any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him"41 is to make known to
him the consequences of foregoing the right to remain silent. The
Court asserted that a warning to an accused of his right to consult a
lawyer and to have one with him during the interrogation will, as stated
in Malloy v. Hogan, assure the individual's right "to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."42
After Miranda, the rule is that, if the prescribed warnings are not
given, there is a presumption against waiver and the burden is placed
on the police to prove the voluntariness of any confession. This new
approach will change several of the Kentucky Court's past practices.
For instance, the Court of Appeals in Scamahorne apparently used the
totality of the circumstances rule in finding an awareness of his rights
from the defendant's behavior, viewed in light of the reasonable man
test (i.e., known or should have known). Miranda specifically over-
rules this procedure by stating: "Assessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education,
intelligence, are speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact."43 This
holding also reverses the current Kentucky practice of presuming a
confession valid on the basis of a silent record.4 4 Miranda also reit-
erated the high standards set out in Johnson v. ZerbsV45 for proving
waiver of constitutional rights. The Court stated that the police must
prove that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and
the recurring inquiry into special circumstances it necessitated. See generally
Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process Values, 61 MicH. L. REv. 219 (1962).
37 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966).3S Ibid. See note 36 supra.
39 Id. at 1625.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.42 Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
43 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966).
44 Smith v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1966).
45304 U.S. 458 (1938). See note 29 supra.
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privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel. The policy behind the Court's decision to apply these
high standards to waivers made during in-custody interrogations is that,
since the state is responsible for the incommunicado interrogation and
has the only means of proving that the required warnings were given,
then the burden rightfully rests on its shoulders.46 One interesting
aspect of the waiver question is the Court's statement that where in-
custody interrogation is involved there can be no valid contention
that the privilege is waived if an individual answers some questions
prior to its invocation. Thus, it seems that one can do in the inter-
rogation stage that which is impermissible at the pre-trial grand jury
hearings, 47 i.e., an accused may waive his privilege at one point with-
out being estopped from later asserting it.48
The practical effect of the Court's presumption against waiver
clearly places a heavy burden on the police. The State must establish
that the waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and with full ap-
preciation of the consequences. To understand the magnitude of the
burden, one need only visualize any lay defendant "appreciating" the
consequences of admitting the commission of a felony, when he is
under indictment for a felony-murder prosecution,49 or the effect under
state law of admitting complicity in a crime.50 Thus, it seems that one
will virtually need counsel in order to waive counsel.
Another noteworthy feature of the Miranda opinion is the Supreme
Court's new conceptual approach in this area. In Gideon, the Court
characterized the problem as one involving the sixth amendment right
to counsel. It nurtured this approach and applied it at different stages
of the criminal process in a series of subsequent cases from White v.
46 86 Sup. Ct. at 1628.
47The Court shows how privilege of self-incrimination in pre-trial proceedings
differs from trial proceedings. In Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951)
the Court held that a witness before a grand jury may not in certain circum-
stances decide to answer some questions and then refuse to answer others. Yet in
Miranda the Court specifically held that there would be no room for the con-
tention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or
gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent
when interrogated. The Court made an attempt at distinguishing the apparent
inconsistency between the two holdings by saying that no legislative or judicial
fact-finding authority was involved in the interrogation process. Further. there is
no nossibflity that the individual might make selfserving statements of which he
could make use at trial while refusing to answer incriminating statements.
48 86 Sup. Ct. at 1627.
49 California v. Stewart, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 16.39 (1966), a companion case
to Miranda, the defendant confessed to a robbery but denied the homicide con-
nected therewith. The defendant never appreciated the fact that he was facing
a felony murder prosecution. In order to understand the complexities of the law,
it seems that one must have counsel before any "intelligent" waiver can be made.
50 In Escobedo. the defendant admitted to complicity in a robbery not know-
ing that under nlinois law his punishment was the same.
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Maryland' to Massiah v. United States, 52 culminating in Escobedo v.
IllinoisY3 After Escobedo, the Court was plagued by cases involving
the point at which the right to counsel arose and the acts needed to
secure it. In the post-Escobedo cases, it dealt with these problems by
skirting difficult questions raised by the right to counsel approach and
adopting the "Compulsion" doctrine. This doctrine is based on the
fifth amendment guaranty that no person may be compelled to in-
criminate himself. The Court stated that since the purpose of the
privilege is to prevent compulsion, warnings are necessary from the
outset of in-custody interrogations, because they are inherently
coercive. By adopting this approach, the Court merely holds that the
right to counsel attaches when it becomes necessary to protect and
effectuate the purposes of the fifth amendment privilege.5 4
Miranda also attempted to deal with the problems which had
developed after Escobedo as to the effort required to invoke the right.
This presented the questions of whether a request is necessary and
the appointed counsel problem. The Court solved this by stating "an
individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer.
While such requests affirmatively secure his right to have one, his
failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver."55 The Court
supported this statement by citation to a California Supreme Court
decision5 ' and one of its own decisions.5r Addressing itself directly to
the indigency problem, the Court held: 'The financial ability of the
individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here.
The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution
applies to all individuals." 8 The Court rationalized its holding by
citing statistics that a majority of the past cases before the courts in-
volved those unable to retain counsel. 59 It then reached the "Lawyer
51373 U.S. 59 (1963).
52377 U.S. 201 (1964).
53378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5486 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
5r Id. at 1626.56 People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-78, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398
P.2d 861, 369-70 (1965) wherein that court stated:
Finally, we must recognize that the imposition of the requirement for the
request would discriminate against the defendant who does not know
his rights. The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very
defendant who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant,
who, not understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the for-
mal request and by such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To re-
quire the request would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication
or status has fortuitously prompted him to make it.57 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
s 86 Sup. Ct. at 1626-27.
59 Estimates of 50-90 per cent indigency among felony defendants have been
reported. Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 MiNN. L. REv. 737, 738-39
(Continued on next page)
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in the Stationhouse" argument presented by several critics6° of recent
Court decisions. The Court asserted that its decision did not go that
far because the police had an alternative to securing counsel for an
accused: they could stop interrogation once an indigent requested
counsel. Thus, the police can either find counsel for an indigent or
stop questioning him.61
Miranda represents an attempt to formulate Black-letter Judge-
made rules relatively free of ambiguity. Although at first blush one
might conclude that the Court's warning requirements will hamper
police interrogation, such probably will not be the case.6 2 Moreover,
the Court did not arbitrarily formulate these rules, but borrowed
liberally from practices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
from the English Judges Rules.6 3
However, even the specificity of Miranda did not solve all the prob-
lems. The Court stated that the prosecution could not use any state-
ments stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrated
the use of procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. 4 From this language, Miranda clearly applies when the
defendant is undergoing in-custody incommunicado interrogation in
the stationhouse. However problems arise as to arrests made on the
street or questioning of an arrestee in a police car.6 5 Does Miranda
apply in such situations? A more difficult situation arises when the
police are forced to question a defendant after he has requested
counsel because of the nature of the case,66 e.g., kidnapping. Are the
police faced with the choice between endangering the victim and
rendering inadmissible all the evidence obtained from the quizzing?
Admittedly, these are hard situations, but they may be presented to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(1961); Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Ac-
cused in Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York State, 14 BUF. L. REV.
428, 433 (1965).
60 See, e.g., 54 Ky. L.J. 602 (1966).
61 See KAmSARII, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure, in CGrmnNv L JusTICE IN Our Tnvm 64-81 (1965). As was
stated in the REP ORT OF THE AiTroRNEY GNERAi.s Coinnrrus ON PovEaRY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDiRAL C~au nAL JusncE 9 (1963):
When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal area, its
obligation is merely no less than that of taling reasonable measures to
eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just administration of the
law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect determinations of
the accused's liability or penalty. While government may not be re-
quired to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly be required
to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of justice.
62 Courier-Journal June 15, 1966. § A (Editorial), p. 8 col. 1.
63 86 Sup. Ct. at 1633, 1634 n.57.
64 Id. at 1612.
65 Id. at n.4.
(6 Id. at 1612.
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courts in the future. The Court has attempted to solve the pressing
problems presented by Escobedo, and only time will tell whether
Miranda clarified or confused the right to counsel area.
At any rate, it is clear that Miranda would have required a dif-
ferent decision in last term's three Kentucky cases, Scamahorne, Smith,
and Hamilton. The future will reveal whether Miranda will unduly
hinder police investigation of crime; the commentators are already
in disagreement on this point.67 At the very least, Miranda should
benefit the state and lower federal courts because the Supreme Court
has made crystal clear its intention to enforce all of the essential
principles of the Bill of Rights through the fourteenth amendment at
the exact point where individual freedoms are threatened by coercive
police practices.
The Court last term also decided cases which involved complaints
of ineffective assistance of counsel.6s
B. Pretrial
1. Indictment.-Fundamentally, an indictment is an accusation in
writing found and presented by a grand jury on oath of affirmation
as a true bill, charging a defendant with some act or omission to act
which, by law, is a public offense. An indictment may originate upon
the initiative of a grand jury legally convoked and sworn to the court
to which it is impaneled, or it may be found and presented pursuant to
a written accusation drawn up and submitted to such grand jury by
the public prosecuting attorney. There is no right to an examining
trial where an indictment has been returned pursuant to a direct
67 New York Times, Oct. 2, 1966, (Magazine) p. 37.
68 In Himes v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. 1966), the defendant
became dissatisfied with counsel whom the judge felt were doing a satisfactoryjob. However, the judge dismissed the original counsel and appointed new
counsel. Prior to such action he warned defendant that he would allow only a one
hour continuance for new counsel to prepare if defendant insisted on new
counsel. Defendant still requested new counsel. On appeal he claimed that thejudge should not have allowed him to finish trial with such inadequately pre-
pared counsel. The Court found an intelligent waiver since the judge had warned
the defendant of this problem and the defendant still chose to have new counsel.
In Fultz v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1966), the defendant went
to trial represented by appointed counsel. Mid-trial, the defendant became dis-
sitisfied with his counsel and asked the court to dismiss him. The judge said
that he believed the attorney was doing a good job and would not appoint
another, but that the defendant could continue without counsel if he so desired.
The defendant chose this option and finished the trial defending himself. The
Court held this to be a waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel. In
Henderson v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1965), the defendant had
counsel appointed lona prior to trial. However. the attorney appointed became
unable to serve and defendant was without counsel for some short period of time.
The Court held that the right to counsel is only essential at critical stages, and
it is not necessary for a defendant to have counsel at every moment from the
time be is charged until the end of the trial.
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submission of evidence before a grand jury. 9 The indictment clearly
satisfies the express mandate of the sixth amendment70 that an
accused be informed of the nature and cause of the charge against
him.
It is basic to this constitutional right that a defendant is entitled to
insist that an indictment apprise him of the crime charged with such
reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and can protect him-
self after judgment against another prosecution on the same charge.
Therefore, no indictment is sufficient if it does not allege all of the
elements which constitute the crime.71
Pursuant to this fundamental concept, it has long been the rule
in Kentucky that amendment to an indictment will be permitted only
where such amendment does not charge a new or different offense
and where there is no resultant substantive change in the indictment
which could in any way prejudice the defendant's substantive rights.72
But an indictment will not fail for want of technical details, and
amendment is to be freely permitted where the change does not go
to the substance. Thus, the Court held last term that alterations which
do no more than change the date when the offense was committed,73
allege the victim was wounded,74 or correct an erroneous statutory
citation,75 are permissible.
Liberality in allowing amendments which charge no new offense
and in no way prejudice defendant's substantive rights does not
violate any constitutional guarantee, and such policy is consistent with
the liberal interpretation given the Federal Rules of Procedure by the
federal courts.76 The Court held that an indictment which sets forth a
plain, concise, and definite statement of the essential facts constituting
the specific offense is sufficient within the constitutional mandate,77
09 Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1965).70 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.71 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
72 See Brown v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964); Kinmon v.
Commonwealth, 255 S.W.2d 987 (Ky. 1953); Hooper v. Commonwealth, 2-50
Ky. 405, 63 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1933).
73 Stephens v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1965).74 Cavitt v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1965).
75 Ward v. Commonwealth. 399 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. 1966); Botkins v. Common-
wealth, 394 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965).
76 Bullock v. United States. 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959).77 Botkins v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1965).
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and an action based upon such an indictment will not fail due to
technical discrepancies. 78
2. Habitual Criminal Statutes.-The defendant in Spears v. Com-
monwealth,79 for the third time, was convicted of illegally selling
liquor. Two counts of the indictment charged him with having been
convicted of similar offenses in quarterly court on two other occasions.
On appeal defendant contended, inter alia, that it was error to charge
him with a felony under the Habitual Criminal Statute.80 He argued
that, although a specific statute8l provides that quarterly courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts when the penalty does not
exceed $100 fine and 60 days incarceration, quarterly courts may not
give punishments for second offenses,8 2 and therefore both previous
convictions should be considered as first offenses. Circumventing this
argument, the Court reasoned that the statute was more concerned
with the number of offenses than with the accumulation of punishment.
It was not the purpose of the statute that an offender be immune
from conviction under the Habitual Criminal Act if the second offense
had not been meted increased punishment.
In Rodgers v. Commonwealth 3 the Court stated very specifically
what shall constitute a valid and sufficient instruction under the
Habitual Criminal Statute. Holding that every factual question must
be submitted to the jury, the Court reasoned that failure to instruct
on prior convictions was error. There must be, said the Court, an
instruction on the primary crime; an instruction on the primary crime
and either previous conviction; a third instruction on the primary and
two previous convictions which together constitute a felony under the
statute; and a fourth instruction on reasonable doubt. This decision
was well within the bounds of existing law.84
Similarly, Wilson v. Commonwealth 5 held that a defendant's sixth
amendment guarantee of a fair trial by impartial jury and his rights
under due process of law were not violated when, pursuant to the
Habitual Criminal Statute, two former convictions were introduced to
the jury for joint consideration along with the issue of the specific
crime alleged. The Court, with one dissent, affirmed a recent deci-
78 Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1965); Brock v. Com-
monwealth, 391 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1965).70,399 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1966).
80t S § 431.190 (1963).
81 KRS § 242.990 (1942).82 Crabtree v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1955).
83399 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1966).84 Brown v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964).
85 403 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1966).
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sion,86 which upheld the constitutionality of the Habitual Criminal
Statute as a wholesome, time-tested, and approved rule which should
not be discarded even in the wake of what might be called the
""evolution and revolution' in thinking."86a
The recurrence of litigation challenging the validity of the Habi-
tual Criminal Statute reflects divergent opinions not only within the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, but also among the states and the federal
circuits. The position of the Kentucky Court is in line with certain
federal circuits which uphold the procedure a la Wilson 7 and with
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that such statutes
do not put a defendant in double jeopardy for the same offense.,
There is other state and federal authority,89 however, which contends,
as does the Wilson dissent, that an accused can never have a trial
unaffected by prejudice or by considerations which should not in-
fluence the jury, if during the trial the jury is informed that the
accused has previously been convicted of certain crimes and evidence
of his former convictions has been introduced.
There is also the renewed attack on Habitual Criminal Statutes as
putting a defendant in double jeopardy for the same offense. But
such consideration finds only token judicial authority in the dicta of
the majority opinion in Chewing v. Cunningham9 ° where Mr. Justice
Douglas of the United States Supreme Court suggested that the pos-
sibility might be considered by an imaginative lawyer. Although
Justice Douglas expressly declined to discuss the point further, this
suggestion might indicate that prior Supreme Court decisions on the
point 9 ' are ripe for reconsideration.
The proper procedure under the enlightened viewpoint of the
Wilson dissent is first to obtain a verdict on one part of the indictment,
i.e., the present crime, and then to read to the jury that part of the
indictment dealing with defendant's prior convictions, allowing the
latter to be considered only in determining the degree of punishment.
Clearly enough, if such procedure were adopted in Kentucky, the use
and application of the Habitual Criminal Statute would be severely
restricted; in the light of arguments to which the Court in Jones
86 401 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1966).
86a Ibid. at 70.
8 7 Breen v. Beto, 841 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1965).
88 Gryger v. Burke, 834 U.S. 728 (1948); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673
(1895).
89 See Lane v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963);
State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 AtI. 452 (1921); Harrison v. State, 394
S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1965).
90 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
91 See text at note 88 supra.
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referred as "so-called 'evolution and revolution' in thinking," it would
not be too far afield to predict such an occurrence, eventually. Before
that event, however, perhaps the Supreme Court will resolve the con-
flict among the circuits and establish a uniform rule applicable to the
states as well.
C. Venue
The defendant in Brunner v. Commonwealth92 was twice tried for
knowingly receiving stolen property. The first trial resulted in a hung
jury but the second yielded a conviction. Prior to each trial, defendant
in compliance with the statute,93 filed his petition together with
affidavits for change of venue. As grounds for relief he alleged wide-
spread publicity and resulting prejudice. In both instances the Com-
monwealth failed to controvert the defendant's application by counter-
affidavits or testimony. Nevertheless, both of defendant's applications
were denied without a hearing. Not until after the second trial and
after motion for a new trial did the Commonwealth file affidavits of
persons stating their belief that an unbiased jury could be procured.
In reversing the conviction and directing a trial de novo, the Court
reaffirmed its definite criteria as to the procedure for change of venue
under KRS § 452.220(2). Echoing its prior position94 that defendant
has the burden to make out a prima facie case for change of venue, the
Court asserted that where proof presented is adequate under the
statute and is uncontradicted by proof on behalf of the Common-
wealth, the trial judge has no discretion and must grant the motion.
The Court made it clear that, when a defendant complies with the
statutory provisions and the Commonwealth fails to controvert, a
change of venue should be granted as a matter of right.95
Pointing to its decision in Brunner as outlining the proper pro-
cedure for obtaining a change of venue, the Court subsequently
denied a motion for rehearing where defendant's application failed to
92 395 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1965).
93KRS § 452.220(2) (1942) provides:
If the application is made by the defendant, it shall be made by petition
in 'writing, verified by the defendant, and by the filing of the atffdavits
of at least 2 other credible persons, not akin to or of counsel for the
defendant, stating that they are acquainted with the state of public
opinion in the county objected to, and that they verily believe the state-
ments of the petition for the change of venue are true. The Com-
monwealth's attorney or, in his absence from the county, the county at-
torney shall be given reasonable notice, in writing, of the application.
If objections to all the adjoining counties are made and sustained, the
change shall be made to the nearest county to which there is no valid
objection, preference being given to counties of the same judicial district.
94 Manning v. Commonvealth, 346 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1961).95 ROBERSoN, NEw KNTruc x CalnNAL LAw AND Paociaun § 162, at
254 (2d ed. 1927).
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address itself to conditions existing at the time of trial.96 Likewise, in
another case 97 it held that if a motion for change of venue is made
without verification or support of affidavits it fails to comply with the
statutory provisions and may be denied.
D. Judges and Attorneys' Conduct During Trial
In general the law concerning the conduct of judges and attorneys
during trial was little affected by the decisions of the Court during the
past term, the major decisions in this area being but an affirmation
and clarification of existing law. However, in Collins v. Common-
wealth9s the Court was presented with a unique situation of first
impression.
KRS § 455.090(1) grants a defendant the right not to testify and
provides that his failure to do so shall not be commented upon or create
any presumption against him. Obviously the statute is based on the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination99 and was designed
to deal with possible abuses by the prosecution. 00 However, in Col-
lins, it was the defendant who was seeking to comment upon his own
refusal to testify. Holding that the trial court did not err in preventing
him, the Court construed the statute to mean that, where a defendant
refuses to testify, all parties, as well as the court, must remain silent.
If the statute and its underlying policies are primarily for the pro-
tection of the defendant it is perhaps unreasonable to construe the
statute to mean that the defendant cannot comment. The argument
will invariably be made that defendant's silence in itself raises a
presumption against him, that the prohibition against all comment is
therefore insufficient, and that defendant ought to have the right to
rebut the impression generated by his silence. On the other hand it
can be argued that, if defendant is allowed to comment in the absence
of a like privilege on the part of the prosecution, the result would be
too much protection for the defendant, i.e., in addition to the privileges
of refusing to testify and having the prosecution not comment on that
refusal, defendant would be able to affirmatively defend his inaction
without fear of a rebuttal. Of course this objection would lose much
of its force if the defendant's comment on his own refusal to testify was
regarded as a waiver of his statutory privilege, thereby permitting
rebuttal by the prosecution. Still another objection against allowing
96 Howard v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1965).
97 White v. Commonwealth. 394 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1965).
98396 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1965).
99 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Stewart v. United States, 366
U.S. 1 (1960); DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962);
Roberts v. United States, 137 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1943).
100 Bradley v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1953).
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the defendant to comment is that such a rule would permit evidence
otherwise irrelevant, for instance, defendant's speech impediment, to
be admitted into the record.
The conduct of the trial judge was at issue in Davidson v. Com-
monwealth,101 where a Commonwealth's witness refused to answer
whether he had pawned stolen property to appellant. At that point
the trial judge asked the witness if he were afraid of the appellant or
if anyone had threatened him concerning his testimony. On appeal,
it was held that this questioning reflected the trial judge's opinion
that appellant was possibly the type of person who would intimidate
a witness. Since appellants good faith and lack of knowledge were
the major questions before the jury, the judge's opinion could have
influenced the verdict and thus was prejudicial. In so holding the
Court stated that a trial court's discretion in questioning a witness
must be used carefully and in conformity with the standards of
impartiality governing his judicial office. When asking such- ques-
tions in the presence of the jury while issues are still in the balance,
the judge should not disclose personal opinions.10 2 But as with all
matters within the discretion of the trial judge, the Court will not dis-
turb the ruling in the absence of a positive showing of abuse of
discretion.103
A question of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was before
the Court in Gossett v. Commonwealth.04 Appellant contended that
where the Commonwealth's attorney in his closing argument com-
ments on the failure of defendant's wife to testify either for or against
her husband, it is prejudicial misconduct violative of defendant's rights
of privileged communications under KRS § 421.210. Pointing to that
statute, the Court sustained appellants contention, reversed the con-
viction, and remanded the case for new trial. Communications be-
tween husband and wife are privileged, and comments by the pro-
secution on the failure of one or the other to testify are improper as
prejudicial to the substantive rights of the defendant.
E. Evidence
While classifications are usually artificial and per force over-
lapping, the criminal law section on evidence has been divided into
two parts-admission and sufficiency. The first section will generally
101 394 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1965).
'
0 2 For discussions see Kennedy, Judge-Jury-Counsel Relations in Kentucky,
54 Ky. L. J. 243 (1965); Lukowsky, The Constitutional Right of Litigants to
Have the State Tial Judge Comment Upon the Evidence, 55 Ky. L.J. 121 (1966).
o3 Tussey v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1965).
104 402 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1966).
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discuss questions of the proper use of testimony taken outside the
courtroom, various problems having to do with competency, relevancy,
and materiality, and the issue of privilege. In the second section the
discussion will relate to the principles used in determining the re-
quisite weight of evidence for conviction, and the comparative weight
of different kinds of evidence.
1. Admission of Evidence.-The problem of the "turncoat" and the
absent witness seems to be occurring with "increasing frequency," said
the court in Thacker v. Commonwealth,103 and prosecutors and defense
attorneys alike have resorted to various home remedies to cure the
evil. When one principal witness failed to appear at a second trial on
the merits, and another witness appeared, but was hesitant to answer
the same questions put to her successfully in the first trial, an enter-
prising Commonwealth's attorney in Thacker read into the evidence the
uncontested testimony of the absent witness elicited at the previous
trial and at the grand jury indictment.
In two other cases where a witness testified contrary to expecta-
tions, an attempt was made to impeach the testimony. In McQueen v.
Commonwealth,'"6 the prosecutor sought to bring in contradictory
statements made at the time of arrest by his supposedly cooperative
witness, who ultimately failed to give the favorable testimony expected
of him. In McGee v. Commonwealth,10 7 where the same problem arose
for a defense attorney, counsel requested permission to play back a
tape recording of the witness' testimony taken one day after the
homicide. In each of these two cases the remedy attempted was
unsuccessful.
In Thacker the Court laid down the guidelines for dealing with the
absent witness. The Court held that in order to allow testimony at an
earlier trial to be introduced at a later trial, the moving counsel must
meet three requirements: he must let the judge know (1) that the
witness is not available, (2) that a subpoena had been timely served
upon him, and (3) that a diligent search had been made for the
witness to no avail. The Court held that the reading of the testimony
was proper in Thacker since opposing counsel had had an unre-
stricted opportunity to cross-examine at the previous trial, and the
other elements were present.'08
105 401 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Ky. 1966).
106 393 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1966). See also Rowe v. Commonwealth, 394
S.W.2d 751 (Ky. 1965) (impeachment of own witness).
107 395 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1966).
10 8 See RCr 7.12, 7.10 and 7.20. See also Noe v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1965). This case laid down the criteria for admitting transcribed
(Continued on next page)
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With respect to the so-called "turncoat witness" the Court was
less generous. The attorney, by leave of court, shall only be permitted
to examine his witness in closed chambers in an effort to refresh his
recollection. If the witness persists in his lack of memory it would be
inappropriate to have the purported testimony read to the jury.
Citing Davidson v. Commonwealth,'°9 and McQueen v. Common-
wealth,"0 the Court reaffirmed the rule that such "negative testimony"
was not prejudicial and thus not subject to impeachment by the grand
jury testimony. McQueen stands for the proposition that if a witness
has given merely negative evidence or has failed to make statements
expected of him, the party calling the witness cannot contradict him
by showing prior inconsistent statements. The evidence has not been
prejudicial and there is thus no ground for impeachment. The holding
is in line with the authorities."'
In McGee, however, it was a Commonvealth's witness whom the
defense attorney sought to impeach by the use of the taped testimony.
The witness' story had varied from the recording-or so it was
claimed. In denying counsel the right to so impeach the witness, the
Court held that no proper foundation had been laid for the recording.
The Court relied upon Commonwealth v. Brinkley 12 that recordings
are admissible into evidence only if the proper foundation is laid. Such
foundations included, (1) a showing that the device was capable of
taking testimony, (2) the operator was competent, (3) the device was
authentic, (4) there were no changes, additions, or deletions in the
testimony, (5) the tape was carefully preserved, (6) the speakers were
identified, and (7) the testimony was elicited without duress.
Brinkley seems to be a proper application of the rule on laying
proper foundations for evidence. However, it is one thing to require
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
testimony of witesses who failed to appear in response to subpoena but who
had appeared on an earlier date, originally set for trial, and had then given
their depositions. The Court relied on dicta in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965), where the Supreme Court said that the result would be different if the
statement had be en at a full-fledged hearing with the defendant having
a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine. This was construed as notto require a public hearing in a courtroom. The decision seems correct. The right
of confrontation guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions is not violated
per se by the use of depositions in evidence.109 394 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1965).
110 393 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1965).
111 See Harlan Pub. Serv. v. Eastern Constr. Co., 254 Ky. 135, 71 S.W.2d 24
(1934); Champ v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 17 (1859); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Herman, 154 Md. 171, 140 At. 64 (1928). See 58 AM,. Jun. Witnesses § 800 at
446 (1948) stating: "Where the testimony of a xvitess is not prejudicial to the
party, calling him, the credibility of the witness is immaterial, and no reasonexists for impeaching him. It is not sufficient that the witness merely fails to
testify to a material fact."
112362 StW.2d 494 (Ky. 1962).
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a careful showing of authenticity for taped evidence in chief, as in
Brinkley, and it is quite another thing to place the same burden upon
counsel who has taken the testimony only for impeachment purposes.
The job of negating the value of the tape should properly have been
placed upon the party introducing the evidence in chief. The ultimate
weight of the impeaching evidence should be left to the jury to
determine. The other case relied upon by the McGee Court, United
States v. McKeener," 3 also deals with evidence in chief and self-
serving declarations (documents used to refresh a witness' memory)
and is not precedent for a strict rule on impeachment testimony.
McGee is probably correct on the theory of harmless error since
the discrepancies in the tape and the testimony in court were minor
ones, but the rule laid down was too inflexible.1 4
In a fourth case similar to those above, Brannon v. Common-
wealth,"5 defendant's counsel requested a continuance because of the
absence of an eyewitness to the homicide. The trial court denied the
request but permitted the absent witness' testimony to be read into
the record. The Court followed RCr 9.0416 that the granting of post-
ponement of the trial for absence of a witness is discretionary with
the judge, and, according to precedent," 7 will not be granted where
the testimony sought is only cumulative.
Possibly the holding in Brannon rests more on grounds of necessity
than of ideal justice. It would seem a continuance should be granted
as a matter of right where, as here, an eyewitness to a possible capital
offense is absent through no fault of counsel. Recorded testimony is
never a substitute to hearing the facts from the horse's mouth. A
continuance should be denied only after a most careful review of the
testimony counsel certifies will be given. Mere cumulativeness of the
"13 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959).
'14 MODEL CODE OF EvrDENcE rule 106(2) (1942) leaves the enforcement
of the foundation requirement to the judge's discretion. For a discussion of the
problem see McCoamncm, EvroENcE § 37 (1954).
"15 400 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1966).
"16 RCr 9.04 Postponement of Learning or Trial; motion and affidavit:
The court upon motion and sufficient cause shown by either party, may
grant a postponement of the hearing or trial. A motion by the defendant
for a postponement on account of the absence of evidence may be made
only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to
be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to obtain it. If the
motion is based on the absence of a witness, the affidavit must show what
facts the afflant believes the witness will prove, and not merely the
effect of such facts in evidence, and that the afflant believes them to be
true. If the attorney for the Commonwealth consents to the reading of
the affidavit on the hearing or trial as the deposition of the absent wit-
ness, the hearing or trial shall not be postponed on account of his
qbsence.
17 The Court cited Miller v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1965).
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testimony seems specious grounds for a denial. Such testimony is
especially vital when it tends to corroborate that of a previously
testifying eyewitness. An adversary system implies in its makeup that
an attorney's opinion as to the importance of evidence to be so pre-
sented should usually be determinative as to whether a continuance
should be granted. This should be particularly true where, as here,
the offense is a capital one and there is no allegation that the
continuance is being used to delay. Recent Kentucky cases reveal that
the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying a continuance where
an affidavit of the absent witness is read has almost always been
sustained.118
Three cases in the last session of the Court illustrate that the
trend of Kentucky law on admissibility of evidence is more surely to
insulate the accused from testimony designed to elicit sympathy or
prejudice." 9 However, in Peters v. Commonwealth, 20 the Court's rul-
ing went against the trend. Appellant was convicted of storehouse
breaking. He was arrested soon after the crime was committed and
while intoxicated signed a confession. The confession* was signed
when appellant was without counsel. He had been apprised of his
right to counsel and had waived it. Though surely the fact of in-
toxication is a crucial one, it is as yet undetermined whether this,
alone, would require reversal. Miranda v. Arizona,'21 decided subse-
quent to Peters, and later held not to be retroactive,' 22 held that an
UsSee 6 Ky. DIG. 652 Criminal Law § 600(3) (1947), and cases cited
therein.
119 See Bell v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1966) for the pro-
position that only in exceptional circumstances may other crimes of the accused
be introduced against him when on trial for a distinct offense. The rule is, of
course, different where the defendant's counsel, himself, opens the door on
direct examination. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1965).
Barnett v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1966), found prejudicial
error where a sheriff, during a jury view of the location of a homicide, sup-
plemented his testimony by pointing out the location of a scuffle and thus
contradicted the defendant's testimony. Kentucky case law establishes the rule that
a jury view is just a view and nothing more. No explanation is permitted.
In Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1966) the statement by
a witness in a conviction for illegal sale of whisky that she had decided to
cooperate with the police because the defendants were "selling my husband
whisky and selling my sister whisky. They have about got her crazy. She runs
her kids off and won't buy clothes for them and half the time they ain't got nothing
to eat" was held clearly inflammatory and prejudicial.
In Daniels v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1966), however, the
Court found harmless error and refused to order a new trial where the lower
court adjourned the jury and admonished them not to discuss the case with anyone
or among themselves, but neglected to warn the jury not to form or express an
opinion as required by RCr 9.70.120403 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1966).
121 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
122 See Johnson v. New Jersey, 884 U.S. 719 (1966).
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accused must "voluntarily" waive right to counsel before a confession
may be taken from him. The jury in Peters found the confession fac-
tually reliable and that the defendant knew the "nature and effect"
of his act, i.e., the act of confession. The problem lies in the de-
finition of that weasel-word "voluntarily." May a person voluntarily
waive while beset with a great moral compulsion to expiate his guilt,
such compulsion being experienced only while under the influence of
alcohol? The problem is not one of not knowing what he was doing.
The defendant did know, and wanted to do it, but this desire was
aroused only by the unnatural effects of the alcohol. Perhaps Miranda
should be construed to require counsel at the time of the waiver of
counsel.12
3
The issue in two other cases in the last session was whether the
item which resulted in the offense should be admitted into evidence.
In Cook v. Commonwealth,124 a wooden block found near a point at
which a police cruiser struck an object hurled from a fleeing car was
linked sufficiently in time, place and a tire mark stained on the block
to qualify it as circumstantial evidence against the driver. In Helvey
v. Commonwealth,2 5 the prosecution, in an indictment for illegal pos-
session of alcohol, was allowed to show proof of sale of the alcohol,
even though illegal sale and illegal possession are separate offenses.
Evidence of one may not be used to prove the other.12 6 The case is
undoubtedly correct since the defendant had not been indicted for the
companion-offense.
The final case in this section deals with the marital testimony pri-
vilege. By statute, 27 one spouse may not testify as to confidential com-
munications with the other spouse during marriage. At first blush the
privilege seems a broad one. The word "communications" is not con-
fined to mere statements between husband and wife, but is construed
to embrace all knowledge upon the part of the one or the other
obtained by reason of the marriage relation, and which, but for the
confidence growing out of it would not have been known to the
123 See, Editorial, "A Warning That the Waiver Might Join the Confession,"
Louisville Courier-Journal, Oct. 10, 1966, § A, p. 8, col. 4.
124 401 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1966).
125 896 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. 1965).
126 See Newton v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 707, 249 S.W. 1017 (192.3).
Where several indictments charged the same person with separate and distinct
offenses of the same kind, a conviction or acquittal upon one is a ban to pro-
secution upon the others, if the evidence in the first case covers the separate,
several acts. Thus, after conviction for sale of liquor there cannot be a con-
viction for illegal possession on the same evidence. See also Davis v. Common-
wealth. 898 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1966).
12 7 KRS § 421.210(1) (1942).
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party.128 In practice, however, the protection is not so extensive, as
York v. Commonwealth-9 shows. In York, the defendant was tried
for the crime of incest. His daughters testified against him and there-
after the wife was permitted to testify. The Court of Appeals held
that the information passed by the wife was not privileged since it
was equally available to other persons who were living in the home.
This interpretation of the statute130 is out of date and needs
changing. For practical purposes the conditions of a highly mobile and
interdependent society permit most any communication to be heard or
observed by another person. Moreover, the exception does not make
the spouse competent to testify merely where another actually over-
hears, but also includes communication which might have been
heard.131 The exception swallows the privilege.
It is not in the best public policy to require marriage partners to
first seek out some sheltered rendezvous before they may confide any
potentially damaging information. An exception to the exception
exists for communications between lawyer and client in the presence
of the lawyer's secretary. 13 2 The same rationale exists for recognizing
the husband-wife privilege where other members of the family reside
in the home.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence.-In most of the cases classified here
the contention was that the requisite degree of evidence to establish
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was not present and
that a directed verdict or new trial should be granted. 133 This was
128 See Todd v. Barbee, 271 Ky. 381, 111 S.W.2d 1041 (1937); Allcock v.
Allcock, 174 Ky. 665, 192 S.W. 853 (1917); Leucht v. Leucht, 129 Ky. 700, 112
S.W. 845 (1908); Commonwealth v. Sapp, 90 Ky. 580, 14 S.W. 834 (1890).
120 395 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1965).
130 See Gill v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1964).
131 See Hughes v. Bates' Adm'r, 278 Ky. 592, 129 S.W.2d 138 (1939).
132The precise question has not arisen in Kentucky, but the authorities and
outside precedents all bring the attorney's secretary within the privilege. See
Foley v. Poschple, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941); MCoRNMICK,
EVmENcE § 95, at 191 (1964); Rice, Evidence-Privileged Communications-Ex-
tension of the Privilege to Communications Involving Agents, 50 MicH. L. REV.
309, 311 (1950).
133 Most of these cases may be dispensed with summarily. In Yates v. Com-
monwealth, 399 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. 1966), the Court affirmed that a witness' con-
fusion as to the name of a seller of illicit liquor, but not as to other pertinent facts,
tended only to affect the credibility of the testimony, and did not destroy its
value as a matter of law. In Dale v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1965)
w.here defendant was the only witness to the slaying of his wife, and refused to
tke the stand in the trial, evidence of what the defendant had told the police
after the homicide was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and sustain a
conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Lang v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 806
(Ky. 1965), affirmed that circumstantial evidence of a break-in and defendant's
actual flight from the scene were sufficient to convict although there was no
(Continued on next page)
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the problem in Commonwealth v. Devine,134 where the arresting
officer observed two men in an auto after dark drive into a park, and
using their auto's headlights for lumination, kill and retrieve a rabbit
in violation of KRS § 150.370, hunting rabbits out of season, and KRS
§ 150.390(2), hunting rabbits with headlights. The judge directed a
verdict for acquittal because the officer could not distinguish which
man had done the shooting. The Commonwealth successfully appealed
under KRS § 21.140(3). The opinion cites no cases to sustain the
reversal saying only that "without belaboring the matter it is our
opinion that the circumstantial evidence was ample to sustain a con-
viction." (Emphasis added.)
Granting for the moment the constitutionality of the statute per-
mitting appeal from acquittal of misdemeanors punishable by fine, it
seems that the evidence requisite for reversal of a directed verdict of
acquittal should be substantially more than that required "to sustain
a conviction." Such a reversal should be governed by the same rule
which gives wide discretion to the trial judge in the granting or re-
fusing of the request for a new trial. Such discretion will not be
interfered with unless the ruling is manifest error or abuse of discre-
tion.135 The rationale for the rule is a logical one-the trial judge is
closest to the facts and is the person most qualified to sift the evidence.
The same considerations are present here, the only difference being
that the judge has directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, not
against him. Indeed the authorities indicate but a single early case
decided on similar evidence and in that case the conviction was re-
versed.136 It is one thing to sustain a conviction and quite another to
reverse an acquittal and require a new trial. The judge obviously,
and, it would seem, quite reasonably, placed much weight on the
failure of positive identification. The Court of Appeals has here
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
positive evidence showing defendant had entered the building. Taylor v. Com-
monwealth, 392 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1965), similarly held that the failure of the
arresting officer to note in his description of the suspect that he wore a mustache
at the time of the alleged theft did not destroy the officer's testimony vis-a-vis the
mustached defendant. In Williams v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.2d 454 (Ky.
1965) where a conviction of a county treasurer for failure to publish the
county's financial statement in the time and manner required by KRS §§ 424.120
and 424.220 (1958) was reversed because the prosecution failed to prove that
the newspaper in the county possessed the qualifications required by the statutes.
The result may be criticized in that the requirements of the statute are probably
facts of common knowledge. The court is not required to instruct the iury on
such -atters. See State v. Blair, 209 Iowa 229, 223 N.W. 554 (1929); 23A
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1159 (1961).
134 396 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1965).
135 See Martin v. Payton. 20 F.R.D. 200 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Merrill v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affirmed, 288 F.2d 218 (2d Cir.
1961): Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952).
136 Burton v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 847, 94 S.E. 923 (1918).
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emasculated a trial judge's function simply because it disagreed with
that court's determination of the facts. The determination is not
clearly against reason. In fact it seems quite sound. The Court has
laid down, with the barest of documentation, a very dangerous pre-
cedent which should be changed at the earliest opportunity.
Defendant's counsel in Durham v. Commonwealth, 137 attempted
to exclude the evidence of two witnesses, claiming they were accompli-
ces and that it was necessary for their testimony to be corroborated.
The witnesses, two women, stood nearby and watched the robbery,
and later made use of the loot. They did not participate. The Court
held that though the women might have been accessories after the
fact, they were not accomplices and their testimony need not be
corroborated.
The authorities state that an accomplice is one who knowingly,
voluntarily, and with common intent, unites with the principal in the
perpetration of the crime, either by being present and joining in the
criminal act, by aiding and abetting in its commisson, or, if not pres-
ent, by advising and encouraging the performance of the act.138 It
would seem that a defense attorney faced with a similar predicament
should be particularly careful to impress upon the court that an ac-
complice when acting only as an aider and abettor need not command,
assist, or instigate, but may be guilty by his mere advice or encour-
agement. Such was apparently not done here.
It is noted with approval that the Court has not equated the terms
"aider and abettor" and "accomplice." These are not precisely
synonymous terms, and care should be taken when they are used
together. 39
In one final case in this section it was affirmed, and rightly so,
that a $1,000 fine levied against a constable for assault and battery of
a motorist for insisting on his right of way on a one-way street was
not excessive.140
F. Instructions
An ever-present source of controversy in the area of instructions for
criminal cases, the proper instruction on an indictment under the
1't 398 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1966).
138 See Clark v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1965); Head v. Com-
monwealth, 310 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1958) and cases cited therein.
139 See Miller v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Ky. 1965) wherein
the Court recognizes the rule that:
To constitute an aider and abettor, sometimes called a principal in the
second degree, it is essential that he be present, actually or constructively,
at the commission of the crime, and participate in it, sharing the
criminal intent of the principal in the first degree.
140 See Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1966).
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Habitual Criminal Statute,141 was considered in some detail in cases
before the Court of Appeals last session.142 In Rodgers v. Common-
wealth,143 the Court clarified the problem, holding that every factual
question must be submitted to the jury. Rodgers is discussed in more
detail above.143A
Two cases dealt with the question of when objections to instruc-
tions must be made to preserve the objection for appeal. Early Ken-
tucky criminal procedure required such objections to be made at the
time the instructions were given, but Harstock v. Commonwealth, 44 a
1964 case, construed the rules as permitting objections through the
period for the motion for a new trial. Marcum v. Commonwealth 45
followed Harstock in holding that since there was no counterpart for
CR 51146 in the criminal rules, objection to instructions need not be
made before, or at the time, the instructions were given. The case left
open, however, the question as to what would be the result if the
record disclosed that a particular basis for objection had not been
argued at all. The Court in Marcum would not assume that no ob-
jection had been argued where the record did not so stipulate.147
In Ward v. Commonwealth 48 the Court laid down a new definition
of the term "feloniously." Defendant appealed from a conviction of
receiving stolen property. Defendant claimed he had purchased the
property with the intent of communicating with the sheriff before
disposing of it. The trial court instructed the jury to find the defendant
guilty if it believed he "willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously received
141 KRS § 431.190.
112See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1966); Marcum
v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1966). In Marcum the instruction was
appropriate but incomplete. The failure to instruct the jury as to the option of
believing that the defendant had been convicted only once previously, was pre-judicial error.
143 399 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1966).
143A See text at note 83 supra.
144 382 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1964).
145 398 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1966).
14 6 CR 51. Instructions to Jury; Objections:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial
as the court reasonably directs, any party may offer written requests
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth therein; the court
shall give or refuse the instructions and shall give the jury written in-
structions before the commencement of the argument to the jury. No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction,
unless he objects thereto before the court instructs the jury, stating
specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his ob-jections. Opportunity shall be given to make his objections out of the
hearing of the jury.
147 The problem was resolved in Brannon v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d
680 (Ky. 1966). The time for such objection stops at the end of the period
for requesting a new trial and a subsequent objection is not meat for appellate
review.
148 399 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. 1966).
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the property knowing it had been stolen." The word "feloniously" was
defined as "preceeding from an evil heart or purpose." The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the instruction did not adequately
present the theory of appellant's defense. 149 The Court amplified the
original definition of feloniously to include the additional words, "done
with a deliberate intention of committing a crime."150 Other instruc-
tional errors are summarized in the footnotes. 15'
G. Post-Conviction Remedies and Procedure
1. Appeal.-In dealing with questions pertaining to procedures
for obtaining a new trial, the Court demonstrated its unwavering
devotion to established rules in the face of what would appear to be
149 See Evitts v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 586, 78 S.W.2d 798 (1935).
wherein it is stated:
Where an accused admits the offense, or essential elements of the offense,
but relies on facts or circumstances amounting to an avoidance of the
crime, he is entitled to a concrete instruction upon his theory of the
case, and a mere general instruction is not sufficient.
150 Id. at 589, 78 S.W.2d at 800.
151 In a number of other cases the instructions were objected to. In Russell
v. Commonwealth, 403 S.V.2d 694 (Ky. 1966) it was held not error to refuse
to give an accomplice instruction where a witness was allegedly a thief who
passed the property on to the defendant. The Court cited authority to hold that
the thief is not an accomplice of the receiver of stolen goods.
In Spears v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1966), where the
defendant was indicted for illegally selling alcohol in a dry territory, evidence was
introduced as to his possession of the alcoholic beverages. The trial court
instructed that if the jury believed appellant "did keep for sale" alcoholic
beverages, they should find him guilty. The Court of Appeals reversed. The
Court here drew a fine semantic line, but accurately. Though the instruction
contains the word "sale" it is technically an instruction on possession. Unlawful
possession for the purpose of sale is a separate offense from that of illegally
selling alcoholic beverages in dry, local option, territory. See Helvey v. Com-
monwealth, 396 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. 1965). The point is vell-taken.
In Noe v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1965), the Court sustained
a conviction where a defendant, indicted for murder, objected to an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter on which he was convicted. The judgment is un-doubtedly correct. The general rule in Kentucky is that if a reasonable inference
can be drawn from the evidence that the defendant in a homicide case is guilty of
a lesser crime than murder, an instruction should be given thereon. Here, there
seemed a clear inference that the homicide was committed in a sudden heat of
passion or sudden affray. The instruction was proper.In Mason v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1965), the Court
affirmed that the trial court did not err in failing to submit to the jury whether
a pocket knife wvith a three-inch blade is a deadly weapon within the meaning
of the statute which states that robbery with a deadly weapon shall be punishedby life imdrisonment. The Court followed a previous case, Montgomery v. Com-
monwealth. 346 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1961 .
In Kilburn v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.d 948 (Ky. 16a), where the
evidence indicated clearly that the defendant killed the deceased to protect his
friend, it was incorrect to instruct that if the jury believed the friend started the
disagreement, then the defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The
defendant was granted a new trial, and the trial court was instructed that if no
stronger evidence th that at the first trial could be produced, a verdict for the
defendant should be directed.
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a just disposition of the merits. The case of Wheeler v. Common-
wealth 52 is in point. There appellant had been convicted of aiding
and abetting an armed assault with intent to rob. Pending appeal, he
moved for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.153
New evidence was submitted along with an affidavit by appellants
counsel asserting due diligence and giving reasons why the evidence
was not presented at the trial. 54 The Court held this was not enough.
The Commonwealth had presented new evidence of an impeaching
nature, but more importantly, an affidavit from appellant himself was
not produced.
In most jurisdictions, a motion for a new trial based on newly dis-
covered evidence must be supported by the affidavits of the accused,
his counsel, and the new witnesses. 55 An affidavit of the accused is
essential because counsel cannot speak for his client in the sense of
giving the client's testimony.156 Doubtless the weight of authority
persuaded the Court to refuse the motion for a new trial in the absence
of an affidavit submitted by the appellant. It might well be questioned,
however, whether strict affirmation of the conviction in Wheeler and
other cases involving purely procedural errors, 157 without granting the
defendant an opportunity to remedy his error, is warranted under
modem notions of justice and procedural due process. Although there
is lack of authority to support the proposition, it would appear that
the interest of justice would be better served if, as in the case of the
insufficient criminal indictment'58 and defective pleading under the
new civil rules, 5 9 the party were given the opportunity to correct his
procedural error and obtain a disposition of the case on the merits.
This does not mean that, where a defendant has had ample oppor-
tunity to comply with the rules for obtaining a new trial but has failed
to do so, the Court is justified in construing such rules so liberally as
to sanction the procedures actually followed. 60
2. Probation and Parole.-The question of whether or not an illegal
condition for probation will render the prior conviction and judgment
152 895 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1965).
153 RCr 10.06 provides: "The motion for new trial based on the ground of
newly discovered evidence shall be made within one year after entry of thejudgment or at a later time if the court for good cause so permits."
154For a full discussion of the substantive prerequisites for granting a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, see Hunter v. Commonwealth,
259 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1953); Spurlock v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 2.38, 223
S.W.2d 910 (1949).
15' 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1484 (1961).
156 Bales v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 272, 231 S.W.2d 61 (1950).
157 Lawson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. 1966).
158 See text at note 72 supra.
359 CR 15.
160 Queener v. Commonwealth 399 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1966).
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void was before the Court in Weigand v. Commonwealth.'6' Ap-
pellant, who was suspected of having entered the country illegally,
was convicted on a charge of issuing bad checks and given a sus-
pended sentence on the condition that he leave and remain outside
the United States. After being sent to a reformatory for violation of
this condition, appellant contended that the sole basis of his probation
was banishment from the country and that the imposition of such a
requirement rendered the entire proceedings against him void ab
initio. Declining to sustain this contention, the Court held that, al-
though a circuit court has no power to inflict banishment from the
country as an alternative to imprisonment, the order of probation is
separate from the conviction and the judgment entered thereon.
Therefore, a conviction and judgment are not renderd void by a void
order of probation. This decision is of practical significance in that it
ensures that proceedings otherwise validly conducted will not be set
aside due to an illegal order issued subsequent to judgment. To
declare the entire proceedings void ab initio in such a case would be
to arm the defendant with a means for setting aside convictions which
would not otherwise be accepted for review in a proceeding under
RCr 11.42 or other requisite procedures for appeal.162
The Court also this past term tvice reaffirmed prior holdings per-
taining to waiver of jurisdiction and the right to a fair hearing before
revocation of parole under KRS 440.330, which provides that extradi-
tion may be granted to persons accused or convicted in Kentucky.
In Herndon v. Wingo' 63 the Court reaffirmed the well-established
rule that, where a convict is on probation and is sent to prison outside
of the state for another offense, the state can revoke the original
probation and arrest him again without a new trial. This holding was
dictated by the strong policy underlying the new Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act'6 4 and the general rule that in no case shall the sur-
render of a prisoner be construed as a complete relinquishment of
jurisdiction by the asylum state.16 5 Likewise a surety will not be
exonerated from forfeiture of a bail bond under the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act on the ground that defendant had been extradited
to another state, where such surety fails to show defendant was
imprisoned in the other state and where he fails to show any other
justifiable excuse for defendant's non-appearance. 1 6
161397 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. 1965).
162See text at notes 153-154 supra.
163 404 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1966).
104 KRS § 440. 380 (1960).
165 Chick v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1966); Crady v. Cranfill,
371 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1963).166 Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 355 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1965).
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Also, the Court restated prior interpretations 67 by holding in
Wright v. Commonwealth'6s that, while KRS 439.800 requires hearing
before probation may be revoked, probationer is entitled only to a
fair hearing and not to the formalities of an indictment and trial. A
probationer is therefore not unlawfully detained if he is arrested and
held in custody prior to the hearing. KRS 439.340 vests a broad
authority in the State Board of Parole, and the statute requires no
mandatory service before a person confined in the penitentiary is
eligible for parole.' 69
3. RCr 11.42 and Post Conviction Habeas Corpus.-RCr 11.42 was
enacted as a mere procedural change in the traditional habeas corpus
remedy in cases involving prisoners in state penitentiaries. 170 It is
very similar in effect to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, although it differs in
one significant respect.' 7 ' The federal rule provides that petitions by
prisoners seeking relief on certain grounds -namely, grave consti-
tutional errors or lack of jurisdiction - should be fled in the court
in which they were convicted, rather than the district in which the
prison is located. The Kentucky rule merely provides that prisoners
are to bring post conviction collateral attacks on the judgment in the
court in which they were convicted, without limiting the grounds on
which such relief is available. The Kentucky rule has been held to be
an exclusive remedy; if one can bring an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate,
then he cannot bring a habeas corpus motion.'7 2 The rule itself does
not represent an extension of the relief available traditionally under
167 Ridley v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1956).
168 391 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1965).
169 Pryor v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1965).
170 RCr 11.42: "Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence. (1) A
prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be released on the
ground that the sentence is subject to collateral attack may at any time proceed
directly by motion in the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside
or correct it."
17128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948): "Federal custody; remedies on motion at-
tacking sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
172 Davis v. Wingo, 396 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1965); Harris v. Wingo, 396
S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1965); Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964). But there
are still areas in which it is appropriate to bring habeas corpus: Herndon v.
Wingo, 399 S.W.2d 486 (Ky. 1966) (involving claimed waiver of jurisdiction after
judgment entered); Thacker v. Asher, 394 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1965) (prior to
trial when defendant unlawfully detained), and areas where RCr 11.42 relief
is not available; Chick v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1966) (where
petitioner is contesting a proceeding in which sentence has never been entered):
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1966) (where petitioner not
now serving sentence he is trying to vacate).
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habeas corpus. However, Rice v. Davis,73 a case decided shortly after
the rule took effect (1963), broadened the scope of relief to consti-
tutional errors so grave that under federal constitutional law they
rendered the judgment void. With that case began a flood of RCr
11.42 motions to vacate and it has continued unabated to the present.
The Court has attempted to stem this flow in two ways, first by
constantly reiterating that not all errors in trial can be attacked
through RCr 11.42 (for example, see King v. Commonwealth7 4 which
sets out a list of errors RCr 11.42 motions will not reach along with
some discussion of the kind of remedies it will), and second, by
promulgating an amendment to the rule designed to stop the flow of
second and third petitions by the same prisoners. This amendment,
RCr 11.42(8),175 requires the first motion to allege all the grounds for
relief which can reasonably be brought at that time; it further provides
that a final disposition of the first motion precludes further motions on
any grounds which could reasonably have been raised. In discussing
this amendment, the Court has said that it is merely declarative of the
common law and hence is retroactive176 and that it is very similar to
an amendment to the Federal Rule in § 2255.177 The amendment
seems to preclude any consideration of areas which might render the
judgment void because of severe constitutional violations which no
court has heard. Additional RCr 11.42 relief would not be available
because a prior motion to vacate had been brought and adjudicated
on a different ground. In this situation, there would also be no state
habeas corpus relief, since the rule is that if a prisoner could have
brought a motion to vacate under RCr 11.42, but is foreclosed under
RCr 11.42 (3) from seeking relief on the particular point advanced,
then he had no state habeas corpus remedy.178 However, it is doubtful
173 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963) (a habeas corpus decision brought before
RCr 11.42 took effect, but heard by the Court after the effective date).
174 387 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1965).
175RCr 11.42(3): "The motion shall state all grounds for holding the
sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge. Final disposition of the
motion shall include all issues that could reasonably have been presented in the
same proceeding."
176 Tipton v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1966). It is not indi-
cative of the prior common law as evidenced by the cases cited in this case. These
cases provide only that the Court does not have to consider a second motion on
the same point brought in a previous motion. Burton v. Tartar, 385 S.W.2d 168
(Ky. 1964); Baker v. Davis, 383 S.V.2d 125 (Ky. 1964).
17 7 Tipton v. Commonwealth, supra note 176. Apparently, it is not. The
federal rule provides that the court does not have to consider a second motion
brought for "similar relief," which apparently has been interpreted to allow a
second motion on different grounds. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (1959) and accompany-
ing annotation.
178 Walker v. Wingo, 398 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1966). Contra, Martin v. Com-
monwealth, 397 S.V.2d 65 (Ky. 1965) (no RCr 11.42 remedy if issue pre-
viously discussed on direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceeding).
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that the theoretical outline above will accurately describe the de-
veloping practice. Though the Court affirmed several decisions last
year on the basis of RCr 11.42(3),179 it sometimes discussed new issues
not raised on prior motions.180 Supposedly, the petitioner would still
have his remedy under Federal habeas corpus.
To attack a judgment through an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate, one
must first file a motion to vacate in the circuit court in which he was
convicted. 181 The Commonwealth does not have to answer the motion
in order to contest the allegations. 18 2 The motion may be dismissed
summarily, when the allegations, if true, would not constitute a ground
for which relief is available, or when they are mere conclusions with-
out facts to substantiate them, 8 4 or when they are clearly con-
troverted by the record.185 However, if the motion alleges facts which
if true would render the judgment void, a hearing must be held. 80
179 Jennings v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1966); Rowe v. Com-
monwealth, 399 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1966); Tipton v. Commonwealth, 398 S.V.2d
493 (Ky. 1966); Warner v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1966); Bell v.
Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1965); Kinmon v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1965).
180 Rowe v. Commonwealth, supra note 179; Tipton v. Commonwealth,
supra note 179; Bell v. Commonwealth, supra note 179; Kinmon v. Common-
wealth, supra note 179.
181 RCr 11.42(1).
182 Roark v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1966); Ramsey v. Common-
wealth, 399 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1966).
183 See text at notes 248-261 infra.
184 Cook v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1966); Brown v. Com-
monwealth, 397 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1965).
185 Carter v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1965) (alleged not in-
formed of date the alleged offense took place, but record showed arraignment
and indictment showed the date. Court took notice that arraignment includes
giving defendant a copy of the indictment); Ray v. Commonwealth, 398
S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1966)( alleged no counsel, record showed appearance with
counsel and plea of guilty); Williams v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 503 (Ky.
1966) (alleged improperly denied a continuance, but record showed no motion
made for a continuance); Carter v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1965)
(appellant claimed sentence was wrong for crime charged, but record showed
charge of offense for which sentence was proper); Brown v. Commonwealth,
396 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965) (alleged no counsel, but record bore name "Stone"
which according to the custom at the time indicated that an attorney named
Stone had been appointed, and all involved except petitioner now dead); Mag-
gard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1965) (alleged insufficient time
to obtain counsel and prepare a defense, but the record showed representation by
counsel and that no continuance was requested); Bentley v. Commonwealth, 392
S.W.2d 67 (Ky. 1965) (alleged court had no jurisdiction and denial of right to
counsel and that no continuance was requested); Bentley v. Commonwealth, 392
S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1965) (alleged no counsel, but the record showed a named
attorney served as counsel). However, the appellant can overcome this if the re-
cord contains only a vague and general statement and appellant gives particulars.
Moore v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1965) (record had general
statement indicating counsel but not naming who was appointed-appellant got af-
fidavits from clerk of attorney alleged to have represented him, held-overcame
the record). But see Grider v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1966)
(Continued on next page)
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If the motion raises only questions of law, no hearing is necessary.18 7
After the hearing, or if no hearing was required because no factual
questions were raised, the judge determines the facts from the weight
of evidence and applies the lav to them.l ss Either the petitioner or
the Commonwealth may appeal from the judge's determination. 8 9 The
petitioner cannot raise issues on appeal not raised in the original
motion;9 0 however, in one case the Court allowed the petitioner to
submit affidavits with his brief which were not submitted as required
in the original proceeding. The Court excused this usually fatal
technical violation on the ground that the petitioner was appearing pro
se."9 ' Finally, the Court held the allegations of his motion were in his
brief.192
RCr 11.42 or post conviction habeas corpus relief is available only
if the judgment is void due to some substantial error in the pro-
ceeding. Exactly what errors are so substantial is not clear. Relief is
always available where the prisoner was denied counsel at some
cricital stage in the proceedings, providing that he did not waive
counsel, 193 where representation by counsel was so ineffective as to
"shock the consicence," 194 where the defendant was so mentally in-
competent as to be unable to effectively participate in the trial,195 or
where for any reason the trial was so conducted as to be a mockery of
justice.196 Relief is not available as a substitute for appeal or for mere
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(alleged jury only gave eight year sentence and supported this with affidavits fromjurors, record showed life sentence, held-the record controlled).186 RCr 11.42(5) At such a hearing petitioner, if indigent, is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel. But such appointed counsel is not entitled to compensation from
public funds. Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).187 Turner v. Commonvealth, 404 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1966).
Iss RCr 11.42(6). The Court has held that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief if he admits the falsity of his allegations at the hearing. (Doss v. Com-
monwealth, 896 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1965) or where the evidence presented at the
hearing refutes the allegations (Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.
1966) ).189 RCr 11.42(7). If the lower court releases petitioner pursuant to vacating
the motion, and the Commonwealth appeals and wins, no new order of com-
mitment is required to make the subsequent commitment legal. Watkins v. Wingo,
403 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1966).
190 Bell v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1965).
191 Moore v. Commonwealth, 894 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1965); but as to their
reasoning, the vast majority of these petitions are pro se (that is, argued by the
petitioner without counsel) and there are many areas where the Court is very
technical and strict.192 Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1965).
193 Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1966).
194 Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1965); Rice v. Davis,
366 S.W. 2d 153, 157 (Ky. 1963).
1'1 Barnes v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth v.
Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).I9 United States v. Edwards. 152 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1957), 256 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 858 U.S. 847 (1958).
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errors in the trial.197 Whether a case falls within these broad generali-
ties is decided on a case by case basis.
Denial of counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceeding
renders the judgment void.198 However, a mere allegation of denial of
counsel at some stage of the criminal proceeding is not enough. First
the allegation must pass the refuted-by-the-record test.199 Many
motions alleging denial of counsel were held last term to be properly
dismissed summarily where the record showed counsel to have been
appointed.20 0 This barrier can be overcome if the record does not
state who was appointed and the petitioner goes further to show that
he was not represented. 21 The denial must have been at a critical
stage. The Court held many motions inadequate which alleged denial
of conusel at preliminary hearing,202 explaining that the preliminary
hearing is not a critical stage in Kentucky.203 Furthermore, the ap-
pellant must be able to show that he did not waive counsel204 either
expressly20 5 or by not objecting at a later stage.20
This year the Court treated a new area of right to counsel relief,
the denial of assistance of counsel on appeal where counsel did not
take an appeal after being requested to do so.207 This is really an equal
protection claim, not a due process claim, and according to the cases
it would seem to be legitimate only for the indigent defendant, for the
equality of protection reguired is between the indigent and the non-
indigent.208 This problem fits but awkwardly in the RCr 11.42 post-
conviction habeas corpus area, because the petitioner is not attacking
the validity of the judgment on the basis of proceedings prior to the
rendering of the judgment, but is attacking on the basis of actions after
197Thornsberry v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1966).
198 Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1966).
199 See notes 170-192 and associated text supra.
200 Ray v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1966); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 396 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965); Bentley v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.2d 67(Ky. 1965); Waddle v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1965).
201 Moore v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1965).
202 Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966); Turner v. Com-
monwealth, 404 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1966); Parsley v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d
202 (Ky. 1966); Clark v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1966); Com-
monwealth v. Watkdns, 398 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1966); Tipton v. Commonwealth,
398 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1966).
203 Commonwealth v. Watkins, supra note 202.
204 Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1965).
205 Shepherd v. Commonwealth, supra note 205.206 Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1965) (alleged denial
of counsel during interrogation; did not object when confession admitted).
207 Hammershoy v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1966). In two
earlier cases, Tipton v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1966) and Short v.
Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1965), the Court denied that such a right
existed. Short involved hired counsel.
208 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
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the judgment which are not necessary to the finality of the judgment.
The relief granted should be the vacation of judgment, not allowance
of a late appeal. However, the Court has chosen to grant the latter.
The principle was first broadly stated in Hammershoy v. Common-
wealth to be:
the right of an indigent defendant in a criminal case to the assistance
of counsel on appeal, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot be
subjected to a determination by either a court or state-provided counsel
that the grounds for appeal are "meritorious" or "feasible". 209
However, the Court later limited the right in Benoit v. Common-
wealth210 to proceedings where the petitioner alleged that he had
requested counsel to make an appeal. In addition, the Court has
limited it further to cases where the petitioner alleges errors which
show that the appeal would have been of benefit.211 Iles v. Common-
wealth212 is distinguishable. There the Court held that petitioner had
not been denied any right when counsel refused to appeal, but in-
formed him of this decision prior to the deadline for filing an appeal.
The sum total of these cases may be no change in the law, for the
rights which were so freely given in Hammershoy v. Commonwealth
seem to have been eaten away by the subsequent cases.
The right to assistance of counsel is the right to effective assistance
of counsel.213 The test as to what constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel so grevious as to require vacating the judgment was set out
in Rice v. Davi 214 to be "circumstances... such as to shock the con-
science and make the proceeding a farce and mockery of justice."21r
When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in his
petition, a general allegation is not enough to prevent the motion from
being summarily overruled without a hearing, 216 and specific allega-
tions may be summarily dismissed if the conduct complained of is
not severe enough to suggest a constitutional violation 217 If the trial
court does order a hearing on the basis of the motion, and if the
motion is overruled after the hearing, the Court will not reverse un-
209 398 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Ky. 1966).
210402 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966).
211 Williams v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1966). For a discus-
sion of Hammershoy, Benoit, Williams and Tipton, all discussed above, see 55
Ky. L.J. 197 (1966).
212 399 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Ky. 1966). The Court says: "He slept on his
right to appeal," however, the Court does not even mention Hammershoy.213 Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1968).
214 Ibid.
215 Id. at 157.216Benoit v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966); Bingo v. Com-
monwealth, 391 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1965).
217 Bingham v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966).
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less the facts so adduced meet the Rice v. Davis test by "shocking the
conscience" and making the trial into a "farce and mockery of
justice."218
In Wedding v. Commonwealth219 the Court apparently found such
conduct. In this case, a murder prosecution, all the attorneys at the
Harrison County Bar with the exception of the prosecutor and one
elderly attorney were appointed to represent the defendant. At the
hearing on the motion to vacate, the apparent leader of the group
testified that they had not properly represented the defendant in light
of the fact that he was in danger of getting a death sentence. The
majority decision relies on Powell v. Alabama,220 in which the Supreme
Court held that the appointment of the entire bar to represent an
indigent where none of the attorneys apparently did anything at all
was a denial of the right to counsel.221 Further, the majority stresses
the testimony of the appointed attorney that the representation was
not adequate and, in particular, that counsel did not properly pre-
pare the defense. The dissent argues that the facts in Wedding do not
meet the Rice v. Davis test for, looking at all the testimony and the
transcript of the trial, the representation certainly would not "shock
the conscience." This case can be explained by looking to the pre-
sumption set out in Copeland v. Commonwealth.222 The Court says
in this later case that ". . . when the court in good faith appoints a
member of the bar in good standing to represent the defendant, the
presumption is that such counsel is competent and diligent." If this
presumption runs through this entire area and is the basis for the very
strict test applied, then Wedding would fall outside the test because
appointed counsel, or at least one of them, overcame the presumption
by his testimony to the contrary.
There were several cases in which the specific allegation of in-
effective assistance was predicated upon a showing that counsel was
appointed such a short time before trial that he could not possibly
have done an adequate job. Nelson v. Commonwealth25 gives as the
rule:
"Adequate preparation by an attorney employed by one charged with
a crime includes full consultation with his client, interviews with pro-
spective witnesses, study of the facts and law applicable thereto, and
the determination of the character of defense to be made and the policy
to be followed during the trial."
218 Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1965).
219 Ibid.
220 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
221 See 54 Ky. L. J. 802 (1966) for an argument that this is a misapplication.
222 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965).
223 295 Ky. 641, 175 S.W.2d 132 (1943).
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If adequate preparation requires all this, then a certain amount of
time is required to prepare for any trial, no matter how simple. Ap-
parently the Court relies on the presumption that appointed counsel
would request a continuance if they felt it was needed; several of
the cases mention these factors,224 and Copeland v. Commonwealth 25
specifically states a presumption, that appointed counsel is competent
and diligent, which must be overcome by the petitioner. The Court
did not grant relief for any of the motions alleging inadequate time to
prepare. In most of these cases a hearing was held and the facts
showed that counsel in good faith did not see the need for additional
time.22 But in two of the cases, the circuit court had not held a
hearing and the Court sustained the outcome. Specifically, the Court
held that the allegations that counsel was appointed only five minutes
before the trial began,227 and that counsel consulted with petitioner
only thirty seconds228 before advising him to plead guilty did not even
require a hearing. Apparently the Court is applying the presumption
of good faith with a vengeance. But surely thirty seconds could not be
enough time for the attorney even to see if the facts admitted by the
defendant fit the crime charged, let alone meet the other requirements
set out in the Nelson rule. However, the Court goes even further and
implies that "three seconds" might be enough time.229
In other cases where the petitioners claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel, the Court held the following acts or omissions of counsel
to be insufficient grounds for vacating the judgment: counsel did not
preserve errors in the record by filing a motion for a new trial;230
224 Copeland v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965); Hargrove v.
Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1965).
220 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965).2 2 0 Smith v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1966) (petitioner plea-
ded guilty after five minutes consultation with appointed attorney; at hearing on
motion appointed counsel testified that further time would not have been of
value); Coles v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1966) (counsel, ap-
pointed on day of trial, testified that more time wasn't needed); Copeland v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965) (five to ten minutes before trial,
petitioner's testimony revealed that counsel did not feel he needed additional
time); Collins v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1965) (counsel, appointed
on day of trial, testified that no continuance was needed).227 Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1965).
228 Burton v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 933 (Kv. 1965).
229 Burton v. Commonwealth, supra note 228, at 934:
Included in his second argument is the contention appellant was given a
total of "30 seconds or less" to confer with his appointed counsel. He
does not contend this brief time was insufficient, or that he asked for
more time and was refused. HIs attorney could ask, "are you guilty," and
get a yes or no answer in less than three seconds.
Furthermore, the Court apparently does not believe this result to be inconsistent
with the Nelson rule for it cites this case as authority only one line after having
quoted the Nelson rule as unchanged. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d
725, 726 (Ky. 1966).230 Benoit v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966).
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counsel did not move to dismiss the indictment, did not examine the
prosecuting witness, and did not argue the case to the jury;231 counsel
did not object to improper closing argument by the prosecutor; 232
and counsel refused to call certain witness on behalf of the ap-
pellant.233
In two cases where petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of
counsel the Court summarily dismissed because the petitioners were
represented by hired counsel,234 citing King v. Commonwealth.235
This is a hard distinction to swallow since Rice v. Davis,230 the in-
effective assistance of counsel case which set out the rule still followed,
involved hired counsel. Surely the rule that ineffective assistance of
hired counsel is not a ground justifying vacation of judgment is only
a presumption, which could be overcome in a case which met the
Rice v. Davis test of "shocking the conscience." In a third case, where
appellant alleged that his hired counsel was prejudiced against him,237
the Court said that if such were the case, then appellant could have
dismissed him and gotten another. Since he did not, counsel must
have not been that bad.
An extremely novel right to counsel question under the Ken-
tucky Constitution was raised in Ramsey v. Commonwealth -.2 3 Ap-
pellant argued that he had been denied the right granted by
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution "to be heard by himself and
counsel" when the trial court refused to dismiss appointed counsel and
let him try the case himself. The Court had already found that his
appointed counsel was not ineffective and apparently thought that
effective representation was all the Kentucky Constitution section re-
quired.
Insanity at the time of trial will render the judgment void and
subject to attack under RCr 11.42.239 However, the degree of insanity
that must be proved is extremely strict.240 The test as promulgated in
231 Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 899 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1966).
232 Elliot v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1966).233 Thornsberry v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1966). There were
two other cases, Bingham v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966); Wahl
v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1965), where the Court found allegations
of error concerning ineffective assistance of counsel to be insufficient, but -id not
state in the opinion what the insufficient grounds were.
234Gregory v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1965); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1965).
235 387 S.W.2d (Ky. 1965).
236 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).
237Short v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1965).
238 399 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1966).
239 Barnes v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth v.
Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).24 0 McElwain v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1966); Vincent v.
(Continued on next page)
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Commonwealth v. Stricklanc]241 is -... whether he has substantial
capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceeding
pending against him and to participate rationally in his defense."242
Procedurally, if appellant alleges that he was so mentally in-
competent at trial as to fall within the Strickland rule, and he sub-
stantiates this allegation in his motion, he is entitled to a hearing on
the facts.243 However, if the trial court decides after an inquiry into
the facts, either prior to the original trial244 or at a hearing pursuant
to the motion,245 that the appellant was competent to stand trial,
petitioner faces a stringent burden on appeal to upset this determina-
tion. The circuit judge's adverse ruling was upheld where the de-
fendant had a history of insanity prior to the trial and was diagnosed
and treated for insanity some seven months after being convicted,246
and even where a jury found defendant to be insane the same day
the trial was held.247 Apparently, these cases rely on the judge's
failure to find evidence sufficient to meet the very strict test of mental
incompetence necessary to vacate the judgment.
Although many allegations other than right to counsel, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and insanity at time of trial were made, none
were upheld. The Court held the following to be insufficient to war-
rant a hearing: defects in arrest or warrant;248 illegal search and
seizure; 249 denial of a preliminary hearing without a showing of pre-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth v. Strickland,
supra note 239.
241 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).
242 Commonwealth v. Stricldand, 375 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1964); Vincent
v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1965) (judged insane same day as trial
and committed prior to sentence, held-judgment not void); Commonwealth v.
Strickland, supra, at 703: "The terms 'insane,' 'unsound mind,' and 'mental
illness' are too loose to serve as a reasonable test [of fitness to stand trial] ......
243 Conners v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1966) (alleged facts
substantiating allegations: Court side-stepped issue by citing King v. Common-
wealth, 387 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1965) ); Copeland v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d
59 (Ky. 1965) (did not allege that he was mentally incompetent, but that trial
court improperly failed to inquire into his competency; denied hearing); Barnes
v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1965) (fled documentary evidence with
his motion; reversed for hearing); Bell v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 784 (Ky.
1965) (mere allegations; denied hearing).2 4 4 McElw'ain v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1966) (the Court
stresses that trial court provided for psychiatric examination before deciding that
defendant was capable to stand trial).2 4 5 McElwain v. Commonwealth, supra note 244; Vincent v. Commowealth,
394 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1965).2 46 McElwain v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1966).
247 Vincent v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1965).
248 Morgan v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1966); Wahl v. Com-
monvealth, 396 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1965); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d
365 (Ky. 1965).
2 49Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966); Wahl v. Com-
(Continued on next page)
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judice;250 delay in the holding of a preliminary hearing without a
showing of prejudice;251 excessive bail;25 2 defective indictment; 253
denial of speedy trial without allegation the defendant sought a speed-
ier trial;254 allegation that jury was prejudiced without any reason
why this could not have been taken care of by usual trial safeguards; 5
one of the jurors related to a prosecuting witness; 25 6 no court re-
porter;257 perjured testimony;258 introduction of inadmissible evi-
dence; 259 insufficient evidence;260 circumstantial evidence; 261 erroneous
instructions;2 62 improper argument by the Commonwealth attorney;2 3
newly discovered evidence;264 counsel's insistance on guilty plea,
coupled with promise of probated sentence.26 5
In certain cases the Court held the prisoner to have waived any
right he might have had. A plea of guilty was held to waive any error
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
monwealth, supra note 248; Gregory v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 944 (Ky.
1965); Moore v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1965). See also, Brown
v. Wingo, 396 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1965) (habeas corpus not available when illegally
seized evidence admitted at trial).250 Banton v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1966); Roark v. Com-
monwealth, 404 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1966); Benoit v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d
706 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 398 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1965); Har-
grove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1965). In Banton the appellant at-
tempted to show prejudice by saying that because he had no preliminary hearing
his counsel did not have adequate time to prepare. This contention was rejected
by the Court, which pointed out that he had counsel over a month before trial.251 Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1965).252 Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966).
253 Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1966); Gregory v. Com-
monwealth, 394 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1965); Waddle v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d
687 (Ky. 1965); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1965).2 5 4 Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966).
255 Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1965).256 Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1966).
257 Tipton v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1966).25S Thornsberry v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1966); Moore v.
Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1965).
259 Brown v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1965).260 Humphries v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1965); Brown v.
Commonwealth, supra note 260; Gregory v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 944 (Ky.
1965); Short v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1965); Henry v. Com-
monwealth, 391 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1965).
261 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1965).262 Benoit v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 706 (Ky. 1966); Copeland v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965); Gregory v. Commonwealth, 394
S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1965); Moore v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1965).
263 Gregory v. Commonwealth, supra note 262.264 Roark v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1966); Parsley v. Com-
monwealth, 400 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1966); Bell v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d
784 (Ky. 1965); Fannin v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1965); John-
son v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1965).265 Ray v. Commonwealth. 398 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1966); Humphries v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1965); Burton v. Commonwealth, 394
S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1965).
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in indictment -66 and all pretrial errors. 267 Failure to object to the ad-
mission of a confession at trial was held to waive constitutional
violations in obtanng the confession.268 Failure to object to the
composition of the jury until after jury was sworn was held to waive
any defects in the method of selecting the jury.269
4. Mandamus.-The most important of several miscellaneous man-
damus cases was Matthews v. Pound,2 70 a case which brought about a
somewhat unique situation due to the relatively intense public and
political fervor attendant the investigation in issue. Following a grand
jury investigation into the activites of certain state parole board
members, the judge, pursuant to the request of the grand jury fore-
man, impounded some nine items from the report on the ground
that if they were released, those mentioned might be jeopardized.
The grand jury had made no indictments or recommendations. Con-
tending that without the impounded items the report was incomplete
and seriously hampered possible future action by proper authorities,
the Governor, under statutory authority,271 requested the intervention
of the Attorney General. Under similar statutory authority,272 two
Commonwealth attorneys requested the assistance of the Attorney
General with reference to such matters in their district.
With no significant precedent available, the Court resorted to an
interpretation of the pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions
in light of what it considered to be the general policy of the law.
Apparently adopting an exception to the general policy of shielding the
proceedings of grand juries from public scrutiny, the Court held that
in view of the request of the Governor under KRS 15.200 and of the
two Commonwealth's attorneys under KRS 15.190, and in light of the
official capacity of the Attorney General under common law and the
state constitution,27 3 the judge had no right to impound the items
from the grand jury report. Moreover, withholding certain items from
the released report in effect created two grand jury reports, i.e., the
one released to the public substantially differed from that rendered
to the court, and nowhere could any authority be found which
sanctioned such procedure.
260 Waddle v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1965).
267 Burton v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1965).26SMaggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1965).
269 Tohnson v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1965).
270403 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1966).
271 IKS § 15.200(1) (1964).
272KRS § 15.190 (1964).
273 Ky. CONST. § 91.
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The final determination was sound. The items should have been
included no matter how meritorious the purpose for omitting them.
The request of the grand jury foreman was a mere recommendation to
be treated as surplusage, and the items omitted in the report sub-
mitted to the court should be incorporated by reference into the re-
port actually released.
In the other cases concerning mandamus the Court merely affirmed
and restated established law. In reiterating precedent,274 the Court
held that mandamus will lie to compel the circuit court to furnish the
petitioner with the record of the proceeding in order to perfect his
appeal.275 Likewise mandamus will lie to compel the circuit court to
furnish the petitioner with the record of the proceedings free of
charge when such petitioner is proceeding in forna pauperis to perfect
his appeal. Thus, where the respondent judge does not state why he
denied the record to a petitioner appealing in forma pauperis, the
Court of Appeals will order the record produced .27  The same will
hold true where the judge does not deny petitioner's allegation that
he is a pauper.277
Similarly, where a petitioner alleges that he spent all his money
and resources obtaining bail and trying to get legal services to defend
the charges against him, and where the response of the judge is so
insufficient as to render it impossible to determine whether petitioner
had been deprived of any right, justice entitles him to at least
appointment of counsel and a hearing.278
But a petitioner is not entitled to a record when he is not making
an appeal.279 Thus a petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus
requiring the circuit court to furnish portions of the record of his
trial where no motion has been filed to vacate the judgment.28 0 Also,
before an order compelling a court to furnish a transcript will issue,
there must be a showing of some ground which would entitle a
defendant to relief. A petition for the writ of mandamus to compel a
court to furnish a copy of the trial record and of the hearing on
motion to vacate in order to perfect appeal before the United States
Supreme Court is fatally defective if it does not allege that proceedings
in the Supreme Court have been commenced.281
274 Davenport v. Winn, 385 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1964).275 Roark v. Stivers, 401 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1966).
276 Wilson v. Jefferson Circuit Court, 401 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1966).
277 Hall v. Stivers, 399 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1965).2 7 8 Bingham v. Stivers, 396 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1965).
279 Wright v. Pound, 399 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1965).
280 See Moore v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1964); Jones v. Breslin, 385
S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1964).
281 Tohnson v. Turner, 399 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1965); Harden v. Turner, 394
S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1965).
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Turner v. Dep't of Parole & Probation212 was a mandamus pro-
ceeding seeking to require the Department of Parole and Probation to
restore petitioner to a parole status which was allegedly arbitrarily
and illegally revoked. Turning to Article 10 of the Kentucky Consti-
tution and the prior decision under that article,28 3 the Court pointed
out that its own jurisdiction in a mandamus proceeding extends only
to judicial officers. Therefore petitioner's motion must be denied,
since an action against any state officer other than a judicial officer
must be brought in the appropriate court of general jurisdiction and
against the individual or individuals sought to be controlled.
282 894 S.V.2d 889 (Ky. 1965).
283 Commonwealth v. Wise, 851 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1961).
X. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. Age of Majority
The most important domestic relations case to come before the
Court in several years is Commonwealth v. Hallahan,1 which in-
terpreted KRS 2.015, the Kentucky age-of-majority statute.2 Although
this 1964 enactment states that eighteen shall be the age of majority
for all purposes except the purchase of alcoholic beverages and the
care and treatment of handicapped children, the Court held that a
person under twenty-one could not obtain a marriage license without
parental consent.3 Procedurally, the case arose when the county
court clerk of Jefferson County, who had been sued to compel
issuance of a marriage license, sought a declaration of rights because
of the penal sanctions of KRS 402.990(8).4
At the time the majority statute was passed, the Legislature also
expressly amended in the same bill five previous enactments which
had used the specific age of twenty-one.5 Taking this as a point of
departure, the Court reasoned that statutes using a specific age, rather
than a general term such as "adult" or "majority," were not intended
to be affected by the present statute. In other words, five statutes
reading "twenty-one years" having been amended to read "eighteen,"
other similarly worded statutes must remain as they stand.6
1391 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1965).
2 'ersons of the age of eighteen years are of the age of majority for all
pumoses in this Commonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic beverages
and for purposes of care and treatment of handicapped children, for which
twenty-one years is the age of majority."
a There is an exception in the case of pregnancy, in which case the male
under eighteen and/or the female under sixteen may apply to the county judge
who has discretion to grant permission to marry. KRS § 402.020(5) (1960).
4 "Any clerk who knowingly issues a marriage license to any person pro-
hibited by this chapter from marrying shall be fined not less than five hunded
nor more than one thousand dollars. and removed from office by the judgment of
the court in which he is convicted."
5KRS § 885.010 (1958) (repealed 1966); KRS § 889.010 (1944) (sales of
minors' realty by court); KRS § 394.020 (1942) (power to make a will); KRS
§ 394.030 (1942) (minor can exercise a power of appointment); KRS § 405.390
(1950) (adoption of adults).
6 The rule which the Court held to be applicable was: "Before a statute
shall be considered amended by implication by a later statute, the two statutes
must be repugnant to each other and be irreconcilable, or the later act must
cover the whole subject of the earlier act." Hallahan v. Sawyer, 390 S.W.2d 664(Ky. 1965). It then gave examples of each of these types of repeal by implication.
Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. City of Anchorage, 393 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1965)
stated that the transfer of zoning power in sixth class cities from the city legislative
body to the county judge and fiscal court necessarily transferred all statutory
powers to implement this. This was a case of incompatibility. Lincoln Bank &
Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1961) held that the enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code repealed certain statutes by implication. The
Legislature obviously meant to cover the entire subject of commercial law.
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The result reached is questionable. For instance, since KRS
199.470(1) provides that any "adult" person may file a petition for
adoption, the rule promulgated by Hallahan, if followed, could allow
a person who is not old enough to exercise his own discretion as to
marriage to adopt a child. Another potentially troublesome area is
guardianship, since chapter 387 of KRS does not specify an age at
which a minor ward attains majority. Under Hallahan, this indicates
that he could assume control of his property at age eighteen. Also
under chapter 387 of KRS, if an infant who dies without issue has
title to real estate derived by gift, devise, or descent from a parent,
the whole descends to that parent. The question arising from Halla-
han would then be whether or not the death of an eighteen-year-old
in such circumstances would be the death of an adult or the death of
an infant.
Other interesting questions could arise in a lawsuit concerning an
eighteen-year-old killed by another's negligence. The father and
mother of a minor child are entitled to his earnings. 7 Would three
years of earnings therefore be includable in damages, or would the
deceased be considered a minor at all for purposes of parental re-
covery?
If the parents of an adult become indigent, he is responsible for
their support.8 The question then becomes whether Hallahan would
require an eighteen-year-old to support his indigent parents, and the
answer demanded by the principal case would seem to be in the
affirmative.
Furthermore, a father is liable for the nurture and education of
his minor children.9 This could create a problem, since most under-
graduates are dependent upon their parents for the financing of a
college education. Some courts hold that a parent owes his child a
college education if he is able to provide it.10 If the Court decided to
follow this line of decision, it would have to overthrow arguments
that the child between eighteen and twenty-one is an adult to whom
no such duty is owed.
Quite possibly the Ha~lahan decision was based on unspoken policy
considerations." The Court might have considered eighteen as too
7 K-RS § 405.010 (1942).
8 KRS § 405.080 (1942).
9 KRS § 405.020 (1942).
10 Gerk v. Gerk. 144 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1966); Jaclanan v. Short, 165 Or.
626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926).
11 Age Divorces per 1,000 Annulments per 1,000
Under 21 12.6 5.3
25-29 4.8 2.3
Paul C. Glick, social statistics branch of the Census Bureau in the Research
Report of Science Research Associates (1962).
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unripe an age to marry without parental blessings. In fact the Court
might well have considered wholesale lowering of the age of majority
to be so unwise as to demand judicial modification of legislative
intent. 12 After all, another established rule of interpretation which
would have produced the opposite result was available. "The primary
rule is to ascertain the intention [of the legislature] from the words
employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the legislature
may have intended but did not express"' 13
The opinion suggested that the Legislature clarify or eliminate
this statute. Efforts were made in this direction during the 1966
General Assembly, but no legislation resulted.14 The Legislature
should carefully examine each area of the age of majority question,
considering the shortcomings in both its 1962 statute and the Hallahan
decision. It should then make a discriminating choice of the proper
age of majority in each of these areas.
B. Adoption
Arciero v. Hager15 involves a conflict of laws problem16 as well as
one of adoption and inheritance. At the time of the adoption in New
York of Thomas Bertram Lively (now Arciero), the Kentucky statute
permitted inheritance through the natural as well as the adoptive
parents. 17 Later the statute was amended to sever all ties to natural
parents.18 Thus, when his natural father's uncle died intestate in Ken-
12 See 55 Ky. L. J. 182 (1966).
13 856 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky. 1962).
14 Senate Bill 297, which would have reversed the Hallahan, decision, was
tabled in the House 30-28 after passing the Senate 29-0. 1966 Final Legislative
Record 14, 28, 30.15 397 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965).
16 The Court decided Kentucky law applied and quoted the following from
2 Am. Jun. 2d Adoption § 115 (1962):
According to the better view and weight of authority the rights of in-
heritance of the child as an adopted child, and the extent of such right
of inheritance, will be determined, not by the law of the state where the
adoption took place, but in the case of real property by the law of the
state where the property is located, and in the distribution of personal
property by the law of the domicil of the intestate property owner, at
the time of his death. This rule is applied regardless of whether the
local law enlarges the rights of the adopted child as fixed by the law
of the state where the adoption took place and confers right of in-
heritance where none existed in the state of adoption or diminishes
such rights. The fact that an adopted child can inherit under the law
of the state of his adoption will not enable the child to inherit property
in another state under the laws of which a child, if adopted in that
state, cannot inherit or can inherit only to a limited extent. (Emphasis
added.)
The policy clearly is that a state where property is located has a superior
interest in how it passes by inheritance.
17KRS § 405.340(9) (1946).
18 KRS § 199.520(2) (1956).
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tucky, Thomas could not inherit. This is in line with a previous case
which held that KRS 199.520(2) "excises the adopted child from its
'blood' family tree,"' 9 thus placing an adopted child in the exact
status of a natural one.
Minary v. Minary20 concerned a testator who adopted his wife in
order to make her his heir. This enabled her to inherit under a trust
established in his mother's will which limited inhertance of the
corpus to her children's heirs at law. The trustees brought an action
in Jefferson Circuit Court for a declaration of rights to determine
how to distribute the corpus of the trust; in a separate action, heirs
other than the wife/daughter sought to have the judgment of adoption
declared void. Both actions were heard together and dismissed by the
trial court, which regarded them as essentially in personam suits.
Since the wife had been served only constructively, neither action
could be maintained. Although the Court of Appeals agreed that the
adoption decree could not be atacked without personal jurisdiction
over the wife/daughter, it held that the lower court did have
jurisdiction to determine the questions raised by the trustees be-
cause the situs of the trust was in Jefferson County. The Court
accordingly reversed with directions to permit the trustees' action for
a declaration of rights and to proceed in a manner "not inconsistent
with this opinion." The Court did not specifically state whether or not
the wife's status as adopted child could be brought into issue in the
distribution proceedings.
Certainly the wife's status is not subject to direct attack, because
the validity of such an adoption in Kentucky was established several
years ago under nearly identical circumstances. 21 The statute effective
at the time of the earlier adoption 22 permitted the adoption of an
adult, as does the present statute.23 The Court rejected the argument
that such adoption was against public policy because it results in an
incestuous relationship, and cited a Mississippi case which did not
find an adopted child to be a daughter within the incest statute.24
Adoption of one's wife as his daughter clearly defeats the intent
of a testator who has established a trust for "heirs at law." However,
the Legislature was surely aware that adoption of an adult is probably
10 Jovett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1960). Here the Court held that
a natural grandfather has no visitation rights-"personal" as well as "legal" rights
are broken.
20 395 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1965).
21 Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r and Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).22 BAL-ow's KENTucK STATUTE SxavicE § 3316-3(1) (1941 Supp.).
23 KJRS § 405.890 (1950).2 4 State v. Lee, 196 Miss. 311, 17 So. 2d 277 (1944).
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for inheritance purposes. 25 Regarding adoption as the creation of a
parent-child relationship when the adoptee is well into middle age
is an irrelevant, if not silly, approach. The statute permitting adoption
of adults therefore should be regarded as an expression of legislative
intent to override testamentary intent in adult-adoption cases. Once
the practice of choosing adult heirs by adoption is allowed, there seems
to be no valid reason for excluding the wife.2 6
C. Custody
The common law rule that the father has superior right to the cus-
tody of his children began to lose force in Kentucky at least as early
as 186 4 .27 Presently, giving custody to the mother is presumed to
best serve the welfare of children of tender years (under eight or
nine), and girls of all ages.28 Although during the past year several
cases granted custody to the father or a third person, this does not
represent a step backward, but merely reflects unusual fact situations, -2 9
in which the mothers were clearly less able to provide for the welfare
of the children.
The Court's reluctance to overrule the discretion of the chancellor,
257 MD. L. REv. 275-76, 283-84 (1943).
26 But see 47 Ky. L. J. 149, for remarks critical of the Graybill decision, the
gist of which is that the Court improperly construed the testator's intent, which
was not necessarily in conflict with the adoption statute if he desired to exclude
adopted heirs.27 Adams v. Adams, 62 Ky. (1 Duval) 168 (1864).
28Babb v. Babb, 293 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1956); Ragland v. Ragland, 299
Ky. 699, 187 S.W.2d 257 (1945).
29 In Whisman v. Whisman, 401 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1966), where the mother
had borne two illegitimate children since her divorce and stated in court that she
intended to have more by her present boyfriend, the father, who lived on a
farm with his present wife, was given custody. It appears that a bucolic at-
mosphere may go over well with the Court of Appeals. Accord, Polivick v.
Polivick, 375 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1964). Yelton v. Yelton, 395 S.W.2d 590 (Ky.
1965), gave custody to the father who was remarried and prosperous. His former
wife was less fortunate. She was poor and her new spouse was serving his second
prison term for bootlegging. She and the children frequently visited him at the
prison. There was no evidence that she was of bad character. Accord, Maynard
v. Maynard, 302 Ky. 590, 195 S.W.2d 304 (1946). Roaden v. Roaden, 394
S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1965), comes closer to departing from the general rule than
the other custody cases. It was proved that the wife had been seeing other men
prior to the divorce, but it was also proved that she had behaved properly during
the two years of the divorce action. Two important factors were that the girls
were ten and fourteen, not of especially tender years, and the reluctance to over-
rule the discretion of the lower court. For the proposition that evidence of re-
formed behavior is sufficient for custody, see Estes v. Estes, 299 S.W.2d 785
(Ky. 1957) where a mother regained custody of her children after proving she
had overcome her addiction to alcohol; Runge v. Runge, 307 Ky. 752, 212
S.W.2d 275 (1948) where custody originally vent to the husband whose wife
had been guilty of adultery. She later got custody because his plans were un-
certain and she proved her present good behavior. Contra, Skidmore v. Skidmore,
261 Ky. 327, 87 S.W.2d 631 (1935).
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absent a clear-cut abuse of discretion or misinterpretation of the law,
was the factor behind two decisions. 30
D. Miscellaneous
The Court of Appeals continued to require alimony to be paid in
a lump sum where possible, and as a general rule, one-third of the
husband's estate is a proper award. This rule was followed in four
cases.31 Another case reversed the chancellor, but did not award a
lump sum. 32
Two convictions for failure to pay child support were reversed
because of misinterpretation of the statutes in the lower courts.33 Two
20 McReynolds v. Hughes, 398 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1966). Here the maternal
grandmother was allowed to retain custody as against the mother absent clear
proof of abuse of discretion. This was somewhat similar to the now-famous case
of Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L.
VEEK - (U.S. Nov. 22, 1966), which allowed the maternal grandparents to re-
tain custody in a stirring victory for God, mother, and the Iowa way of life. The
court stated that grandparents' home provides "a stable, dependable, conventional,
middle-class background," while the father's would be "unstable, unconventional,
arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating." See Note 79 HAnv. L.
REv. 1710. Sexton v. Sexton, 391 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1965) held there was no
evidence to justify reversing the lower court which awarded custody to the
mother.
31 Elliot v. Elliot, 400 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1966); Ralston v. Ralston, 396
S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965); Hunt v. Hunt, 394 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1965); Porter v.
Porter, 394 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1965). See, Furgerson v. Furgerson, 307 Ky. 394,
211 S.W.2d 161 (1948), which listed factors the chancellor should consider in
determining whether or not to award alimony:(1) the extent of the husband's estate.
(2) his earning capacity.
(3) their social position.(4) their accustomed standard of living.(5) the reasonable needs of the wife.
(6) other factors.
In Cawood v. Cawood, 329 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1959) the wife got one-third of
the estate in a lump sum despite a finding on the trial court that she:
[Cireated an unhappy home life for plaintiff; was cold and indifferent
towards plaintiff; was too preoccupied with all of her social and club
activities to give any attention to plaintiff; spent most of her evenings
drinking . .. and slept most of the mornings; never prepared plaintiff's
breakfast, and very few other meals; spent his income faster than he
could make it.
For other extreme cases, see Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1961);
Yonts v. Yonts, 329 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1959); Alexander v. Alexander. 317
S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1958); Oldham v. Oldham, 259 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1953);
Ahrens v. Ahrens. 313 Ky. 55, 230 S.W.2d 73 (1950); Green v. Green, 152 Ky.
486, 153 S.W. 775 (1913).
32 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 405 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1966).33 In Gauze v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1966) the defendant
was convicted under KRS § 435.240(3) (1954). This was reversed since the
stqtute expressly limited its application to decrees made after its enactment. In
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1966), KRS § 435.240(3)(a) (1954) required that the children be in indigent circumstances, and this
requirement was not met.
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other child support cases were decided, one covering the method of
payment and the other the adequacy of payments.3 4
Restoration of property to the spouse who held it before marriage
was considered in three other cases.35
34 Tucker v. Tucker, 898 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1965) held that a person ordered
to pay child support through a domestic relations court cannot defeat a judgment
for arrearages by showing he has paid by other means. Taylor v. Taylor, 894
S.W.2d 896 (Ky. 1965) declared $80 per month child support inadequate and
suggested a $50 minimum.
35 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 405 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1966), reduced a
restoration award to the husband from $7,000 to $4,000 because some of the
$7,000 had gone for a car instead of real property. Taylor v. Taylor, 400 S.W.2d
677 (Ky. 1966), refused restoration to a husband who had conveyed a farm to
his wife to escape a possible judgment. Hoehle v. Hoehle, 397 S.W.2d 161 (Ky.
1965), reafrmed the rule that a wife whose income was spent solely for living
expenses will not be entitled to a restoration of real property acquired by the
husband during the marriage. See Bissell v. Gentry, 403 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1966),
discussed infra Sec. XIII, Insurance, note 7.
XI. ELECTIONS
As illustrated by the legal complications resulting from the 1966
Georgia gubernatorial election, disagreements over elections often
produce the most heated and controversial of court battles. Courts
have the delicate problem of making legal determinations which by
their very nature have political repercussions, regardless of which side
wins. Cognizant of this problem, the General Assembly has enacted
specific instructions as to how elections are to be conducted. The
Court was called upon to interpret these election statutes five times
last term.
One such controversy concerned the meaning of "election" as used
in the Constitution and the statutes. Prior to this term, the Court had
said that section 148 of the Constitution, which prohibits the holding
of more than one "election" per year, does not refer to primary
elections.1 This interpretation was based on the fact that it has be-
come a political necessity to hold primary as well as general elections.
In Stevens v. HickS, 2 decided this term, the Court, without overruling
prior cases which construed "election" in a constitutional context,
interpreted "election" as used in a reapportionment statute 3 to include
primary elections. The Court apparently felt that it was important to
clear up the endless confusion over reapportionment near election
time, although it thereby laid itself open to criticism for being in-
consistent. However, a strong case can be presented that it is not in-
consistent to give a word one meaning when used in a statutory con-
text and quite a different one when a constitutional provision is being
interpreted. In another reapportionment case,4 the Court held that,
under statutes5 authorizing the filing of vacancies after nomination in
primary elections, the party's county executive committee can select
candidates for magistrate and constable in five new magisterial dis-
tricts, where a county court order (adjudged valid by the Court of
I Wilson v. Dean, 177 Ky. 97, 197 S.W. 547 (1917); Morgan v. Goode, 151
Ky. 284, 152 S.W. 584 (1912); Hodge v. Bryan, 149 Ky. 110, 148 S.W. 21
(1912); Montgomery v. Chelf, 118 Ky. 766, 82 S.W. 388 (1904).
2 401 S.W.2d 75 (Ky. 1966).
3IRS § 25.680 (1942) provides: "A county may be reapportioned into
justices' districts under the provision of KRS 25.690 and 25.700 at any county
term four years after a previous apportionment but not within sixty days previous
to an election for justice of the peace .... "
4 Davenport v. Redmon, 394 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1965).
5 KRS § 118.090(4) (1942) authorizes the chairman of the state, county,
or city district committee of the party to fill a vacancy in case of the removal of
a candidate subsequent to nomination. KRS § 119.020 (1948) provides that the
governing authority of the party has the power to fill vacancies of unopposed
candidates in certain situations.
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Appeals) had reapportioned the county into five, in lieu of eight,
districts.
Two other cases pertaining to the filling of vacancies of candidates
were decided by the Court during the past term. In Brock v. Helton6
two candidates had withdrawn before the primary election but after
the date for filing. The Court held that since the date for filing had
passed, the vacancies came within the meaning of KRS 119.020(3),
which allows the governing authority of the party to fill the vacancies.
In the second case,7 a list of qualified precinct officers was given to
one member of the board of elections by one of the political parties.
The Court held that the list must be submitted to the whole board, not
just one member. And as dictum the Court stated that substantial
compliance with KRS 116.1708 would be delivery to the chairman of
the board.
In the last case 9 the Court established guidelines for determining
what a complainant must allege in order to state a cause of action to
contest the election of a nominee in a primary.'0
6 395 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1965).
7 Ball v. Helton, 395 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1965). In this case the Republican
executive committee submitted a list of eight names for each of the thirty-two
precincts to one member of the board of election commissioners who, in turn,
submitted only the top two names from each precinct list to the board. Anything
other than the entire submission of all eight names on each list would, according
to the Court, have been in defiance of KRS § 116.050 (1942).
8KRS § 116.070 (1942) requires that "the county executive committees of
the two political parties . . .[submit] in writing to the county board of election
commissioners a list of at least eight [qualified precinct officers] for each
precinct."
9 Davis v. Britt, 394 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1965).
10 The Court said the complainant does not state a cause of action where
he fails to allege: (1) that 20 percent of the voters voted illegally, based on
voting requirements; (2) how each voter who allegedly voted illegally actually
voted; or (3) that proof of how each voted is unattainable. The Court indicated
that the complainant, in order to state a cause of action under KRS Chapter 123,
Corrupt Practices Act, must allege (1) that the successful candidate committed a
violation of the act, or (2) that any violation was committed in his behalf by
others with his knowledge.
XII. ETHICS
A. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Historically, the judiciary has concerned itself with the problem
of unauthorized practice of law in order to protect the public from
the unscrupulous, the untrained, and the incompetent.1 However,
institutions such as trust companies have been refused the right to
offer legal services mainly because of potential conflict of interests
between the client and the company.
2
Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.3 represents the Court's
first important pronouncement in this area since Hobson v. Kentucky
Trust Co. of Louisville.4 As fiduciaries, five trust companies, through
salaried lay and legal employees, were appearing in probate court,
drafting all necessary papers, and making final settlements of a number
of estates without legal counsel. They were soliciting fiduciary
business through local news media and occasionally referring to the
value of legal aid in drafting wills and planning estates. Some materials
sent to prospective customers focused upon the ability of the trust
company to analyze, plan, and suggest possible improvements in
estates.
As a first defense, the trust companies contended that Hobson per-
mitted these activities. The Court, however, found "that invoking the
jurisdiction of the county probate court through pleadings or ap-
pearances is the practice of law."5 Thus a corporate fiduciary can file
probate or fiduciary documents in the probate court or other court of
record only if they are in the name and by the authority of a licensed
1 Dunlap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 287, 65 S.W. 441 (1901). For a discussion of
unauthorized practice of law by realtors and title insurance companies, see Note,
49 Ky. L.J. 884 (1961).
2 Following is a list of six possible conflicts in every trust arrangement: 1)
an outright disposition of estate might be in order, but the trust company's fees
would be reduced; 2) circumstances may deem it advisable to have two trustees,
but the trust company is not interested in sharing trust fees; 8) a short-term trust
may be in the clients best interest while the trust company wants to manage a
long-term one; 4) the client's interest may be best served by limiting the power
of the trust company, while the trust companies encourage broad grants of power;
5) the client may desire a high degree of responsibility while the trust company
wants a low standard of care; 6) and in an unusual situation the same trust
company may represent both claimant and defendant trust funds. Hicks and
Katz. The Practice of Law by Layman and Lay Agencies, 41 YAL. L.J. 69, 82
(1931).
3 893 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965). For another discussion of Frazee, see Rouse
What Does the Decision in Frazee v. Trust Companies Mean to the Lawyer and
to the Banker, 29 Ky. S.BJ. 5 (1965).
4 803 Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946). The Court held that a trust
company is not, when acting in a fiduciary capacity, acting for itself, and is not
a "party" to an instrument within the meaning of the statute providing that one
may drift instruments to which he is a party.
G 893 S.W.2d at 782.
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attorney. Instead of attempting to distinguish Hobson, the Court over-
ruled it to the extent that it was inconsistent with its findings.
A second defense interposed was KRS 895.145.0 The Court quickly
disposed of this argument by ruling that insofar as the statute provided
that "no fiduciary shall be required to be represented by an attorney,"
it was ineffectual and superseded by the Court's Rules.7
Also, in affirming the ruling of the lower court concerning advertising,
the Court held:
It is specifically declared that the defendants do not have the right to
advertise their services in such manner as to assert the claim that they
or their officers are (independent of specific advice from lawyers)
authorized or permitted to plan, or make suggestions for the savings to
be effected by the planning of, the legal aspects of estates of decedents
or the settlors of voluntary trusts. 8
The plain import of Frazee is to partially declare the rights, duties,
and obligations of bankers in relation to lawyers, this being accom-
plished through judicial recognition of a joint Statement of Policy
adopted by the two interested professions and an enumeration of
services which banks and trust companies may and may not perform. 9
Evidently, no other jurisdiction has attempted to define the un-
authorized practice of law in this manner, proceeding rather in a case
by case method.' 0 However, the Court seemingly has provided a work-
able solution by which future "practices" can be clearly defined by
mutual accomodation and compromise, recognized judicially.
B. Suspension, Disbarment, and Reinstatement
The past year's cases add little or nothing to the body of law con-
cerning suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys. A
six month suspension for assaulting an attorney, threatening another
6KRS § 395.145 (1942): "At the time of appointment of a fiduciary, he may
designate an attorney who will represent him in matters relating to the trust, and
when so designated notices to such fiduciary shall also be sent by the court to
such attorney, but no fiduciary shall be required to be represented by attorney."
7KRS § 30.170(2) (1962): "The rules of court adopted and promulgated
under this section shall supersede all laws or parts of law in conflict therewith, to
the extent of the conflict."8 393 S.W.2d at 783.
9 The Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law of the
American Bar Association and the Executive Committee of the Trust Division of
the American Bankers Association adopted this Statement of Policies. The Court's
enumeration of services not to be performed by banks or trust companies can be
generally categorized as follows: 1) Drafting of instruments, 2) Conducting
litigation or appearing before the courts, 3) Rendering legal advice, 4) Preparation
and filing of tax returns. For a complete listing, see 393 S.W.2d at 783.
10 Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 404 (1960). See, e.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); 26 MD. L. REv. 192
(1966).
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attorney, improper political advertising, and failure to attend to a
client's affairs, all occurring over a ten-year period,11 seems rather
short and perhaps can only be rationalized in light of the absence of
moral turpitude.12 The Court apparently found this moral turpitude
when it disbarred the Public Administrator of Fayette County for
improperly accounting for funds over an extended period.13
The two reinstatement cases decided in this term merely reinforce
the established rule that a disbarred attorney is under a heavy burden
of proof in such proceedings.14
11 In re Gordon, 402 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1965).
12 This emphasis on moral turpitude is readily apparent in the 1964-65
decisions. In re Porter, 893 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1965); In re Shumate, 882 S.W.2d
405 (Ky. 1964).13 In re Lewis, 404 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1966). In addition, the Court under
RCA 3.050 would not allow respondent to voluntarily resign in order to escape
the stigma of disbarment.14,In re Applewhite, 401 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1966) (an examination of ap-
plicant's conduct prior to disbarment was allowed); In re Cohen, 401 S.W.2d
54 (Ky. 1966) (the Court relying on applicant's failure to satisfy a civil fraudjudgment rendered against him in 1954).
XIII. INSURANCE
Most of the insurance cases decided last term involved the con-
struction of various insurance policies. However, the Court did face
some other issues in cases involving the changing of beneficiaries, the
right of a divorcee to recover as beneficiary on a life insurance policy
of her former husband, an attempt by an insured to revive an expired
policy after an accident, and misrepresentations by an applicant for life
insurance coverage.
In Marshall v. Marshall,' a case dealing with an attempted benefic-
iary change, the Court relied upon its "substantial compliance" rule
to give effect to an attempted change which failed to comply with
the instructions for beneficiary changes set out in the policy. The in-
sured was covered by a group life insurance policy paid for and ad-
ministered by his employer. When he began his employment in 1954,
the insured signed a statement informing the employer that he wanted
his mother named as his beneficiary. When he returned to his em-
ployment in 1958 after a military leave of absence, he filled out two
information sheets wherein he named his wife as beneficiary. He
died before any other steps toward perfecting a change of beneficiary
were taken. According to the policy, a change could only be per-
fected by written notice to the insurer.
The insured's wife sued his mother to recover the amount of the
proceeds of the policy. The Court of Appeals rejected the mother's
argument that the change was ineffective for failure to comply with
the provisions of the policy and held, reversing the lower court, that
the wife was entitled to the proceeds. The Court looked at the
realities of the case and took cognizance of Kentucky's adherence2
to the "substantial compliance" rule, a rule by which an otherwise
ineffective change of beneficiaries is given effect when the insured has
substantially complied with the enumerated procedures "and has done
'all' or 'about all' he could do to make the.., change effective."3
In applying the rule to the facts of the case before it, the Court
was compelled to scrutinize the efforts of the insured to change the
beneficiary on the policy. He had signed an "information sheet" re-
questing a beneficiary change, had always dealt with the insurer
through his employer, and had been required merely to fill out
similar papers when he named his mother as beneficiary in 1954. The
1399 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1966).
2 Pikeville Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 158, 135 S.W.2d
481 (1939).
3 899 S.W.2d at 489.
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only difference was in the employer's conduct-in 1954 the employer
completed the transaction, in 1958 he did not.
The substantial compliance rule, a result of the notion that equity
will not prevent circumstances beyond the insured's control to defeat
his best efforts to change his beneficiary,4 is universally applied where
the defect is merely formal.5 By applying it to Marshall the Court of
Appeals stretched this doctrine, but the very nature of the rule war-
rants the extension.6 It should be remembered, though, that Marshall
presented a factual situation that virtually cried out for application of
the rule. Whether the Court would reach the same result under a less
extreme situation seems doubtful.
In Bissell v. Gentry7 the Court was faced with the question of whe-
ther a named beneficiary's right to the proceeds of a life insurance pol-
icy was extinguished by K.RS 403.060, which provides that, upon a
final divorce judgment, each party is to be restored to any property
which was not disposed of at the beginning of the action and which
he obtained from or through his spouse during, or in consideration of,
the marriage.7A
In Bissell, the plaintiff was the wife of the insured, who named her
as beneficiary in the group life insurance policy paid for by his
employer. Following their divorce, the insured never changed the
beneficiary, and on his death the plaintiff and the insured's admini-
strator both claimed the proceeds. The circuit court held the ad-
ministrator entitled to the proceeds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court, holding KRS 403.060 applicable,8 decided that, since the
plaintiff had not made the premium payments, the statute extinguished
her right to the proceeds. The Court was impressed with the idea that
the insured's employment was the only consideration for his employer's
paying the premiums and that, consequently, "the result is as though
4 VANcE, INSuRAXCE § 148 (2d ed. 1980).
1 Ibid.6 The well-reasoned opinion of the Court discusses this. The mother urged
adoption of the reasoning applied in Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F.2d 930 (5th Cir.
1943), while the wife based her argument on Johnston v. Kearns, 107 Cal. App.
557, 290 Pac. 640 (1930). The Court accepted Kearns. In Kearns the California
court held that an insured who notified his employer from his deathbed that hewanted to change the beneficiary on his group policy had substantially compliedwith the policy's requirement that notice be given to the insurer by the insured.
The Court characterized Kearns as consonant with reasoning and precedent, whileit criticized the Johnson case as inconsistent with the substantial compliance
doctrine.7403 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1966).
7A See other cases involving post divorce restoration of property noted supraSec. X, Domestic Relations, note 35.
C holding is based on solid precedent. See Sea, Adm'r v. Conrad, 155
Ky. 51, 159 S.W. 622 (1913).
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Bissell [the insured] individually procured and paid for the policy."
The decision falls squarely under the rule, established in the cases
cited by the Court,10 that if the wife procures the policy and pays
the premiums during the marriage, the policy is her property, not the
insured-husband's, and, conversely, if she has not paid the premiums
the policy is the husband's property" and is restored to him by the
statute. As Vance 12 points out, the general rule is that, absent statute,
a beneficiary's interest is not divested by his divorce from the insured,
but Bissell is in accordance with the construction given similar statutes
in other jurisdictions.' 3 The decision is sound for two reasons: first,
there is no reason for giving a divorced spouse's beneficial interest in
an insurance policy any better treatment than other property would
receive under the same statute; second, since this was a group policy
paid for and presumably administered by the employer, the insured's
failure to change beneficiaries probably resulted from oversight rather
than from a wish to retain the plaintiff as beneficiary.
Another significant case decided last term, Trautman v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co.,'4 involved the insured's efforts to revive an automobile
liability policy which by its terms had lapsed before the accident. The
Court refused to hold that the insurer extended the policy's express
time limitation by cashing a check' 5 which purported to be full pay-
ment of a premium and which was mailed after the policy had expired
and after the insured had been involved in the accident. The Court
in so holding was swayed by what it called the "immutable fact" that
the policy by its express terms had expired before the accident
occurred. It focused on the utter absence of any conduct on the part
of the insurer which could have led the insured to believe the policy
9403 S.W.2d at 16.
10 Salisbury v. Vick, 368 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. 1963); Henderson v. Baker, 362
S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1962); Ficke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 305 Ky. 172,
202 S.W.2d 429 (1947).
"1 See Salisbury v. Vick, 368 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Ky. 1963).
12 VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 597 contains a substantial discussion of the
Kentucky statutory scheme.
'3 Ibid.
1 400 S.W.2d 215 (Ky. 1966).
15 In Carden v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 278 Ky. 117, 128 S.W.2d 169 (1939),
cited by the Court as binding precedent on this point, the insurer exercised the
right given it by the terms of the policy to cancel the policy at any time. In
holding that the insurer did not vitiate the cancellation by cashing a check in pay-
ment of premiums, the Court was more concerned with enforcing the right of
free cancellation reserved by the insurer than with the effect of the cashing of
the check itself. However, though no precise case in point has been found, the
holding in Trautman is proper in light of the fact that a corporate insurer must,
as a result of internal operations, be given a reasonable time before imputation
of such knowledge will be assumed.
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would continue in force after the stated expiration date.16 The
decision is sound because it reflects a willingness by the Court to
recognize a fact of corporate life, namely, the necessary internal
mechanics of corporate functioning.' 7 The Court was correct in re-
fusing to let the insured take advantage of this fact at the insurer's
expense. Since the case was disposed of by holding that no policy of
insurance existed at the time of the accident, an interesting problem
-the plaintiff's right to sue on the policy as a third party beneficiary
since the plaintiff was not the insured' 8 was avoided.19
In Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co. v. Burchfield,20 the Court was
called upon to apply KRS 304.656,21 which provides that "misrepre-
sentations [by an applicant for life insurance] unless material or
fraudulent, shall not prevent a recovery on the policy." The Court had
no difficulty in concluding that, although the insured had made
material misrepresentations concerning his previous state of health, the
insurer was estopped to deny liability on the policy, since it was
clearly chargeable with notice of the misrepresentations. The sound-
ness of Burchfield is unquestionable both on precedent 22 and policy,
since the decision does no more than implement the widely enter-
tained 23 notion that the insurer will be presumed to have waived
1' The Court distinguished three cases cited by the plaintiff on the ground
that they involved acceptance of premium. payments with knowledge of a ground
for forfeiture: Home Ins. Co. v. Caudill, 366 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1963); Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 223 Ky. 205, 3 S.W.2d 219 (1928); Kentucky Live
Stock Ins. Co. v. Stout, 175 Ky. 343, 194 S.W. 318 (1917).
17 Since renewal of an insurance policy which by its terms has expired is in
effect no more than the creation of a new contract of insurance, there must be
contractural intent by both parties. Such an intention cannot be found from the
mere failure of a corporation to immediately refuse a check given to pay a
premium on a lapsed policy. See 13 A.,. Fmrir, INsuRNcE LAw & PRAcvicE §
7641 (1943).
Is Note that the plaintiff in Trautman had been awarded a judgment against
the insured. Presumably this judgment was worthless, since plaintiff sought re-
covery on the policy against the insurer.
19 See 1 A ConmN, Co rRncrs § 214 (1963); 46 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 1191,
1243 (1946). There is Kentucky authority to the effect that the injured person
may sue the insurer as a third party beneficiary, at least where the policy does
not provide contra. See Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pippen, 271 Ky. 280, 111
S.W.2d 425 (1937); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Albritton, 214 Ky. 16, 282 S.W.
187 (1926); Transylvania Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 209 Ky. 626, 273 S.W. 537
(1925). Such a rule seems consistent with Kentucky's attitude toward third party
beneficiaries generally. Traylor Bros., Inc. v. Pound Tire Supply, 338 S.W.2d
687 (1960).
20 394 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1965).
21 K1RS § 304.656 (1950).
22 Mills v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 335 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1960); John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 259 Ky. 220, 82 S.W.2d 317 (1935);
Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. McDaniel, 251 Ky. 212, 64 S.W.2d 581 (1933);
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore. 154 Ky. 18 156 S.W. 867 (1913).23 29A Amr. Jtr. Insurance §§ 1018-20 (1940).
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defenses based on facts of which it had knowledge, and will therefore
be estopped to raise such a defense.24
The remainder of the insurance cases turned on the Court's con-
struction of various policies. In a case25 which raised the question of
whether a particular business interruption policy was an "open" as
opposed to a "valued" policy, the Court reiterated the definition to
which it had previously adhered,26 a definition approved by Couch,27
and held that under a policy limiting liability to actual loss the insured
could recover only what the evidence showed the actual loss to have
been. In a case 28 involving the issue of whether the policy entitled
the insured to recover the diminution in the value of her automobile
resulting from a wreck, the Court followed the black-letter rule 29 and
held that where the policy limited the insurer's liability to the actual
cash value of the vehicle or to the cost of repairing or replacing the car,
the insured could recover only the cost of repairing the vehicle, not
the diminution in value. In two other cases, the Court utilized the
general rule ° that unambiguous terms of an insurance policy are to
be construed according to their plain meaning. Accordingly, it gave
force to a provision in a fiduciary bond policy which limited the
computation of losses3' and to a provision in an automobile policy
which exempted from coverage as a "substitute" car a vehicle custo-
marily available to the insured.32
24 Id. at § 1017.
25 National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hutton, 396 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1965).
26 See Ellis v. Hartford Livestock Ins. Co., 293 Ky. 683, 170 S.W.2d 51
(1943). Apparently Ellis was not cited by the appellant in Hutton, but Stuyvesant
Ins. Co. v. Jacksonville Oil Mill, 10 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1926), cited by the Court,
states a definition and rule substantially the same as that in Ellis.
27 1 COUCH, INSURaNCE: § 1:81 (2d ed. 1959) provides:
An open, or, as it is sometimes called, an unvalued policy is, as its name
implies, one in which the value is not fixed, but is left to be definitely
determined in case of loss. A valued policy is one in which the parties
have agreed upon the value of the property insured in the event of
future loss.
28General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky.
1966).29 See, e.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Huffman, 253 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1952)
and cases discussed therein; 15 COUCH, INSURANCE §§ 54:139 - :140 (2d ed. 1966).
30 See, e.g., Washington Natl Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1953);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 257 Ky. 709, 79 S.W.2d 28 (1935); Doyle v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 168 Ky. 795, 182 S.W. 946 (1916); 13 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE
LAW & PRACTiCE §§ 7384, 7387 (1943).
31 Kentuckiana Sales, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., 394 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. 1965).32 Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kitchen, 395 S.W.2d 769 (Ky.
1965).
XIV. LABOR LAW
The most important labor case decided was Kentucky State AFL-
CIO v. Puckett,' which invalidated a right-to-work ordinance of
Shelbyville reading as follows: "The right of persons to work shall not
be denied or abridged on acount of membership or non-membership
in, or conditioned upon payments to, any labor union, or labor
organization."2 This decision was based on an assertion that Congress
intended to preempt the field of labor-management relations when it
enacted Section 8(a) (3)3 of the National Labor Management Act,
which permits agreements requiring union membership as a condition
of retaining employment. Section 14(b)4 of the Taft-Hartley Act
merely created an exception to this preemption by providing that:
"nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which
such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial
law."
The words "State or Territory" were emphasized by the Court. It
took their use to be indicative of congressional intention to create a
power the state had not possessed before the enactment of section
14(b). Since section 14(b) was regarded as a limited exception to the
overall policy of preemption, its language was properly given a strict
construction. As the Court pointed out, it would have been unreason-
able to interpret congressional intent so as to allow any political units
smaller than states to determine labor relations policies. Since it is an
exception to the overall policy of preemption,5 these words were
properly given a strict construction. Moreover, the Court construed
the Shelbyville ordinance as intended, inseparably, to encompass
interstate commerce as well as local commerce, thereby affecting more
than "that tiny area of purely intrastate activity to which the federal
Act does not apply."6
City and county right-to-work ordinances have also been invali-
dated in California. 7 The decision there was based on an assertion
that the state by inaction had preempted the field, and local units of
government could not act. The California court said the National
1391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965).
2 Id. at 361.
329 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1935).
429 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1947).
5 Compare Berke and Brunn, Local Right to Work Ordinances: A New
Problem in Labor and Local Law, 9 STAN. L. REv. 674 (1957), with Finman,
Local "Right to Work" Ordinances: A Reply, 10 STAN. L. RE:. 53 (1958).
6 391 S.W.2d 360, 362.
7 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
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Labor Management Relations Act did not apply to purely local com-
merce, but the ordinance was nonetheless invalid because of state
preemption. Thus, neither California nor Kentucky were willing to let
the local ordinance stand, but the Kentucky decision left with local
governments the power to legislate on intrastate matters. This power
is relatively insignificant, however, since so few businesses now fall in
the intrastate category.
International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers v. Board of Educ. of Jef-
ferson County8 seemed contrary to the general trend of allowing
government employees the right to have their representatives present
their grievances to their superiors." Appellee school board had agreed
to discuss a dispute with certain dissatisfied employees. The employees
brought with them to the conference two representatives from their
union. The school board thereupon refused to engage in discussion in
the presence of the representatives. The Court held that the board
acted within its discretion in refusing to meet with the union men.",
Of course, public employees do not generally have the right to
strike. Since their own services have to do with the functioning of
the Government, a strike of public employees manifests nothing less
than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of
Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking
toward the paralysis of Government by those sworn to support it, is
unthinkable and intolerable." In fact, an injunction to stop such
strikes can be granted even where statutes do not prohibit strikes.12
8393 S.W.2d 793 (Ky. 1965).
9 Iowa Ops. Att'y Gen. (1961); ANN. LAws MASS. ch. 149, § 178 D (1962);
MiNN. STAT. §§ 179.51-.58; Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.500-.530 (1965 Cum. Supp.);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 31.53 (Supp. 1959); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1947);
Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
Contra, CODE ALA., tit. 55, §§ 317(1)--(4) (Supp. 1957); LA. CODE ANN., §§
54-909, 54-9923 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT., §§ 95-97, 95-100 (Supp. 1959); VA.
CODE §§ 40.65-.67 (1950).
10 Note that this was not a matter of a demand for collective bargaining; the
holding was much narrower.
11 Letter from President Roosevelt to the President of the Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees, August 16, 1937 (quoted from 1961 Wis. L. REv. 601, 604). See
also, Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, 138 Conn.
269, 83 A.2d 482, 485 (1951), which states:
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the people.... The
government so created and empowered must employ people to carry on
its task. Those people are agents of the government. They exercise
some part of the sovereignty entrusted to it. They occupy a status
entirely different from those who carry on a private enterprise. They
serve the public welfare and not a private purpose. To say that they can
strike is the equivalent of saying that they can deny the authority of
government and contravene the public welfare. The answer to the
question [the right to strike] is "No."
12 Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951); City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Street, Electricity Ry. and Motor
(Continued on next page)
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On the other hand, Federal policy, first laid down by the Civil Service
Commission in 1954,13 and later affirmed by President Kennedy,
favors freedom of organization.14 Over a million of the 8.5 million
federal employees were organized in 1960.15
A continuing total refusal to deal realistically with government em-
ployees can lead to grave results. Kentucky has seen strikes by
teachers,' policemen,' 7 and other governmental employees. Con-
tinued narrowmindedness on the part of government officials can only
lead to further friction and strife.
Horn Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Morgan,'8 the only other labor case
decided by the Court last term, involved the purchase of the assets of
the Horn Lines by another company. Horn was operating under a
union contract, while the purchasing company was not. After the
acquisition, the purchaser executed a health, welfare, and pension
fund agreement with the bargaining agent named in the labor contract.
The Court held that the jury was able to find that, under the cir-
cumstances, the purchaser had become obligated under Horn's labor
agreement. The decision does not represent any departure in the
development of the law.19 However, it is significant in that it serves
as a reminder that, in a transaction involving the purchase of a
business or a substantial portion of business assets, the labor contract
and collective bargaining relationship of the entity to be acquired
deserve as much scrutiny as any other major obligations of that
enterprise.2 0
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Coach Employees, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio 1949); I.B.E.W., Local 976 v. Grand
River Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 Okla. 1956).
iaFederal Personnel Manual ch. 4 (1956), as cited in the White House
Directive to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (June 3, 1958).
14 Memorandum from the President addressed to Heads of Departments and
Agencies on the subject of Employee-Management Relations in the Federal
Service (June 22, 1961).
1 88 MomNmy LABOR REmvIw 17 (1960).
16 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 2, 1966, § B, p. 1, col. 1.
17 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 28, 1966, § A, p. 1, col. 4.
18898 S.w.2d 284 (Ky. 1965).
19 See, e.g., John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 548 (1964).
2
-Jay, Change of Ownership and Representation Problems, 18 N.Y.U.
CoNFERENCE ON LABOR 293, 312 (1965).
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XV. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
As demonstrated during this past term, cases pertaining to munici-
pal government involve more than constitutional and statutory in-
terpretation of local governments' powers and limitations. Such cases
question the extent to which the municipal government may act in the
public interest through its police power when its exercise affects the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the individual. Dealing with these
conflicting interests in the past term, the Court has adhered to the
approach of looking not only to precedent but also to the results of its
decisions. Both the balancing of interests and the approach of the
Court were manifest in its decisions relating to financing of urban re-
newal projects, city renovation programs and public utilities, and to
problems of annexation, civil service and procedure.
A. Finance
One of the basic problems confronting municipal governments is
the financing of public projects and services. This problem has be-
come more critical in recent years because of rapid urban migration
occurring under a rural-oriented constitution, a Legislature too weak
to cope with local problems, and executives unable or unwilling to
pick up the "gauntlet." Consequently, local officials have devised a
variety of methods to finance projects and services.
1. Urban RenewaL-In Watkins v. Fugazzi the Court of Appeals
reviewed the constitutionality of the City of Lexington's effort to
finance part of its urban renewal plan. The city had encouraged its
own independeht agency and the United States Housing and Home
Finance Administrator (HHFA) to jointly finance the removal of rail-
road tracks in the proposed urban renewal area, pursuant to the
Kentucky governmental inducement statutes.2 Broadly speaking, these
statutes empower municipal corporations to induce governmental
agencies to undertake projects in its area.3 The implicit purpose of
these statutes is to increase federal spending in Kentucky. More
specifically, in the only other case4 which has defined the scope of these
statutes, the Court recognized the immediate purpose of the statutes
as inducement of a governmental agency, which employs personnel
1394 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1965).
2 KRS §§ 82.105-82.180 (1962).
3 The governmental inducement statutes define the terms, governmental
agency KRS § 82.180(3), governmental project KRS § 82.105(4), and the pro-
cedure the city must follow in order to use the power delegated to it by the
state under these statutes.
4 Grimm v. Moloney, 858 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1962) (City of Covington in-
duced the Internal Revenue Service to locate a regional computer center there).
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on a continuing basis, to locate in the state. Consequently, there was
some question as to whether the Lexington urban renewal program
was covered by these statutes, since no federal agency located in
Lexington would actually be employing personnel. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the broad language of the statutes indicates that the
General Assembly intended the statutes to apply to the Lexington
situation.
Additionally, the Court held that the City of Lexington could
finance its share of the cost through the issuance of bonds. Further-
more, the bonds could be funded by a mere pledge of an occupational
tax5 without violating sections 1576 and 1587 of the Constitution. When
read together these sections prohibit both the incurrence of indebted-
ness over a maximum amount and the obligation of future revenues
without approval of a two-thirds vote of the people. The Court of
Appeals based its decision of constitutionality on the fact that the
occupational tax could be withdrawn at any time and, therefore, the
city was not obligating future revenues without a vote of the people.
From a realistic standpoint it is submitted that the city has committed
future revenues because a city cannot default on its bonds and still
expect to borrow money in the current market. The result of the
Court's approach is to further relax the constitutional limitations on the
ability of a municipality to borrow money backed by a pledge8 of
revenues from a special fund.9
GThe Court of Appeals redefined its position in Grimm and held that KRS§ 82.145(2)(b) does not limit occupational tax to a levy on just "new" money
arising from new employment, but on all employment in or directly related to
the project area. See Skidmore v. City of Elizabeth, 291 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1956)(where the Court of Appeals did not make a distinction between new and old
revenues).
6 Ky. CONST. § 157 provides: "No county, city, town, taxing district, or other
municipality, shall be authorized or permitted to become indebted, in any manner
• ..without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof ... " It also sets
maximum tax rates, according to the size of the town for municipal purposes
except for school purposes.7 Ky. CONST. § 158 provides: "The respective cities, towns, counties, taxing
districts, and municipalities shall not be authorized or permitted to incur in-
debtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate ex-
ceeding the following named maximum percentages .... "
SThe Court of Appeals has been slow to recognize the distinction between
pledge and debt although other jurisdictions have done so. 49 Am. Jur. States,
Territories & Dependencies, 67 (1943). In Curlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W.2d 934
(Ky. 1955), the Court was reluctant to permit circumvention of the constitution
through the pledge technique of financing, but five years later reversed its stand
in Turnpike Authority of Kentucky v. Wall, 336 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1960). Two
years later the Legislature authorized pledging of a special fund in the govemment
inucement statutes. KRS § 82.145(2)(b) (1962).slw Acceptance of the special fund theory embracing occupational tax has been
SPrior to Grimm and Vat Ins, only revenues from a use tax paidby an individual who benefited from the project or r s fr  rent on school
(Continued on next page)
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The significance of Watkins is far-reaching. The Court left no
doubt as to the scope of the governmental inducement statutes. The
statutes are not limited to inducing governmental agencies employing
personnel but provide local officials a means to acquire federal money,
thereby enabling them to cope with the problems of slum clearance,
modernization of downtown areas and construction of viaducts, rapid
transits, and local public buildings. But more importantly, the govern-
mental inducement statutes and Watkins place Kentucky municipalities
on a competitive footing with other cities in the country. The General
Assembly, in effect, has delegated to the cities power to meet their
problems and the Court of Appeals has approved a method by which
the municipalities can raise sufficient funds to qualify for federal
matching funds programs.
2. City Improvements.-The city of Louisville approached its
problem of financing a variety of public projects in the traditional
method, pursuant to the Constitution. Section 157 provides that the
people by a two-thirds vote can increase the maximum ad valorem tax
rate provided for in that section. Section 159 requires that all debts
of the current year must be met by sufficient tax revenues in that
year. Pursuant to these sections the citizens of Louisville voted by
more than a two-thirds vote to incur the indebtedness. After the
referendum, the city issued an ordinance stating that the bonds would
be paid out of the general sinking fund and if in any year the sinking
fund should be insufficient to meet the voted obligation, the city could
levy an ad valorem tax to raise additional revenue.10
After the election, but before the issuance of the bonds, House
Bill I (1965)" was enacted. The purpose of H.B. I was to place a
ceiling on ad valorem tax rates which local taxing units might levy
against property evaluated at 100% of its market value. More parti-
cularly, the act provides that each local taxing unit in 1966 and there-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
buildings were pledged. See Slddmore v. City of Elizabeth 291 S.W.2d 3 (Ky.
1956). The Court justified its earlier approach by distinguishing between consti-
tutionally permissible pledging of "private" revenues obtained in the above
mentioned manner and constitutionally impermissable pledging of "public" revenue
derived from a general levy on all citizens. In Grimm revenues to fund the bonds
were paid from excess revenues obtained from public utilities and from revenues
derived from occupational tax, while in Watkins only revenues from occupational
taxes were pledgedpursuant to KRS § 82.145(2),(b) (1962).10 KRS § 91.200(c) (1958) provides that: "Ad valorem taxes for the benefit
of the sinking fund shall not be levied unless the income of the sinking fund is
otherwise insufficient to meet such requirements." The other methods referred to
are the levy of license taxs, occupational taxes and franchise taxes.
11 Ky. Acts, First Ex. Sess., 1965 (hereinafter cited as H.B. I).
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after will be limited to an ad valorem tax rate12 which will produce
the same amount of revenue the taxing unit collected in 1965, unless
the taxing unit shows that it cannot operate within this limit. In that
event the tax rate used in 1965 may be increased by 10% in 1966-67,
with a second percent increase permitted in 1967-68.13 Since it is a
future possibility that the City of Louisville may have to levy an ad
valorem tax rate in excess of the compensating tax rate required by
House Bill I, Raque v. City of Louisville'4 was instituted to test the
validity of the city ordinance and House Bill I.
The Court was faced with a conflict of interests. If it ruled that the
Louisville Ordinance violated House Bill I, the Court would be void-
ing a constitutional right of the people to authorize local government
to float a bond.15 Conversely, if the Court held that House Bill I, was
unconstitutional in toto, the Court would deprive Kentucky citizens of
the protection they sought in House Bill I. The Court, in its wisdom,
"split the baby" and held that it was not the intent of the Legislature
to apply H.B. I "to limit the rate at which taxes must necessarily be
levied to pay an indebtedness either theretofore or thereafter by
authority of the vote of the people under the constitution."1 The Court
grounded its reasoning on a sound basis: the purpose of House Bill I
was to protect the people from unintended tax burdens,' 7 not from
ones which they, themselves, specifically authorize through refer-
12KRS § 132.010(6) (1965) provides:
Compensating tax rate means that rate which, rounded to the next higher
one-tenth of one cent per one hundred dollars of assessed value and ap-
plied to the 1966 assessment of the property subject to taxation by a
taxing district for the 1965 tax year, produces an amount of revenue
approximately equal to that produced in 1965.
13 KRS § 160.470(4) (1965) which permits the school board, upon a proper
showing of evidence that its tax revenues are inadequate, to increase its as-
sessment by 10% for 1965-66 and 1966-67. KRS § 68.245(3) (1965) and KRS
§ 132.027(2) (1965) provide similar exceptions for the county and city re-
spectively.
14402 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966).
'If the Court had held that the ordinance is violative of H.B. I, the
decision would have serious side effects. H.B. I, in effect, would stand as an
absolute restriction on the municipal governments' ability to finance additional
projects without sacrificing existing programs (exceptions would only modify the
situation by permitting a 10% increase in revenues for 1965-66 and 1966-67).
This is to say nothing of the bind cities would be in as the cost of administration
and public services increases while their revenues remains constant. The latter
shortcoming provides a prime reason why the General Assembly should find a more
accomodating manner to protect the interest of the individual and to preserve the
powers of the municipal government.
1 402 S.W.2d at 698.
17H.B. I was passed in order to limit the effectiveness of Russman v. Luckett,
391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965), which held that the Constitution requires all property
to be assessed at 100% its full value.
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endum.1' The Raque decision strongly exemplifies the result-oriented
approach of the Court because it has interpreted legislation in such a
manner as to protect Kentucky citizens from increased taxes levied
by local officials and has also given the City of Louisville its bond
issue.19
8. Public Utilities.-All municipal governments are confronted with
the problem of providing and maintaining adequate public services to
their inhabitants. The Court decided four cases relating to this
problem, two of which approved the city's financial approach to meet
the needs of the people. In the other two cases the Court considered
the municipality's approach unreasonably restrictive of the interest of
the individual.
In the first case,20 the municipal government wanted to consolidate
the water districts in its metropolitan area, thereby providing better
water services at lower rates to its customers. The Louisville Water
Co. contracted to purchase the assets and liabilities of the Preston
Street Water Co. and two other local companies by buying the out-
standing revenue bonds at a premium. There was, however, some
question as to the validity of the contract. The public utility companies
to be purchased would, in effect, be dissolved, but Kentucky statutes
do not provide any method for dissolution of a public utility. KRS
Chapter 74, which defines the powers and limitations of a water
district, only provides a method by which "the territorial limits of an
established water district may be enlarged or diminished.21 The Court
reasoned that the intention of the General Assembly was not to create
a "corporate creature" for perpetuity, and held that dissolution can be
effected when it is "incident to a substantially complete territorial
diminution."22 The result of the decision is that the Court of Appeals
has filled in a gap in the statutes, thereby enabling local officials to
meet financial needs of the people through a method overlooked by
the Legislature.23
18 The Court's approach of excising unconstitutional portions from the scope
of the statute is consistent with the generally accepted constitutional construction
that the "legislaure is presumed o be cognizant of the constitution, previously
enacted statutes, and the common law, Cook v. Ward, 381 S.W.2d 168 (Ky.
1964) and, therefore, does not pass statutes which are unconstitutional.:19 It should be noted that there is some question as to the constitutionality
of H.B. I because it attempts to set a maximum tax rate below that which is set
in section 157 of the constitution.2 0 Valla v. Preston St. Water Dist. #1, 395 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1965).
21 KRS § 74.110 (1942).
22 395 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Ky. 1965).
23 In addition, the Court held that the 6% per annum limit on the cost of
issuing bonds, set out in KRS § 74.290(2), does not limit a public utility from
purchasing public bonds from the owners in an open market at a greater rate of
interest. Id., at 775.
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In a related case, 24 two small communities were faced with the
problem of supplying their respective inhabitants with adequate
sewage facilities. The two municipal governments contracted to com-
bine their efforts, but a question as to the validity of the contract was
raised. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed a prior decision 25 in holding
that the two municipalities could constitutionally contract to jointly
use the sewage facilities financed and constructed by one and leased to
the other.
The next two cases indicate that, while municipal governments can
use new methods of financing, they cannot be unreasonable in the
application of such methods. In City of Maysville v. Coughlin26 the
Court held that the city could not continue to finance the operation of
a sewage system through a tax levy after the bonds had been paid
and the ordinance revoked.27 The Court also held that a resident is
not obligated to pay a rental fee for sewage facilities which were sup-
posed to, but did not, extend to his property.28 In a second case,29 the
city of Corbin claimed that it was too costly to extend a water line to
complainant's property when it had had extended the line to a neigh-
bor's. The Court held that the city in operating its own water company
must reasonably adhere to fixed standards and not discriminate against
persons similarly situated.
An overview of the above four cases indicates that the Court of
Appeals has permitted municipal corporations to introduce innovations
to meet their increasing problems, so long as the power is exercised in
such a manner as not to restrict unreasonably the rights of the
individual.
B. Annexation
During the last term, five remonstrance 30 and prohibition suits
were instituted to invalidate city annexation ordinances and pro-
24 City of Russell v. City of Flatwoods, 394 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1965).
2 3 Francis v. City of Bowling Green, 259 Ky. 525, 82 S.W.2d 804 (1935).
26 99 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1966).27 The Court looked to the intent of the ordinance and held that although
1 of the ordinance stated that the revenue was for "the purpose of completing,
altering and operating, the sanitary sewer system of the city," § 6. which provides
that rental charges are to be collected "so long as the principal and interest of
the bonds secured thereby remain outstanding." is controlling.28 This holding is consistent with Puckett v. Muldraugh, 403 S.W.2d 252
(Ky. 1966) decided during the same term, in which the Court held that a
landowner is obligated to pay a minimum meter rent on water lines which
service his property, even though no water is being consumed at that time, be-
cause he is paying for the avail-bilitv of the wtr and not for its consumption.
29 Tohnson v. Reasor. 892 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1965).
30 Remonstrance is defined as a represent,;tion made to a court or legislative
body wherein certain persons unite in urging that a cont-mulated measure be not
adopted or passed. BLACiK, LA W DicnoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
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ceedings. The trend of these and other recent 3' Court of Appeals
decisions indicates the Court's reluctance to void city annexation pro-
grams.
A brief explanation of the theory behind annexation may help in
understanding annexation suits. Migration to urban areas has resulted
in city suburbs assuming urban characteristics. These outlying areas
are, in fact, the outgrowth of cities, but they are not part of those
cities. This situation leads to a number of undesirable results. For
example, natural borders and incorporated areas surrounding cities
cause overcrowding, which results in a decline of health and moral
standards. Moreover, industrial concerns and residential inhabitants
are reluctant to locate in areas outside of cities because they are un-
able to get adequate service from public utilities. An inequity also
exists in that people living beyond city boundaries take advantage of
municipally-sponsored programs without assuming a fair financial
burden for their support.32 Most importantly, the city is better able to
finance and administer public utilities than is the county.33
In considering private interests, a basic argument against annexa-
tion is that it takes property in violation of the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution. Whether or not due process has been
violated generally depends upon the facts of the case, the particular
annexation statute, and the requirements of the appropriate consti-
tutional provision.34 Such decisions turn upon the courts' balancing
of these circumstances. Other arguments against annexation emphasize
higher taxes (property, occupational, and the like) and zoning re-
strictions. Thus, in annexation suits, the Court must weight public wel-
fare considerations against private rights and interests.35 The argu-
ments for annexaton are strong and usually prevail.
In Hellman v. City of Covington,-3 appellee city's evidence revealed
that annexation would result in improved police and fire protection,
lower insurance rates, better garbage and sewage disposal, and better
water service for the area in question. Appellant, representing more
31 See Court of Appeals Review, 53 Ky. LJ. 553 (1964).
32 Note, 53 [y. L. J. 154 (1964).23 Cities are able to finance programs better than counties because of the
sources of revenue the cities are able to collect. Higher city property taxes,
occupational taxes, payroll taxes, and programs sponsored through bond issues
provide the cities with more finances. The cities are better able to administer
these programs because they are able to hire the personnel for technical positions.
Furthermore, the compactness of cities renders more effective administration than
is possible in counties whose needs vary with the locale in which the individuals
are situated. Ky. CONST. § 158.
24 37 Am. JvR. Municipal Corporations § 29 (1941).
35 37 Am. Jun. Municipal Corporations § 23 (1941).
26 393 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1965).
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than fifty percent of the resident freeholders, remonstrated against the
proposed annexation on the basis that the area was unfavorable for
development. He argued also that the residents were content with
the present status of the property and did not desire change. In
sustaining appellee's evidence, the Court found that failure to annex
would result in prosperity retardation for the city and for the owners
and inhabitants of the territory sought to be annexed.
The Court's recent adoption of a policy favoring annexation is fur-
ther indicated by the favorable procedural treatment it bestows upon
the city. In City of Shepherdsville v. Gentry37 the Court adopted a
supple approach to the city's failure to comply with procedural re-
quirements. The Court held that it would be inconsonant with justice
to enter a default judgment against the city without having a trial on
the merits. Somewhat inconsistently, the Court held in City of Dan-
ville v. Wilson3 s that the failure of a remonstrantor to follow procedural
guidelines voided his action to prohibit annexation. The Court
stressed that it was without authority to interpose judicial limitations
or conditions inconsistent with those set by the legislature.
Another issue presented to the Court involved partial annexation.3 9
Citing precedent,40 the Court held that the proposed annexation of
unincorporated territory by a city should be approved or disapproved
as a whole. Such reversal gave the city another chance to annex all
of the territory in question.
The policy considerations underlying annexation gave rise to a
case 4' concerning the closing of a road. The issue involved the right
of the city to condemn property for its use, thereby depriving com-
plainant of a more convenient access to a public highway near his
property. The Court held that the road closing neither deprived him
of a reasonable means of ingress and egress to public highways nor
injured his property interests. This decision parallels the reasoning of
the Court in the annexation suits.42
Annexation conflicts present a difficult problem. The complexity
of interests involved promote the impossibility of obtaining results
37 395 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1965). Here the city failed to file its answer to the
complaint within the twenty day period allowed by KRS § 81.110 (1942).3s 395 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965). In this case the complainant did not include
the city in his original complaint. The Court said the city was the proper party
to bring the suit against, but would not let the complainant amend his complaint
to include the city because the time for amending under the statute had expired.
,,J Robertson v. Citv of Hazard, 401 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 19Q'4oCity of Prestonsburg v. Conn., 317 S.V.2d 484 (Ky. 1958); Donovan v.
tCity of Louisville, 299 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1957).
41 City of Louisville v. Kerr, 403 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1966).4 2 The condemnation by the city in this suit was for the purpose of obtaining,
(and for the city airport so that one of its runways could be extended.
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satisfactory to all concerned parties. A possible solution to annexation
in the larger cities may be the establishment of a metropolitian or city-
county combination-type government, in which one body of gov-
ernment administers designated programs. Until solutions are pro-
mulgated, the approach of the Court favoring annexation programs
will probably remain in effect. In light of the aforementioned policy
considerations, such an approach is justifiable.
C. Municipal Civil Service
The needs of smaller cities often require liberal interpretation of
statutes in order to provide such areas with personnel capable of per-
forming much needed services. In City Util. Comm'n of City of Owens-
boro v. City C.vil Service Commission of Owensboro,43 dispute arose
as to whether a person appointed pursuant to statute44 by the utilities
commission to a classified position of civil service should be certified
by the civil service commission even though he failed to meet certain
standards required by statute45 for the taking of a civil service
examination. The Court of Appeals held that it was not the intent of
the Legislature in drafting KRS 90.350(6), under which the appoint-
ment was made, to make an examination necessary in all situations.
This is sound policy, for it enables smaller cities to fill technical posi-
tions even though statutory requirements cannot be met for taking
civil service exams. If the Court had not reached the result it did, the
city of Owensboro would have been without the services of an
engineer.
D. Procedure
Aside from the annexation cases which were concerned with the
proper procedure in remonstrance suits, the Court of Appeals reviewed
four other cases involving procedural issues. The Court, by speci-
fically explaining the impact of the rules, more clearly defined the
general powers of cities.
Two cases involving essentially the same two parties concerned the
standing of an intervening third party to fie a motion under CR 60.02
on behalf of a city. In one case46 the Court held that the alleged right
to intervene on behalf of the city in the purported capacity as special
43 396 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1965).44 KRS § 90.350(6) (1942) waives the necessity of a "competitive examina-
tion" where special qualifications of a particular profession are met.
45 KRS § 90.880 (1942) requires certain age, residency and voter require-
ments before qualifying an individual to take the necessary examination to be
certified for coverage under civil service.
46 City of Manchester v. Keith, 896 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1965).
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attorney, citizen, taxpayer and legal resident was an insufficient allega-
tion under the Rules. In a subsequent case 47 a week later, it was
argued that such an intervening third party may acquire standing by
alleging that he has made a demand on the proper city officials to make
a motion to set aside judgment or that such a demand would have
been futile. In construing these rules, the Court indicated that such
standing must be accompanied by the lack of objections as to any
irregularities.
The significance of these two cases to municipal corporations is ob-
vious-it reduces a city's control over whether it should enter into
litigation. While the procedure may be utilized in some cases to pro-
tect the public's interest from dilatory officials, it might also be used
as a lever by strong pressure groups to force city officials into un-
desirable positions.
In another case the Court held that, in tort actions against cities,
it is not necessary to give prior notice to the city's officials before
bringing suit' s against the city's public utility because state statute
bestows upon the utility a separate legal capacity. Since the public
utility may sue and be sued, there is no necessity to give the city
government notice of its legal affairs.
In Kilburn v. Colwel49 the Court held that a policeman may be dis-
missed from his position where there is evidence sufficient to prove
that he received gifts and solicited campaign funds for the mayor, not
only in violation of a city ordinance preventing officers from accepting
such gifts, but also in violation of KRS 95.470, which prohibits political
activities by policemen.
47 City of Manchester v. Asher, 396 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1965).4 8 McIntosh v. Electric and Water Plant Bd., 394 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1965).
49 396 S.W.2d 803 (Ky. 1965).
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A. Pre-trial and Trial Procedure
Since 1953, when the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure became
effective, the Kentucky practitioner has been exposed to a body of
procedural law and a spectrum of procedural problems dissimilar in
many respects to the pre-1953 code. The cases herein discussed
exemplify recurrent problems in the use of the Kentucky Rules, and
the discussion when appropriate will refer to the Federal Rules after
which they were patterned.'
1. Statutes of Limitation.-The rule enunciated in Wethington v.
Griggs2 and Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc.3 materially alters
the law concerning statutes of limitation applicable to personal in-
juries arising from a tort committed in another state. Only Wethington
need be described, since it illustrates the fact pattern in both cases.
As a result of an automobile accident in Ohio in 1962, suit was filed in
Kentucky against defendant Griggs in 1964. The complaint was dis-
missed since the Kentucky statute4 provides a one-year limitation on
personal injuries, although the Ohio statute allowed two years in
which to bring the action. The Court held under KRS 413.3205 that
the Kentucky one-year statute is displaced only when the statute of
the foreign state stipulates a shorter time. Kentucky's position now is
consistent with the rule in all the other states.0
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Ratliff,7 the Court was
called upon to determine whether a five8 or a ten-year 9 statute of
limitations applies to the negligent damaging of a highway bridge.
The Court held categorically that the five-year limitation applies to
a negligent act as well as to an intentional trespass. Since the High-
way Department had filed its action five years and one day after the
accident, it was barred from recovery.
1 See Reform of Civil Procedure-A Symposium, 40 Ky. L.J. 8 (1951).
2 392 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).
3 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965).
4 KRS § 413.140 (1942).
5 KRS § 413.320 (1942) provides that if the foreign state's statute provides
a shorter time period than Kentucky's, the action shall be barred in Kentucky at
the expiration of said shorter period.6 In Seat, the Court restated the majority law that a statute of limitations does
not extinguish a legal right, but rather the remedy. Since the forum controls
remedies and procedure, the Kentucky statute controls except where KRS §
413.320 intercedes. See generally, Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 563 (1952); Annot., 75
A.LM. 203, 231 (1931).
7 392 S.W.2d 913 (Ky. 1965).8 KRS § 413.120 (1942) provides that an action for trespass on real or
personal property shall be commenced within five years.9 KRS § 413.160 (1942) is a catch-all statute which allows ten years for
bringing suit.
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In Wenneker v. Bailey,'° a girl of fourteen years was injured in an
automobile accident in 1955. She married in 1960 at the age of
nineteen and brought this action against appellant within one year
after reaching twenty-one. Although appellant's answer alleged that
appellee was barred from maintaining the action, a jury verdict
awarded the girl $3,000, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals,
citing Hicks v. Steele," reversed and ordered the complaint dismissed,
stating that under KRS 413.170 marriage removes the disability of in-
fancy and a personal injury action must be brought within one year
after the disability is removed. An interesting point to note is the
possible effect of the Kentucky age-of-majority statute12 on future
cases similar to Wenneker. There seems to be ample support in Com-
monwealth v. Hallahan3 for the conclusion that appellee would lose
her remedy one year after reaching eighteen.14
2. Trial Judge.-The appointment of a special judge under KRS
23.28015 was the dominant issue in Mills v. Broughton.16 Appellants
contended that a special judge,17 appointed to try an election contest,
could not thereafter determine the measure of damages under the
supersedeas bonds, since the later hearing transpired in a subsequent
term, leaving the special judge without jurisdiction. Because the
appointment made no mention of a special term, the Court held that
KRS 23.230 governed and ruled that the special judge had authority to
try the case to a final determination including an assessment of
damages under the supersedeas bonds.
KRS 2S.230 was also construed in Wedding v. Lair.'8 The Court
held that a trial judge, having voluntarily disqualified himself, cannot
thereafter reassume jurisdiction to appoint an attorney as counsel for
an indigent petitioner in the absence of an agreement of the parties.19
10 392 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
11309 Ky. 833, 219 S.W.2d 35 (1949).
12KRS § 2.015 (1965).
13 391 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1965).
14For a discussion of the majority statute, see 55 Ky. L.J. 182 (1966); See
also Domestic Relations, this review for an extended discussion on the policy of
protecting unmarried infants in light of the 1965 age of majority statute.
1" Appointment of a special judge when the circuit judge cannot preside.
16 396 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. 1965).
17KRS § 23.260 (1942).
18 404 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1966).
19 A second issue raised in Wedding, but not decided, was whether the
attorney was outside the trial judge's jurisdiction since he was a member of
another county bar association. In light of recent developments in this area, the
question will undoubtedly reappear for the Court's determination. See Grove,
Gideon's Trumpet: Taps for an Antiquated System? A Proposal for Kentucky, 54
Ky. LJ. 527 (1965).
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8. Pre-trial Hearings.-Three cases in this term restated the rule
that where no record of the hearing is filed, it is presumed that the
trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence.20 At first
blush this rule, which gives blanket support to the trial judge's dis-
cretion, might seem unjust. However, as pointed out in Richardson
v. Eaton,21 a hearing without transcript is easily remedied through the
procedure set out in CR 75.18 and RCr 12.68, by which appellant need
only prepare a narrative statement of the evidence or proceedings,
serve it on the opposing party, and submit it on appeal.
4. Pleadings.-Generally, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide a
method of ascertaining facts and resolving controversies through an
orderly judicial process. 22  Furthermore, they also allow judicial
discretion within certain limitations as demonstrated by the following
cases.
CR 15.01 provides, in effect, that when a party requests the court's
permission to file an amended pleading, leave should be freely given.
As a general rule, the trial court's discretion is not often upset.23 How-
ever, in Ashland Oil v. Phillips,24 the Court found that the trial judge
had abused his discretion by refusing plaintiff's motion to file an
amendment, when defendant's long delay in answering plaintiff's inter-
rogatories had prohibited him from filing his amendment on time and
when there was no allegation that defendant would be prejudiced by
the amendment.
CR 15.01 further provides that a litigant may amend once as a
matter of right and thereafter by leave of the court. In Hisgen v.
Hisgen,25 it was held improper for a party to withdraw his amended
answer in favor of a second amended answer, without leave of the
court. Consequently, the withdrawal of the first amendment served
to reinstate the original answer.
In Taylor v. Nohalty,26 the Court decided that CR 9.02 (circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity
when pleaded) does not include perjury. And in Massengale v.
Lester,27 the Court recited the rule that it is not incumbent on the trial
20 Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966) (a motion t-, quash a
summons for improper service); Richardson v. Eaton, 402 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1966)
(habeas corpus); Turner v. Gentry, 402 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1966) (change of
venue hearing).
21402 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Ky. 1966).22 Cleary, The Uses of Pleadings, 40 Ky. L.J. 46 (1952).23 Lawrence v. Marks, 855 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1962).
24404 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1966).
25400 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1966).
26 404 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1966).
27403 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966) (involved a motion to quash a summons on
grounds that the service was improper).
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judge to hear a motion again on the pleadings when it has already
been disposed of before the trial.
CR 13.01 provides that a counterclaim is generally compulsory
when it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing
party's claim.28 Since the rule was specifically designed to end multiple
litigation,29 it should follow that failure to raise the mandatory counter-
claim precludes a party from subsequently raising it. Notwithstanding
the support which this strict interpretation has received in some
jurisdictions, such a result does not necessarily follow when the pur-
pose of CR 13.01 is balanced against that of the Civil Rules taken as a
whole.30
Although it is not patently clear what policy, i.e., res judicata or the
rule itself, precludes subsequent counterclaims, it is evident that most
jurisdictions apply the rule with flexibility,31 holding, in effect, that
the rule was intended to broaden the scope of inclusive claims rather
than to bar a litigant who has not properly raised his counterclaim.3 2
A recent case, Mullenax v. Lighthouse Realty Corp. of Port
Charlotte,33 indicates that Kentucky has adopted a flexible interpreta-
tion for CR 13.01 when the first proceeding is based on a default
judgment. A Florida real estate broker had sold two vacant lots
located in Florida at the request of appellants, Kentucky residents.
He sued in Florida to recover his commission and received a default
judgment. He then sued on the judgment in Kentucky. At this point
and for the first time, appellants raised a counterclaim, presumably
compulsory, since no mention of permissive counterclaim was made.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the right
to file a counterclaim in Kentucky was not barred by the failure to
file the counterclaim in the Florida court.
Although the policy underlying this decision is not discernible, it
is clear that, had the compulsory counterclaim rule been given a
strict interpretation, full faith and credit34 would have required that
2 8 The Kentucky Civil Rule 13.01 and Federal Rule 13(a) are identical in this
respect but differ on the second exception.
29 1A BARmON & HoLzos, FEDaAL PAncrE AND PnocnuREa § 394
(Wright ed. 1960); Mr.xt.-u, CiviL PROCEDuRE OF THE TIAL CoURT IN HIs-
TORICAL PERsPEcE 138 (1952).
30 The trend adopted in the Civil Rules is away from penalizing a party who
has committed procedural errors.
31 Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim under Modern
Pleadings, 38 Mn-N. L. REv. 423, 432 (1954) (only a handful of states have
ever barred a subsequent action based on a counterclaim).3 2 BARRON & HOLTOFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 584.
33 402 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1966).
34U.S. CONST., art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) (the constitutional
provision is binding only upon state courts; this statute imposes the same duty on
federal courts).
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the Florida judgment be given effect as if rendered in Kentucky, since
that judgment would have been res judicata on the issue required to
be raised.35 The Court evaded this conclusion by stating with apparent
indifference, "The appellants probably could not successfully prosecute
a separate suit... in Florida. If they have a claim against the appellee,
they must file it on a counterclaim. The appellants have elected to
file their counterclaim in Kentucky."36 If the Court means by this
statement that henceforth compulsory counterclaims will be inter-
preted as permissive, then it has probably gone too far, even though a
strong argument can be made for the proposition that CR 13.01
should have certain limitations37
On the other hand, the Court clearly felt it unjust not to allow the
counterclaim in this case. It might also be at least conjectured that our
Court was concerned with possible fact situations more blatantly un-
fair to a Kentucky resident which might arise in future cases. Take,
for example, the situation in which a Kentucky resident has a $50,000
claim against a Florida businessman. As a counterclaim, the business-
man has a $1,000 setoff. It is readily apparent that, if the Florida
businessman can sue first in Florida, he can secure a favorable forum
as well as force the Kentucky resident to appear in Florida with what
would then become a counterclaim for $50,000 and his failure to
appear would bar the subsequent use of his claim.
When viewed in this manner and in light of recent developments
in 'long-arm" expansion of jurisdiction for entry of personal judg-
ments,38 the decision seems basically fair to the litigants and con-
sistent with the intent and spirit of the Civil Rules, i.e. flexibility. And,
although this is a case of first impression in Kentucky, the decision
reflects the prevailing distaste for a preclusive rule barring forever a
3 5 Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929), holding that a default judg-
ment by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter operates
as res judicata in the absence of fraud or collusion. See, 1B MOoRE, FEDEmL..
PRACTICE ff 0.409, at 1024-43 (2d ed. 1965).
36 402 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Ky. 1966). The Court went on to cite Dixie Ohio
Express v. Eagle Express, 346 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1961) for the principle that a claim
could be filed in a state court even though it was not ified as a counterclaim in a
federal court. This was clearly not the rule in Dixie since both the federal and
state actions were pending, which, under CR 13.01, expressly takes the case out
of the rule.
37 Proponents of this theory speak in terms of "estoppel" rather than "res
judicata," "merger, or "bar," since it is the litigant's own negligence or culpable
acts in failing to raise the counterclaim that precludes its subsequent use. Con-
versely, the unknowing litigant, very often the product of a subrogation clause, can
be excused without injury to the compulsiveness of the rule. Wnicirr, FEDEa-.u
CoURTs 302 (1963).38 Auerbach, The "Long Arn" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. BEy. 13
(1966); 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960); Comment, 40 TuL. L. REV. 366 (1966);
Comment, 35 U. CiNc. L. REv. 157 (1966) (for a list of jurisdictions which
have adopted the so-called "long-arm" statute).
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claim which was not raised even though perfectly justifiable reasons
existed for not doing so at the time.
5. Summary Judgments.-CR 56 provides generally that summary
judgment is available to either plaintiff or defendant where there is no
genuine issue of fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. This is sometimes referred to as "trial by affidavits" and
has been the subject of a notable judicial comment.39
In American Ins. Co. v. Horton,40 the Court was faced with the
propriety of granting a summary judgment and, while upholding the
trial court's decision, added the criteria that the movant is entitled to
summary judgment when the opposing party can not strengthen his
case and the movant would ultimately be entitled to a directed
verdict.41
6. Evidence and Instructions.-While problems relating to specific
topical areas, e.g., tort, criminal law, etc., are left for consideration in
those areas, a few cases raised general points concerning evidence and
instructions. The Court upheld the general rule that admissions
against interest are admissible 42 except where they are made at a
prior trial in which the witness was not a party.43 Furthermore, even
if a witness has been harrassed, causing him not to testify, the Court
will not grant relief without a showing of both what the witness
would have said had he testified and the resulting prejudice to ap-
pellants absent the testimony.44 Finally with regard to evidence, a
witness may testify to a pattern of reckless or wanton driving even
though the vehicle, at a point some distance away, was not under
continual observation by him.45
In Kentucky-W. Va. Gas Co. v. Burchett,40 the Court reaffirmed
the principle that technically incorrect instructions are not grounds
for reversal unless clearly prejudicial to the losing party.47
39 California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 903
(2d Cir. 1947). The admonishment was made by Judge Learned Hand.
40401 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1966).41 Mario's Pizzeria, Inc. v. Federal Sign and Signal Corp., 379 S.W.2d 736
(Ky. 1964).42 Hall v. Turner, 396 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1965).
43 fBartman v. Derby Constr. Co., 395 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965); Sutherland
v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (1941) (represents the long established
rule that a party to an action is bound by admissions made in a prior action to
which he is a party).44 Kentucky Stone Co. v. Caddie, 396 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1965).45 Tingle v. Foster, 399 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1966).
46 402 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).47 Bailey v. Shrader, 265 Ky. 663, 97 S.W.2d 575 (1936).
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B. Original Proceedings: Prohibition and Mandamus
Use of the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition in
appellate procedure is emerging as a possible alternative to the delay
inherent in appellate review of final judgments. 48 In general, these
writs do not lie unless a judicial tribunal has acted without, or in
excess of, its jurisdiction49 and will not be issued against one not a
member of the judiciary. 50
As a general proposition, the Court will not prohibit a trial court
from acting without a showing that great and irreparable injury would
result and no other adequate remedy is available. 51 However, the Court
in Young v. Bertram52 found that appeal was not an adequate remedy
where, after petitioner had filed a motion to have the circuit judge
vacate the bench for prejudice, he refused to do So. 53
Often the writ of prohibition is used to attack discovery orders.
An example is Mayer v. Bradley,54 where the Court denied relief on
a petition to prohibit a trial judge from enforcing his pre-trial order.
In Turner v. Gentry,55 the Court was asked to prohibit a circuit
judge from hearing a divorce case. The judge had previously heard
proof relating to the residence of petitioner and had denied her motion
to dismiss for want of venue. Although such a petition generally is
entertained in a divorce action when the issue of residency is raised,56
the Court would not issue the writ since the venue hearing was not
preserved by record or otherwise, and petitioner did not show great
need or necessity by specific allegations of fact.
48 Note, 50 COLUM. L. lEv. 1102, 1111-13 (1950). It has been suggested, for
example, that the strict use of mandamus and prohibition be reexamined and per-
haps a new policy formulated allowing a more liberal approach to the use of
extraordinary writs. Feigenbaum. Interlocutory Appellate Review via ExtraordinaryWrit, 36 WASH. L. Rxv¢. 1 (1961). Indeed, at least one jurisdiction has made
extensive use of the writs in this manner in order to provide speedy determina-
lion of critical trial issues. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. App. 2d
355, 364 P.2d 266 (1961); CAL. CODE Cv. Pnoc. §§ 416.1-.3.
49 Ky. CoNsr. § 110; KRS § 21.050.
50Barnes v. Taylor, 399 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1965) (Mandamus to have an
attorney return legal documents).
51 Beachcomber Club, Inc. v. Keith, 402 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1966); Wright v.
Ropke, 393 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1965) (petitioner must plead or show that a
remedy by appeal is inadequate).
52398 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1966).
53 The judge neither questioned the sufficiency of the motion nor asserted
any reason why he should not vacate.
54401 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1966) (The trial court granted a motion for dis-
covery of defendants business records which would show the patents he had
treated in violation of a partnership agreement).
55 402 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1966).
56 Russell v. Hill, 256 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1953).
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C. Appeal
While the Court has applied the Civil Rules with flexibility to
lower court proceedings, a different approach has been manifested
regarding appellate procedure.5 7 Indeed, the 1965-66 decisions exhibit
a strict application of the rules to final judgments, post-trial motions,
and final disposition of cases.
1. Post-trial Motions.-Three cases this term concerned the pro-
priety of granting relief under CR 59 (new trial) and CR 60.02 (relief
by motion). In Friar v. Webb,5 8 the plaintiff was awarded damages
for medical expenses and upon her motion the trial judge ordered a
new trial limited to the question of damages for pain and suffering. The
Court of Appeals affirmed this order, pointing out that the injuries
giving rise to medical expenses will also support a claim for pain and
suffering.
CR 59.05 states that a motion to alter a judgment must be served
within ten days. In Cargo Truck Leasing Co. v. Piper,59 appellant,
throughout the trial, had maintained that if the jury found the appellee
negligent, resulting in verdicts for the other plantiffs, that he should
also be entitled to a verdict as a matter of law. When the jury awarded
verdicts to all plantiffs except appellant, he promptly moved for a
judgment n.o.v. The Court held that, the motion, though technically
incorrect, should have been treated as a motion under CR 59.05 since
it was designed to cover situations such as this.60
In Robertson v. City of Hazard,6' a circuit court rendered a judg-
ment allowing the city of Hazard to annex part of an unincorporated
territory. However, the order was invalid, since under Donovan v.
City of Louisville62 partial annexation was unauthorized. Both parties,
realizing the error, subsequently moved to set aside the order under
CR 60.02 but were overruled since the trial court found its decision to
be merely erroneous and not void. In reversing, the Court held that
where the parties both agree that there is a mistake in the judgment, it
should be set aside, absent some good reason to the contrary.
2. Final Iudgments.-CR 73.01 provides that a judgment cannot be
appealed until final, and the Court this term dismissed an appeal
5 7 This strictness probably results from: (1) overcrowded dockets and (2) a
desire to finalize proceedings after the parties have been liberally permitted to
present their case at the trial level.
583 94 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965).
59 394 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1965).60 See 7 CLAY, KEzNrucx PacrncE 210 (1963); Moutardier v. Webb, 300
S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1958).01401 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1966).
62 299 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1957).
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taken from an order overruling a motion to vacate on the grounds that
it was not a final judgment.63
In order to be final, the judgment must be written (CR 54.01),
signed (CR 58), and entered in the Civil Docket by the circuit court
clerk (CR 79.01); unless these requirements are satisfied, the trial
court retains jurisdiction over the proceedings.0 4
Ball v. Beatrice Foods65 states the further requirement that where
a judgment is entered upon one but not all claims then, for that judg-
ment to be final, there must be a recitation in that order that there is
no just reason for delay (CR 54.02). Where such recital is made, and
it is reasonably debatable whether single or multiple claims are in-
volved, the trial judge's discretion is conclusive.66
8. GeneraL-Wright v. Crawford,67 is an important and perhaps
far-reaching decision. A judgment of $2,526.80 was ordered against
petitioner for malicious assault, a civil charge. Throughout the trial,
he had acted as his own counsel. Subsequent to the verdict, petitioner
filed a "Notice of Appeal and Affidavit for Allowance to Proceed in
Forma Pauperis," alleging that he was bankrupt and praying for as-
signed counsel. This motion was denied, and pursuant to KRS
426.390, a notation made at the foot of the judgment allowing ex-
ecution, i.e., arrest. In deciding the question for the first time, the Court
concluded that a pauper, subject to imprisonment for failure to satisfy
a civil judgment, is entitled to assigned counsel to perfect his appeal.
However, since assignment of counsel is conditioned on petitioner's
being adjudged a pauper, the trial court was ordered to grant him a
hearing on that issue.
Although KRS 453.190 expressly provides that an indigent may
have assigned counsel to prosecute or defend, it had not previously
been applied to civil cases. Indeed, as late as 1961, the Court in
Parsly v. Knuckles6 stated, "There is nothing in the common law that
requires counsel in civil cases and any step toward that end must be
made by the legislature." Apparently no other jurisdiction has been
faced with this precise issue,69 and the Kentucky Court has enforced
the statute only in criminal proceedings.70 Now it seems that at least
63 McFerran v. Postal Service, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1966).64 Murrell v. City of Hurstbourne Acres, 401 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1966).
65 395 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1965).66 Jackson v. Metcalf, 404 S.W.2d 793 (Ky. 1966); 6 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTCE § 54.33 (2d ed. 1965).
67401 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1966).
683 46 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1961).
69 New York legislation provides for appointment of counsel for "poor persons"
in civil cases. 7B N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 1101-03 (1963).
70 Moy v. Bradley, 306 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1957); Pearson v. Commonwealth,
290 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1956).
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where a pauper is subject to imprisonment in a civil action, the statute
is mandatory and extends the use of assigned counsel into the ap-
pellate area.
Two cases this term restated the general rule that the Court is
confined to matters in the record of appeal.71
In Bailey v. Ashland Discount Assn.72 and Abell v. McGuire,73 the
Court dismissed appeals on grounds that appellants did not "promptly"
serve upon the appellees and file with their respective circuit courts a
designation of the records required by CR 75.01. In Bailey, 117 days
had elapsed before appellant filed the designation of a partial record,
while in Abell the appellants fied sixty days after notice of appeal.
The Court in Bailey expressed its sentiments by stating: "The case at
bar presents a glaring example of misuse of the pertinent rules ap-
plicable to perfection of appeals... ."4 Though CR 75.01 does not set
out a specific time for filing a designation of record, the rule of both
cases contemplates a "prompt" filing in the literal sense - a filing
within the earliest reasonable time.
A second issue in Bailey concerned appeal made as a matter of
right.75 The Court held that there must be an affirmative showing that
the amount in controversy exceeds $2,500 before the right accrues;
since appellant did not establish this by pleadings or final judgment,
the error was fatal.76
The use of the supersedeas bond in appellate procedure is
illustrated in Berryman v. Ardery.7 Under CR 73.04, a supersedeas
bond is required upon motion to stay the execution of the circuit court
judgment pending appeal. However, when appellant filed his notice
of appeal without moving to stay the execution, it was improper for
the circuit court to require the bond.78
In Tyler v. Bryant,79 the trial court had awarded $3,000 for at-
71 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Howard, 402 S.W.2d 853 (Ky.
1966) (appellant through its own error recited on the notice of appeal to the
circuit court a period longer than the permissible thirty days under KRS §
177.087); Crowder v. Stinson, 401 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1966) (appellant tried to
raise an affirmative defense for the first time).
72 400 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1966).
73 402 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1966).
74 400 S.W.2d E08, 510 (Ky. 1966).
75KRS § 21.060 (1942); KRS § 21.070 (1942); KRS § 21.080 (1942).
76 Kayrouz v. Joiner, 377 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1964).
7 398 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1966).
78As a general rule, when an execution is stayed, it does not alter the
effective date of the lower court's judgment, notwithstanding final determination
by the Court of Appeals. In Gering v. Brown Hotel Corp., 396 S.W.2d 332 (Ky.
1965), a case involving a minimum wage order by the Commissioner of Labor,
the Court held that a subsequent injunction by the circuit court, pending appeal,
does not postpone the effective date of the Commissioner's order.
79 394 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1965).
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
torney's fees in a divorce suit. The fee was awarded to the wife in-
stead of her attorney and ordered to be paid as court costs. Although
the appellant contended that the fee was excessive, the Court ruled
that the appeal was not properly brought since the attorney involved
was not made a party to the appeal.
The Court, in City of St. Matthews v. Oliva,0 was faced with
interpreting its own mandate. In an earlier decision the trial court's
judgment had been reversed and the case remanded "for proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion."81 The case was retried over the
city's objection, resulting in another judgment against it. The settled
rule in Kentucky is that when the Court directs a reversal of a judg-
ment rendered without a jury, a trial judge may not retry the case
absent special circumstances. 2 Appellees contended that since the law
concerning proof in zoning cases had been changed while the case
was pending, the trial judge was justified in retrying the case as he
did. In short, it was argued that the court's discretion had been
properly exercised. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating emphati-
cally that there were no special circumstances allowing the trial court
to do anything other than "enter a judgment consistent with the
opinion, that is, a judgment dismissing the complaint."8 3 Although the
result may be sound, it is judicial administration of doubtful wisdom
to allow a trial judge limited discretion to retry a case and then to
chastise him for exercising that discretion, albeit wrongly.
In the case of Wabash Life Ins. Co. v. King,8 4 the Court recited no
facts nor rule of law, stating simply that there was no error in the
proceedings warranting reversal. There may have been good cause for
limiting the discussion as the Court did. Yet in considering this opinion
consisting of a few lines, one might reasonably deduce that the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has been afflicted with the appellate disease
common to many courts, i.e., too many cases and insufficient time.
80 392 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1965).
81 Unpublished opinion cited in City of St. Matthews v. Oliva, 392 S.V.2d
39 (Ky. 1965).
82 Stephenson v. Burton, 246 S.W.2d 999 (Ky. 1952).
83 City of St. Matthews v. Oliva, 392 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Ky. 1965).
84 391 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1965).
XVIL PROPERTY
Stability and predictability have long been the keystone of the law
of property. As one would expect, the decisions of the Court in the
past term were based largely on established precedents and principles.
A. Construction of Deeds
The Court was presented with four cases calling for the construction
of deeds. In Berryman v. Elmore,' the plaintiff had acquired a
one-half interest in three separate tracs of land. The deed to the third
tract contained a restriction and reverter clause. Subsequently, the
plaintiff acquired by conveyance the remaining one-half interest in the
tracts from their owner, the deed reciting the restriction and reverter
clause in such a way as, on its face, to apply to all three tracts. The
person with whom the plaintiff had a contract for the sale of the land
refused to accept the deed. In an action for specific performance and
construction of the deed, the Court held that the deed was not one
that called for reformation by the Court and hence the statute of
limitations did not apply.2 The Court concluded that the mistake was
not in the wording of the deed but "in the physical position and typed
spacing of a particular paragraph." The Court characterized this as a
"latent ambiguity" which may be resolved by discovering the intent
of the parties, which, in this case, was clearly to apply the restrictions
to only one tract.
In another case4 the owner conveyed the coal rights under a certain
tract of land to another. He later conveyed his title to the land to a
third party, reciting in the deed that the "mineral" rights had pre-
viously been conveyed. Subsequently, this grantee also conveyed,
again with the recital in the granting clause that the "mineral" rights
had been formerly conveyed. In a contest to determine the owner of
the oil and gas rights, the Court held that all the mineral rights were
reserved by the first grantor, and not merely the coal rights which he
had conveyed. The Court quoted with approval language in a prior
case to the effect that "where an exception of minerals is placed in the
granting clause it should not be construed as a limited or restricted
exemption unless the language is clearly and positively restrictive."5
The question of intent in Letcher County Coal & Improvement Co.
1402 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1966).
2Under KRS §§ 413.120(12), 431.180(3) an action for reformation of the
deed had been barred.
3 402 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Ky. 1966).4 Brown v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1966).
5 Bartley v. Rowe, 343 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Ky. 1961).
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v. Marlowe stemmed from a contradictory deed in the appellant's
chain of title. The wording of this deed first described the land being
conveyed in metes and bounds and immediately thereafter declared
that such description embraced "all of a fifty acre survey" made in the
name of the patentee of the land, the grantor's predecessor in title. The
Court, while recognizing the general rule that in a deed containing
both general and particular descriptions of the land, the particular
must prevail absent language showing an intent to the contrary, relied
on the corollary that if "the facts and circumstances surrounding the
transaction must clearly reflect the intention of the grantor that the
general description was intended," then that will be adopted.7 Here,
the intention of each grantor in the chain of title was, the Court
found, to convey the entire fifty acres.
A case involving the question of implied intent of the parties re-
volved around the problem of whether a conveyance of land by the
grantor to her two daughters was an advancement, or a valid sale.8
Generally, an advancement is defined as "a giving, by anticipation, to a
child or other relative, of a part of the whole of what the donee would
receive on the death of the owner intestate, with the result, generally
speaking, that the amount thereof is deducted in determining the share
of such donee after the donor's death." What constitutes an advance-
ment in a particular jurisdiction is determined by the particular statutes
therein.10 Most statutes provide that the gift must be acknowledged
either by the donor or donee to be an advancement, in order for the
rules applying to advancements to take effect." Kentucky's provision,
however, is more stringent and applies to "any real or personal property
or money given ...by a parent or grandparent to a descendant."12
(Emphasis added.) Thus, to come within the purview of the Ken-
tucky statute, it is necessary to show only that the transfer from the
parent or grandparent was in fact a gift. Questions of whether the
grantor intended the transfer to be an advancement, or whether the
recipient so understood, are irrelevant. In the instant case, the two
appellees received from their mother a deed to a farm for a stated
consideration of one dollar. After the mother died intestate, the deed
was recorded. The two daughters sought to show that the farm was
conveyed to them as a result of extraordinary and compensable services
rendered by them to their mother, and hence that the transfer was not
6 898 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1965).
7 McKinney v. Raydure, 181 Ky. 163, 172, 203 S.W. 1084, 1087 (1918).
8 Thomas v. Thomas, 398 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1966).
9 TFFANY, OUTLNE OF REAL PROPERTY § 386, at 477 (1929).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 KRS § 391.140 (1942).
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a gift. The Court took the contrary view, and held that, since the
daughters had not made a claim on their mother for their services and
had no idea of their value, the intent of the parties at the time of the
transfer was not that the land be a satisfaction for the services. The
transfer was made in "appreciation" rather than in "consideration" of
the services and was a gift, making the property thus acquired apply
toward their share of the intestate's estate under the terms of the
advancement statute. The Court's decision is undeniably correct,
given the terms of the present advancement statute. But in this and
similar cases the intention of the donor may often be thwarted, since
the statute defines all such gifts as advancements. If, indeed, the in-
tention of the owner is to prevail in the disposition of his property, it
would seem that the Legislature should enact a more realistic statute,
one that rests on the intestate's intention respecting his gift.
B. Restrictive Covenants
The single case' 3 from last term concerning restrictive covenants
also involved the intention of the parties to the deed at the time of its
making. A subdivision was laid out in Lexington in 1899. In the deeds
conveying the lots facing one street of the subdivision was the con-
venant that no residence should be placed nearer than three feet to
the property line, and that no stable or garage should be erected with-
in seventy-five feet of the street. The appellee had erected an office
building on lots outside the scope of the covenant, and a parking lot
for the tenants of that building covered two of the lots to which
the covenant applied. The appellants lots adjoined one of these lots.
Seeking to have the convenant enforced, she based her argument on
the proposition that the parking lot was either a garage or a residence.
The lower court issued a summary judgment on the basis of its con-
clusion that, since the neighborhood was now essentially commercial
as opposed to residential, the restrictions were unenforceable. 14 The
Court, while not holding the restrictions unenforceable, affirmed on
the narrower point that the covenant did not apply since a parking lot
is not a "garage" or "residence." It applied the customary meanings of
the words, having found that these were the definitions intended by
13 Mascolino v. Noland and Cowden Enterprises, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 710 (Ky.
1965).
'4 See Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W.2d
1024 (1938) (same restrictions held unenforceable in different section of same
neighborhood).
1; See McMahan v. Hunsinger, 375 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Ky. 1964): "We must
seek the intention of the grantor from the language used, considered in light of
such factors as the general scheme of the subdivision. We may not substitute
what the grantor may have intended to say for the plain import of what he said."
1967]
KENTUCKY LAW jOURNAL
the owner at the time of the creation of the covenants.15 A parking lot
was unheard of at the time the covenant was inserted; thus the
Court felt the grantor could not have had that in mind.
C. Easements
The Court decided three cases involving easements.16 One of these
concerned the question of prescriptive easements, i.e., easements
acquired in the same manner as land is acquired by adverse possession.
By analogy to law relating to land and its ownership, the courts have
held that easements and other incorporeal rights in land can be
acquired by prescription, if the elements requisite for adverse posses-
sion are present. The use must be continuous, uninterrupted, actual,
visible, and hostile to the owner. 7 A use with the permission of the
owner of the right of way or easement over another's land lacks the
element of hostility, and hence the prescriptive right cannot mature
into a right. In the case' dealing with these issues, the Court affirmed
the rule that when a passway over another's land has been used
continuously and without interruption for a period of fifteen years,
the presumption is raised that such use was of right and the burden is
on the owner of the estate over which the passway crosses to show
that its use was merely permissive. 19 The Court noted that once the
prescriptive right is acquired it cannot be defeated by obstruction or
interference unless the acts themselves are continuous for the statutory
period of fifteen years.20
In a similar controversy,21 a single tract of land having a road
running across it was divided and sold as separate tracts. The road
provided the only egress for the owner of the second lot. The Court
applied the settled rule that in such circumstances the easement will
pass by implication upon the division of the land, the same as if the
owner of the landlocked tract had a deed to the easement.22 Such an
implied grant is known as an "easement of necessity."23
16 
"An easement in another's land involves primarily a right or privilege, more
or less permanent, of doing a certain class of acts on or to the detriment of such
land, or a right against such other that he shall refrain from doing a certain class
of acts on or in connect;on with his own land, the easement usually existing as an
accessory to the neighboring land, and for its benefit." TXh'FANY, op. cit. supra
note 9. at 307-8.
17 Id. § 395, at 492-8.
18 Blue v. Haner, 395 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1965).
19 See Snyder v. Carroll, 203 Ky. 320, 262 S.W. 290 (1924).
20 See Crigler v. Newman, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 27. 91 S.W. 706 (1906).21 Helton v. Jones. 402 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1966).
22See Delong v. Cline, 302 Ky. 358. 194 S.W.2d 631 (1946).2 3 Ti- ANY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 274, at 327.
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A third dispute24 involved a situation in which a landowner gran-
ted an easement to a city for its water lines in return for water service
therefrom. The Court held that, with the subsequent reconveyance
of the easement to the grantor, the contract was destroyed and the
grantor lost any right he might have had to the water service.
D. Boundary Disputes
Three of the cases involving boundary disputes focused on the
issue of whether title had been gained by one of the contestants by
adverse possession. To attain title by adverse possession, the claim-
ant must fulfill specific requirements in his relation to the disputed
land. Among these are continuous and uninterrupted possession for the
statutory period, such possession being actual, visible, notorious, and
hostile to the real or true owner. Further, one who is in adverse
possession of a tract of land, to all of which he has color of title, is
regarded as being in constructive possession of the whole tract, as
against an owner who is not in possession of any part thereof.25 In
Martin v. Kentucky-W. Va. Gas Co.,26 the Court decided the dispute
under the rule that adverse possession under color of title must be to
well-defined boundaries. A second problem 27 of conflicting claims was
decided on the special rule applicable betveen the grantor and his
grantee to the effect that the grantor and his successors in title can-
not acquire title by adverse possession to the conveyed land as against
the grantee and his successors without giving notice by way of an
express disclaimer and making a notorious assertion of title.28
In deciding cases involving deeds containing conflicting des-
criptions, courts must seek to find the intention of the parties
thereto,29 and they have formulated certain rules to aid them in this
search. Public policy and the avoidance of future litigation dictates
that the description of the land which is conveyed be precise and
easily capable of identification. The onus of providing a clear des-
cription has been placed on the grantor of the land, and ambiguities in
the instrument are resolved against him. This rule was applied last
term in White v. Howard.30 A similar rule applicable to the discovery
of intent is that natural objects will prevail over inconsistent calls for
24 Bryant v. City of Danville, 404 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1966).
25 SeTiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 394, at 489.
206401 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1966).2 7 Louisvilie Gas and Elee. Co. v. Brown, 391 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1965).
28 See Williams v. Thomas, 285 Ky. 776, 149 S.W.2d 525 (1941).
29 TFFANY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 342, at 418.
30 394 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1965).
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distances, as such monuments are more likely to be correct than
abstract statements on the length of an imaginary line. This rule was
sufficient to dispose of the question in Bowling v. Gayheart.31
Two cases were appealed disputes on the value of evidence used
to determine boundaries. In one,32 testimony of the appellants ex-
pert witness as to the location of an extinct county road serving as
the boundary between the two tracts of land conflicted with that of
appellee's lay witnesses who testified from personal knowledge of
the prior location of the road. The Court held that in such cases the
testimony of such competent lay vitnesses could overcome that of an
expert not acquainted with the locale. In the other case,33 the Court
held that because one call of the surveyor's description was in error,
such error did not invalidate the whole of his testimony.
E. Mineral Leases
A significant case,34 one of first impression in Kentucky, was
decided in the area of mineral leases. The question was whether a
city zoning ordinance which prohibited the drilling for oil within a
certain section of a city was unreasonable and arbitrary and hence
unconstitutional as being a taking of property without due process of
law. Oil had been discovered just outside the city limits, adjacent to
plaintiff's property, which was within the city and covered by the
zoning ordinance. The producing formation, which in all probability
extended under the plaintiff's land, was being drained of oil, to the
distress of the city dwellers. The situation presented a serious prob-
lem for zoning policy because the exploitation of minerals is not com-
mercial enterprise that can be relocated in a more appropriate zone of
the eity.34A The Court, while recognizing the obvious hardship to
landowners in such cases, held that such a zoning ordinance is a valid
exercise of the police power of the municipality, that it is not un-
reasonable or arbitrary, and that hence it is not a taking without due
process of law. In establishing the reasonableness of the ordinance,
the Court pointed out that such oil operations, apart from destroying
vegetation and presenting a general nuisance to the entire neighbor-
hood, could be a serious danger in case of explosion or fire during
drilling.
3' 396 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1965).32 Vanhoose v. Williams, 396 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1966).
33 Carroll v. Kentucky-W. Va. Gas Co., 403 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. 1966).
34Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (KY. 1966).
34ABlancett v. Montgomery also discussed supra Sec. I, Administrative Law,
notes 89-42.
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The result, supported by Kentucky precedents in zoning law3 5 and
analogous cases from other jurisdictions,36 illustrates the Court's
general unwillingness to interfere with ordinances which have any
rational basis.30A
If a result fairer to all parties involved is to be attained, the
burden is on the city to adopt a more reasonable and realistic zoning
ordinance. A compromise, involving stringent safety and waste dis-
posal restrictions on the drilling operations to preserve the integrity
of the residential area, would obviate the undesirable after-effects of
the operations and, at the same time, give the landowners the right
to profit from the wealth of their property. The city could recoup
the expenses of inspection and administration through appropriate
licensing fees.
Another case 7 in this area dealt with the time at which a mineral
lease expires. The terms of the lease in question provided that it
would remain in force for five years and as long thereafter as oil
or gas was produced. The five years had been exhausted at the bring-
ing of the suit, and it was no longer possible to raise the oil to the
surface by primary method, i.e., without resorting to the more ex-
pensive "waterfiood" recovery methods. The lease had ceased pro-
duction in 1961 and after that had only been pumped intermittently
for four or five days before the bringing of this suit to quiet title. In
considering the case, the Court listed the ways in which a mineral
lease can expire.38 After citing the general rule that after the primary
term of the lease has expired "if production ceases, the lease is at an
end, although a temporary cessation of production does not terminate
the lease," 9 the Court reiterated the Kentucky qualification that the
cessation of production must in light of all the circumstances be un-
reasonable for the lease to be at an end. Applying this rule in the
instant case, the Court found that the cessation after the primary term
of the lease had expired was unreasonable. The lessee could have
foreseen the failure of primary production and should have taken
timely steps to begin secondary recovery procedures. However, the
Court also indicated a willingness to hold differently in situations
35 Fried v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n,
258 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); City of Richlawn v. McMaldn, 313 Ky. 265, 230
S.W.2d 902 (1950); Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (1928).36 Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931).
30A See discussion, supra., Sec. VI, Constitutional Law, notes 29-39.
3 7 heeler & Lemaster Oil & Gas Co. v. Henley, 398 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1966).3 8 The reasons for the expiration of a lease are: (1) forfeiture for breach of
condition, (2) abandonment of the operations, and (3) expiration of the lease by
its own terms. 2 SuMEmas, Oi Aim GAs § 305 (penn. ed. 1959).
39 See Lamb v. Vansyckle, 205 Ky. 597, 266 S.W. 253 (1924).
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where the lessee is diligently working to initiate secondary recovery.
The Court's recognition of the delay and difficulty necessarily at-
tendant upon financing secondary recovery projects should be read
as clearly limiting the case to its facts. The equity of the decision
here lies in the fact that the lessor's only source of income from royal-
ties on the production of oil or gas, and his income necessarily ceased
with the cessation of production.
In another case, 40 a coal lease provided that the lessees were to
pay twenty-five cents per ton royalty on the coal taken from the land
and for ninety percent of the estimated tonnage whether it was mined
or not. The parties agreed the ninety per cent referred to coal which
could be taken from the land at a reasonable profit using sound mining
practices. The trial judge, in arriving at the quantity of coal that was
minable, deducted from the estimated coal under the tract only a
certain area which was unminable. The Court held that this deduction
was not extensive enough. Not all of the estimated coal in minable
areas can be extracted because many factors, such as burnouts, wash-
outs, and the fact that pillars must be left standing to support the
mine, all combine to reduce the quantity of minable coal.
F. Wills
Kentucky has no statute of limitations which by its terms applies
expressly to the time within which wills must be probated. However,
there is a statute which provides that "an action for relief, not pro-
vided for by statute, can only be commenced within ten years after
the cause of action accrued."41 A long line of Kentucky cases4
beginning in 1842 have applied this statute or its predecessor 43 to the
probate of wills. Two legatees were confronted with this statute when
they attempted to probate a twelve-year-old will in Second Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.44 The will
was found by an heir at law who had received a larger share of the
estate through intestacy than she would have under the will. The
legatees asserted the statute should be tolled by virtue of conceal-
ment or obstruction to probate. In order to toll a statute of limitations,
concealment must be clearly proved.4 5 The Court held there was no
40 Bishop v. Howard, 408 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1965).
41 KRS § 418.160 (1942).4 2 Allen v. Froman, 96 Ky. 313, 28 S.W. 497 (1894). Other cases in this
'line" are: Hoagland v. Fish, 288 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1951); Allen v. Lovel's
Adm'x, 303 Ky. 288, 197 S.W.2d 424 (1946).
43 Carroll's Ky. Stat. § 2522.
44 398 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965).
4554 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 895 (1948).
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evidence of fraud or intentional concealment and thus probate of the
will was barred.
Generally, "the object of the court, or its duty, in construing a will
is to arrive at the testators intention as expressed in the language
used, and the testator's intention as shown by the will itself must gov-
em." 46 However, because of ambiguous terms or unforeseen events, it
is often difficult for a court to ascertain the true intent of a testator.
In Sandidge v. Kentucky Trust Co.,47 the will in contention provided
that two sons by the testator's first wife were each to receive one-
eighth of the estate at testators death. The remaining six-eighths
were to be held in trust for the testators second wife. Upon her death
the testator's two sons by her were to receive a sum sufficient "to make
them equal"48 with the other two sons. Whatever then remained of the
estate was to be divided among all four sons equally. The source of
difficulty lay in the fact that between the time the two sons received
their one-eighth shares and the second wife's death, the estate had
more than doubled in value. Thus, the question was whether the
second sons were to be made equal by receiving the same number of
dollars, or the same percentage of the estate as received by the first
sons. The Court chose the latter alternative, stating that "it is quite
clear that the testaor inended his four sons o fare equally with but one
exception... [the first sons] were to be deprived of the use of only
half of their shares."49
In order for a will to be set aside on the grounds of mental incapa-
city, the testator must lack testamentary capacity.60 This capacity
exists when the testator has sufficient memory and mentality to under-
stand and remember the nature and purpose of the transaction, the
extent of his property, and those vho have a claim to his remem-
brance.6 ' Undue influence is a related ground for invalidating a will.
While difficult of definition it means basically that a testator was under
some duress which caused him to act as other than a free agent and
express a will other than his own.52 The case of Creason v. Creason3
involved both of these elements. The testator simultaneously executed
a will and a deed, the effect of which were to give the bulk of his estate
to one grandson and significantly smaller shares to three other grand-
children. The trial court gave instructions on undue influence and
46 95 C.J.S. Wills § 591 (1957).
47402 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1966).48 Id. at 106.
41Ibid.
V)94 C.J.S. Wills § 15 (1956).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53392 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1965).
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mental incapacity as to the will only. After the jury found for the
plaintiff, the court ruled that both the will and the deed were invalid.
In affirming this ruling the Court noted that the mental capacity
required to execute a deed is basically the same in kind as that needed
to make a will,54 but that, in Kentucky, the law requires a greater
degree of mental capacity for a deed.55 Therefore, since the jury found
that the will was invalid, the trial court could properly strike down
the deed as well.
The only other case of significance in this area was Ryburn v. First
Nat'l Bank of Mayfield,56 where the testator left his entire estate to a
charitable association. The Court had reviewed this will several times
previously, 57 and as a result of this litigation the testator's brother and
nephew had signed a waiver of their rights to contest the will for a
consideration of $50,000. The present action involved a contest of the
will's validity by the testator's grandniece and grandnephew. As a
general rule, in order to contest a will one must be in a position to
receive a distributive share were the will to be invalidated.55 Under
Kentucky's descent and distribution statute59 both the testators
brother and nephew stood before the plaintiffs in the line of descent.
The plaintiffs contended that the waiver by the brother and nephew
elevated them to heirs at law, thus allowing them to contest the will.
The Court would not accept this contention and held that rights as
heirs at law are created by statute and cannot be contracted away.
The plaintiffs were not descendents within the legal meaning of that
term.
60
To contest the appointment of an administrator of an estate the
person so contesting must have an interest in the estate.6 ' In a case62
applying this rule, the Court of Appeals held that a testator's children
do not have sufficient interest in his estate to challenge the appoint-
5426 C.J.S. Deeds § 54(b) (1956).
55Ibid. The reason for this rule being that in executing a deed one must
deal with another person, thus increasing the possibility of undue influence, fraud
and the like. See n.99.
56 399 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1965).
5 7 Annie Gardner Foundation v. Gardner, 375 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1963); First
Nat'l Bank of Mayfield v. Lisanby, 354 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1962); First Nat'l Bank
of Mayfield v. Gardner, 348 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1961); First Nat'l Bank of May-
field v. Gardner, 330 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1959); First Natl Bank of Mayfield v.
Stahr, 329 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1959); Commonwealth ex. rel. Ferguson v. Gardner,
327 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1959).
58 Rogers v. Leahy, 296 Ky. 44, 176 S.W.2d 93 (1943).
)9 IS § 391.010 (1956).
60 "'[Diescendant designates or connotes the issue of a deceased person,
and does not describe the children of a parent who is still living ..... 26A C.J.S.
Descendant § 504 (1956). This is the rule in Kentucky. See Collis v. Citizens
Fid. Bank and Trust Co., 314 Ky. 15, 234 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1950).
6133 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 57(b) (1942).62 Williams v. Ratcliffe, 402 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1966).
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ment of an administrator de bonis non by the county court. The
testator had left his entire estate to his wife and appointed her ad-
ministratrix. Although a final report had been fied before the wife's
death, the county court appointed an administrator de bonis non. Up-
holding this appointment, the Court reasoned that the challengers did
not have sufficient interest in the estate to challenge the appointment.
Three cases affirmed general rules. First, opinion evidence as to a
forged signature on a will when supported by other suspicious cir-
cumstances creates a factual issue for the jury.63 Secondly, a verdict
directed solely on the basis that evidence regarding undue influence
tended to be self-serving is error.64 The third case6 5 involved an at-
torney who was employed on a fee basis by the executor of a lost will.
The Court held that this was not such a personal interest as to pre-
clude him from testifying on the contents of the will, especially since
he already had employment as attorney for the administrator ap-
pointed prior to the finding of the will.
G. Future Interests
There were two significant developments in the area of future inter-
ests during the past term. The effect of these developments was to
imbue the contingent remainder with a more substantial status as
property. While these developments can hardly be regarded as start-
ling, they nonetheless represent a refreshing change in some concepts
long settled in Kentucky law.
The early case of Leppes v. Lee66 enunciated the rule that one who
receives a contingent remainder can convey or devise it, but if he dies
before the contingency occurs nothing passes to the grantee or devisee.
This rule was applied to a contingent remainder in personal property
in a later case,67 but the Court had found no other occasion for its
use until this term. That the rule is unsound is not doubted. "It is
everywhere held that remainders, whether vested or contingent ...
descend in the same manner and to the same persons as possessory
interests in land. ,,"s Thus the death of the remainderman does not
affect the interest he holds. The Court in Saulsberry v. Second Nat'l
Bank of Ashland69 overruled Leppes and joined the majority of
jurisdictions in permitting the contingent remainder to descend in the
same manner as a possessory interest.
63 Reffett v. Hughes, 396 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1965).
64 Hall v. Childress, 392 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1965).
65 Phelps v. Waddle, 400 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1966).
692 Ky. 16, 17 S.W. 146 (1891).
67 Roy v. West, 194 Ky. 96, 238 S.W. 167 (1922).
68 S ms & Szwr, Fu'r-am INT aurs § 1883 (2d ed. 1956).
69 400 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1966).
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The other development in future interests law involved convey-
ances by deed which reserve in the grantor a right to convey. In such
situations the grantees should take at the grantor's death, if he still
owns the property. The rule in Kentucky had been that this type of
conveyance, reserving a right to convey in the grantor, is testamen-
tary.70 Basic to this determination was the concept that such a deed
does not pass a present interest.71 (This is reminiscent of language in
Leppes72 to the effect that a contingent remainder does not pass a
present interest.) Once again the Court aligned itself with the bulk of
modem property law73 by holding in two cases74 that a grantor's
reservations, including that of a right to convey, are to be considered
only as part of the circumstances in determining whether there was an
intent for an interest to pass presently.
It is believed that these cases represent the better view. The pri-
mary purpose in interpreting any instrument is to carry out the
dominant intent of the grantor. This purpose can only be frustrated
by setting up rigid standards for the interpretation of conveyances.
The Court reiterated this desire to give effect to the grantor's
dominant intention in Franklin Real Estate Co. v. Music.75 Here a
deed, for the stated consideration of $3,000, contained the following
provision: "The intention of this deed is to convey to the said Laura
B. Music and her bodily heirs the foregoing described tract of land,
which deed shall be in full force and effect at the demise of the said
Grantor herein, D. Mart Hager."76 It is clearly the rule in Kentucky
that "whether an instrument is a deed or a will is to be determined by
the intention of the one who executed it."77 The Court felt the grantor's
intent here was to postpone the enjoyment of possession and not
postpone the vesting of the estate; thus the instrument was a deed.
In another phase of the law of future interests, the Court was
called upon to determine the meaning of the word "children" in a
will.78 They felt it "well settled that the word 'children' does not in-
clude grandchildren unless it plainly appears that such was the
meaning from other provisions of the will, or that such a construction
must necessarily be given to the deed or will so as to give effect to the
70 Douglas v. Snow, 804 Ky. 805, 202 S.W.2d 629 (1947).
71 Ibid.72 Leppes v. Lee, 92 Ky. 16, 17 S.W. 146 (1891).
7323 AM. JuRa. 2d Deeds §§ 179, 185-90 (1965).74 Deweese v. Arnett, 402 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1966); Witherspoon v. Wither-
spoon, 402 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1965).
75 892 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1965).
76 Id. at 67.
77 Glocksen v. Holmes, 299 Ky. 626, 629, 186 S.W.2d 634, 636 (1945).
78Cooper v. Cooper, 392 S.W.2d 662 (Ky. 1965).
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grant or devise."79 The will in this action devised the testator's property
to his four children and stated that, if any of these children should die
without issue, his portion was to go to the survivors or "their children
should the parents be dead."80 Some years later only one of the four
children was living. Of the other three, two had died without issue,
and the other had died leaving two sons. These two sons together with
their uncle attempted to convey a fee simple interest in the property.
This conveyance was challenged on the grounds that "children" was
a class that could be fixed and ascertained only if and when the uncle
died without issue. This contention was held to be without merit. It
is well accepted that the word "children" is commonly used to denote
issue of the first generation only.8 '
The only other case 2 in this area involved a will in which the tes-
tator left all of his property to his wife but "advise [d]" her to leave
anything that was left at her death to one Edith Lee. The Court held
this provision did not create a life estate with the power of disposition,
but rather a fee simple interest.
H. Miscellaneous
In the five other property cases decided last term, the Court
merely applied well-established rules to the facts before it. Where a
discrepancy in a map used to mine coal and allocate royalties is pointed
out by a later map showing that most of the coal belonged to an
adjoining lessor, there is sufficient evidence to support an award for
unjust enrichment.83 An owner may dedicate part of his land to public
use by taking appropriate acts, and his grantee has no claim to the
part dedicated; signing an instrument reciting dedication and in-
forming purchasers of a priori dedication and use of land as a street by
the public are sufficient for a valid dedication. 84 Actual possession of
a junior patent of land is insufficient to acquire title to an overlap of
a senior patent which has never been occupied by the owner when the
overlap itself is not actually possessed adversely by the junior patent
holder or his predecessors.85 A mortgagee must accept a check from
a mortgagor although it is marked "paid under protest."86 Lastly, in
Cooper v. Sarros,87 the Court was able to reconcile a will and a
codicil, although the language appeared ambiguous.
79 Id. at 664.
so Id. at 663.
81 R sTATEmENT, PRoPERTY § 285, comment d (1940).
82 Kirk v. Lee, 402 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1965).83 Bates v. Bates, 399 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1965).
84 Good v. Music, 398 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1966).
sJ. Walter Wright Lumber Co. v. Baker, 395 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1965).86 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hilander, 403 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1966).
87 391 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1965).
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XVIII. TAXATION
The Constitution of Kentucky provides that property "shall be
assessed for taxation at its fair cash value."' However, for many years
real property in Kentucky was assessed at a fraction of its true value.
The fractional assessment was upheld if it was uniform.2 As for
personal property, some types were assessed at full value while others
were assessed fractionally.3 The fraction used in assessing property
for taxation only needed to be uniform in the taxing unit, the county,
and then only for the classes of property assessed fractionally.
In 1965, in Russman, v. Luckett, the Court struck down fractional
assessments and ruled that all property must be assessed at its "fair
cash value."4 In holding that seventy-five years' neglect of the full
cash value standard did not abrogate the constitutional provision5 re-
quiring full value assessment, the Court relied upon the principle
that the failure of the executive to enforce a law does not result in its
repeal.6
In reaching its decision, the Court cited cases from five other
jurisdictions, 7 none of which extended the rule of full value assessment
as far as Russman, i.e., to all property on a statewide basis. The cited
cases applied full value assessment only to a county,8 or a city,9 or to
that portion of property in the state assessed by the tax assessor.10
One of the cases held that all realty must be assessed at some uniform
percentage of fair cash value;" another required the assessor to assess
realty at its fair cash value and thereby fix a new ratio between realty
1 Ky. CONST. § 172.
2 See, e.g., Luckett v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 331 S.W.2d 879
(Ky. 1960); City of Lexington v. Cooke, 309 Ky. 518, 218 S.V.2d 58 (1949);
City of Louisville v. Martin, 284 Ky. 490, 144 S.W.2d 1034 (1940); McCracken
Fiscal Court v. McFadden, 275 Ky. 819, 122 S.W.2d 761 (1938); Eminence
Distillery Co. v. Henry County Bd. of Supervisors, 178 Ky. 811, 200 S.V. 347(1918). See also, discussion of full value assessment problem in 51 VA. L. REv.
1456-64 (1965).
3 Kentucky Fin. Co. v. McCord, 290 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1956).
4 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). The Russman decision was reported too late
for inclusion in the 1964-65 Court of Appeals Review. Because of its significance,
we are discussing it in this year's survey.5 Ky. CONST. § 172.6 District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
7 McNayr v. State, 166 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1964); Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa
22, 294 N.W. 237 (1940); Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223,
178 N.E.2d 10 (1961); Village of Ridgefiield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of
Taxation, 31 N.J. 420, 157 A.2d 829 (1960); State v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175
Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964).8 McNayr v. State, supra note 7; Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County
Bd. of Taxation, supra note 7.
9 Bettigole v. Assessor of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).10 Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 237 (1940).
11 State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St.
410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964).
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and other types of property fractionally assessed. 2 One New Jersey
case was an equalization problem rather than a full value assessment
problem and required all property in the county to be assessed at full
value because equality among taxing units in the county could be
achieved no other way.'3 A Florida case14 likewise applied to only a
single county, but the court suggested that the decision could have
secondary impact on the assessment and collection of ad valorem
taxes throughout the state. Later Florida cases show this prediction
is apparently coming true, but still only on a county by county basis.1
The Constitution of Kentucky, unlike the constitutions of many
states, does not provide for fractional assessment. In some states the
assessed value is ascertained as provided by law or the constitution,'"
or by the legislature,' 7 or in proportion to the property's true cash
value,' s or at thirty-five percent of its true value,19 or according to its
true value.20 All such provisions require that the actual cash value of
the property be used in establishing the assessed value, which may be
a fraction of the true value. The Kentucky Constitution does not
provide that property be assessed in proportion to or according to fair
cash value, but specifies that it be assessed "at" fair cash value.21
According to earlier decisions of the Court, the definition of the
"fair cash value" at which the constitution requires property to be
assessed is the price the property would bring at a voluntary sale,22
free of encumbrances, 23 on the date of assessment.24 Property may not
be assessed at what it would bring in more normal times,25 nor may it
be assessed at its ultimate productive worth, 26 but it must be assessed
'
2 Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 228, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961).
13 Village of Ridgefleld Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 31 N.J. 420,
157 A.2d 829 (1960).
14 McNayr v. State, 166 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1964).
15 Schooley v. Sunset Corp., 185 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1966); Townsend v. Grey,
181 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1966).
16 CALiF. CONST. art. XII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. H, § 28; TEX. CONST. art
Vi, § 1; UTAH CoNsT. XIII, § 2; W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
17 ARx. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.8 MIcH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
19 OKrA. CoNsT. art. X, § 8.
20 MIss. CONST. art. IV, § 112.
2 1 Ky. CONST. § 172.
22Evans v. Allen, 305 Ky. 728, 205 S.W.2d 514 (1947); Atlantic States
Coal Co. v. Letcher County, 246 Ky. 549, 55 S.W.2d 408 (1932); River Coal
Corp. v. Knott County, 245 Ky. 822, 54 S.W.2d 377 (1932).23 Lynch v. Kentucky Tax Comm'n, 333 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1960) (defines
"fair cash value" in a decision on the Kentucky inheritance tax); Commonwealth
ex rel. Reeves v. Sutcliffe, 287 Ky. 809, 155 SV.2d 243 (1941).24 Atlantic States Coal Co. v. Letcher County, 246 Ky. 549, 55 S.W.2d 408
(1932).
25 Ibid.26 Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Knott County, 246 Ky. 822, 54 S.W.2d 377
(1937).
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at its value at the time of assessment. Generally, the word "fair" adds
nothing to "market value" except to indicate what the seller would
have received had there been a sale.27 The fair cash value of property
is determined by the County Tax Commissioner. Since he is responsible
for his assessment, he has discretion in selecting the method he will
use in making the determination.28 So long as the method used in
assessing property is designed to reach, and reasonably tends to reach,
an approximation of the fair voluntary sale price, the tax assessment
cannot be held invalid because of the method employed in making
it.20
One meaning suggested for "fair cash value," which would have
avoided the decision in Russman, is that the phrase be taken to mean
an adjusted fair price rather than current price. Such a definition
would permit an adjustment by different fractions of different classes
of property to take account of inflation. By the adjustment of value,
current economic trends such as a "boom" in real estate would be dis-
missed, and the inflated value would be adjusted to the pre-boom
value with the result that the owner of property with inflated value
would have no tax increase when the owners of property with stable
values did not.30 It would seem that the Court in defining the phrase
as it traditionally has been defined properly left the construction of
the tax scheme to the Legislature.
As a result of the Court's mandate that property be assessed at its
actual value, the base for the ad valorem tax has been increased
approximately three-fold.31 This new assessed base would increase
tax burdens and revenues by the same amount, if the pre-Russman tax
rates were maintained. However, to allay the fears which the
Russman decision provoked, the Legislature in extraordinary session
limited increases in property tax revenue as a result of Russ-man. This
2 7 John P. Dant Distillery Co. v. Pabst, 72 F. Supp. 619, 623 (W.D. Ky.
1947) (action on agreement to convey property). The Supreme Court has
defined "fair cash value" as the amount that woul be paid were the property
condemned and taken by eminent domain. Great No. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297
U.S. 135 (1936).
28 Borders v. Cain, 252 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Ky. 1952) provides:
Tax assessors have always received advice and counsel on the valuation
of property. That advice might come from a friend, a neighbor, the
owner of the property to be assessed, or even from the personnel of the
State Revenue Department. One assessor might use one method and
another a different method in arriving at the same result. . .. Nor do we
know of any law which gives the taxpayer the right to object to the
method used so long as the assessment is fair and equitable.
29 Fayette County Bd. of Supervisors v. O'Rear, 275 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1955).
30 Fryman. Russman v. Luckett: Property Taxes and the Kentucky Consti-
tution, April, 1966. Unpublished thesis, Harvard Law School.
31 The statewide median real estate assessment ratio was approximately 27
percent of fair cash value. Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1965).
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was accomplished through legislation requiring cities, counties, and
school districts to adjust their tax rate in inverse proportion to the
increase in assessment. Thus each of the taxing units was directed to
apply a compensating tax rate which, when applied to its total tax
assessment in 1966, would produce revenue approximately equal to
that produced in 1965.32 The compensating rate may be increased as
much as ten percent by cities3 3 and counties34 for 1966 and 1967, and
by school districts "for the school years 1966-1967 and 1967-1968." 35
In response to this legislation, fifty-four counties which had re-
ported to the State Local Finance Officer on October 4, 1966 had
levied tax of from $.09 to $.263 per $100 of assessed value, as opposed
to $.50 per $100 of assessed value in nearly every county prior to
Russman. As of November 10, 1966, 149 school districts had levied the
ten percent increase in the school tax, forty-four had not, and ten
districts were undecided.
The legislative limits on taxation were designed to provide for an
immediate emergency and are temporary. The compensating rate is
only for the years 1966 and 1967. Should the Legislature in 1963 fail to
enact new provisions, the only limit on the local tax rates applied to
property assessed at full value would be the constitutional limits. The
local units then could, but would not be compelled to, set rates at the
constitutional limit.
The Court in Russman did not usurp any taxing power of the
Legislature. It simply allowed the Legislature and local taxing units to
exercise the full extent of the constitutional power to tax. It is always
the duty of the Legislature and the local taxing units to select the tax
rate or acquiesce in the selection of the existing rate.
The Court of Appeals recently held that the compensating rate
applies to the total tax revenue of a county and is not to be restricted
to general fund revenues.3 6 The controversy arose when a county
which, prior to the enactment of tht compensating rate, had voted a
special levy for the retirement of a bonded indebtedness; the revenue
produced by the special levy had been insufficient for the purpose,
and the deficit had been made up from the general fund. The school
district was not permitted to collect both a general fund equal to that
32 KRS § 132.032 (1965). Where the officials of a taxing unit refuse to col-
lect a tax, the compensating rate is determined on the amount that would have
been collected had the officials collected the tax. Boggs v. Reep, 404 S.W.2d 24
(1966).
33KRS § 132.027(2) (1965).
34 KRS § 68.245(3) (1965).
35 KRS § 160.470(4) (1965).3 6 Fayette County Bd. of Education v. White, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1966);
Cf. Holmes v. WAlden, 394 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1965) (school tax levy in excess of
constitutional limit).
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of 1965 and a special fund sufficient to meet the full obligation of the
bonds, but was restricted to the compensating rate in the special levy
as well as in the general levy. In the Court's opinion, KRS 160.477
requires that bond and rental payments be met and that tax revenues
be sufficient for the purpose. In an extraordinary situation the rate
must go beyond the compensating rate in order that those payments be
made, but in the ordinary situation where the bond and rental pay-
ments are being met, it is the purpose of the compensating rate
legislation that the total tax burden not be increased except by the
permitted ten percent increase.
Thus events since Russ-man indicate that this decision poses not a
threat, but an opportunity for more uniform and equitable distribution
of tax burdens. The assessment of property at 100%. of its fair cash
value can have more than fiscal consequences. For example, the ap-
praisal of property for both public and private use in such diverse
areas as real estate transactions, financing, planning of property
utilization, economic analysis, and compensation in condemnation
could be simplified. In particular, the most obvious effect for the
immediate future could be on eminent domain valuations: property
assessed at full value for tax purposes could be presumed to have the
same value for condemnation.
Additionally, Russman holds that when a taxpayer who is the par-
ent of a schoolchild has no other adequate remedy, a justiciable
controversy is presented by the taxpayer's prayer for injunctive re-
lief in the nature of mandamus to rectify the violation of the consti-
tutional provision discussed above.37 McDevitt v. Luckett,38 a later
case which incorporated the Russman opinion, stated the rights of
property owners to demand compliance with the constitutional pro-
visions requiring assessment of property at its fair cash value.P
Clearly, Russman v. Luckett is one of the most significant decisions
rendered by the Court in recent years.
37 KY. CONST. § 172. Because of the extreme circumstances of the long pre-
vailing, though illegal, custom of fractional assessment, the county tax com-
missioner and other public officials were not removed from office for misfeasance
as provided by KRS § 132.370(3) (1942), although an official will be subject to
the penalties of the statute for such misfeasance committed after January 1, 1966.
Miller v. Layne, 391 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1965).38 391 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1965).
89 Soon after deciding Russman, the Court held the requirement of full value
assessment does not apply to a deduction of the assessed value of tangible pro-
perty from the total valuation placed on the shares of bank stock. Because the
deduction is a matter of legislative largess, only the assessed value of the tangible
property is deducted if that amount is less than the fair cash value. Owensboro
Natl Bank v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Revenue, 394 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1965).
KRS § 136.280(2) (1942) was amended, Ky. Acts 1966, cl. 159, § 2, so the
deduction is no longer allowed.
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An important tax decision during the 1965-66 term was Thomas v.
Elizabethtown,40 where the definition of ad valorem tax was expanded
to include the use tax.4 1 Concluding that a use tax, leveled at three per-
cent of ninety percent of an automobile's purchase price, was an
ad valorem property tax rather than an excise tax, the Court held that
an automobile, purchased by a city and considered property used for
a public purpose, was exempt from the use tax.42
Other jurisdictions have generally held that use taxes are excise and
not property taxes,43 although dicta to the contrary is occasionally
found in some decisions.44 The Court in Thomas held that the use tax
is not excised from or by reason of a transaction (as is the sales tax)4 3
but is a tax on the use and enjoyment of property.46 One court has
indicated that a use tax may be a property tax when laid upon con-
sumables such as gasoline, toilet goods, gun powder, dynamite,
solvents, chemicals, and lubricants used in mining and manufacturing
in which the only material use of the item is its consumption; but
that court says nothing concerning the nature of the use tax when laid
on durables such as automobiles. 47 The tax on the use or enjoyment
of property certainly affects the property, but a tax which affects
property is not necessarily a property tax.48 "The owner of an auto-
mobile in Virginia pays a tax for the privilege of operating his car. In
a sense this tax affects the car, but it is universally conceded that this
is a license or privilege tax and not a tax on the property concerned,
to wit, the automobile."49
40403 S.V.2d 269 (1966).
41 The term "use tax" is used in the opinion. KRS § 138.460 (1942), which
imposes the Motor Vehicle Usage Tax, is cited. KRS § 139.320 (1960), which
imposes the use tax, is not cited. In this discussion the term "use tax" will refer
to the tax imposed by IS § 138.460 (1942).42 City of Louisville v. Cromwell, 233 Ky. 828, 27 S.W.2d 377 (1930) is
cited for the proposition that exemption from taxation is a matter of grace granted
either by constitutional or statutory provisions and that the exemption granted by
Ky. CoNST. § 170 to property used for a public purpose refers only to ad valorem
taxation.43 Phoenix v. State, 53 Ariz. 28, 85 P.2d 56 (1938); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295. 57 A.2d 128 (1948); Whitehead & Kales Co.
v. Green, 133 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Lane Const. Corp.
v. Comptroller of Treasury, 228 Md. 90, 178 A.2d 904 (1962); State ex rel.
Transp. Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Bates, 359 Mo. 1002, 224 S.W.2d 996 (1949);
Watson Indus. v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 203, 69 S.E.2d 505 (1952); Broadacre Dairies
v. Evans, 193 Tenn. 441, 246 S.W.2d 78 (1952); Cordon v. State, 166 Tex. Ct.
Crim. App. 24, 310 S.W.2d 328 (1956); Ralph Child Const. Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 53, 862 P.2d 422 (1961).
44 47 Am. Jur. Sales & Use Taxes § 42 (1943).
45 KRS §§ 139.200-.300 (1960).
46 403 S.V.2d at 272.
47 Mann v. McCarroll, 198 Ark. 628, 130 S.W.2d 721, 724 (1944) (dictum).4 M-Elligot v. Kissam, 275 Fed. 545 (2d Cir. 1921); Hunton v. Com-
monwealth, 166 Va. 229, 183 S.E. 873 (1936).49 Hunton v. Commonwealth, supra note 48, at 879.
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In 1961 the Court held in George v. Scent5" that "It [the use tax51]
is an excise and not a property tax or fee for regulation."52 This
opinion described the use tax as a complement to the sales tax, de-
signed to form a comprehensive tax system applicable to motor
vehicles. 53 The result of Scent is that a man who has purchased an
automobile and paid sales tax in a state which has reciprocity with
Kentucky for payment of such a levy is not required to pay the Ken-
tucky use tax upon registration of the automobile in Kentucky, on the
theory that to do so would be a kind of double taxation. If Thomas
does not overrule George v. Scent5 4 (which was not cited in the
Thomas opinion), a strange result follows: cities are exempt from the
use tax because it is a property tax, and the out-of-state buyer is
exempt because it is an excise tax.
If the Court truly intended that all use taxes are to be regarded as
property taxes, it neglected important distinctions between the two.
"A property tax is ordinarily measured by the amount of property
owned by the taxpayer on a given day, and not on the total amount
owned by him during the year. It is ordinarily assessed at stated
periods determined in advance, and collected at appointed times, and
its payment is usually enforced by sale of the property taxed and,
occasionally, by imprisonment of the person assessed."55 The use tax
differs from the ordinary property tax in that the use tax is not
assessed on a given day, but whenever the property is acquired during
the year. It is not assessed periodically, but only once; and it is not
enforced by a sale of the property, but by non-issuance of license tags
by the clerk until the tax is paid.5 6
Furthermore, when the use tax and the ordinary ad valorem pro-
perty tax are levied concurrently on an automobile in the year of its
purchase, an unconstitutional classification of automobiles may be
created. The imposition of both taxes in the year of an automobile
purchase results in a greater total rate of tax than is levied on a
similar automobile which was not purchased that year. One juris-
diction has held unconstitutional a use tax which is in fact an ad
50346 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1961).
51 See note 40 supra.
52 346 S.W.2d at 788.
53 Ibid.54 The Court in Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Revenue,
256 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Ky. 1953) stated: "it is well to keep in mind the rule that
an opinion [of the Court] will not be construed as overruling all former precedents
and establishing a principle never before recognized unless expressed in plain and
explicit terms."
5551 Am. Ju-i. Taxation § 29 (1944).
5GKRS § 138.460(3) (1942).
[Vol. 55,
COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW
valorem property tax imposed upon a class of automobiles.5 7 The levy
of only the use tax, as an ad valorem tax, may also be unconsti-
tutional, since the use tax rate exceeds the ordinary ad valorem tax
rate by which cars of similar value are taxed.
The Court of Appeals decided a few other cases of minor import
during the past term. In Boggs v. Reep 5s the creation of a special
taxing district for the establishment of a local library was held
constitutional. Because a county collecting a library tax59 does so as
agent for the library district, the library tax may increase the total
tax collected by the county beyond the constitutional maximum. The
Court went on to say, "We have previously observed that districts for
specific purposes may be created without the consent of the residents
affected."60 The cases6' cited as authority for the principle-both over-
ruled on another point-dealt with districts which collect fees rather
than taxes; but there is apparently no distinction between fees and
taxes for this purpose.
Turning to the question of the classification of property for pur-
poses oft taxation, the Court required in Burge v. Marcum62 that the
classification be related to some permitted end of government. Be-
cause there was no such relationship in Burge, a transfer tax on all
shares of stock in Kentucky corporations belonging to United States
citizens domiciled in a foreign country fails to be a permissable
classification under section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution. The
defense of the classification was based on the theory that citizens of
other states in the union are subject to taxes on capital stock in the
home State, foreign domiciled citizens are not taxed for similar stock
by the foreign country. The tax burden is thus equalized, and double
taxation is avoided. The Court disposed of this argument by saying
that no authority for non-taxation by a foreign country was found and
that the possibility of double taxation exists whether one lives in
another state or in a foreign country.
An occupational tax was distinguished from an income tax in
57 Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74 P.2d 47; Annot., 114 A.L.R. 838(1937). Aiz. CoNsT. art. 9, § 1 is similar to Ky. CONST. § 171 in regard to
classification of property.
58 404 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1966).
59 KRS §§ 173.715-720 (1964).
GO Boggs v. Reep, 404 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. 1966).
61 Farley v. Beaver-Elkhorn Water Dist., 257 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1953); Rash
v. Louisville & Jefferson County Met. Sever Dist., 309 Ky. 442, 217 S.W.2d 232(1949).
62 394 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965); The test to be applied to classifications is,
first, to determine the purpose of the act creating the classification and, second, to
determine whether the classification can reasonably be said to be related to that
purpose. Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S.W.2d 516 (1939).
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Batten v. Hambley.63 The occupational tax in question was levied by
a fourth class city's ordinance, which required employers to withhold
the tax from wages, to declare anticipated receipts, and to pay in
advance the estimated tax due. The Court held that the occupational
tax was not an income tax and could be levied by a city. It further
held that it was unnecessary for the ordinance creating the tax to
spell out in minute detail the administrative procedures for its
enforcement.
63 400 S.W.2d 683 (1966).
XIX. TORTS
A. Negligence: Standard of Conduct
1. In General (Automobiles Excepted).-This term's landlord deci-
sions seemingly go no further than affirming previously articulated
principles. Landlords and store owners have a duty to use ordinary
care to maintain stairsteps in a reasonably safe condition on behalf of
business invitees. A jury can properly find that duty was violated if
the only stairwell light source is placed so that a descending tenant's
shadow obscured the steps in an apartment building.' But negligent
maintenance of stairs must in fact be proved; a mere showing of
invitee's injury on the premises is not sufficient to take the case to a
jury.2 Landowners, or the persons legally in control of the property,
need not furnish notice to social or business invitees of dangers which
should be observed in the exercise of ordinary care, such as an upside-
down bathmat in a shower stall,3 or a terrazzo sidewalk, which became
more slippery than concrete when wet but had been in (apparently)
accident-free service for twenty-five years.4
The terrazzo case was Weathers v. Morris's Estate.5 Affirming a
directed verdict for the defendant storekeeper, the Court noted that
twenty-five years of pedestrian traffic, including perhaps the plaintiff,
had passed over the sidewalk. Therefore it was evident pedestrian
plaintiff should have known of the danger presented. Plaintiffs leather
sole and heel footgear was a persuasive factor in the decision. The
Court indicated that wearing leather shoebottoms in the rain charged
the plaintiff with a higher degree of care for his own safety. Finally,
even though the terrazzo was graded at a degree greater than the
maximum prescribed in city building regulations, the plaintiff would
have had to show that the grade actually created a dangerous condi-
tion, over and above the violation, before a jury issue was presented.
The opinion presents several problems. Evidence of previous safe
passages over the terrazo is relevant as to whether not only the
pedestrian but also the storekeeper had notice of the dangerous
condition.6 The Court should have stated explicitly whether the
twenty-five years' history of the sidewalk had seen similar accidents,
rather than leave it to inference, in order to determine which party
was supported by the evidence of previous passage. Where wet ter-
razzo is obviously dangerous, other states have placed a duty on
1 Urban v. Walker, 403 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1966).
2 Hannin v. Driver, 394 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1965).
3 Keown v. Keown, 394 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1965).4 Weathers v. Morris' Estate, 397 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1965).
GIbid.
'Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31 ,232 P.2d 210 (1951).
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storekeepers to provide safety devices.7 There are no cases from any
states which hold contributorily negligent a person who slips and
falls on a dangerous sidewalk because of the type of shoes he was
wearing.8
The major weakness of the opinion is the Court's treatment of the
building regulation. A definite decision should have been made whe-
ther the regulation applied to the defendant,9 and whether his was the
type of accident the regulation was designed to prevent.10 If so, then
the modem Kentucky rule is that the defendant's violation was
negligence per se.11 The Court's apparent reasoning was that de-
7 E.g., Ibid. There the storekeeper's duty to provide at least some form of
safety mat was based on a neighborhood custom of doing so.8 Based on research through the entire American Digest system, scanning for
cases involving wearing materials in general. Apparently there are no cases which
base the contributory negligence of a falling pedestrian on any wearing apparel.
Tne standard case in the area simply decides whether the conditions on the side-
walk which caused the fall were such as to give the pedestrian notice of the
slipperiness. E.g., Hansen v. Ware's. Inc., 324 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
Weghtman v. Bettilyous, Inc., 390 P.2d 120 (1964). The case closest to
Weathers is Green v. Acosta, 173 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1965), where plaintiff
was contributorily negligent because he hurried across sidewalk known to be
slick.
9 All evidence that such a regulation eisted was presented in the oral
testimony of a civil engineer, who further testified that he could not determine
whether the regulations had been in effect at the time the sidewalk was built.
The Court simply let the matter stand at that point, although the opinion continues
to speak of the regulation as if it were in force.10 Proxamnate cause is established upon a showing that the accident was of
the class the statute or ordinance was desigued to prevent. Greyhound Terminal
of Louisville v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44. 209 S.W.2d 478 (1947). It seems there
could be no other purpose for an ordinance limiting the slope of terrazzo side-
walks than to limit falls when the material is wet.
11 The original rule concerning violation of a city ordinance in Kentucky was
that it had no bearing whatsoever on the defendants negligence. The princiole
originated with Dolfinger v. Fishback, 15 Ky. (12 Bush) 474 (1876). In that
case an ordinance of the city of Louisville forbade a driver of a team to be
more than ten feet away while on a public street. Defendant driver violated the
ordinance by leaving his team to make a delivery to a house, and his unattended
team crashed into a wagon passing by. The Court held it was error for the
ordinance even to have been read into evidence. The Court reasoned:
The general council of the city has no general power of legislation. It
no doubt had the power to pass the ordinance and to enforce it as a mere
police regulation, but further than that it had no power. It may be
dangerous for a driver to leave his team upon the street, and the city
council no doubt had the authority to prohibit such an act; but the
simple fact that they did prohibit it does not prove or even tend to prove
th-t the appellant's driver was guilty of such negligence as renders them
liable for an injury resulting from their team having been left standing
upon the streets in violation of the ordinance. Id. at 480-81.
This rule was strongly affirmed in Louisville & N.R.R. v. Dalton, 102 Ky. 290(1897) and Ford's Adm'r v. Paducah City Ry., 124 Kv. 488, 99 S.W. 355 (1907).
Then the Court of Appeals began to punch holes in the coverage of the
doctrine. Violation of citv ordinances were held negligence per se when the
ordinances were in accordance with a provision of the Kentucky Constitution.
Mullins v. Nordlow. 170 Ky. 169. 185 S.W. 825 (1916).
Finally in Pryor's Adm'r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602, 105 S.W.2d 564 (1937), the
(Continued on next page)
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fendant should not be liable for his violation because the plaintiff had
notice of it. Of course, once a defendant's negligence has been
established, it is possible that the facts will demonstrate that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law or that the
defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of injury, thus
absolving the defendant of liability. But this was not the Court's con-
clusion; rather, it decided that "the evidence was not sufficient to
authorize a finding of negligence on the part of the defendants...."12
This case should have been remanded for a determination of whether
the regulation applied to the defendant and, if so, consideration of
the question of contributory negligence. When contributory negligence
was pleaded as a defense against statutory violation, Kentucky cases
decided in both the '64265 and '65-'66 terms held that a jury question
was presented.'3
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Court broke with the old rule and held a violation of ordinance regulating
traffic in Louisville to be negligence per se. The Court stated: "Statutes and
ordinances defining duties and regulating traffic are regarded as declaratory of the
common law and supplementary thereto . . . a violation of the terms of a statute
or ordinance is in this jurisdiction held to be negligence per se." Id. at 606, 105
SAV.2d at 566.
Very closely in point with the case at bar was Greyhound Terminal of
Louisville v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W.2d 478 (1947). A Louisville
ordinance provided: ". . . All stairs shall have walls or well secured balustrades
or guards on both sides, and except in dwellings shall have hand rails on both
sides .. ." Id. at 45, 209 S.W.2d at 479. The plaintiff slipped and fell on stairs
in defendant's building which lacked handrails. The Court stated that "if the
injury complained of is one which was intended to be prevented by the Statute
and Ordinance, supra, the violation of their provision must be concidered as the
proximate cause of the injury." Id. at 45, 209 S.W.2d at 479. It continued,
reasoning that since the fall on the stairs was undoubtedly the type of accident
intended to be prevented by the statute and the plaintiff testified to such facts
that the jury could have concluded she would not have fallen h'd there been
a handrail, the judgment for plaintiff must stand. The Court cearly stated therule of the Greyhound Terminal case which must likexvise apply to Weathers v.
Morris Estate: "The violotion of the terms of an ordinance is negligence per
se.... ." Id. at 45. 209 S.W.2d at 478.
For a fuller discussion of the history of the rule see Stephens, Torts-A Sum-
mat and Critique of the Law of Statutory Negligence in Kentucky, 38 Ky.
L. J. 479 (1950).
-12 Weqthers v. Morris's Estate, 397 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Ky. 1965).
13 In Gregory v. Paducah Midstream Serv., 401 S.W. 2d 40 (Kv. 1966), the
trial court had directed a verdict for a tugboat operator whose craft had rammed
deceased's small fishing boat on Kentucky Lake. The Court of Appeals reversed,
primarily because defendant had violated a statute requiring a lookout on vessels
operating in navigable streams: such a lookout would have seen deceased's boat,
especially in populous waters. Eldridge v. Pike, 396 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1966), was
a case in which the parties met in a head-on collision on a narrow bridge. The
Court held that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence turned on
which machine was on the br~dge first, and when the evidence was conflictine the
cs; was properly submitted to the iurv. In Bruce v. Alley, 391 S.W.2d 678 (Ky.
1965). a case handed down in the 1964-1965 term, the Court reversed a directed
verdirt for the the defendant installer of a gas furnace because of a showing by
plaintiff, who had been injured by carbon monoxide fumes produced by allegedly
(Continued on next page)
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In Mackay v. Allen' 4 the plaintiff entered one of two identical doors
beneath a marquee advertising a medical clinic and dropped into a
basement. The clinic doctors and the co-tenant drug store were held
to be negligent as a matter of law in failing to provide notice, make
the basement entrance safe, or lock it. The landlord was not liable be-
cause he had turned over his keys and possession of the building to
the cotenants. A delivery company whose employees had left the
basement door unlocked was also absolved of liability because they
had never been instructed to close it: "An ordinary workman employed
on a delivery truck can hardly be expected to exercise a great deal of
independent judgment beyond what he is told to do."15
Dictum in the opinion indicated that the landlord's retention of
control over portions of an area leased to two or more common use
tenants renders him responsible for the condition of his part, and he
is presumed to have retained control over parts used in common by the
tenants.16 In this case absolute control by the tenants conclusively
rebutted the presumption.1r Cleanup visits to the basement every two
months were insufficient to render the landlord liable for the condi-
tion of the premises. Under Kentucky law he would not be liable even
if he had received complaints about the danger, or had otherwise
been brought to realize it, and failed to inform the unnoticing
tenants.18
Electric power company employees who arrive at the scene of a
fire and find it already out of control owe no duty to cut off the current
to the burning building (a decision from the 1964- 1965 term)."'
And where a power company has constructed its lines within an ease-
ment and about thirty feet off the ground it will not be liable to the
owner of the property through which the lines pass if the owner
receives electric shock when the far end of a television cable he is
holding is thrown over the power lines by a third person not in the
suit.20
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
improper installation, that defendant's installation technique violated a state
safety regulation.
14 396 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965).15 Id. at 60. By the same tolren the failure of the drugstore tenants to lock
the basement door was foreseeable by the members of the clinic and hence was not
such an intervening cause or negligence as to neutralize their primary negligence.16 Id. at 59. Apparently the rule has never been so explicitly stated in Ken-
tucky before; the Court cited Primus v. Bellevue Apts., 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d
347 (1950); 32 Am. JuR. Landlord and Tenant § 688 (1941).
17 396 S.W.2d at 59.18 Landlord's failure to notify the tenant after receipt of rentals of know-
ledge of ore-existing defects might be unneighborly but is not such as to render
him legqlly liable. Holzhauer v. Sheeny, 127 Ky. 28, 104 S.W. 1034 (1907).
19 Kentucky Util. Co. v. Terry, 392 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1965).20 Mullins v. Kentucky Power Co., 396 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1965).
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On a job where conditions are constantly changing as work pro-
gresses, such as construction of a barn, an employer is not liable to his
employee for injuries caused by hazardous and unsafe conditions of
which the employer is unaware.
21
In Williams v. Ehman2s the defendant, whose auto had run off a
tvo-lane highway and wrecked, injuring him, made his way to the
edge of the road just below the crest of a hill and waved his arms at
passing traffic to attract help. One car slowed in response and the
auto in which plaintiff was riding crashed into its rear. The Court said
the defendant was injured, dazed, and in an emergency situation; it
concluded, "we cannot say that he had a duty to not stand there; nor
can we say that he was under a duty to refrain from attempting to
obtain assistance by waving his arms and calling out for help."
23
Pemberton v. Commonwealth, Department of Mental Health24 is
the first action of its type to be reported in Kentucky. A state mental
patient escaped from the institution, stole a car, and negligently col-
lided with plaintiff's car. The suit was brought in the Board of Claims
for negligent failure to keep the escapee in maximum security. Certain
privileges given the escapee had led to his opportunity to flee. The
Court decided that the defendants could not be held liable for a
"mistake in judgment."2 5 The Court noted the importance of granting
privileges as an element of therapy, then reviewed the institutional
record of the escapee and concluded the doctors could reasonably have
decided the escapee deserved the privileges granted.
Curing mental patients is as much art as science; it is difficult to
protest the standard of good faith judgment established in the case.
Yet it is highly important that the case was decided on the question of
standard of care because the doctrine of sovereign immunity has pre-
vented most cases of this nature from ever going to trial.26 Two
Louisiana cases held for the state by relying primarily on the lack of
proximate cause between the institution's negligence and the ultimate
injury.27 Pemberton raises two questions which must remain un-
answered for the present. The escapee had been classified by hospital
21 Mitchell v. Franklin, 398 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1966). The Court also found
that a servant who pried his support boards out from under him was contributorily
negligent in producing his own fall.
22 394 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1965).
23 Id at 907.
24 398 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1966).
25 Id. at 490.
26 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 23 (1951).2 7Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La. 1956); Green v. State, 91 So. 2d 153
(La. 1956). In Green the court held that the state was not liable for injury to
persons hit by an escaped inmate in a stolen car because of the remoteness of
the causal connection between the breach of duty by the state employee and the
injury to the plaintiff.
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officials as a violent type who belonged in a penitentiary. In future
cases should officials be held liable for negligent failure to secure a
transfer of the patient?28 And since the Pemberton suit was brought
under the Board of Claims Statutes, 29 will the Court allow a similar
action against a private institution? 0
In one other case the Court held that the jury could properly
find a driver of complex farm machinery liable to a stranger riding on
the machine on the ground that the driver was negligent in failing to
warn of his inexperience at the task.31
2. Automobile Drivers.-One of the many situations in which the
hypothetical reasonable man is expected to anticipate and guard
against the conduct of others is that where a small child suddenly
darts into the street in front of his car. If the child is in a position
near the street where a motorist in the exercise of ordinary care
should see him, the motorist must anticipate that the child may sud-
denly dart into the street. In Thomas v. Gates32 the court applied
this principle, known as the "small child doctrine." While there was
conflicting evidence as to which side of the street the child darted
from and as to whether the child came from a concealed position, in
the court's opinion the preponderance of the evidence indicated the
child was in a position where she should have been seen. Of course,
this case is not the first application of the "small child doctrine" in
Kentucky,33 nor is it uncommon in other jurisdictions.34 It joins other
Kentucky precedents 3  in saying that if a child is concealed and the
place of concealment is such a distance from the path of the vehicle
28 Research reveals no authority which indicates an answer to this question.
Yet no reason is evident why this would not be actionable negligence.
29 KRS § 44.070(1) (1946) provides: "A Board of Claims... is created and
vested with full power and authority to investigate, hear proof, and to compensate
persons for damages sustained to either person or property as a proximate result
of negligence on the part of the Commonwealth, any of its departments... '
30 Kentucky has no cases which would serve as precedent to answer this
question. Two reasons exist for believing action against a private institution
would be permitted. (1) The principles in Pemberton are easily extended to
private as well as public institutions, and (2) private institutions have an additional
area of judgment-admittance-beyond that of public hospitals, which must
accept anyone committed by the courts, whether there is room or not.
31Hurst v. Sanders, 899 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1966).
32 899 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1966).
33Potts v. Krey, 862 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1962); Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky.
855, 89 S.W.2d 513 (1981).
34 Greene v. Willey, 86 A.2d 82 (Me. 1952); Crowe v. Havens, 277 App.
Div. 812, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 760 (1950); Pavone v. Merion, 242 N.C. 594, 89 S.E.2d
108 (1955); Green v. Mitchell County Bd. of Educ., 287 N.C. 886, 75 S.E.2d 129(1958); Doyen v. Lamb. 49 N.W.2d 882 (S.D. 1951); Read v. Daniel, 197 Va.
858, 91 S.E.2d 400 (1956).35Benton v. Parks Adm'r, 272 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1954); Dixon v. Stringer,
277 Ky. 847, 126 S.W.2d 448 (1989).
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that the child should be noticed before he reaches the street, the
motorist is under a duty to see and avoid him.
Dean Prosser recognizes the "small child doctrine" and the policy
upon which it stands. He says the motorist's duty,
becomes most obvious when the actor has reason to know that he is
dealing with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that
they will do unreasonable things. Therefore, when children are playing in
the vicinity much is necessarily to be expected o fthem which would not
be looked for on the part of an adult. It must be anticipated that a child
will dash into the street in the path of a car.3 6
Although most agree with Dean Prosser on the soundness of
protecting children in residential areas, the Court over-extended the
small child doctrine in Modern Bakery v. Brashear.37 The Court took
a doctrine, which has ordinarily been used where children were in or
near the street in residential, low-speed zones, and applied it to a
motorist who saw a child walking parallel to a rural, high-speed
highway. While the burden of stopping or slowing in a residential
area when a child appears at the side of the street is not unreasonable,
this burden is much greater if a driver must stop or slow to a snail's
pace every time he sees a child treading a well-beaten path parallel to
an out-of-town highway. In Brashear the Court said the same rule
applies in the country as well as in town, but it said nothing about
the seriousness of placing such a burden on the highway motorist.
Either the court possessed no insight into the problem, or it neglected
to express its rationale for imposing the same standard of care in both
rural and residential settings. If the latter, perhaps the underlyLig
policy of the "small child doctrine" was regarded to be protection of
children in all traffic situations. However, it bears repeating that
Prosser mentions "children" who are "playing." 8 In Brashear the boy
was alone, walking a well-beaten path along the side of the road
opposite the driver. At any rate, the "small child doctrine" now rides
with us on the open highway.
While the defense of "sudden appearance" is often raised by the
driver in small child cases, the court this year in Brown v. Wilson 9
said such defense presupposes the defendant's exercise of ordinary
care. Thus, Kentucky would now hold the driver of an automobile to
the duty of keeping a lookout for children on the road and sidewalks.
He must use ordinary care to avoid injuring anyone and to discover
36 PRossEn, ToRTs 175 (3d ed. 1964).
27405 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1966).
38 PnossER, TORTS 175 (3d ed. 1964).
29401 S.V.2d 77 (Ky. 1966); See also Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347, 126
S.W.2d 448 (1939).
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that someone is in a dangerous position. If, after all this, a child still
gets in the way of the car, then the motorist is entitled to the sud-
den appearance defense.
Another possible defense was provided the motorist by Williamson
v. Garland,40 where an eleven-year-old child was struck by a car. If a
child appears to be in the "darting age group," but is in fact older and
is found by the jury not to have exercised the care of an ordinary
prudent child of his age and experience, then recovery should be
denied due to contributory negligence.
Mackey v. Spradlin41 presented the novel question of the duty of
care owed child customers by a mobile ice cream vendor. The Court
reached a sound and logical result by drawing an analogy to, but not
actually applying, the "attractive nuisance"42 doctrine and imposing
a duty to warn children of approaching traffic. It said further:
In this particular type of situation the danger is enhanced by the sense
of haste that is purposely aroused in the children of a neighborhood bythe tinkling of bells and flashing of lights heralding the imminent ar-
rival of an attraction that will stay but a moment and be gone unlessthey come at once. The responsibility of one who knowingly provokesinto action the natural recklessness of irresponsible children ought surelybe proportionate to the degree of danger he thereby creates.43
This case also made use of the "small child doctrine" in saying that
the propensity of young children to dart or run into the street must
be anticipated. It held that a dump truck driver proceeding along a
street on which was parked an ice cream wagon attended by young
children should have anticipated that some child momentarily hidden
from view by the ice cream wagon might suddenly emerge from be-hind it, and that it was the driver's duty to stop or to proceed so
40402 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1966); For a fuller discussion of this case see text at
notes 71-77 infra.41397 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1965).
42 Kentucky accepts the Restatement version of attractive nuisance. FoursearnCoal Corp. v. Greer, 282 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1955). This version says:A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young childrentrespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he
maintains upon the land, if:(A) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon whichthe possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to
trespass, and(B) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know
and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable
rsk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and(C) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition orrealize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming withinthe area made dangerous by it, and(D) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight
as compared to the risk to young children involved therein.43 397 S.W.2d at 37 (Ky. 1965).
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carefully as to minimize the chance of hitting children. The Court
sanctioned a finding of concurrent negligence, making both driver and
ice cream vendor liable.
This was a 4 to 3 decision. The dissent felt that the speed of the
truck was not shown to be unreasonable and that to find liability
would be to make ice cream vendors insurers of the safety of children.
It criticized the majority for applying attractive nuisance principles
when, admittedly, this was not an attractive nuisance case.
Last year saw a number of cases concerning the standard of care
in various traffic situations. For instance, a motorist who drove onto
a through highway after failing to come to a full and complete stop at
a stop sign, when a second motorist was approaching so closely as to
consititute an immediate hazard, was held negligent as a matter of
law.44 In another case45 the Court said violation of a statutory duty
is negligence per se, but does not bar recovery unless the violation was
the proxmate cause of the injury. Here the Court found sufficient
evidence to prove that the failure of the appellant to have a turn
signal was the proximate cause of the accident and therefore the
appellee's violation of his statutory duty in failing to sound his
horn when passing was not contributory negligence.
Brockie v. Shadwick" answered a question of great confusion
among the motoring public when it held lawful a motorist's entry into
an intersection under a yellow light. It said the yellow light merely
warns the motorist that a red signal is imminent and that he must be
prepared to stop. While the court tried to distinguish Bryan v. Battoe47
on the facts, Shadwick in effect overrules that decision, which made it
the motorist's duty to refrain from entering intersections on a red or
yellow light. The American Law Reports48 cites Bryan v. Battoe49 as
indicative of the general view that a motorist approaching an inter-
section with the green light in his favor must bring his vehicle to a
stop, upon appearance of the yellow light unless he is too near the
intersection to be able to stop safely. It is difficult, however, to ascer-
tain if this is still the general view, because the courts of other
jurisdictions have taken widely divergent positions on the question of
duty to stop when the light is yellow.50 In Tilford v. Garth,51 the
44 Riggs v. Miller, 896 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1965).4 5 Jewell v. Oglesby, 402 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1966).
46396 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1965).
47209 Ky. 47, 160 S.W.2d 369 (1942).48 Anno., 164 A.L.R. 8, 49 (1946).
49 290 Ky. 47, 160 S.W.2d 869 (1942).
GO Annot., 164 A.L.R. 8 (1946).
51405 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1966).
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the Shadwick52 case was cited for the proposition that the yellow
light is nothing more than a warning that the signal is about to change,
but Tilford added "unless there is a statute or ordinance to the con-
trary."53 The ordinance in question belonged to the City of Louisville,
and provides: "yellow alone or 'caution' when shown following the
green or 'go' signal: Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop be-
fore entering the nearest crosswalk at the intersection." 4 While the
Court of Appeals felt the ordinance should be amended for purposes
of uniformity, it was unwilling to say the ordinance was so unreason-
able as to be void. One interesting suggestion on the yellow light prob-
lem is the new "countdown" traffic light that has been tested in
Abilene, Texas. Twelve seconds before the light is due to change, the
amber light blinks a countdown from nine to one in numerals that are
visible for 200 feet. It then glows steadily amber for three more
seconds before turning red. Over an eight-month period it resulted in
a 44% cut in traffic accidents at a busy intersection.55
A Kentucky statute 6 concerning proper following distance was
applied in Propane Transp. Co. v. Edelen.57 There an empty tank-
trailer, going up a hill on a wet country highway, was held to be
following too close to the vehicle ahead when it observed a following-
distance of only forty feet.
In a number of other decisions the Court dealt summarily with
cases which reaffirmed existing precedents. Where a motorist who
skidded off the road had notice of the hazard of mud and water on
the highway, she could not claim that the negligence of the highway
department caused the accident 58 as a matter of law. Another case"9
found a driver deservedly guilty of negligence when he got into his
parked car with the windows fogged up, backed up 35 to 40 feet, and
hit plaintiff's parked automobile. In two cases, 60 the Court upheld
52 396 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1965).
53405 S.W.2d at 8 (Ky. 1966).54 LomusvirL Ky., ORDiNAN cE § 323.01(b).55 Time, Oct. 21, 1966, p. 80.
56 KRS § 189.340(6) (a) (1942) provides: "The operator of a motor vehicle
shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent,
having regard for the speed of the vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of
the highway."
57400 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966).58 Brown v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 397 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1965).
59 Lee v. Dutli, 403 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1966).60 Metcalfe v. Hopper, 400 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1966) (where one driver may
have pulled out of a secondary road onto a highway without yielding the right of
way to another driver who may have been traveling at an excessive rate of speed,
the jury could prooerly find concurrent negligence); Crabtree v. Guthrie, 405
S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1966) (where evidence was conflicting as to whether a truck
driver gave the required signal of his intention to turn, and as to whether an
(Continued on next page)
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jury verdicts which found both parties concurrently negligent. Another
opinion0' said a vehicle coming up behind a left-turning car may not
proceed as if the left-turn and the passing process will be precisely
synchronized. The court also reiterated existing precedents as to
jury instructions in two cases.62
S. Governmental Liability.-Shearer v. Hall63 presented an im-
portant question concerning the personal liability of public officials
for damages resulting from negligent omission to perform their
duties. Plaintiff sued the members of the fiscal courts of Shelby and
Oldham counties, which were jointly responsible for maintaining a
bridge which collapsed under the plaintiff. He alleged (1) that the
fiscal courts' members knew or, by exercise of ordinary care, should
have known of the dangerous condition of the bridge and should have
warned the public, and (2) that it was their duty to repair and
maintain the bridge for the public's safety but they willfully and
wantonly failed to do so. The Court of Appeals held it was error for
the circuit court to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The
underlying problem was interpretation of a statute 4 providing that
the fiscal court "may" erect, keep in repair, and superintend bridges
and other structures, and provide for the good condition of high-
ways in the county. While the majority opinion saw the duty as
ministerial, the dissent believed it was discretionary. It is commonly
held that if the duty is ministerial the officals may be liable.65 The
crux of the problem is deciding how to classify the duty. The majority
opinion noted some early Kentucky cases 66 ruling that the duty of
maintaining roads under this statute is discretionary rather than
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
automobile driver sounded her horn before attempting to pass and as to her keep-
ing a proper lookout, the jury could logically decide that both parties were
negligent).
61 Townsend v. Stamper. 398 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1966).
62 Miller v. Quaife, 391 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1965) (an instruction which set
forth general duties applicable to drivers, including the duty to operate their
automobiles to the right of the center line, was not objectionable); Pritchett v.
Herber 398 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1966) (an eastbound motorist whose automoblwas struck by a southbound vehicle as it entered a through street, on which the
south-bound vehicle was traveling, preparatory to making a left turn in order to
travel 40 feet northward along a dog-leg turn and to there turn right on the street
was improperly refused an instruction on right-of-way at an intersection).
03.399 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1966).
64 KRS § 67.080 (1942).
0543 Am. JuR. Public Officers § 279 (1942); 25 Aar. Ju. Highways § 603
(1940); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 125 (1950).
GG Hardwick v. Franklin, 120 Ky. 78, 85 S.W. 709 (1905); Sinkhorn v.
Lexington, H. & P. Turnpike Roqd Co., 112 Ky. 205, 65 S.W. 356 (1901);
Wheatly v. Mercer, 72 Ky. 704 (1873).
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ministerial, but said that a later case67 clarified the meaning of
ministerial. It said discretion in the manner of performance of an act
arises when the act can be performed lawfully in more than one way
and the performer has discretion to decide the manner of performance;
however, an act is not necessarily taken out of the class styled "mini-
sterial" because the officer performing it is vested with a discretion
respecting the method to be employed. Although not cited by the
Court, other Kentucky cases68 recognize that, while "may" usually
denotes discretion, it can be construed as mandatory. The Court did
cite dicta from a 1902 case which said:
We are of the opinion that under the statutes above quoted the duty
of keeping the public highways of a county in repair is primarily imposed
upon the members of the fiscal court.... . The responsibility, if any, for
a willful failure to discharge this duty, would rest upon the members
individually and not on the county.69
The Court, in finding that a cause of action was stated, may have
been influenced by a realization that the county' legal status is dif-
ficult to define. A 1959 case70 held that no recovery for the negligence
or misconduct of county officers could be had against the county, since
it is an arm of the state. According to this decision, claimants must
seek redress from the individuals. The strongest argument against
this rule is that capable men will not serve as county officials if they
know they will be personally liable for negligent misfeasance or non-
feasance. But while this places county officials in a position where
they must risk their individual wealth, it should cause them to be
more alert to the responsibilities of their offices. Perhaps bonding is
the best solution for quieting the fears of public officials and still
allowing recovery to injured claimants.
B. Negligence: Defenses
1. Contributory Negligence.-While the Court reaffirmed a number
of established contributory negligence rules during the recent term, it
also overturned precedent and made it easier to find children con-
67 Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Ky. 1959). An
official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts; that a
necessity may exist for the ascertainment of those facts does not operate to
convert the act into one discretionary in its nature.
68 Hart v. Central City, 289 Ky. 431, 159 S.W.2d 18 (1942); Davidson v.
Board of Educ., 225 Ky. 165, 7 SAV.2d 1056 (1928); Hays Exr'X v. Burns, 216
Ky. 827, 288 S.W. 764 (1926).
69 Commonwealth v. Boyle County Fiscal Court, 113 Ky. 325, 68 S.W. 116,
118 (1902).
70 Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1959).
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tributorily negligent. In Williamson v. Garland,71 the Court expressly
overruled Baker v. Sizemore,72 which held that for a child between
the ages of seven and fourteen there is a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity for contributory negligence. Due to the burden of over-
coming such a presumption, the practical effect of Sizemore had been
to prohibit a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The Garland case 73 did hold the plaintiff, an eleven year old, con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Having abandoned the rebuttable presumption, it was of course in-
cumbent upon the Court to establish a standard of care for this age
group. The Court said:
[W]e consider it appropriate in cases involving such litigants that they
be charged with contributory negligence to the extent that their acts
may be deemed violative of the degree of care usually exercised by
ordinarily prudent children of the same age, intelligence and experience
under like or similar circumstances. 74
Just two months prior to the Garland decision, the Court had been
faced with a similar case, Lareau v. Trader,75 where apparently it was
not prepared to take the step advanced in Garland. But in the earlier
case the Court did uphold the lower court's finding that a child of
thirteen years and eight months had sufficient judgment "as a matter of
law" to be held negligent, possibly with an eye to the impending
change. Regardless of whether Trader or Garland was responsible,
the presumption of incapacity for contributory negligence, which is
the general rule 6 followed by most states,77 has been abandoned in
Kentucky.
The Court handled a number of cases involving acts which the
Court thought were so imprudent as to constitute contributory negli-
71 402 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1966).
72338 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1960).
73402 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1966).
74 402 S.W.2d at 82.
75 403 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1965).
70 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 218 (1966).
77 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Peters, 206 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1953);
Luhman v. Hoover, 100 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1938); McGough Bakeries Corp. v.
Reynolds, 250 Ala. 592, 35 So. 2d 332 (1948); Levin v. Lauterbach Coal & Ice
Co., 329 IM. App. 180, 67 N.E.2d 303 (1946); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Klee, 154 Ind. 430, 56 N.E. 284 (1900); Kallansrud v. Libbey, 234 Iowa 700, 13
N.W.2d 684 (1944); Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1954); Moak
v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845 (1957); State v. Harrington, 260 N.C.
663, 133 S.E.2d 452 (1963); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Matthesen, 171 Okia. 541,
44 P.2d 56 (1935); Braden v. City of Pittsburgh, 143 Pa. Super. 427, 18 A.2d
818 (1941); Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892
(1942); Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 249 S.W.2d 295 (1952); Nelson
v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 P.2d 225 (1940); P. L. Farmer,
Inc. v. Cimino, 185 Va. 965, 41 S.E.2d 1 (1947).
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gence as a matter of law. These cases involved conduct such as
walking across a railroad track without looking,78 crossing the street
between intersections and not in the crosswalk,79 failing to see a power
line which was in plain view,8" continuing to ride in an automobile
with a driver who was known to be intoxicated, 81 and stepping into a
bucket of lye which was in plain sight.82 Such conduct as failure to
maintain a constant lookout by a person whose employment duties
require him to work in the street83 and reliance on railroad crossing
signals without looking when the view is substantially obstructed 4
was held insufficient to to establish contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law. The latter of these two cases, Shewmaker v. Louisville &
N. R.R., 85 modified an earlier case86 which held that a person could not
rely on these signals. The Court, overruling only to the extent of the
inconsistency 87 between the cases, stated: "We do not say that in
every such instance he may rely absolutely on the signals, but we are
of the opinion that whether and to what extent ordinary care would
demand any further or additional lookout on his part is definitely a
question for the jury to decide.""8
The Court upheld findings of contributory negligence by juries
where evidence showed that an eighteen-year-old bicycle rider could
not stop or steer the bicycle which was weaving from one side of the
78 Cincinnati, N. 0. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Wood, 392 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1965)
(a pedestrian, who was killed by a locomotive while walking across a public
crossing on a clear day, who had a clear view for at least 500 feet, but who did
not look toward the area from which the train was approaching, was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law).
79 Clements, Adm'r v. Peyton, 398 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1966).80 Goetz v. Green River Rural Elec. Co-op Corp., 398 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1966)
(failure of a property owner who had been on the premises three times, to there-
after observe power lines before or during climbing of a television tower to install
an antenna which was blown onto the wire with the result that owner fell
constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law). For further analysis see
55 Ky. L. J. 192 (1966).
81 Noble v. Jones, 392 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1965).
82 O.K. Tire Store No. 3, Inc. v. Stovall, 392 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1965) (plain-
tiff who came to a tire store to have an automobile tire checked and who, while
watching a store employee check the tire for a leak, stepped backward into a
five-gallon bucket of cleaner containing lye and received burns was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law).
83 Lobred v. Mann, 395 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965) (a gas and electric company
cable splicer, who was stru-k by an automobile after he emerged from a manhole,
was not contributorily negligent for failure to keep a lookout).84 Shewmaker v. Louisville & N. R.R., 403 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1966).
85 Ibid.
86 Southern Ry. Co. v. Feldhaus, 261 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1953).
87 In Shewmoker there was an obstruction which made it difficult to see,
while in the Southern Railway case the view was clear. In Southern Railway the
Court said the signals could not be relied on, and Shewmaker says that when the
view is sul-,tantially obstructed the driver may rely on the signals.88 403 S.W.2d at 286,
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road to the other and collided with defendant's truck, 9 and where a
defendant's truck was struck from behind while preparing to make a
left turn.90
2. Assumption of Risk.--"In its simplest and primary sense, as-
sumption of risk maans that the plaintiff, in advance, has expressly
given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct
toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk
arising from what the defendant is to do or to leave undone."91 Where
a plaintiff went down the highway to flag oncoming automobiles on
a wet and misty night to help the defendant extract his mired auto-
mobile, the Court held that as a matter of law he assumed the risk
of being struck by an automobile.9 2 In another case,93 for eighteen
months the plaintiff had been opening an elevator door by using a
wire hook and putting his weight against it. The Court upheld a
directed verdict for the defendant but did not decide whether plaintiff
was contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of his fall into
the empty shaft. In barring recovery it said: "There may be debate
whether nomenclature labels appellants conduct as 'contributory
negligence 'or 'assumption of risk, but in either instance the result is
the same."9 4
S. Last Clear Chance.-The "last clear chance doctrine" is actually
a defense to contributory negligence because contributory negligence
will not bar recovery if plaintiff can show that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the accident. In three cases,9 5 the Court
89 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Mason, 393 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1965).
Three boys on one bicycle riding down a steep and tortuous mountain road
collided with a highway truck approaching from below. The plaintiff claimed to
be on the right side and alleged that the truck was straddling the middle of the
road. Testimony of the truck driver and a passenger indicated that the bike
was swerving from side to side and the boys were dragging their feet to try
to stop the bike.
o0 Quackenbush v. Larnker, 398 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1966).
91 PnossER, TORTS 450 (3d ed. 1964).92 Baker v. Willett, 393 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. 1965).9 3 Wimsatt v. J. Bacon & Sons, 401 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1966). The plaintiff
who was employed by a package delivery business and who made re.9ular calls at
the defendant's store to obtain package for delivery to defendant s customers
could not recover for injuries sustained when he fell into the shaft of a converted
elevator in the store. This was because he was either contributorily negligent or
had assured the risk, where for eighteen months he had been opening the elevator
door from the outside by using a wire hook made from an ordinary coat hanger
and by putting his weight against the door.
04 Id. at 582.
O, Rogers v. Burden, 397 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1965) (evidence which indicated
that a collision took place between an automobile traveling west on the north
half of a blacktop highway and a boy on a bicycle coming south from a dirt
road into intersection at a point six inches to one foot from the north edge of the
(Continued on next page)
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decided that the facts did not warrant a last clear chance instruction.
In both, the important factor was lack of time for the defendant to
avoid the accident. In another case96 a lower court's determination
that a railroad had the last clear chance to avoid the accident was
overturned because it was not shown that it could have done any-
thing to avoid it.
C. Proximate Cause
The decision whether a given defendant's action was a proximate
cause of an injurious result answers the question whether the actor
who is assumed to have been a physical cause may be held legally
responsible.97 Proximate cause involves the length to which courts
will go to find liability in a given chain of causation; it concerns the
scope of liability. Since the proximate cause decision determines legal
responsibility rather than physical cause, the question does not en-
ter the case unless defendant's act was in fact one of the physical
causes of the plaintiff's injury. This elementary point was brought
home in a case where the plaintiff employee claimed that a defendant
employer had supplied him with a tractor that had defective steering.
Since the plaintiff failed to prove the steering was actually defective,
the employer's negligence could not have been the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury resulting from a wreck involving the tractor.98 The
plaintiff must produce "evidence of substance which would... tend to
tilt the balance of causation as between an unavoidable accident, a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
blacktop surface did not justify last clear chance instruction). Feistritzer v. Lister,401 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1966) (where a motorist, proceeding south on a two-lane
highway and making a left-hand turn across the northbound lane, had at most
two seconds from the time he commenced the turn to the time of impact, last
clear chance instruction was properly refused). Skees v. Whitaker, 398 S.W.2d
715 (Ky. 1966) (plaintiff opened his car door and it was struck by defendant;
he was entitled to last clear chance instruction since evidence disclosed that the
accident occurred in the twinkling of an eye).96 Cincinnati, N. 0. & Tex. Pac. By. v. Wood, 392 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1965).
The railroad was not liable on a last clear chance theory for the death of a
pedestrian, who was killed by a locomotive while walking across a public crossing
on a clear day, and who had been contributorily negligent in failing to look to-
ward the area from which the train was approaching. There was an absence of
any showing that operators could have done anything to avoid the accident after
the pedestrian's inattentiveness was realized.9 7 PRossEn, ToRTs 282 (3d ed. 1964).98 Klingenfus v. Dunaway, 402 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1966). The Court said, at845:
There were some 'wobbly' marks in the surface of the gravel road,
extending a number of feet back from the point where the tractor came
to rest.... The appellee argues that the wobbly' marks justify an in-
ference thst the tractor went out of control by reason of the claimed
defect in the steering mechanism. We think the marks are no more
indication of a cause of the tractor's going out of control than of a loss
of control from some other cause. (Court's emphasis.)
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defective condition [in the machinery involved in the incident] ... ,
or negligent activity on the part of ... [defendant] ."99 Even if it can
be shown that defendant negligently produced dangerous conditions,
the claimant must show that those conditions, rather than, for example,
his own negligence were actually the cause of his accident.100 The
Court of Appeals noted that to hold the defendants liable in such
cases would make them absolute insurers, which it is unwilling to do.' 10
On the other hand, even if the plaintiff's injury would not have
ocurred but for the defendant's act the defendant will not be liable if
his act was too remote from the ultimate result as traced along the
chain of causation. 10 2 And there will be no liability if the injury 'cannot
be considered a reasonable consequence of the [defendant's] acts."10 3
The Court of Appeals wrestled directly with intervening cause in
two other cases. In Pence v. Sprinkles'04 the defendant, whose car
was parked so as to extend several inches onto a blacktop highway,
was not liable for injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, who was sitting
on the hood of his car parked immediately to the rear of the first car,
when a third car swerved off the road to avoid a pedestrian and
went out of control into the first (defendant's) car. Defendant's car's
extending onto the blacktop was "not the proximate or a contributing
cause of the collision . . . [because] the accident resulted from an
99fHighway Transp. Co. v. Daniel Baker Co., 398 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Ky.
1965). Defendant's employee was filling a reservoir tank from his gasoline truck
when the whole operation was obliterated by an explosion. Numerous equally
credible theories were advanced as the cause of the explosion, only a few of which
indicated negligence. Reversed with dirctions to direct a verdict for defendant.
See also Scott v. Patterson, 400 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1966). In Scott the plaintiff's
decedent was killed in a gas exposion. Two theories of causation were presented:
decedent lighting his cigarette lighter near leaking gas, and some unknown third
party plugging in a defective extension cord in the same vicinity. A jury verdict
for defendant and directed verdict against defendant gas company's cross claim
were affirmed where the evidence introduced tended to support both parties.
100 Williams v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, Inc., 399 S.W.2d 467
(Ky. 1965). Delivery man pouring oil into a receptacle in a room whose floor was
dotted-probably negligently-with ink puddles slipped was injured. However,
he could produce no evidence as to why he slipped other than the fact that there
was ink on his shoe soles..The Court of Appeals stated he could not recover wtih-out showing the defendant's act of leaving the ink puddles actually caused hisfall, rather than perhaps oil splashing from the receptacle as he filled it. Affirmeda directed verdict for defendant.
101 Id. at 469.
102 Williams v. Ehman, 394 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1965).
103Williams v. Ehman, 394 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Ky. 1965). It may be that
the use of this "reasonable consequence" rule would result in much the same
findings of proximate cause as the usual Kentucky test of "forseeability." See
Mackey v. Allen, 396 S.W.2d 55 (1965). But in tort law one must play the
proper linguistic games. The Williams opinion leaves the meaning of "reasonable"
entirely to conjecture. There is indication it is tied up with the "reasonably for-
seeable" test employed in relation to intervening causes. 394 S.W.2d at 907. But
that is a phrase of a different dinlect.
104 394 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1965).
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intervening or superceding cause . . ,105 namely, the loss of control
by the drunken third party, which the Court stated was "unforesee-
able."106 The point is finely drawn: even if the defendant had been
parked so as to constitute a traffic hazard he would have been liable
only for damages suffered in a collision with the car behind him if the
initial accident causing that collision were a direct product of the
traffic hazard. 10 7 A suggested statement of the rule in the case is as
follows: The creator of a traffic hazard is not legally responsible for
accidents which are caused entirely by conditions unrelated to the
hazard, even though the accidents may involve it. 08
Smith v. Akers,10 a case from the 1964-1965 term, presented a
fact pattern wherein the defendant secured a stairway he had built
with a cleat which extended twelve to fifteen inches onto a walkway.
After the structure had been in place nearly three months a state
park employee pulled the board away and later the stairs fell while
plaintiff was attempting to descend. The opinion states that the hazard
defendant created was that pedestrian traffic might collide with the
brace; the risk created by the hazard was not that a manipulation of
the protrusion by a third party would cause injury to the plaintiff who
was on the stairs rather than the walkway.110 While removal of the
hazard was within the risk set up by the defendant, it was not for-
seeable that it would be removed in such a way that another different
dangerous condition would be established."'
The Smith decision contained a questionable inculcation of one of
Professor Prosser's concepts into Kentucky tort law. The problem was
to find a method of determining whether the intervening cause was of
such nature as to absolve the defendant from liability as a proximate
cause. In a paragraph of dicta the Court introduced a new test:
"... [Prosser] states that it is not always accurate to inquire whether
the intervening cause was foreseeable, since liability has been im-
posed despite unforeseeable intervention if the intervention could be
said to be 'normal.' "112 But then the Court proceeded to administer
105 Id. at 947. The Court continued: "Stated somewhat differently, there
would have been no accident but for Root's inability to direct the course of his
[the third] automobile."
106 Ibid. Any collision is rationally foreseeable on a two-lane blacktop road
with cars parked along it. This is an illustration of the fact that proximate cause
means "legal cause" and forseeable means "legally forseeable."
107 Ibid. The Court notes that the third car would have collided with
plaintiff's parked car even if defendant's auto had been absent and that the
third car had had ample room to pass down the road despite defendant's vehicle.
108 Ibid.
109 893 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1965).
110 Id. at 885.
111 Ibid.
112 Id. at 885. Citing PTossmi, TORTS 267 (2d ed. 1955).
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this "normal" test by considering that the park employee had special
training as an engineer and was governed by certain procedural
policies of his employer. 13 The conclusion was that the intervening
cause was not normal because his act was contrary to the behavior
to be expected from his training and was in violation of the employer's
policies.
Unfortunately, the Court has confused the test114 of "normal" with
that of "extraordinary."" 15 Prosser used the "normal" test to refer to
those intervening causes which were the results of an initial negligent
act which could not possibly be foreseeable in the ordinary sense of
the word, but which were held by courts not to relieve the original
negligent actor of liability because they were "foreseeable.""" As the
Court's statement, above, indicates, normal was simply thought to be
a more realistic term to use in inquiring whether the intervening
cause would relieve the original cause of liability.117 Prosser's idea of
the test is whether the intervening acts are "closely and reasonably
associated with the immediate consequences of the defendant's act;
and form a normal part of its aftermath .. ."118 In the Smith context
this ought to translate into whether the pulling loose of the brace by
anyone or by any means was a reasonably associative consequence of
the way defendant set up his structure. But the Court's "normal" test is
whether the pulling loose of the brace by the specific park employee-
engineer involved was a reasonably associated consequence. Limita-
tion to the particular person automatically restricts the scope of
"reasonable consequences," with the result that the "normal" test
yields liability for intervening causes in a narrower spectrum than the
foreseeable test, rather than in a broader number of cases as intended
by Prosser." 9
113 Id. at 885. Evidence in the case shows clearly that state employees were
not, as a matter of state policy, to bother the work of contractors.
114 There is serious doubt as to whether Prosser ever intended the term as a
test. He introduces it and gives his primary discussion of it at NossEa, ToRTs 315
(3d ed. 1964). A reading of that page indicates the term was intended only as
an analvtic device. However, the Court has clearly picked it up as a test.
115 "Normal" does not mean usual or customary, but rather it denotes the
antithesis of abnormal or abnormal or extraordinary. BESTATEMENT (SEcoiN),
ToRTs § 443 comment b (1965).110 F lossan, Tours 315 (3d ed. 1964). Prosser felt many cases had extended
"foreseeable to cover consequences of an original act which in a realistic sense
could not reasonably have been expected by the actor at the time of the act.
""7Cf. REsTATEzMNT (SECOND), TORTS § 443 (1965). "The intervention of a
force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent
conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct hqis been a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about." Normal, meaning "foreseeability plus:" has
replaced foreseeable.118 PaossEa, op. cit. supra note 116, at 315.119 Pnossmu, op. cit. supra note 116, at 311, where Prosser notes that the
(Continued on next page)
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Ultimately the debate between the various names for the tests to
be administered in order to determine defendant's liability for an inter-
vening cause may be, as Prosser suggests, a "pointless quibble."120 At
base the tests are all different methods of determining whether the
intervening cause was within the risk created by the initial negligent
action.121 The broad rule for both the cases just discussed is that in-
tervening causes which are not consequences of the situation (or, not
within the risk) created absolve the defendant from liability. 12 This
indicates the main point: the whole question is how far back along
the chain of causation between the defendant-created initial situation
and the ultimate injury the courts should travel to levy liability. Any
device which enables the courts to make a more realistic analysis is
worth the pain of creation.
D. Strict Liability
Until 1966 the Kentucky consumer who sued for negligent manu-
facture or bottling had to become an expert industrialist overnight in
order to show in minute detail how the defendants were using care-
less production techniques. In the vast majority of cases he found the
Court unsympathetic to his attempts. For example, one plaintiff was
told:
What was shown was that all bottles, after being washed, passed in front
of a strong light at the rate of forty-eight per minute, at which time an
inspector checked them to see if any foreign matter had survived the
washing process. Plaintiff contends that there should have been two
inspections. However, she introducd no evidence to show that such was
the usual procedure in bottling plants, or that two inspections were
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
practical application of the distinction between foreseeable and normal un-
doubtedly has involved a considerable element of hindsight. See 2 HAPa &
JArms, ToR's § 20.5 at 115C (1956). Use of the word "normal" as a test invites
a broad view of what is foreseeable.
120 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 116, at 311: "It is perhaps a pointless quibble
over the meaning of a term to debate whether such normal intervening causes are
to be called 'foreseeable."'
121 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 116, at 809:
On its face, the problem is one of whether the defendant is to be held
liable for an injury to which he has in fact made substantial contribution,
when it is brought about by a later cause of independent origin, for
which he is not responsible. In its essence, however, it becomes again
a question of the extent of the defendant's original obligation.
See, e.g., Rane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 186 (1872); Gilman v. Noyes, 57
N.H. 627 (1876). Both of these leading cases on intervening cause used the
foreseeable approach to determine what was for them the basic question, whether
the intervening cause fell within the defendant's risk.
122 In fact, the Court actually stated in Smith v. Akers, 893 S.W.2d 382, 385
(Ky. 1965): "that 'definite hazard' was not a risk that the stairs would fall-it
was a hazard that some person would trip and fall."
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necessary to guard adequately against foreign matter in the bottles. It
is very doubtful that negligence was shown.'23
In the midst of such a prevailing attitude it was patently meaningless
to require of the bottlers a high degree of care to prevent entrance of
foreign substances. 24 Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing
Co.Y 5 changed all that. In one stroke the requirement of privity be-
tween an ultimate consumer and a remote manufacturer was severed,
so that the consumer could now sue the latter both for negligent
manufacture and breach of implied warranty. And even more stunning,
recovery in such a suit would thenceforth be based on the principle of
strict liability.
The remote manufacturer, also a defendant, had supplied acety-
lene in metal tanks to the ultimate consumer (Dealers) through
jobber (Battery). During normal use in consumer's business the tanks
caught fire and exploded. The only possible explanations were rough
handling by the consumer, extreme heat conditions in the consumer's
building, or defective construction of the tanks. The consumer sued
both the manufacturer and the jobber on alternative theories of
negligence or breach of implied warranty. The Court of Appeals re-
versed a summary judgment for the manufacturer and a jury verdict
for the jobber. The Court noted that suits by an ultimate consumer
against a remote manufacturer in negligence had already been allowed
in Kentucky,12 and that while a previous decision had ruled explicitly
that privity was necessary in a suit based on express warranty,127
Kentucky law in regard to the essentials of a suit based on implied
warranty was confused. The Court concluded it was "unable to per-
ceive a valid basis for requiring privity of contract in a products
liability claim based on a breach of implied warranty and disregarding
privity in such claims based on negligence."128 It then recognized that
privity is not a prerequisite for maintenance of actions for breach of
implied warranty in products liability in Kentucky. 129
Furthermore, recovery in such cases could henceforth be founded
on strict liability. That is, a seller of any product
1
-3 Davis Red Rock Bottling Co. v. Alsip, 287 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ky. 1956).
'
24 Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 38 S.W.2d 701 (1931).
'25 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
r2c The Court cited C.C. Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky.
1956).
12 7 Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907).
128 Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Ky.
1965).
129 Id. at 446.
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in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user... [is liable
for physical harm thereby caused to an ultimate consumer or his
property if] (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold ...al-
though . . . (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the pre-
paration and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller. 130
Also, the consumer is not under any duty to make a "full blown in-
spection" of the product to check for dangerous defects, although his
acceptance of the product with readily apparent flaws might prevent
the warrantor's liability.
13 1
Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 13 2 applied the Dealers Transport
Co. holding to a case involving a plaintiff who sued the bottler of a
soft drink for injuries received when she swallowed a piece of glass
from one of the bottler's products. By doing so the Court relieved the
plaintiff in such cases of his Superman's burden of proving lack of
due care in the bottling process. The quotation which began this
section will echo nevermore. But Kentucky's long line of soft drink
impurity cases133 contains another regrettable element which strict
liability did not dissolve: Plaintiff must still prove that the impurities
could not have been added after the bottles left the defendant's plant.
Only Hercules could vanquish such monsters in his path since:
Human experience has forced us to the conclusion that the presence
of foreign objects in bottled soft drinks may in the ordinary course of
things be the result of a prank or a deliberate wrongful act equally as
well as being the result of negligence on the part of the bottler. There-
130 Id. at 446-47. The Court is quoting BESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §
402A (1964).
131'The jury verdict for the wholesaler in the case was reversed by the Court
because the jury had been instructed in regard to "readily apparent" defects,
while the flaws in the acetylene tank were more or less concealed.
132403 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1966).
133 Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Smith, 303 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1957); Royal
Crown Bottling Co. v. Morgan, 299 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1957); Davis Red Rock
Bottling Co. v. Alsip, 287 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1956); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v.
Bingham, 277 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1955); Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.
v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1954); Ewing Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Miller,
264 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1954); Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, 258
S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1953); Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reynolds, 258
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1953); East Ky. Beverage Co. v. Day, 248 S.W.2d 923 (K.
1952); East Ky. Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66, 230 S.W.2d 106 (1950);
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Curtis. 302 Ky. 190. 194 S.W.2d 375 (1946);
Seale v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 297 Ky. 450, 179 S.W. 2d 598 (1944) (a
bright spot, as plaintiff was able to show that the slivers of glass he consumed
had been in the bottle at the time it left defendant's plant); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W.2d 745 (1932); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas,
236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930).
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for we are unwilling to apply the presumption of negligence ...in the
absence of proof of lack of opportunity for pranks or tampering.' 3 4
In keeping with its strict liability rule, Kentucky should drop the
"Integrity of the Bottle" doctrine. The policy behind imposing upon
the remote manufacturer liability for defective products sold to con-
sumers'-5 calls for an emphasis on the responsibility of the manu-
facturer for delivering a non-defective good to the consumer and a
de-emphasis of the possibility that a handful of those thousands of
products might be the subject of contaminating pranks. In the case
cited by the Court in Dealers Transport Co. as being persuasive in the
decision to abolish the privity requirement in implied warranty suits,
the plaintiff was not required to carry the tremendous burden of
proving the integrity of the allegedly defective automobile, although
it had been serviced several times.136 Urged by leading authorities, 137
several jurisdictions have refused to engage in "mere conjecture" as
to the possibilities of tampering, in recognition of the plaintifFs dif-
ficulty in proving the negative.138 Their reasoning has been attractive.
'34 Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, 258 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Ky.
1953). Thus, while plaintiff need not be a superman, he should at least be a
Hercules.
135 1 FtmumR & FRmEDAN, PnODUCrs Lu~mrrY 1 (1966). Madison Avenue
glorifies the products of the expert-run, industrialized modem world and directs
its appeal to the ultimate consumer. Id. at 4:
Just as the advertising modes have done so much for distribution of pro-
ducts, so other media [e.g., consumer research organizations] have
educated the consumer to the possibility that someone may be liable for
the harm which is caused by a product.... And that public which has
been persuaded to buy with enthusiasm is just as eager to impose
liability if the product does cause harm. In this the public is justified.
Manufacturers and other suppliers do have duties to the public. They
have no greater right to place on the market a product which may
forseeably cause harm than does a drunken driver to operate an auto-
mobile. And, as a matter of public policy, even if the manufacturer
exercised due care, who should bear the risk of injury or, perhaps more
accurately, who is in better position to distribute the risk?
130 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 98
(1960). The court stated that "there is nothing in the proof to indicate in the
slightest that the most unusual action of the steering wheel was caused by the[plaintiff's] operation of the automobile on this day, or by use of the car be-
tween delivery or happening of the event." Thus the question of breach of war-
rpnity was admtted to the jury. The automobile had been in the plaintiff's
possession ten days at the time of the accident and had been serviced several
times. As the quotation indicates, the plaintiff was not required to prove that
there had been no opportunity for a prankster to loosen the steering with his
wrench. as he would have had to do under Kentucky's integrity doctrine.
137 See, e.g., 2 FRuMER & FREDMAN, PRoDucTs LtL.Bnrr 629 (1966).
138 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st
Cir. 1958); Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958);
Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 683 (1957);
LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1912);
Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Asbury, 206 Okla. 269. 242 P.2d 417 (1952);
Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 281 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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In common experience deleterious foreign substances do not find their
way unaided by intentional human acts into bottles after they are
properly covered with "crown" caps frequently enough to amount to
more than a discountable possibility of such an occurrence .... General
experience shows that in combination, the safety measures of bottlers
are not perfect enough nor the number of tamperers great enough for
the courts to require consumers to negative by affirmative proof a reason-
able opportunity for tampering, or tampering, before a judge can
consider the case, or reach a proper verdict. The burden of such a rule
on plaintiff would be wholly disproportionate to any benefit to a
defendant.139
And is it good logic to require proof of the integrity of bottles but
not of milk cartons in open coolers?140
Congratulations are in order to the Court of Appeals for removing
the burden of privity and adopting strict liability for manufactured
goods. But the praise must be dampened by two comments. In Dealers
Transport Co. the Court remarked, "the pragmatic view impels us to
recognize that recovery against a remote vendor in this type case, even
when based on implied warranty, truly sounds more in tort than in
contract."141 Why? There is good authority that an action for breach
of warranty is a hybrid born of both tort and contract parents.14 By
providing for such an action with the application of strict liability,
is not the Court simply giving the consumer a recourse similar in
result to that given him earlier under the Uniform Sales Act and its
successor, the Uniform Commercial Code? 143 In any event, the Court
of Appeals should have discussed together the elements of the tort
action involved and the relevant actions which may be brought under
the Sales Act and the Code on ostensibly contract grounds. 44 The
doctrinal distinction is not an idle one: the statute of limitations runs
against tort actions in one year, while plaintiffs under the Uniform
Commercial Code are allowed four years.' 45
Finally, the authorities agree that the concept of privity has no
'39 Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1958).
140 Chappells Dairy v. Walters, 269 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1954).
141 402 S.W.2d at 445.
142 PRossEn, TORTS 651 (3d ed. 1964); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1126 (1960). Contra, 1 W. LISToN, SALES § 244, at
619 (1948).
143 The Uniform Sales Act was in effect at the time the case was originated.
144 The area of contract warranty versus tort warranty versus strict liability in
tort is an obscure one. But understanding is not increased by ignoring the prob-
lem. Prosser suggests that if courts would inquire into the area they might well
find it more realistic and effective to drop what he believes is a fictional approach
and admit that all these actions, when appearing in the tort field, are simply
strict liability in tort. PRossER, ToRTs 681 (3d ed. 1964).
145KRS § 355.2-725(1) (1958) (limitation of action for breach of sales
contract); KRS § 413.140 (1942) (limitation of action for tort).
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place in product liability actions.346 In Dealers Transp. Co. the Court
of Appeals concluded there was no reason to retain the requirement
of privity in suits for breach of implied warranty. What reason does
the Court have for retaining the privity requirement in suits for breach
of express warranty? And at least in the case of express warranty, if
the courts will not remove privity as a requirement, then privity (if
not technical contractual privity) should be found to exist between
the manufacturer and consumer.147 The New York Court has reasoned
persuasively as follows:
The world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of direct
contract; it is, rather, a world of advertising and, when representations
expressed and disseminated in the mass communications media prove
false and the user or consumer is damaged by reason of his reliance on
those representations, it is difficult to justify the manufacturer's denial of
liability on the sole ground of the absence of technical privity.14 8
E. Intentional Torts
1. Fraud and Deceit.-Occasionally a case is significant for what
is not in the opinion rather than for what is. Walser v. Glenn'49 is such
a case. The plaintiff bought a subdivision lot from the defendant real
estate developer. While the plaintiff was viewing the lot prior to sale,
a salesman had told him that dirt fill had been placed on the lot in
order to comply with a regulation that there be six feet of fill over any
rock if a lateral system for a septic tank were to be maintained. After
purchase it developed that the fill was insufficient and the Louisville
and Jefferson County Department of Public Health required the
plaintiff to add dirt. He brought suit against the real estate developer
for expenses incurred on the theory of fraud and deceit. The defendant
showed he had relied upon the opinion of his engineers that the lot in
question satisfied health regulations. The Board of Health had actually
146 2 HARPER & JANtEs, ToRTs § 28.16, at 1571 (1956):
Where commodities are dangerous to life and health, society's interest
transcends that of protecting reasonable business expectations. It extends
to minimizing the danger to consumers and putting the burden of their
losses on those who best can minimize the danger....
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YAE L.J. 1099, 1127 (1960): "If
Warranty is a matter of tort as well as contract, and if it can arise without any
intent to make it a matter of contract, then it should need no contract; and it
may arise between parties who have not dealt with one another."; Jaeger, Privity
of Warranty: Has the Tocsine Sounded? 1 DuQuEsNE UNsvEsrry L. REv. 1(1963): "A veritable revolution against the artificial strictures of privity of
warranty...
147 2 FRu MR & Fm DmAN, PonDucrs LLkBuxrry § 3-39 (1966).
148 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 7, 181
N.E.2d 399, 401 (1962).
149 400 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1966).
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approved the subdivision via telephone on the basis of the written
descriptions of the engineers. The Court of Appeals held that there
was no actionable fraud and deceit because the misrepresentation was
not made with knowledge or suspicion of its falsity. Since the de-
fendant lacked the necessary scienter, the Court found no reason to
discuss the issue of whether there had been a misrepresentation of
the condition of the fill or a reliance thereon.
The case was decided exactly in line with well established
national' 50 and Kentucky' 51 precedents of fraud and deceit. Yet in
regard to the overall result, it is impossible to approve. Caveat emptor
oozes from between the lines of the opinion. Courts have practically
ceased applying caveat emptor to the sales of chattels. 52 Why is the
doctrine still thrown in the face of vendees of realty?153 The same
commercial situation which the Court last term ruled as justifying
strict liability on the part of manufacturers in Dealers Transport Co. v.
Battery Distributing Co.154 exists in real estate transactions. In modem
times large corporate subdivision developer-vendors use every avail-
able Madison Avenue technique to sell the man-in-the-street a pack-
age deal complete with landscaping, sewer works, dream house, and
lot. Surely it is time to recognize that a vendee of a new subdivision
lot may reasonably expect it to meet all regulations imposed on it. 55
What are the alternatives for allowing the vendee to realize this
expectation? A warranty approach seems promising at first glance, but
on examination proves to be impractical. The Uniform Commercial
Code warranty sections deal only with chattels. 56 Only one United
States decision has ever been reported allowing recovery on an implied
warranty theory in a case involving a sale of realty.157 Actions on
express warranty have been successful, 58 but because the parol
150 See PRossEr, TORTS 715-16 (3d ed. 1964).
151 Church v. Eastham, 331 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960); Livermore v. Middles-
borough Town-Lands Co., 106 Ky. 140, 50 S.W. 6 (1899) (to establish actionable
fraud a misrepresentation must be made with knowledge of its falsity).152PROSSER, TORTS 648 (3d ed. 1964).
153 Beaman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 V. ND. L. REV. 541 (1961); Cf. Hamilton, The History of Caveat Emptor,
40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
-54 402 S.W.2d 441 (1965).
155 Support for the proposition advanced is given in PRossER, TORTS 409
(3d ed. 1964), in discussion of "sadly needed improvement in bargaining business
ethics." See 2 HARPER & JAs:s, TORTS § 27.18, at 1576 (1956). The porcupine
problem of liability for latent construction defects is avoided. The case does notjustify entering that ticklish question-a regulations warranty seems much more
readily justifiable.5 6 UNroTma CoymnmcrAL CODE § 2-102.
'57 Hope v. Century Builders, Inc., 329 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1958).
15 8 Beaman, supra note 153, at 548. In these cases the express warranty has
been in the deed.
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evidence rule limits these actions to written warranties, 159 they are of
negligible aid to the commonly trusting vendee, as Walser demon-
strates. The answer, in the absence of special legislation, is to allow
an action for non-negligent misrepresentation, thus applying strict
liability to vendors for their representations. Kentucky would be
joining a list of eighteen states which already recognize the action,
including neighboring Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia.1so
If Walser and his fellow vendees were sufficiently vocal in the political
arena, there could be two reasonable legislative solutions. Statutes
could provide that every sale of land would render the vendor liable
for certain implied warranties which could be enumerated in the bill.
Or, in the alternative, vendors could be required to specify each
representation about the property in writing, preferably in the deed,
so that an action for express warranty could lie.
As for other possible relief, an action may already be maintained
against a Board of Health member where his actions display gross and
willful carelessness in the exercise of his authority.' 6 ' If the duty to
examine a new subdivision before certification were sufficiently
emphasized it might even be possible to bring an action against the
person who okayed Walser's lot on this theory, since he had certified
merely on the basis of reading a letter of descriptions. And by analogy
to Shearer v. Hull'62 it might well be feasible to impose a higher
standard of care on the members of administrative boards with control
over property.
2. Malpractice.-Physicians are held to the standard of skill,
knowledge, and care of other doctors in the community, and in the
usual malpractice case other doctors from the area must testify as to
whether the physician in question violated the standard. But the
testimony of other physicians is not necessary where the subject mat-
ter is within the common knowledge and experience of laymen, such
as the question of whether a physician has satisfied his duty to give
all necessary and continued care as long as the case requires.163 This
question may go to the jury without the aid of expert testimony. And
a jury may decide on their own knowledge whether there is negligence
where a physician operates on plaintiff for a uterine tumor which is
found to be a pregnacy instead, when the doctor did not first ad-
159 PnossER, ToRTs 727 (3d ed. 1964).
160 Id. at 726.
16139 C.J.S., Hea7th 9 56, at 873 (1944).
102.R99 S.W.2d 701 (Kv. 1965).
103 Doan v. Griffith, 402 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1966). The doctor did not tell
patient at time of release that his broken facial bones required resetting.
1967]
KENTUKY LAW JouIRNAL
minister a simple pregnancy test.164 These Kentucky rules are in keep-
ing with a national trend toward relaxing the requirement of expert
testimony.1 0- However, the jury may not consider the question of
whether the operation caused a later miscarriage without benefit of
the testimony of other physicians.'66
3. Nuisance.-Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly' 67, decided this term,
contains a definitive statement of nuisance law. The questions in a
nuisance case are whether the defendants maintained or operated their
equipment or buildings in such a manner as to damage plaintiffs
property, and whether the nuisance created was temporary or
permanent. The difference between the two types of nuisance plus the
separation of nuisance from a negligence base was clarified as
follows:
[I]n determining whether a nuisance is permanent or temporary, the
question is not whether the defendant failed to exercise due care in
the construction, maintenance or operation of a structure. It is whether
the cause of the nuisance results from some improper installation or
method of operation which can be remedied at reasonable expense.'0 s
(Court's emphasis)
An exception is an action for nuisance consisting of blasting vibra-
tions, in which instance negligence must be proved.169 The correct
measure of damages for a temporary nuisance is diminution of use
value of the property.170
Ruling on a permanent nuisance action based on noise from air-
craft, the Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict and rendered judg-
ment for the appellant air board in Louisville and Jefferson County Air
Board v. Porter.1 1 The Court stated that although Lynn Mining Co.
marked the end of requiring a plaintiff in nuisance to prove negligence,
he still must show unreasonable intrusion on property and such grave
harm that an overall inequity to him is demonstrated. 172 The opinion
reiterated the policy that public transportation agencies have an ad-
vantageous position in law because they are directly important to pro-
gress and public welfare. Finally and conclusively, at the time plaintiff
moved into his present location, Standiford Field had been planned
164 Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965).
165 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 17.1, at 968 (1956).
166 Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965).
167 394 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1965).
168 Id. at 759.
169 Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 399 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1965).
17ONally & Gibson v. Mulholland, 399 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1966); Jarboe v.
Harting, 394 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1965).
171 397 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965). The Board was chosen as defendant on the
basis of Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
172 397 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Ky. 1965).
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and building had already begun with the purpose of handling a large
volume of air traffic. "It is fundamental that a buyer of property as-
sumes the risk of changing community conditions" which are expect-
able and avoidable at the time of his purchase. 173
4. Malicious Prosecution.-An action for malicious prosecution
may lie only when the defendant had no probable cause on which to
base his action, notwithstanding the fact that the original action
may have been motivated by a desire for vengeance. 7 4 If the plaintiff
in the malicious prosecution action can show that the defendant's
prior suit against him was without probable cause, the suit may be
maintained despite defendant's successful motion to dismiss his
original action. 75
In contrast, motivation is an element of the tort action for abuse
of process, the gist of which is an attempt to use the legal process as
a means to secure collateral advantage. Causing the arrest of a credit
manager for practicing law without a license in order to obtain a
bargaining point against the credit manager's suit to garnish the
instigator's wages is abuse of process as a matter of law. 76 The rule
stands regardless of whether there was probable cause for the im-
properly motivated suit.
Advice of counsel is a defense to an action for malicious pro-
secution, but may only be considered in mitigation of damages when
the action is abuse of process.'77
5. Libel and Defamation.-The rule that publication of a police
judge's delinquency in paying personal and property taxes is not an
actionable invasion of privacy 17 was derived from the larger principle:
"One who holds public office subjects his life to the closest scrutiny
for the purpose of determining whether the rights of the public are
safe in his hands." 70 As authority for the principle the Court cited an
out-of-state case.180 It is, of course, sound policy for the public to
173 Id. at 152.
174 Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1966). Causing arrest of
cororate creditor's credit manager for practicing law without a license is not
malicious prosecution if instigator of action believes credit manager did so,
regardless of fact that arrest was instigated as a countermove to credit manager's
garnishing against wages of instigator.
175 Bybee v. Singer, 404 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1966). Defendant had caused
plaintiff's arrest on grounds of malicious destruction of property for a merely
negligent act.
176 Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1966).
77 Id. at 495.
178 Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky.
1966).
179 Id. at 88.
180 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL
have information of the performance of elected officials. But unlimited
extension of the principle could create a problem if a newspaper began
publishing details of the private life of a public official or candidate
against whom its editor-in-chief was vigorously campaigning. Ken-
tucky limits such comment to being reasonable, truthful, and in good
faith.' 8 '
The Supreme Court is currently dealing with the problem of what
limits should be placed on publications concerning public figures. The
recent developments in this area merit discussion at this point. In
1964, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 2 settled a conflict among libel
and defamation rules'83 with this holding:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.184
The reasoning supporting the rule proceeded as follows:
[lilt is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not
always with perfect good taste, on all public -institutions. . . . [citing
case], and this opportunity is to be afforded for 'vigorous advocacy' no
less than 'abstract discussion.'
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials... [citing cases].
[Elrroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need... to survive ...
Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political
conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the governed must
not criticize their governors. 185
The Supreme Court indicated in New York Times and a companion
case, Garrison v. Louisiana,'8" that proving the publisher of an article
guilty of reckless disregard of whether a statement therein was false
181 Clark v. Bullock. 234 Ky. 683, 28 S.W.2d 991 (1930).
182376 U.S. 254 (1964).
183Prior to Sullivan a majority applied the "fair comment" rule in permitting
defamatory statements regarding public officials or other persons only where the
statement was purely opinion. 1 HA"ERa & JrAms, TORTS. § 5.28 (1956);
Pnossn, ToRTs 812-816 (3d ed. 1964). A minority opinion had created a "public
official" rule which held that any defamntory statement of opinion or of untrue
fact was privileged if it referred to a public official and could be the subject of a
libel action only if published with actual malice. See. e.g.. Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac, 281 (1908); Paossm, TORTS 814 (3d ed. 1964).
184New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 279-80 (1964).
185 Id. at 269-72.
186379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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would require proof of a genuine recklessness; mere showing of failure
to exercise ordinary care to ensure truthfulness would not be suf-
ficient. l87
The New York Times holding contains two elements: "public issue"
and "public official." Whether the plaintiff will be required to show
actual malice on the part of the publisher in future cases where one
or both of the two elements are absent is a question of immediate
relevancy to the problems of publishing standards suggested by the
Kentucky public official decision.
The first issue raised is whether the New York Times rule applies
to the publication of false and defamatory statements concerning the
private lives of public officials. The most persuasive arguments lead to
a negative conclusion. Sullivan was an elected Commissioner of Public
Affairs in Alabama whose duties included supervision of the Police
Department. 8 8 The allegedly defamatory statement concerned his
supervision of police in attempting to control a nationally publicized
Negro demonstration. 8 9 The objects of criticism in Garrison were the
eight judges of the Criminal District Court of Orleans Parish, Loui-
siana. Defendant District 'Attorney stated they had hampered his
efforts to enforce vice laws by refusing to appropriate funds for the
purpose, thus raising "interesting questions about the racketeer in-
fluence on our eight vacation-minded judges."190 Thus the facts of the
two cases dealt only with obviously public acts. The reasoning in New
York Times, quoted above, is phrased exclusively in terms of "public
187 In New York Times, the defamatory material appeared in a full-page
advertisement. Neither the statement of the Times' Secretary that he thought the
material was "substantially correct" nor the failure of the Times to print a
retraction upon request constituted malice. The Secretary's statement did not
indicate reckless disregard of probable falsity. The failure to check the material
with news stories of the event in the Times' own files did not indicate reckless
disregard when the editors relied on the reputation of the persons who signed the
ad and had no knowledge to give them a reasonable belief of the article's
falsity. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Supreme Court stated
at 79 that "the test which we laid down in New York Times is not keyed to
ordinary care; defeasance of the privilege is conditioned, not on mere negligence,
but on reckless disregard for the truth."
Two cases have recently been appealed to the Supreme Court on the
question of exactly what is needed to show actual malice. The question in Kahn
v. Fox, (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1966), 35 U.S.L. WX 3159 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1966). is
whether knowledge of falsity on the part of the publisher at the time of publica-
tion bars the invocation of the first amendment privilege. In Driscoll v. Toledo
Blade Co., 3 Ohio App. 2d 351, 210 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), 35
U.S.L. ,VF_ 3159, (U.S. Nov. 1, 1966) the issue is whether proof of actual malice
requires more than a preponderance of evidence.
188 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 258 (1964).
lS91d, at 261. The Supreme Court also decided that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support the jury's verdict thit the defamatory statements were
actually made of, and concerning, the plaintiff.
190 379 U.S. at 70.
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institutions," "debate on public issues," "attacks on government and
public officials," and "reports of the political conduct of officials."' 19
Other language in both New York Times and Garrison likewise
explicitly limits the rule to defamatory remarks against "official con-
duct," and not to such publication against "private conduct."19 2 Mr.
Justice Goldberg, concurring in New York Times, stated that the
Constitution did not protect "defamatory statements directed against
the private conduct of a public official or private citizen." 93 In fact,
the Court indicates throughout this case that it is speaking with
specific reference to criticism of government.19 4
One lone statement in Garrison'9 would tend to broaden the
permissible area of coverage by defamatory articles still allowed to
come under the New York Times rule:
The public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a
free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their
servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official's fitness
for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness
for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even
though these characteristics may also affect the official's private char-
acter. 196
191 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964).
192 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964), the Court
stated:
We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is consti-
tutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of
speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct. (Emphasis added.)
In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964), the Court indicates that the
Sullivan rule would not have applied had the statements been "an attack upon
the personal integrity of the judges, rather than an official conduct." (Emphasis
added.)
193 Mr. justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 (1964), explicitly distinguished
private conduct from the holding of the case:
This is not to say that the Constitution protects defamatory statements
directed against the private conduct of a public official or private citizen.
Freedom of press and speech insure that government will respond to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by peaceful means.
Purely private defamation has little to do with the political ends of a
self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation
does not abridge the freedom of public speech.
194 Among many statements in the opinion which might be cited for this
proposition is this sentence which appears near the end of the opinion (376
U.S. at 292):
Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government
will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Ala-
bama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected
area of free expression.
See also the language quoted from New York Times appearing at the beginning
of the discussion of that case, note 119 supra.
195.879 U.S. 64 (1964).
196 Id. at 77.
[Vol. 55,
COURT OF APPEALs REVEv
This is the same principle which Kentucky has now adopted. (Al-
though Bell did not apply it to defamatory material, the rule was used
to define an area of privacy which could be permissibly invaded.) This
principle would permit comment and report on more private matters
than would a more factual and "public issue" oriented interpretation
of the two Supreme Court decisions. It puts immediate significance on
Justice Goldberg's warning that a gray area exists between private
and official conductl1r The boundary between acts of a public
official which are and are not sufficiently relevant to his fitness for
office is indeed obscure. Mr. Justice Goldberg's statement that, "in
most cases ... there will be little difficulty in distinguishing defama-
tory speech relating to private conduct from that relating to official
conduct,"u s would be accurate only if the New York Times rule were
applied solely to comments on those personal attributes relating
directly to the official's performance of official duties. Stated in another
manner, remarks relating to an official's fitness for office must, in fact,
be so relevant to his actual performance of the office's duties as to
qualify as a public issue.
The second question denoted by the New York Times rule is
whether it applies to public figures who are not officials. The Gar-
rison and New York Times decisions place great value on free dis-
persion of information relevant to public affairs. The Court said in
Garrison: "Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal
sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. . . . For
speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government." 19 9 Thus, despite the frequent appearance
of the term "official," the cases as a whole must be taken as supporting
the principle that the Constitution affords protection for the maintenance
of a free forum for the debate of public issues.20 0 Mr. Justice Douglas,
1 9 7 Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
876 UJ.S. 254 (1964), stated at 302 note 4:
In most cases, as in the case at bar, there will be little difficulty indistinguishing defamatory speech relating to private conduct from that
relating to official conduct. I recognize, of course, that there will be a
gray area. The difficulties of applying a public-private standard are,
however, certainly, of a different genre from those attending the dif-
ferentiation between a malicious and nonmalicious state of mind.
398 Ibid.
199 Garrison v. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).200 See Mr. Justice Black, concurring in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254. He wrote at 293-94:
The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent
protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly
does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First
Amendment. . . . The half-million-dollar verdict does give dramatic
proof... that state libel laws threaten the very existence of an American
(Continued on next page)
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concurring in New York Times, presented the view that the factor
which should be given prime consideration in determining if actual
malice must be shown is whether the subject matter is of public con-
cern.201 Adoption of "public issue" as the test would automatically
eliminate the problem of whether non-officials could be included under
the New York Times rule. As suggested, "public issue" may already be
the ultimate determinant as between public and private conduct of
officials.
The "public issue" approach seems to have been utilized in several
lower court decisions since New York Times. These cases refused to
extend the rule to a comedian on a variety show,20 a druggist,203 or a
former governor,20 4 where the subjects of defamation were not closely
associated with or acting in the public arena. The three cases indicate
that, in order to come under the New York Times rule, the action of the
subject has to be connected with issues which are not only public but
also political.20 5 This requirement is further demonstrated in a recent
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold
enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.
Mr. Justice Douglas joined in this opinion.
201 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298-99 (1964). Mr.
Justice Goldberg joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, stated:
The theory of our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his mind
and every newspaper express its view on matters of public concern and
may not be barred from speaking or publishing because those in con-
trol of government think that what is said or written is unwise, unfair,
false, or malicious.
See Id. at 302 note 4, supra note 197, where these same Justices speak of the
public versus private acts standard.
202 Mason v. Sullivan, 271 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1966). The court said that
despite public adulation for figures of the entertainment field it could hardly be
said that the reaction of a master of ceremonies to the antics of a comedian
constitute a public issue. New York Times was, therefore, not applied.2 0 3 Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffer, F.2d (D.C. Cir.
1966), 35 U.S.L. Wizz 2117 (Aug. 23, 1966). The man about whom the com-
ments were made was a druggist who occupied a non-public role and had never
mounted a public rostrum; he made an a ppeal to the public, sought or received
public funds, offered a service or product for public use or comment, or
organized a boycott or other group activity by members of the public. New
York Times not applied.204 Powell v. Monitor Publishing Co., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966). New
York Times not applied.
205 A comparison of Mason and Afro-American Publishing Co. indicates that
lower courts require both that the issue involved be the subject of a high
degree of public concern and that the plaintiff who was mentioned in the
defamatory material be acting in the public political arena. This political type of
arena does not mean necessarily an involvement in elective politics; rather, the
requirement is that the actor-plaintiff be in the political arena in the sense that
he is trying to influence public opinion, social processes, or more technically,
political mechanisms.
Compare the conclusion reached in Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1965). that an assistant deputy chief of
detectives is within the province of the New York Times rule; that is, the actual
malice rule applies to appointed, as well as elected, public officials.
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Kentucky federal district court case, which held that a retired, politi-
cally prominent army general came under the actual malice rule in-
sofar as his actions connected with a nationally-publicized race riot
were concerned 200
On the Supreme Court's 1966-67 docket are four cases which pre-
sent important questions about the scope and the application of New
York Times v. Sullivan. In two of the three cases which have already
been granted certiorari, the lower courts found libel per se in publi-
cations concerning the actions of General Walker during race riots207
and accusations that a university athletic director gave valuable game
information to the coach of a forthcoming football opponent.208
Certiorari has also been granted to a case in which the publisher of
an article of some "social value" contends that the Times doctrine
gives his article first amendment protection against an action for in-
vasion of privacy.20 9 Certiorari has yet to be granted to the fourth
case, in which the lower court held that the Times rule applied to a
prominent scientist who thrust himself into public discussion of con-
troversial foreign policy questions.210
Before the actual malice rule is applied to a private citizen, the
issue in which he is involved must clearly be of concern to the com-
munity. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the four cases on its
docket will determine whether, as suggested by several lower federal
courts,211 the scope of New York Times is limited to actors and issues
in the political arena. The matters presented in the publications were
of public interest in all four cases. However, while the areas of in-
volvement were obviously political in the cases of the retired army
general and the prominent scientist, the question in the other two
cases is whether the mere "social value" of the articles justifies their in-
clusion within the Times rule. If the Supreme Court, in deciding these
four cases, emphasizes the public-issue-of-a-political-nature rationale
of New York Times and Garrison, it will establish a sound approach to
2 0 0 Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231
(W.D. Ky. 1965).
207 Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert.
granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3124 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966).2 0 8 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
granted, 35 U.S.L. WE=n 3124 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966).
209 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 15 N.Y.S.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965), cert.
granted, 34 U.S.L. W= 3428 (U.S. June 21, 1965), hearing held 18-19 October
1966 35 U.S.L. NV=- 3153-3154 (U.S. Nov. 1. 1966).2 10 Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966),
docketed in Supreme Court, 35 U.S.L. W=a 3143 (U.S. Oct. 18. 1966).
211 Note 205, suvra. The political orientation of both New York Times and
Garrison is evident throughout the opinions. The special focus on debate about
government was pointed out in note 194, supra.
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the problem of finding proper limits for publications concerning public
figures.
Another case handed down last term by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals involved the rule that a complaint in a federal court is privi-
leged matter and does not lose its character as such when published in
a newspaper. Thus, while a publication falsely charging an attorney
with unprofessional conduct is libelous per se, an attorney, wrong-
fully named in a complaint alleging the offense and printed in a
newspaper, has no action against the complainant.2 2
An important decision in the 1964-65 term was Ashton v. Common-
wealth of Kentucky. In 1966, the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals and struck down Kentucky's common law libel as being
unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness. 213
6. Trespass.-The fact that an allegedly trespassing party disputed
the ownership of the property at the time of his entry did not absolve
him of liability for his damages to the land when the party claiming
the land protested the entry and proved himself to be the rightful
owner of the land at trial. This rule, presented in a case from the
1964-1965 term, is well established. 214
7. False Imprisonment.-The law governing false imprisonment
is also well established. One can bring this action for any unprivileged
deprivation of his liberty, without his consent, by threats or force.
Mere words are insufficient to effect imprisonment if the subject is not
deprived of freedom of action, and submission to verbal direction is
not deprivation. 215 But sometimes the fact situation belies the simpli-
city of the rule. In Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer216 the Court
of Appeals decided that, where three girls, ages ten to fifteen, were
told to return to a store they had just left in order for the manage-
212 Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1965).
21.3 384 U.S. 195 (1966). Defendant published a pamphlet containing state-
ments admittedly defamatory and false concerning a breach of trust by a news-
paper published and two local officials in distribution of funds. He was con-
victed under the common law crime of criminal libel, which the Supreme Court
found to be basically the publication of a defamatory statement about another,
which is false, with malice. The Supreme Court found this common law crime to
be so broad and vague as to be a violation of the first amendment's guarantee of
free speech to the defendant through the fourteenth amendment.
214 Louisville Builders Supply Co. of St. Matthews v. City of Richlawn. 392
S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1965). See Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965),
where the Court held that defendant, who had reasonable doubt of owners
dominant right, and entered land and began operations on advice of reputable
counsel, was an innocent trespasser and could therefore be required to account
to owner for net profit from land but not gross profit.215 PaOSsER, TonTs 57 (3d ed. 1964).
216 402 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1966).
[Vol. 55,
COURT OF APPEALS REvIEW
ment to determine whether they had stolen a compact, there was no
false imprisonment when they did return and had their purses
searched to prove their innocence. Concentrating on the words of the
store manager who asked the girls to return, the Court noted that he
had not threatened them, spoken to them in a loud or rough voice or
placed them in fear.
But was this really sufficient basis to reverse a jury verdict for the
girls and direct that the complaint be dismissed? The problem with
the opinion is a matter of emphasis. False imprisonment is a social
wrong inflicted in a social surrounding. The people and circumstances
involved vary, and with them varies the strength of language necessary
to detain a person against his will. Considering the ages of the girls,
the accusation of theft, the rural small town setting, and the position
of authority of the manager, it is difficult to understand why there was
no jury issue.
8. Unfair Trade.-Whether a geographical name acquires a secon-
dary meaning and represents a particular product or business, so that
a business employing it first may enjoin a second business from using
it, is a question of fact.217 This rule was promulgated in a decision
handed down during the 1964-1965 term; and in applying it the Court
decided further that, in order to sustain the injunction, the disputed
name need not be specific, but may be general, such as "Falls Motel
and Restaurant" near Cumberland Falls. 218 And the injunction is
justified if the names of the two businesses are sufficiently similar "as
to make it likely that unsuspecting persons would be led to believe
that it was the same."219
A trade secret is a novel plan or process, known only to its owner,
which has been perfected and appropriated by individual ingenuity.
The courts, in an equity proceeding, will protect the possessor of trade
secrets from unfair exploitation, and the current development of suc-
cessful methods of gaining judicial protection of secrets is a vital
national issue.220 The one Kentucky case in this area was tame, how-
ever. It held that where the alleged secrets are shown not to be con-
fidential or unique because they are merely applications of basic and
217Jackson v. Stephens, 891 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1965). However, there will
be no injunction when the trade name adopts the actual geographic proper name.
See Wyatt v. Mammoth Cave Dev. Co., 26 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1928),
distinguished in Jackson.
218 391 S.V.2d at 703.
219 Id at 706.
220 See, e.g., Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade Secrets and Protection, 54
KY. L.J. 190 (1965); Note, 14 Crv.-MAn. L. R1v. 157 (1965); Note, 50 IowA
L. REv. 836 (1965).
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well known principles in the industry, and they cannot be shown to
have been appropriated in an objective sense, the action will fail.2 '
F. Damages, Contribution
The damages awarded for a tort were challenged as excessive in
two cases during the past year. One of these held there was prejudicial
error in an instruction permitting a finding of damages up to $20,000
even though the damages could be readily repaired and the only
evidence relating to the cost placed a maximum of $1,764.94 on the
repairs. 22 The other case 223 upheld an award of $1,800 actual damages
for removal of 24 pine trees from city property and also held that
punitive damages were proper since the removal was accomplished
in wanton and willful disregard of the rights of the city.
A question of contribution (reimbursement on a pro rata basis of
one who has paid the whole debt or suffered the whole liability by
those who are also liable for the damage in question 224) arose in
Martin v. Guttermuth.2 5 It was held that one joint tort-feasor who
settles with the other is not hereby estopped from asserting against
the other a claim for contribution subsequently accruing.
221 155 Mid-States Enterprises, Inc. v. House, 403 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1966).
222 Kentucky Stone Co. v. Gaddie, 396 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1965).223 Louisville Builders Supply Co. of St. Matthews, Inc. v. City of Bichlawn,
392 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1965) (there was a dispute between the remover and the
city as to which one owned the land upon which the trees were located, the
trees had been planted by the city, the removal was over the city's specific pro-
test, and the land actually did belong to the city).2 2 4 BLAcx, LAw DICTIONARY 399 (4th ed. 1951).
225 403 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. 1966). Where a collision took place between the
plaintiff's automobile and the defendant's limousine, and the plaintiff's insurance
carrier settled the defendant's claims and those of his passengers and obtained
releases, the Court held that this payment did not estop the plaintiff from as-
serting on behalf of his insurance carrier a claim against the defendants for
contribution for one-half of the amount paid to the defendant's passengers on
the theory that the defendants were joint tort-feasors.
XX. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. Arising in the Course of Employment
To determine if an injury occurred in the course of employment,
the Court by long-established rule looks to the time, place, and
circumstances of the injury.' A troublesome problem regarding the
"place" aspect of this test arises when the employee is on his way to
or from work. The rule in the majority of jurisdictions is that the
employee may recover if injured while on the premises of the em-
ployer.'
In Ratliff v. Epling,3 perhaps the most important workmen's com-
pensation case decided last term, the Court accepted the premises
concept, but narrowed the majority rule somewhat by limiting the
premises to the "operating premises." In explaining the new test, the
Court indicated that the "operating premises" do not include all the
employer's property, but are limited to areas which constitute an
integral part of the business.
The facts of Ratliff are as follows. The employee, while waiting for
a ride home, was killed in a rock slide which ocurred on a roadway
173 feet from the mouth of the mine in which he worked. The accident
took place thirty minutes after quitting time and while deceased was
gathering coal for his personal use. The Court, in determining whether
Ratliff was in the course of his employment when he was killed, over-
turned its old approach of looking to see whether the accident was an
"industrial hazard" and adopted the new test. It held, however, that
although the deceased was within the "operating premises," the
deviation in both time and activity was enough to take him out of the
course of employment.
The operating premises test is a compromise between the highly
subjective industrial hazard test and the majority rule. It is not so
arbitrary as the majority rule, but it may prove to be as difficult to
apply as the test overturned. Ratliff held only that a roadway 173 feet
from the mouth of an operating mine was within the operating pre-
mises of a mining concern; this holding is a weak guide indeed for
future application of the rule. Although the Court has yet to clarify the
meaning and scope of application of the new test, it would seem that
the Ratliff decision is a step in the right direction. Since the old test
has been abolished and since the details of the new one have yet to be
I Masonic Widows and Orphans Home v. Lewis, 330 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1959).
2 1 LASON, WowmN's ComPzNsAToN LAW § 15.11 (1965).
3401 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1966).
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determined, the effect of Ratliff is at least to clean the slate for a fresh
consideration of the problem.4
B. Arising Out of Employment
There are three main lines of interpretation of the phrase "arising
out of employment." First, the "increased or peculiar risk" theory finds
an injury to have arisen out of the employment if the employment
increased the risk of such an injury or if the risk of the injury is
peculiar to the employment. Second is the "actual risk" theory, by
which an injury is seen to have arisen out of the employment if in
fact it was an actual risk of the employment, regardless of whether the
risk is increased by or peculiar to that employment. Third, the
"positional risk" theory holds an injury to have arisen out of the
employment if the accident would not have happened but for the
fact that claimant's job put him in the position where he was injured.5
Of the three, the positional risk theory is clearly the most generous to
the claimant; in fact, it almost does away with the requirement of a
causal connection.
In 1964 the Court in Corken v. Corken Steel Products, Inc.6
ostensibly adopted the positional risk theory.7 The opinion, however,
was not detailed, and it is possible to interpret Corken much more
narrowly. Two cases decided this term which add to the confusion
are Black v. Tichenors and Gordon v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court.9
4 Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Tennessee are the other jurisdictions which
use this test. The Pennsylvania court, unlike the courts in the other two states,
has dealt with the "operating premises" problem quite frequently. In defining the
term that court has held that a parking lot across the street from the place of
employment was not within the operating premises (Young v. Hamilton Watch
Co., 158 Pa. Super. 448, 45 A.2d 261 (1946); that part of a shipyard 300 to
1000 feet from the particular ship to be worked on was within the operating
premises (Wolsko v. American Bridge Co., 138 Pa. Super. 339, 44 A.2d 873
(1945); that a dormitory maintained by a hospital in a wing of the main building
was within the operating premises (Hopwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 153 Pa. Super.
398, 33 A.2d 658 (1943); that a house provided for a hostess which was five
hundred feet from the main building was within the operating premises (Werner
v. Alleghany County, 153 Pa. Super. 10, 33 A.2d 451 (1943)); and that a
private drive which was the only entrance to the rear of a mine was within the
operating premises (Barton v. Federal Enameling & Stamping Co., 122 Pa. Super.
587, 186 Ad. 316 (1936) ).
Since the Kentucky Court looked to Pennsylvania for the test, it is reasonable
to assume that it will interpret and apply the test in a similar manner. If so, then
perhaps we do have some guidelines to determine where and when the
operating premises" begin and end.
5 1 LARSON, WonimmN's COMPENSATION LAW §§ 6.20-6.40 (1965).6 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1964).
7 For a more detailed discussion of the positional risk theory in Kentucky,
which includes a discussion of both Black and Gordon, infra notes 8-9, see Note,55 KY. L.J. 172 (1966).83 96 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1965).
9 403 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. 1966).
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In Black an employee of an accounting firm was injured in an auto-
mobile acident while on his way from Louisville to Middlesboro. He
was riding with a fellow employee, and they were to start work the
following morning. The Court cited the Corken case in holding that
the employee was in the course of employment when injured, but if
Black reaffirms Corken, it does so obliquely. The opinion quotes Lar-
son, the definitive work in this area: "Employees whose work entails
travel away from the employer's premises are held in the majority of
jurisdictions to be within the course of their employment continuously
during the trip, except when a distinct departure or personal errand
is shown." 10 This is one time that Kentucky is in the majority.-'
Perhaps one can validly conclude that, since it could, but did not,
base this decision squarely on Corken and the positional risk theory,
the Court has recognized the potentially wide sweep of Corken and
has withdrawn some from it.
In Gordon, however, an opposite conclusion may be drawn. There
the employee, a watchman in a garage, was found dying under the
rear end of his own car, the front end of which was on the grease
rack. He made no statement concerning his injury before he died.
There was, however, a rule that no personal work was to be done on
company time. The Court, holding that the death did not arise out of
the employment, distinguished Corken by the fact that there the
deceased had been using his car to further the business of his employer
whereas in Gordon the deceased was furthering his personal ends.
Since the positional risk theory is applicable only to neutral risk cases,
i.e., cases where the injury is neither personal to the claimant nor
clearly work-related, and since the injury in this case was of a per-
sonal nature, the fact that the Court mentioned Corken at all seems
to indicate that the positional risk theory may be here to stay. The
Court must do some clarifying. The positional risk theory has the
potential to revolutionize workmen's compensation law in Kentucky.
Few states have been willing to accept the full implications of the
positional risk theory,' 2 and have either limited it to particular sit-
uations or rejected it completely. Kentucky, if it is going to follow the
theory at all, should limit its application to cases where the injury is
caused by a "neutrar' risk, i.e., neither peculiar to the employment
nor personal to the claimant; to do otherwise distorts the real purpose
of the law-to pass on to the public the risk of work-connected
accidents.
10 1 LARSON, WoIauEN'S COIPENSAT1ON LAW § 25.00 (1965).
11 Standard Oil Co. v. Witt. 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W.2d 271 (1940).
12 1 LARsoN, WoRMEN'S Coin'ENSATioN LAW § 6.40 (1965).
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C. Total Disability
Determining when a person is entitled to total disability compen-
sation has perplexed courts for quite some time. The definitive cases
in Kentucky on this subject are E. & L. Transport Co. v. Hayes'3 and
Leep v. Ky. State Police.14 In these cases the Court said that a work-
man is totally disabled when he is "[t]otally disabled from the per-
formance of work in his former occupational classification and his
capacity to perform other kinds of work is impaired." In applying this
test it is necessary, of course, to define the phrases "occupational
classification" and "totally disabled from performance of work." A
series of cases this term has shed some light on just what is meant by
these two phrases.
First to be considered is the meaning of "former occupational
classification." In denying compensation, Everidge v. Nickells Coal
Co.15 held that "occupational classification" was not so narrow a term
that a distinction could be made between a "low-coal" miner and a
"high-coal" miner. The claimant, before his injury, worked mainly in
coal mines where he had to squat to mine the coal; after the injury,
he could still work as a coal miner but only in "high" mines, i.e., those
where he was not required to squat. The Court stated that claimant was
"not entitled to claim so narrow a classification" as "low-coal miner."
Everidge provides welcome clarification of the leading cases,
Hayes and Leep. In the Hayes case, a truck driver returned to work
as a "gasser" for the same company, while in Leep, a state trooper re-
turned to work as a dispatcher. Total disability was awarded in both
cases. In Everidge, the change of occupation was much less distinct.
Everidge then, is a guide to when and where the Court will hold
that there is no distinction between two job classifications.
"Totally disabled from performance" is the second phrase to be
considered. Two recent cases suggest a new meaning for the phrase.
A long line of cases16 has held that a person is not totally disabled if
he can perform his work, even though he has to suffer some pain while
doing it. But this year, in Harlan Collieries Co. v. Smith,'7 the Court
13341 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960).
14 366 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1963). Two cases which reafrm the test stated in
Hayes and Leep are Russell Constr. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 397
S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1966) and Methodist Hosp. of Ky. v. Ratliff, 391 S.V.2d 676
(Ky. 1965).
15 394 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1965).
16Brock v. International Harvester Co., 374 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1963);
Stephens Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Tibbs, 374 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1963); Bethlehem
Mines Corp. v. Davis, 868 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1963); Mary Helen Coal Corp. v.
Chitwood, 351 S.W.2d 167 (Kv. 1961).
17 396 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. 1965).
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held that a person could be disabled even though he had the physical
capacity to perform his former work. There was competent medical
testimony that if the claimant continued to work it would "kill" him.
The Court took a practical view of the problem, reasoning that "the
mere fact that the worker may suffer some aches and pains while
working does not make him disabled but surely it would strain reason
to hold that a man whose work would literally kill him has no
disability to work."' 8 The Court will meet this problem continually,
since many occupational diseases, especially silicosis,19 will "kill" the
employee if he continues to work. A strong dissent was written by
Justice Montgomery. His concern was with reconciling the cases cited
above, 0 and he felt the problem was one for the Legislature, not the
Court, to solve.
The second case throwing light on "disability from performance"
is Hopkins v. Wiscombe Southern Painting Co. 21 In that case, the
Court refused total disability compensation to a construction painter
who, after his injury, could still command top wages (higher, in fact,
than before his injury) in that occupation, although he could not
paint as high as before, hang his own rig, and pull his own weight.
The Court indicated that the low supply of skilled workers in that
occupation was primarily responsible for allowing the claimant to con-
tinue at his occupation, and implied that if these market conditions
change there would be a possibility of his being declared totally
disabled. Thus it should be noted that market conditions may be of
prime importance to the lawyer preparing a total disability case.
Two general rules in this area which were reaffirmed last term
were (1) that an employee is entitled to only one award of total
disability even though he suffered a personal injury and contracted an
occupational disease simultaneously,22 and (2) that in silicosis cases
the worker must be actually disabled in order to collect-having the
disease is not enough.23
D. Statutory Application and Interpretation
Beth-Elkhorn Corp. v. Thomas24 and Lovell v. Osborne Mining
Corp.,25 decided last term, deal with the "immediately next" pro-
18 Id. at 68.
19 Silicosis is a form of respiratory disease caused by the inhalation of stone
dust. It is a form of pneumonoconosis.
20 Supra note 16.
21 402 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1966).22 Da'is v. Harlan Everglow Coil Co., 392 S.V.2d 62 (Ky. 1965).23 Osborne Mining Corp. v. Blackburn, 397 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1965).
24 404 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1966).
2r 395 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1965).
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vision of KRS 342.316(4). The statute provides that in silicosis cases
it must be shown that the employee was exposed to the hazards of the
disease within the state for at least two years immediately next before
his disability. The avowed purpose of the statute is to prevent an in-
flux of silicosis victims into Kentucky from other states where they
have been injuriously exposed.26 The statute accomplishes its purpose,
but also, by its wording, commands that any silicotic claimant show
that his exposure continued until the very day of his disability. In
Thomas, the employee worked steadily for the employer for several
years until he voluntarily ceased employment on May 25, 1960. He
was injuriously exposed to silicosis for more than two years im-
mediately prior to May 25, 1960, but as of that date he was not
disabled, nor had he experienced any distinct manifestations of the
disease. He became aware in September, 1963, that he had silicosis
and filed his claim soon after. The Court felt it could not construe the
statute to mean that a person with a silicosis claim must show that
he had been exposed to silica dust right up until the time of disability.
It therefore held that KRS 342.316(4) comes into play only when the
"injurious exposure" in Kentucky has been interrupted by "injurious
exposure" outside Kentucky. The Court overruled Chapman v. Pea-
body Coal Co.27 and took cognizance of the fact that rarely, if ever, is
the last injurious exposure coincident with the first manifestation of
the silicotic condition.
However, in Lovell, the other current case, there was outside ex-
posure (claimant had worked for thirty-three years in Kentucky, then
worked in a West Virginia coal mine for three months), and the Court
denied compensation. The Court recognized the harshness of the
result, but felt it had no choice in light of KRS 342.316(4). Yet, it
seems unlikely that the Legislature intended to prevent compensation
in this type of case; for the employee worked long enough in Kentucky
for one to reasonably conclude that he contracted the disease in this
state. It should be noted that this case was decided almost a year be-
fore the Thomas decision; perhaps the Court, since it has recognized
the flexibility of the "immediately next" provision of the statute, will
in the future further limit the provision to cases where one cannot
reasonably conclude that the employee contracted his silicosis in
Kentucky.
KRS 842.121 provides for the appointment of a disinterested
physician to aid the Workmen's Compensation Board in answering
medical questions. If no specific objections are made to the report of
26 Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Parrot, 290 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1956).
27385 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1965).
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the appointed physician within ten days, the report is conclusive.
This term the Court somewhat broadened the base for rendering the
report advisory by declaring that a thorough cross-examination of the
physician is the equivalent of specific objections and will render the
report of such physician advisory.2
Other cases were decided in this area,29 but they are of minimal
significance.
E. Employee Status
A particularly troublesome problem in the employee status area
is the employee-independent contractor dichotomy. In Ratliff v. Red-
mond"3 the Court reaffirmed the standard test used to determine
whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. The
factors considered, which are those found in Restatement of Agency,
Section 220, are (1) extent of control of the employer over the work
done, (2) whether or not the worker is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion, (3) the kind of occupation, (4) the skill required in the
occupation, (5) who supplies the tools and equipment, (6) length
of time for which the worker is engaged, (7) the method of payment,
(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer, and (9) the intention of the parties. This test is used by
most jurisdictions.31 It must be noted, however, that the Court
28 McCown v. Hellier Elkhorn Coal Co., 399 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1966).
29 Brown Equip. Co. v. Duff, 394 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1965) (a motion to re-
open in 1964 a referee's hearing which took place in 1958 merely to have certain
language deleted from a Board opinion will not be allowed); Kentucky-W. Va.
Gas Co. v. Ritchie, 402 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. 1966) (specific objections to the report
of the disinterested physician appointed pursuant to KRS 342.121 if made within
ten days after such report will render the report advisory only); Marus v. United
States Steel Corp., 402 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1966) (KRS 342.316(5), which provides
that "in case of death where the employe has been awarded compensation or
made timely claim within the period provided for in this section, an employe has
suffered continuous disability to the date of his death occurring at any time
within ten years from the date of disability, his dependents, if any, shall be
awarded compensation for his death as provided [by this act] . . .," does not
allow recovery where the employee made a timely claim, but lost the decision);
Johnson v. Eastern Coal Corp., 401 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1966) (an application for
full Board review of an award granted two years previous will not be heard);
Kibbey v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 404 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1966) (an award for
the severance of a limb or for the loss of an eye or ear is limited to the scheduled
amount set out in KRS 342.105 even though the severance or loss results in total
disability); Brown v. Gregory, 398 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1965) (although the Board
was remiss in its failure to make specific findings as to the percentage of disability
caused by a pre-e.,dsting condition, it was not error to do so where the award
given was against the employer only); Kiser v. Bartley Mining Co., 397 S.W.2d
56 (Ky. 1965) (a compensation claim is limited in time by the statute of
limitations in effect at the time of the bringing of the action; not the one in
effect at the time of the injury).30396 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1965).
31 1 LAsoxr, Wormm= s COaN'ENSATON LAw § 43.10 (1965).
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liberally construes these factors in favor of an employee status when
applying the test.32
Two other cases decided the past term reiterate the well-known
rules that (a) the claimant must be an employee of the employer
being sued in order to prevail,33 and (b) in order for a person to come
under the "loaned servant" doctrine there must be some benefit
accruing to the employer sought to be charged under that doctrine. 4
F. Proof
In a group of cases, which are related in that they deal with the
presentation of evidence, certain well-established rules were followed.
The cause of death or casual relationship between the injury and the
work may be proved by lay testimony.35 Speculative evidence, or
evidence speaking in terms of possibilities rather than probabilities,
carries no weight.36 Testimony related to a physician which aids him
in his diagnosis is admissable as an exception to the hearsay rule.3r
G. Occupational Disease
KRS 342.316(1) provides:
Occupational disease as used in this chapter means a disease arising
out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to
which the general public is equally exposed outside of employment shall
not be compensable, except where such diseases follow as an incident
of an occupational disease as defined in this chapter.
In the one occupational disease case decided this term, National
Stores, Inc. v. Hester,38, the Court dealt with "ordinary life diseases,"
and held that tenosynovitis is compensable as an occupational disease.
Tenosynovitis is an attritional type of lesion and is created after re-
peated movement of a tendon doing an unaccustomed type of motion.
The medical testimony established that the condition was caused by
the employee's continuous use of her right hand in operating a
calculating machine. The physician testified that "typewriting, piano
playing, writing, washing, wringing out clothes . . ." are tasks which
furnish a cause necessary for the production of this lesion.
There are two problems involved in this type of case: first,
32 KRS § 842.004 (1950); Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1955).
33 Durrett v. Williams & Miller Funeral Home, 899 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1965).
34 Tohnson v. L. & N. R.R. Co.. 894 S.W.2d 110 (Ky. 1965).35 Hall v. Banks. 895 S.W.2d 776 (1965).36 Miller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1965);
Dupreist v. Tecon Corp., S96 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth. Divti-
sion of Forestry, Dep't of Conservation v. Fsrler. 891 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1965).3 7 Bartley & Senters Coal Co. v. Hall, 399 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1965).
383 98 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1965).
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whether compensation for a disease is excluded because the general
public is equally exposed to it; second, whether the disease is in fact
an occupational disease. The Court resolved the first problem by
giving a liberal interpretation to the statute:
There is probably no movement of the human body required in the
performance of a job which cannot be duplicated in the discharge of
household chores or in the pursuit of recreation yet any of these might
produce a disease such as we have here. Similarly there are few, if
any, compensable diseases induced by germs or inhalation of impurities
which could not at some time be contracted by a member of the general
public. To accept such a view [which would limit occupational diseases
to those which could not be contracted outside of the employment]
would give [the statute] a narrow, if not nugatory, effect contrary to the
provision of KRS 342.004.39
Important in solving the second problem is the test used to define
an occupational disease. The Court cited a New York case40 wherein
the test is whether there is a recognizable link between the disease
and some distinctive feature of the claimant's job. Applying this test
the employee would recover. The Court, though not expressly
adopting the New York test, was clearly persuaded by it.
The Court, fully recognizing the sweep that might be given this
opinion, forewarned that it did not intend to make the employer
liable for wear and tear on the human body and "open the door to
recovery for every condition or disease that might be caused or ad-
versely affected by the employment."41
The Court's warning is simply a reiteration of the general rule ap-
plicable in all jurisdictions.42 No jurisdiction will award compensation
for wear and tear on the body, but many are equally adamant in their
opposition to compensation for ordinary life diseases-even if they are
caused by the employment. With this decision the Kentucky Court has
moved away from the arbitrary rule that if a disease can be con-
tracted outside of employment it is not compensable. Such a disease
will be compensable if it passes the test of whether or not there is a
link between the disease and a distinctive feature of the job. The ap-
proach taken by the Court is the correct one. To do otherwise, i.e., to
deny compensation for certain diseases without looking at the causal
connection between the disease and the job, undermines the real
purpose of the workmen's compensation statute-to compensate em-
ployees for job-caused harm.
39 Id. at 604.
4 0 Benware v. Leo F. Benware Creamery, 22 App. Div. 2d 968, 254 N.Y.S.2d
466 (1964).
41 Supra note 38 at 605.
4 2 LARSON, Woxzm's COaMPENSATION LAw § 43.31 (1965).
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H. Miscellaneous
In a series of cases which concerned more the procedural aspects
of a case rather than the substantive law, the Court continued the
trend toward interpreting the statutes liberally.43
As usual, there were numerous cases44 reaffirming the well-
established rules that (a) the Board is the determiner of the facts, and
(b) when there is a conflict of medical testimony, the Board's choice
of whom to believe will be conclusive. Of course, the Court may
reverse the Board on a ruling of fact, but in order to do so the finding
of the Board must be "clearly erroneous." This is a relatively new con-
cept in Kentucky law (the provision calling for this test was added to
the statute in 1964). 4 5
Under the "clearly erroneous" test, the Court may look to the
"rightness" of a decision and reverse it if it finds the conclusion drawn
by the Board to be, in its judgment, the wrong one. Under the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule, the Court may think one conclusion right and
the other one wrong, yet regardless of its view of the "rightness" of
the decision, it cannot reverse if the conclusion reasonably follows
from the evidence. Thus the clearly erroneous test gives a broader
scope of review.46 It remains to be seen whether the Court will more
readily reverse now.
One case this term did mention the 1964 amendment. In Porter v.
43 Cabe v. Dudgeon, 404 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1966) (where an injury cannot
be conclusively stated to be a result of claimant's last injurious exposure, but is a
result of his continued exposure for forty-three years, nevertheless the county
wherein the last injurious exposure occurred is a proper venue; Fraley v. Rusty
Coal Co., 399 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1966) (where employee withdrew his notice of
appeal and applied for an additional thirty days to file an appeal on the same
day, the two motions are considered inseparable so that a ruling which nullifies
the extension of the thirty days also nullifies the motion to withdraw the notice
of appeal); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Parker, 394 S.W.2d 899 (Ky.
1965) (if there is no showing of "bad faith" the fact that appellant served sum-
mons on Board by leaving it with the Attorney General rather than the Executive
Secretary of the Board, as required by KRS 342.285(1), does not necessitate the
dismissal of the appeal).
44 C. F. Replogle Co. v. McGuire, 405 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1966); Belknap
Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 402 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1966); Dobbs v. Inland
Steel Co., 402 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1966); Simmons Bros. Paving Co. v. Presley, 401
S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1966); Clay Coal Corp. v. Abner, 401 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1966);
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Connick, 400 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1966); Turner
v. Industrial Erectors. Inc., 400 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1966); E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Whitson, 399 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1966); Eastern Coal Co. v. Anderson, 399
S.W.2d 733 (Ky. 1966); Roberts v. Owensboro Milling Co.. 399 S.W.2d 466 (Ky.
1965); Lewis v. United States Steel Corp., 398 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1965); Green
Valley Coal Co. v. Caroenter, 397 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1965); Beverly Coal Co. v.
Smith. 396 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1965); Sullivan v. Foster & Creighton Co., 394 S.W.2d
917 (Ky. 1965); Blaw-Knox Co. v. Knapp, 392 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1965).
45 KRS § 342.285(3)(d) (1964).46 DAvis, A nm aswRA'nV LAw 914 (1951).
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Goad47 the Court pointed out that the amendment did not affect the
test as to the sufficiency of the evidence when the Board finds against
the person having the burden of proof, i.e., the claimant. The test in
those situations is whether the evidence wvas so strong as to require
a finding for the claimant. This is clearly a much more stringent test
than either the "substantial evidence" or "clearly erroneous" rules, and
an attorney when considering an appeal on this basis should take
cognizance of the fact that as a practical matter the Court rarely
makes such a finding.
Two cases4S this term reiterate the rule that, although functional
disability is a medical question, the Board has the duty to translate
that functional disability into occupational disability. One case49
illustrates the fact that an employee can have an action for breach of
contract against an employer who has failed to apply for silicosis
coverage after having agreed to do so.
47404 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1966).
48Congleton Bros., Inc. v. Farmer, 399 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1966); Kilgore v.
Goose Creek Coal Co., 392 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1965). There seems to be a frequent
mistake on the part of attorneys in these cases in assuming that the proportion of
disability should coincide with the proportion of medical disability or disability to
the body as a whole. Nothing could be further from the truth, for there is agreat difference between the two. For example when a person completely loses
the use of one of his arms, the disability to the body as a whole is probably less
than 50%. If, however, the worker is a bricklayer, or in any other occupationwhich requires th e e of both arms, he is tota l  disabled. As a praetieal matter
the attorney should point out the difference to his medical witness before he isput on the stand.49 Blankenship v. Majestic Collieries Co., 399 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1966).
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